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ABSTRACT 
This thesis carries out an extensive analysis of Asian banking industry over 20 years of 
developments, from 1985 to 2004. Particularly, it investigates three important interrelated 
aspects of Asian banks: efficiency, risk and management behaviour; particularly focusing on 
five crisis-affected countries in SE Asia: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines. In order to do this, the thesis is organized into three research papers that address 
the above three aspects of Asian banks. 
The first research paper empirically investigates the effects of financial deregulation, financial 
crisis and restructuring on both profit and cost efficiency of SE Asian banks from 1985 to 
2004. We found financial deregulation has been most successful in improving bank 
performance in Indonesia and Korea. To resolve financial distress, SE Asian authorities 
implemented inter alia bank restructuring and privatisation programmes and widened access 
for foreign ownership. Our results tend to support these policies. However, we suggest the 
potential benefits of these policies may take time to be realised. On the other hand, we found 
domestic consolidation (M&A) brought about efficiency gains in both the short-term and long- 
term. For the domestic banks, our results support diffused ownership (widely-held) but not 
concentrated ownership (state, family and company) on economic grounds. 
The second research paper determines management behaviour at Asian commercial banks 
between 1985 and 2004. This is done by examining the intertemporal relationships between 
loan loss provision, efficiency and capitalisation. The econometric results suggest that the most 
pressing management problem for Asian banks is the combination of bad management, bad 
luck and moral hazard behaviour. The problems of bad management and bad luck are common 
across most Asian banking sectors but appear particularly pronounced in China and Indonesia. 
The third research paper employs panel data methods and multinomial logit models to identify 
the best set of accounting variables that can be used to monitor a bank's financial health. We 
investigate the relationship between accounting-based and capital market-based measures of 
banking risk for a sample of listed SE Asian banks before and after the 1997 financial crisis; 
we find the relationship strengthens over time. Furthermore, the results from multinomial logit 
model confirm that the safety index, equity capital, variation in customer_ deposits, bank 
liquidity and loan loss reserves are good measures of bank risk. Our recommendation for bank 
regulators is to use these accounting indicators in a system of monitoring the financial status of 
Asian banks in order to reduce the likelihood of bank failures in future. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION: 
Background, Aims, Methodology 
and Structure of the Study 
1. Background 
Banks play a crucial role in an economy; they not only facilitate economic transactions 
but also help allocate scarce economic resources efficiently to the most productive 
investment projects. The link between financial development and economic growth has 
been well established (King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Beck and Levine, 2004); a 
healthy and well-functioning banking sector could contribute significantly to economic 
growth. However, due to its nature, banks are traditionally considered to be more 
vulnerable to instability than other industries. 1 In addition, in case bank runs or crises do 
happen, the bailout costs and the impacts on the economy are enormous. For these 
reasons, the efficiency and stability of banking sector has long been an important goal of 
policy makers. 
During the last two decades, banks around the world have undergone some dramatic 
changes in both internal organisation as well as external environments. The profound 
changes in external environments have been driven mainly by the deregulation of 
domestic financial markets undertaken by governments and the fast-paced-developments 
in information technologies. Under the theoretical framework of McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973), financial deregulation has been implemented in a wide range of developing 
countries since the 1970s, spanning Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia 
and more recently, as part of broader structural adjustment programmes, Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Financial deregulation, which removes restrictions on bank activities as well as 
' Banks are more vulnerable than other industries because they are highly leveraged; and 
because of the use 
of short-term deposits to fmance long-term illiquid assets making them vulnerable to 
liquidity crises and 
bank runs. In addition, bank runs are much highly contagious; a failure of one 
bank can quickly spread to 
others and the whole banking system. 
I 
barriers to entry, is expected to bring about more competitive environments in financial 
sectors. In such environments, banks enjoy more freedom in determining their products 
and services; however they also face severe competition from both other banks and non- 
bank financial institutions. Under a more pressured competitive envirom-nent, banks are 
forced to change their operating behaviour such as paying greater attention to the areas of 
pricing and upgrading the quality of their products. Also, severe competition could reduce 
bank interest margins and induce banks to engage in more risky businesses. 
A parallel process that profoundly changes bank operating environments as well as the 
ways in which banks operate is the rapid developments in information technologies in 
developed countries as well as emerging economies in Asia. These developments create 
more opportunities for banks such as providing banks with an alternative distribution 
channel, internet banking, with much lower operating costs compared with the traditional 
"brick" branch offices. With this new delivery channel, banks can offer products and 
services at anytime and anyplace, and therefore, can attract new customers and, at the 
same time, give their customers a timesaving way to control their finances. Technological 
advances also help banks better in processing their customer information thereby help 
creating more specific and innovative products and services to meet customers' demands 
and, in theory, improving customers' relationship and creating more revenues (see Berger 
and Mester, 2003). However, banks also face more competition, not only from banks 
located everywhere around the world but also from non-bank financial institutions such as 
those that also provide electronic payment services, e. g. Paypal, Billpoint, Yahoo Pay 
Direct, and Google. Furthermore, developments in information technologies along with 
financial deregulation have been facilitating the integration of global financial markets. 
On the one hand, this process gives domestic banks more opportunities to diversify their 
products and services. On the other hand, it could expose domestic banks to many new 
types of risks such as foreign exchange risk, sovereign risk and cross-border financial 
contagion risk. 
The internal organisation of banks has also witnessed profound changes in the last two 
decades as a result of two dominant events: consolidation and privatisation. The 
consolidation waves during the last two decades in response to technological advances 
and globalisation of economic activities have significantly altered the structure of banking 
industry in many nations. Along with the changes in ownership structure as a result of 
2 
domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As), cross border acquisitions have also led to a 
significant increase in foreign ownership in the banking sectors of many countries, 
especially emerging economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia. Another 
event that has had considerable impact on bank internal organisation is the privatisation 
policy in many countries around the world. Many state-owned banks have been privatised 
transferring large ownership shares from government control to private sector hands. This 
is especially true for South East Asian countries in the aftermath of the 1997 financial 
crisis, which significantly altered the ownership structure of banking systems. 
The profound and complex changes in both bank internal organisation and external 
environments have large impacts on bank behaviour and the ways banks do business. 
Thus, it is of interest to bank management and policy makers to understand how these 
changes affect bank behaviour with regard to management, risk, return and efficiency. For 
policy makers, understanding bank behaviour is crucial because it will help them create 
appropriate policies that facilitate efficiency and stability for the banking system. For 
bank managers, being aware of how these fundamental changes may affect their banks 
will help them formulate better strategies and policies to avoid potential risk and take up 
opportunities that these changes may bring about. 
2. Aims of the Study 
Like elsewhere in the world, Asian banking systems have undergone profound changes 
during the last two decades. A large scale financial deregulation programme was 
implemented in many Asian countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, 
these programmes were ended abruptly by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 which 
plunged the five SE Asian economies (Indonesia, Republic of Korea (thereafter Korea), 
Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines) and their financial systems into severe depression. 
The resolution of the crisis involved the participation of international financial 
organisations, particularly the IMF. Although the strategies for dealing with the crisis 
in 
each country are similar, the speed and detail of the approaches differs. Nine years since 
the crisis, there have been signs of recovery in domestic banking sectors though the pace 
of recovery is uneven across countries. 
3 
This study aims to carry out an extensive analysis of Asian banking industry over 20 
years of developments, from 1985 to 2004. In particular, the thesis will investigate the 
efficiencies (profit and cost), risk and management behaviour of banking systems in Asia, 
with particular focus on the five crisis-affected countries in SE Asia. 
A study of developments in SE Asian banking systems is important for several reasons. 
Financial deregulation programmes were implemented across the region during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, which intended to improve the efficiency of the banking systems. 
However, the empirical literature on the effects of financial deregulation on bank 
efficiency is mixed (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Although there have been a number of 
studies on this issue in industrialised countries, a limited number of studies have been 
undertaken in developing economies, including SE Asia. Further, the empirical evidence 
from SE Asia tends to be mixed and most studies only cover the pre- 1997 financial crisis 
period. This study enhances the literature because it covers periods of financial 
deregulation, financial crisis, and financial restructuring. In addition, there is a paucity of 
studies estimating profit efficiency dynamics in emerging markets. 
The Asian financial crisis uncovered the weaknesses inherent in national banking sectors 
and which were undermined by several corporate governance problems in the banking 
sectors (see Corsetti et al., 1998; Krugman, 1998). The corporate governance problems 
stem from several factors. First, before 1997, large numbers of East Asia banks were 
controlled by either a family or conglomerates with the additional complication that cross 
ownership between banks and the corporate sector was highly prevalent in SE Asia 
(Claessens et al., 2000a; Nam, 2004). The interrelationships between finance and 
ownership gave rise to connected lending which was primarily based on special privileges 
rather than the ability to repay loans. Connected lending can cause economic distortions, 
undermining the efficiency of capital allocation, and making banks highly vulnerable 
during economic downturns. The corporate governance problem also stems from the fact 
that the state has played an influential role in terms of bank ownership in SE Asia. 
Problems with state-owned banks such as directed lending and principal-agent issues 
could adversely affect bank performance. 
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Given the potential corporate governance problem of SE Asian banking, there is little 
empirical evidence on how banks perform under different ownership structures, for 
example, family-owned, company-owned, financial-owned and state-owned. This study 
aims to provide empirical evidence on this issue by comparing the efficiency performance 
of these different bank governance types. In addition, it contributes to the established 
literature on bank privatisation, foreign banks, and financial restructuring because three of 
the most important policies associated with financial restructuring in SE Asia have been 
bank privatisation, facilitating wider foreign ownership, and banking sector consolidation 
(either on a voluntary or compulsory basis). Specifically, we aim to examine whether 
-changes 
in bank governance facilitated improvements in bank performance. We compare 
bank performance before and after governance changes, which we quantify into short- 
term and long-term components. There are four types of governance changes specified in 
this study: changes due to bank privatisation; acquisition by foreign banks; domestic 
M&A; and bank restructuring. 
Although bank regulators want a safe and sound banking system, the way in which banks 
are run very much depends on its management behaviour. The Asian financial crisis 
uncovered the weaknesses of the banking sectors; however, there is little empirical 
evidence on how banks were managed in Asia; indeed, management behaviour may have 
played a contributing factor to those weaknesses which, once apparent, exacerbated the 
crisis. Our second aim is to explore management behaviour of Asian banks. Following 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004) we investigate management behaviour 
namely bad management, bad luck, skimping, and moral hazard behaviour for Asian 
banks. This is done by examining the intertemporal relationships between loan loss 
provision, efficiency and capitalisation, which imply different modes of management 
behaviour. Our study extends the existing literature by providing a robustness test of the 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004) results for US and EU banks, 
respectively. Our study covers a sample of commercial banks from seven Asian 
countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand. 
Before the 1997 financial crisis erupted, SE Asian countries had experienced rapid growth 
for more than two decades and were considered a "miracle" (see World Bank, 1993). 
The 
financial crisis led to a large number of banks being closed or distressed. Yet, the Asian 
crisis was not predicted neither by economists, academics nor 
international financial 
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organisations and rating firms. The crisis revealed the shortage of an effective early 
warning system which can monitor bank risk and provide an early signal of problem 
banks. We aim to build up a set of bank risk accounting indicators which can be used to 
monitor the risk of distress or failure of banks in future. In addition, because capital 
market-based measures of bank risk may be better than accounting measures in signalling 
problem banks (Flannery, 1998; Curry et al., 2001; Krainer et al., 2002), we check the 
relationship between these two types of bank risk measures to see whether accounting 
measures can "mimic" market-based measures. This is particularly important in emerging 
economies (EMEs) where the number of listed banks tends to be limited. Our study of 
bank risk in SE Asia is necessary because the literature on bank failure prediction as well 
as the literature on the relationship between accounting and market-based measures of 
bank risk mostly concentrates on the US market. However, the experience in the US can 
not be transferred automatically to other emerging countries where banks operate in very 
different environinents. 
In short, the objectives of this thesis are to examine the performance (efficiency), risk, 
and management behaviour of Asian banks from 1985 to 2004. In order to do that, it 
focuses on answering the following three main research questions and their related sub- 
questions: 
How do financial deregulation and bank governance affect 
commercial bank performance in SE Asia? 
Related 
Sub-Questions 
1.1. Did financial deregulation improve bank efficiency? 
1.2. Does bank privatisation create better performing banks? 
1.3. Do foreign banks target or cherry-pick their acquisitions? 
1.4. Are foreign banks more efficient than domestic-owned 
banks? 
1.5. Do domestic M&As improve bank performance? 
1.6. Are banks under diffused ownership types (widely-held 
banks) more efficient than banks under concentrated 
ownership types (family-owned or company-owned)? 
6 
Main Research 
Question 2 
Related 
Sub-Questions 
Main Research 
Question 3 
Related 
Sub-Questions 
What is the management behaviour of Asian banks? 
2.1. Are the declines in bank asset quality due to bad management 
or bad luck? 
2.2. Do most efficient banks engage in skimping behaviour? (i. e. 
they save monitoring costs to be efficient in the short-term but 
this results in increasing problem loans in the long-term) 
2.3. Do poorly capitalised banks tend to take on more risk 
(engage in moral hazard behaviour)? 
Can bank regulators use accounting measures of bank risk 
to monitor the riskiness of SE Asian banks? 
3.1. Are accounting measures of bank risk consistent with the 
capital market-based measures? 
3.2. Which accounting measures of bank risk can be used to 
signal bank failure and distress? 
3. Research Methodology and Data Sources 
In this study, different methodologies and data will be used to address the aforementioned 
three main research questions and their related sub-questions. 
In the main research question 1, cost and alternative profit efficiencies are used as 
measures of bank performance. We employ the technical inefficiency effects model of 
7 
Battese and Coelli (1995), which is a "one-step" stochastic frontier methodology, and the 
Fourier flexible functional form to estimate an alternative profit and cost function. Using 
the technical inefficiency effects model, we can directly deten-nine the effect of bank 
governance, and changes therein following the restructuring programmes on bank 
inefficiency. We follow Berger et al. (2005) method to capture the static, selection, and 
dynamic effects of changes in bank governance on bank performance. The governance 
indicators are specified by dummy variables. The bank production process is modelled 
using the intermediation approach which considers banks to be financial intennediaries 
that purchase inputs in order to generate earning assets (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). Since 
we estimate an unbalanced common efficiency frontier, following Berger et al. (2004), we 
present the measures of bank performance in rank order. To test for improvement in bank 
efficiency following financial deregulation, we employ the standard parametric t-test and 
non-parametric Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test. 
Our dataset used in research question I covers 250 commercial banks in SE Asia 
(Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) between 1985 and 2004 
yielding a sample of 2,713 observations. The bank financial statements data was sourced 
from the BankScope and IBCA databases whilst macroeconomic data was obtained from 
the IMF International Financial Statistics and the Asian Development Bank. In order to 
qualify bank ownership, we relied on the aforementioned databases, bank websites, and 
academic sources that have detailed changes in banking ownership including 
privatisations. 
To address the research question 2, following Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams 
(2004), we use the Granger-causality approach to examine the intertemporal relationships 
between loan loss provisions, efficiency and capitalisation for Asian banks. The OLS 
techniques are used to estimate three different equations representing different hypotheses 
about management behaviour. We use the same approach as used for the main research 
question I to estimate cost and alternative profit efficiencies. The only different is that in 
this study we use the operating cost efficiency model rather than the variable cost 
efficiency model. The operating cost efficiency model covers only operating costs (e. g. 
labour cost, administrative costs etc. ) whereas the full cost efficiency model also includes 
funding costs. This study covers 1985 to 2004; it uses a large sample of commercial 
banks from seven Asian countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
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Vietnam, and Thailand. The dataset comprising of 2,870 observations (before lags are 
taken) was sourced from BankScope and IBCA databases. 
In the main research question 3, we utilise panel data methods to empirically investigate 
the relationship between accounting-based and capital market-based measures of banking 
risk. This approach could limit the multicollinearity and estimation bias problems that 
exist in most previous studies using OLS regression. We extend the existing literature by 
introducing an alternative measure of systematic risk which is estimated using a bivariate 
asymmetric VARMA-GARCH model. This model allows good and bad news to affect the 
variance and covariance of returns asymmetrically. We also compare performance of this 
new measure of systematic risk to a standard static CAPM estimate. The multinomial 
logit model is used to examine whether accounting measures of bank risk can be used to 
predict bank failure and distress. This model is selected because it can capture the three 
states of financial distress, namely, "exiting" (being closed or absorbed), "restructured" 
(distressed), and "healthy". Previous studies mostly focus on only two states of financial 
distress (failed and non-failed); the covering of the three states of financial distress is 
important because it reflects the continuum of the bank financial health. 
Data used for the main research question 3 is a sample of 55 listed commercial banks 
from SE Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) from 1991 to 
2004. The bank financial statements data are sourced from BankScope and IBCA 
databases whilst the capital market data, including banks' weekly stock price and the 
stock market indices of the five countries, were obtained from DataStream. We chose 
weekly data to overcome the problem of calendar effects and thin trading in EME stock 
markets. The sample is split into pre-crisis (1991-1997) and post-crisis (1998-2004). The 
purpose is to examine whether there are changes in the relationship between accounting- 
based and market-based measures of bank risk in post-crisis. The sample of banks is 
balanced over 1991-1997 but unbalanced over 1998-2004. 
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4. Structure of the thesis 
Beside this general introduction, the thesis is organised into three research papers and a 
conclusion. The three research papers will address the aforementioned three main 
research questions. All the research papers have the similar structure, including the 
following sections: introduction, literature review, methodology and data, empirical 
results and conclusion. 
Paper I investigates the effect of financial deregulation and bank governance on 
commercial bank performance in SE Asia from 1985 to 2004. This paper provides a 
fundamental background for the two other papers because it gives a large review of the 
development of banking systems of SE Asian countries, covering three important events: 
financial deregulation, financial crisis and restructuring. Also, this paper provides the 
methodological frameworks for estimating bank efficiencies which will be used in Paper 
2. The empirical evidence provided in this paper is among the earliest indication of the 
effects that policies such as bank privatisation, widening access to foreign institutions, 
and restructuring (consolidating) national banking systems have had on commercial bank 
performance in SE Asia. 
Paper 2 investigates bank management behaviour of Asian banks. In this paper, several 
hypotheses regarding management behaviour will be tested using the Granger-causality 
approach. More specifically, it examines the intertemporal relationships between loan loss 
provisions, efficiency and capitalisation for Asian banks. These relationships imply 
different management behaviour such as bad management, bad luck, skimping and moral 
hazard behaviour. This paper is amongst the earliest to provide the empirical evidence on 
the issue in Asia. 
Paper 3 examines whether bank regulators can use accounting measures of bank risk to 
monitor bank financial health in SE Asia. It first utilises the panel data methods to 
empirically investigate the relationship between accounting-based and capital market- 
based measures of banking risk before and after the 1997 financial crisis. This exercise is 
important because it provides information on how the relationships between accounting- 
based and market-based measures of bank risk might change after the crisis. This 
10 
information, along with the results from the bank failure predicting model (multinomial 
logit model), will be used to build up an early warning system for the post-crisis period. 
Finally, the Conclusion section will summarise the main findings from the three research 
papers and draw some general policies and conclusions. It also points out some 
limitations of the study and offers suggestions for future research. 
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Paper 1: 
Financial Deregulation and Bank Performance 
in SE Asia, 1985-2004 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of changes in bank governance on bank perfonnance for a 
sample of commercial banks operating in South East Asia between 1985 and 2004. We 
identify bank governance in terms of bank ownership and measure bank perfon-nance as rank 
order alternative profit efficiency and cost efficiency. The period was characterised by 
financial deregulation, the Asian crisis and bank restructuring programmes. We found 
financial deregulation has been most successful in improving bank performance in Indonesia 
and Korea. To resolve financial distress, SE Asian authorities implemented inter alia bank 
restructuring and privatisation programmes and widened access for foreign ownership. Our 
results tend to support these policies. However we suggest the potential benefits of these 
policies may take time to be realised. On the other hand, we found domestic consolidation 
(M&A) brought about efficiency gains in both the short-term and long-term. For the 
domestic banks, our results support diffused ownership (widely-held) but repeal concentrated 
ownership (state, family and company) on economic grounds. 
JEL classification: G21; G28; G32; C14; D21; L33 
Keywords: Financial liberalisation; Bank restructuring; Profit efficiency; Cost efficiency; 
Asian banks; Stochastic frontier analysis; Governance; Ownership; Privatisation; Foreign 
banks 
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1. Introduction' 
This paper investigates the relationship between commercial bank performance and bank 
governance in SE Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand) between 
1985 and 2004. Performance is measured using two concepts; alternative profit efficiency 
and cost efficiency whereas bank governance reflects commercial bank ownership. The 
results presented herein are among the earliest indications of the effects that policies such as 
bank privatisation, widening access to foreign institutions, and restructuring (consolidating) 
national banking systems have had on commercial bank performance in SE Asia. 
A study of developments in SE Asian banking systems is important for several reasons. 
Financial liberalisation programmes were implemented across the region during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, which intended to increase the competitiveness of national banking 
sectors. A priori a more competitive environment should encourage bank management to 
lower costs and raise revenue, that is, to become more efficient which should foster an 
improvement in the allocation of resources. The established literature considers the effects of 
financial deregulation on bank efficiency. However, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
Similarly, the empirical evidence from Asia tends to be mixed and the majority of studies 
cover the pre- 1997 financial crisis period. This study enhances the literature because it covers 
periods of financial deregulation, financial crisis, and financial restructuring. Furthermore, 
there is a paucity of studies estimating profit efficiency dynamics in emerging markets. 
VNUIst financial liberalisation helped to integrate SE Asian markets with global markets, it I 
constituted a major challenge for domestic banks and their systems of governance (Gochoco- 
Bautista et al., 2000). The effect that bank governance has on bank performance may be 
considered through the principal-agent framework (see Altunbas et al., 2001). Before 1997, 
the Asian economic model had been characterised by the presence of large, dominant 
corporate and family-owned corporations. These corporations owned financial subsidiaries 
which served (a) to create an internal market within the firm and (b) to circumvent 
restrictions most notably on offshore financing. The interrelationships between finance and 
' This paper is largely based on Williams and Nguyen (2005). 
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ownership gave rise to connected lending. Consequently, external markets for finance tended 
to play a minor role and were underdeveloped as a result. The state has also played an 
influential role; in terms of bank ownership, and through subsidising banks as lending was 
directed in support of national growth strategies. The internal economic model and 
underdevelopment of external finance created governance issues that could adversely affect 
bank performance. This potential problem was compounded by an underdeveloped 
institutional environment characterised by weak bank supervision and regulation, which in 
turn helped to create opaque banking systems. 
This paper contributes to the established literature on bank privatisation, foreign banks, and 
financial restructuring because three of the most important policies associated with financial 
restructuring in SE Asia have been bank privatisation, facilitating wider foreign ownership, 
and banking sector consolidation (either on a voluntary or compulsory basis). The economic 
argument underpinning the choice of policies is the disciplining role of the market in terms of 
improving bank performance by eliminating agency problems associated with former 
governance systems, and expectations that foreign ownership can import international best 
practice and technological benefits. 
Specifically, we aim to quantify whether changes in bank governance facilitated 
improvements in bank performance. We compare bank performance before governance 
changes with subsequent performance, which we quantify into short-term and long-term 
components. There are four types of governance indicator specified in this study: changes in 
governance due to bank privatisation; acquisition by foreign banks; domestic M&A; and 
bank restructuring. The results shed light on several important issues. For instance, does bank 
privatisation create better performing banks? Do foreign banks target or cherry-pick their 
acquisitions? Are foreign banks more efficient than domestic-owned banks? Therefore, we 
can contribute to the debate surrounding state versus private bank ownership. We contribute 
to the existing literature on private ownership by considering the relative performance of 
alternative private governance systems: family ownership, company ownership, financial 
ownership, and widely-held ownership (following Laeven, 1999); and we discuss if bank 
failure in 1997 was associated with a particular type of private governance. 
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In order to address the issues and questions raised above, we investigate the empirical 
relationship between bank performance and bank governance utilising the approach of Berger 
et al. (2005). Berger et al. (2005) account for static, selection and dynamic effects on bank 
performance arising from changes in bank governance. Dummy variables are used to qualify 
the governance indicators: static governance indicators (state, foreign, and private 
ownership); selection governance indicators (banks selected for closure, absorption (by 
healthier institutions), foreign acquisition, bank privatisation, domestic M&A, and bank 
restructuring); and dynamic selection indicators for the short-term and long-term (acquired 
by foreigners, privatised, domestic M&A, and restructured). The dynamic selection 
indicators yield useful information regarding the effectiveness of bank restructuring and 
deregulation initiatives. 
We employ the technical inefficiency effects model of Battese and Coelli (1995), which is a 
"one-step" stochastic frontier methodology, and the Fourier flexible functional form to 
estimate an alternative profit and cost function. Since we estimate an unbalanced common 
efficiency frontier, we present the measures of bank performance in rank order (following 
Berger et al., 2004). 
By way of preview, we found financial deregulation appeared to have been successful 
improving bank performance in all SE Asian countries, except the Philippines. Moreover, our 
results support the policy of bank privatisation, widened access for foreign ownership, 
restructuring and domestic M&A in SE Asia although there may be a short lag before the 
potential efficiency gains are realised. Finally, our results tend to support banks with widely- 
held ownership rather than concentrated ownership (state, family and company banks). 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly overview the 
development (deregulation, crisis and restructuring) of SE Asian banking sector. Section 3 
reviews theoretical and empirical evidence on the effect of financial deregulation and 
ownership forms on bank performance around the world and in SE Asia. Our preferred 
econometric framework and discussion of the dataset are presented in Section 4. The 
empirical estimates of bank performance are reported in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Financial deregulation, crisis and restructuring in SE 
Asia 
Financial deregulation in SE Asia 
Although financial deregulation was initiated quite early in SE Asian countries, it only 
accelerated from the late 1980s or early 1990s for most countries (the main deregulation 
dates of SE Asian banking sectors are summarised in Table 1). 2 Malaysia was the earliest 
-country to liberalise the financial sector. The first attempt at financial liberalisation took 
place in 1971 with the relaxation of interest rate controls. In 1987, interest rates were 
completely free from control; but they were regulated again in 1985 to mitigate the effect of 
economic recession. Significant progress of financial liberalisation was made in 1991 when 
the Central Bank freed all interest rates and, at the same time, reduced credit control policy. 
Similar to Malaysia, the early attempt of financial deregulation in Thailand, by the relaxation 
of the upper limit imposed on the interest rate in 1980, was soon interrupted in the first half 
of the 1980s, due to macroeconomic difficulties and financial crisis over 1983-1987. Only 
after the financial crisis did the financial deregulation process resume again. The milestone 
that pinpointed the significant progress came in 1990 when the government engaged in a 
series of three-year Financial System Development Plans. The first Plan, from 1990 to 1992, 
intended to enhance the competition and efficiency of the financial system. This Plan 
included liberalisation of interest rates; relaxing foreign exchange transactions; and 
expanding the scope of financial institution businesses. The second Plan, from 1993 to 1995, 
aimed to enhance savings mobilisation through pension systems and other means; extend 
financial services to rural areas; and develop Bangkok as a regional financial centre by 
establishing an offshore banking centre. Policies in this period aimed at strengthening 
prudential regulation (including the adoption of the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) 
capital adequacy ratios in December 1993); relaxing entry barriers for domestic bank 
branches; further expansion of bank business activities; and further liberalisation of capital 
and foreign exchange controls. The third Plan, from 1996 and 1998, continued to strengthen 
bank prudential and supervision, and further liberalise foreign exchange controls and barriers 
2 More details of policy development in SE Asian financial sectors can be found in Appendix I. 
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to entry into the domestic financial system (Kawai and Takayasu, 1999; Okuda and Mieno, 
1999). 
Table 1: A Chronology of the of SE Asian banking sectors 
Country Largely Interest Credit Barriers Reserve Privati- Capital Prudential I 
Deregulation rates control to ent ry require- sation account Regulation 
(1) (2) (3) ment (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Indonesia 1988 1983 83-90 1988 83-88 1992 71-94 88-97 
Korea 1 1991 88-97 84-98 1989 1996 1981 94-97 92-97 
. .................. ............. .... Malaysia 1991 ...................... -- -------- .......... 71-91 1991 11 1994 .............................. .... 1994 ---------- no 78-93- 89-97 . ......... Philippines 1 81-82 1 19"83 1 1993 1989 1995 85-96 
, 
Thailand 1990 .............. 80-92 11 1992 1 92-96 1 1992 1989 92-97 
Notes: The table presents the deregulation dates with respect to seven aspects of financial 
deregulation during the period 1970 to 1998: 1) liberalisation of interest rates; 2) removal of credit 
controls or policy loans; 3) removal of entry barriers; 4) lowering of reserve requirements; 5) 
privatisation of state-owned banks; 6) liberalisation of capital account; and 7) introduction of 
prudential regulation. "Largely deregulation" marked the time where significant progress of financial 
deregulation has been made with respect to the above seven aspects of financial deregulation. 
Sources: Central Bank reports (various issues); Sabirin (1991); Hamada (2003); Manlagnit and 
Lambert (2004); Cho (2002); Kawai and Takayasu (1999); Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002); Laeven 
(2003). 
Korea and the Philippines began their deregulation programme at the same time in 1981 but 
with different approaches. Korean started with the privatisation of the banking sector (198 1) 
and al lowed banks to introduce new services (1983). However, progress was slow and 
eventually stalled in the late 1980s, due to the deterioration of the economic situation, and the 
weakening of the corporate sector's financial situation. A significant date was in 1991 as 
interest rates were partially re-liberalised (the government fully liberalised interest rates at 
the end of 1988, but resumed control again in 1989). 
3 The deregulation programme 
accelerated from the end of 1993 when the government announced its "Blueprint for 
Financial Liberalisation and Market Opening" in July 1993; and the "Foreign Exchange 
Reform Plan" in December 1994. The progress of financial liberalisation and opening from 
1993-1996 was fairly rapid, partially because the government attempted to become a member 
of OECD by the end of 1996 (Cho, 2002). VA-iilst Korea started their deregulation 
' The main reason for the re-imposed was the government's concern for increasing interest rates due to the high 
demand for credit and high debt ratio (debt to total capital ratio) of corporate sector (300-400 percent for most 
large firms). And despite being formally liberalised in 1993, bank interest rates continued to be implicitly 
controlled until 1996 (Cho, 2002). 
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programme by the privatising stated-owned banks, the Philippines began with the 
liberalisation of interest rates in 1981. However, the Philippine financial deregulation only 
gained it momentum from 1989 as the governinent promoted competition by removing entry 
barriers and branch restriction for domestic banks. The last step was the liberalisation of 
foreign bank entry in 1994. 
Similar with the Philippine approach, Indonesia also started their financial deregulation 
programme in 1983 with the abolition of interest rates and the reduction of government direct 
credit. 4 However, the pace of financial deregulation did not accelerate until 1988 as the 
government announced a banking-sector reform policy package, in which the main policies 
were the abolishing of restrictions on the establishment of new private banks as well as 
foreign banks (which had been prohibited since 1968). In addition, stricter prudential 
regulations were introduced to constrain the explosion of bank credit that followed 
deregulation, e. g. the issuing the lending limits and strengthening of capital-adequacy ratio. 
Two years later, in February 1991, a policy package for sound banking was organised which 
raised commercial banks' minimum capital; enforced observation of the Legal Lending Limit 
and the provision concerning non-performing loans. Finally, the deregulation of foreign 
investment in 1994 contributed to the expansion of the financial sector as well as capital 
inflows during the period 1994-1997 (Sabirin, 199 1; Hamada, 2003). 
Overall, with regard to the sequences of financial deregulation, all SE Asian countries began 
their deregulation programme with the liberalisation of interest rates, except Korea where 
deregulation was initiated by the privatisation of state-owned banks. In addition, Indonesia 
was the only country where capital account and foreign exchange controls were liberalised 
before the deregulation of the domestic banking sector. This is contrary to the common 
wisdom of financial liberalisation sequencing where the domestic financial market should be 
deregulated and strengthened before opening up to external market (McKinnon, 1991; 
4 In Indonesia, the first financial reform was implemented in the late 1960s which successfully reshuffled the 
financial sector and brought down hyper inflation. However, the government was still in control of the financial 
sector until 1983. This period was essentially characterised as financial repression, in which the government 
controlled and maintained a negative real interest rate. Financial liberalisation in Indonesia was stimulated by 
the decline of oil prices in 1982, which badly affected government revenue - the main source for subsidising the 
financial sector. Therefore, the govemment liberalised the financial sector aiming to improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation, which was expected to increase domestic saving to offset the decline in oil revenue 
(Sabirin, 
1991; Hamada, 2003). 
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Alawode and Ikhide, 1997). Finally, except the Philippines, all other SE Asian countries, in 
general, failed to strengthen bank prudential and supervision at the outset of financial 
deregulation. Malaysia and Indonesia did improve their prudential regulation at the same 
time that they largely liberalised their banking sectors. However, the Indonesian government 
eventually relaxed some prudential regulations, like the capital-adequacy ratio, because they 
were condemned as excessively burdensome for banks. Korea and Thailand started to apply 
the capital adequacy framework in 1992 and 1993, respectively. By the end 1996, although 
prudential practices in SE Asian banking sectors were largely in line with those 
recommended by the Basle Committee, banking systems in these countries failed to absorb 
the risks simply because of the lack of law enforcement as well as compliance (Oh et al., 
1999; Ariff and Khalid, 2000). 
2.2. Effect of financial deregulation, crisis and 
restructuring on SE Asian banking 
2.2.1. Financial deregulation and SE Asian banking sector development 
Financial deregulation had a large impact on the development of SE Asian banking. The 
easiest way to observe the effect is to look at the increase in numbers of players and the 
expansion of banking sector assets following financial deregulation. Table 2 shows a 
significant increase in number of commercial bank as well as bank branches in all the 
countries following the liberalisation of barriers to entry. The effect was most clear for 
Indonesia, where the numbers of bank and bank branches almost doubled in only two years 
following the liberalisation of bank entry in 1988. The numbers of foreign banks also 
increased considerably, roughly four times within the period 1988-1996 (from II to 41 
banks). Similarly, in the Philippines, the liberalisation of foreign bank entry in 1994 tripled 
the number of foreign banks within two years (from 4 banks in 1994 to 14 banks in 1996). In 
Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, although the number of banks increased marginally following 
liberalisation, their bank branches had almost doubled from the late 1980s to 1997. As with 
the increase in numbers, foreign bank share (in term of assets) also improved gradually 
following liberalisation. However, up to 1996, the share of foreign banks in SE Asia was still 
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relatively small, with the highest proportion in Malaysia (around 22%), followed by the 
Philippines (11.6%), Indonesia (9.2%), Thailand (8.5%) and Korea (7.3%). 
The expansion of banking sector assets following financial deregulation was also very 
impressive. In Indonesia and Thailand, for example, the ratio of banking sector assets to GDP 
doubled, from 40% and 69% in 1986 to 95% and 122% in 1996, respectively. This ratio in 
the Philippines, on the other hand, showed little change until the opening of banking sector to 
foreign investors in 1994. 
Table 2: Development of SE Asian banking sectors, 1985-2004 
1985 
Indonesia 
Commercial banks 
of which foreign banks 
oT, 5ý asset shar5_(O 
Total bank branches 
Bank assets/GDP 
Korea 
Commerciif-ýWiýk-S 
of which foreign banks 
Foreign asset share (%) 
Total bank branches 
Bank assets/GDP (%) 
Commercial banks 
of which foreign banks 
Foreign asset share (%) 
Total bank branches 
assetýLG qDjý o 
Philippines 
Commercia'ý`aj 
............ of which foreign banks 
FoKýiga. 4ý set share (%) 
Total bank branches 
Bank assets/GDP 
Thailand 
6.80 
! 1:. a 
35 
n. a 
1986 
114 
11 
6.60 
40 
na 
n. a n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
__. 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
96 n. a 
31 
4 
13.33 
1.776 
31 
4 
1.789 
52 43 
1988 1 1990 
ill 171 
5.20 
1,957 3,437 
..................... - 42.. 
-. -.... 
' 6.3... 
-. 
n. a 76 
n. a 53 
n. a n. a 
I 
n. a 1 2,032 
n. a 79 
29 37 
14 14 
n. a 24.20 
n. a 109 
39 30 
4...... 4 
n. a 12.34 
1,774.. I[. 
_. 
1,863 
43 50 
1992 
178 
30 
AAQ 
5.495 
70 
n. a 
80 
37 
14 
23.70 
n. a 
n. a 
......... .... 
32 
4 
13.56 
2.361 
51 
1994 
200 
40 
9.50 
6.026 
87 
76 
1996 
198 
9.20 
7.314 
95 
74 
........... 
I 
n. a 7.30 
............ 
n. a 5,105 
911 05 
37 
14 
ý2.90 
1,283 
37 
14 
22.25 
1.569 
n. a 
33 
_. _ 
4 
8.17 
2.924 
142 
49 
14 
11.60 
3,647 
63 86 
1998 
208 142 
44__ 
13.00 23.20 
, 886 Tt'ýP2 
6,397 
66 80 78 
200OT2002 
76 66 59 
51 4ý 40 
25.30 33.20 
5,112 4,802 5,003 
117 101 108 
35 
13 
22.21 
1.690 
160 
34 
14 
25.18 
1,758 
150 
24 
14 
26.33 
2,386 
156 
53 
19 
15.72 
4.230 
94 
44 
17 
17.50 
4,250 
42 
19 
19.52 
4.265 
90 1 81 
2004 
134 
31 
31.14 
7.826 
53 
53 
39 
35.60 
5,060 
103 
23 
14 
28.21 
2.276 
170 
42 
18 
_. 
2_0.3g__: 
78 
! pj q 29 29 29 29 29 31 37 34 1 31 30 ýýrcial banks 29 ............. --------- --- * ...... *............ I ................. foreign baý 14 14 14 1 14 14 14 1.. 6.. 21 21 
..... . ..... . ...... . ....... ............. ...... ....... ..... . ....... .......... ........ I ........ ........ Foreip asset share (%) n. a n. a n. a 4.7 0 4.90 6.90 8.50 20.10 22.20 23.71 25.20 . ................ ............................. ................. ....... Total bank branches n. a 2,186 2,358 2,454 2,837 3 167 3 268 3,215 3,067 3,095 
................ ......... ... . ... ..... ................. ........ . .. Bank assets/GDP 68 73 i 92 1 97 11 122 140 127 119 111 69 
1 
Sources: Central bank reports (various issues); Asian Development Bank Key Indicators; 
IMF country report (various issues); and author's estimates 
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Financial deregulation has had mixed effects on the profitability of SE Asian banking sectors 
(Table 3). Whilst the upward trend was observed in Thailand and Malaysia for the retum-on- 
assets ratio (ROA), the opposite was true for Indonesia and Korea. Indeed, Korean banks 
experienced very low profitability and their ROA ratio reduced further with the acceleration 
of financial liberalisation during 1994-1996. Notably, the profitability ratio (ROA) in all 
countries, except Malaysia, declined one year before the onset of the financial crisis. 
Table 3: Profitability and soundness indicators of SE Asian banking sector, 1985-2004 
1985 
Return on Assets 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Risý-ýighted capital ratio (0 ' 
- ---------- ---- Indonesia n. a n. a 
Korea n. a n. a 
Malaysia 
1986 1 1988 
n. a 
1.5 
n. a 
__. --I 
n... a 
n. a 
n. a 
n. a 
2.1 
0.9 
.......... I-. -.. ---.. - n. a 
n. a 
1990 
n. a 
0.6 
1.4 
2.8 
1992 
2.2 
0.6 
1.3 
2.2 
1.2 1 1.5 
..................... 
n. a 
n. a 
10.6 
15.48 
n. a 
.... ............. - 
n. a 
n. a 
11.6 
19.38 
n. a 
............................. 
1994 
1.9 
0.4 
1.7 
1.9 
2.1 
12.5 
10.2 
17.92 
n. a 
n. a n. a n. a 
Philippines 0.47 
Thailand n. a n. a 5.9 
Non-Performing Loans ratio_(' "T Indonesia n. a n. a 
Korea 
M#4yýýia.. 
_. Philippines 
Thailand I n. a 1 7.00 1 9.70 1 n. a 1 7.50 1 13.0 1 45.00 1 19.50 1 18.10 
Notes: a, Non-Performing Loans data exclude those in asset management companies 
b, From 1985-1994, this ratio is the average equity-to-assets ratio 
Sources: National Central Bank reports; IMF country report (various issues); World Bank 
(East Asian update, various issues); BIS (2004); and authors' estimates. 
2.00 
7.50 
12.30 
11.6 
Table 3 shows the development of soundness indicators of SE Asian banks. The financial 
crisis in the late 1980s resulted in a large amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the 
I- -. -ý 
banking sectors of Malaysia and the Philippines. As its peak, non-performing loans amounted 
to 30% of total loans in Malaysia and 23% in the Philippines. Since then, this ratio declined 
significantly in both countries until they were hit by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. On the 
other hand, on the onset of the Asian financial crisis 1997, Indonesia and particularly 
Thailand appeared to have problems with loan performing loans. The NPLs ratio of Thailand 
doubled within two years before the crisis (from 7.5% in 1994 to 13% in 1996). With regard 
n. a i n. a i ri. a i n. a 
1996 11 1998 
-19.9 0.3 -3.3 
2.0 -0.9 
2.2 0.9 
2000 
1.0 
-0.6 
1.4 
0.4 
2004 
3.5 
0.9 
1.2 
0.9 
1.2 
2002 
1.9 
0.6 
Ll 
-. 
2--J 
0.8 
0.2 
11.8_1 -13.0 12.5 22.5 
9.1 8.2 10.53 10.52 
10.8 11.7 1.2.3 
__l 
3.2 
16.50 17.70 16.20 16.70 
n. a 10.4 
_. _ -Liý- 
ý- 
8.80 i 48.6 
19.4 
11.29 
14.3 
16.50 
11.9 
18.80 1 7.50 1 4.50 
na na n. a 8.00 7.10 5.80 4'10 8.60 8.80 2.40 
n. a na 29.6 20.1 14.7 6.90 3.60 10.60 9.70 10.20 
. ... .......... ..... 22.63 20.44 10-79 7.18 6.13 
_. 
3.. 39 2.80 15.10 15.00 
n. a 
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to capitalisation, the data show that the Philippine authorities have been ahead compared with 
other countries in strengthening the capital position of the banking system. Indeed, their 
banking sector was highly capitalised even before the deregulation of banking sector in 1989, 
and this helped them effectively weather the 1997 financial crisis. 
2.2.2. The effect of the 1997 Asian financial crisis and restructuring on 
SE Asian banking 
The crisis started from Thailand with the floating of the Baht on 2 July 1997 and then soon 
spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea and Philippines. The Asian crisis abruptly ended 
financial liberalisation with bank restructuring programmes beginning almost immediately in 
1998 and not ending until 2003 .5 Financial restructuring was administered by state-owned 
and managed entities. The programmes contained a mixture of stock and flow solutions to 
financial distress; flow solutions aimed to protect banks from making losses whilst stock 
solutions intended to resolve accumulated losses (Gochoco-Bautista et al., 2000). Generally, 
governments responded to financial distress by nationalising banks; closing unviable banks; 
carrying out compulsory purchases and assumptions and transferring assets to healthier 
banks; creating larger core banks; removing bad assets to state-owned and managed asset 
management companies; and providing capital injections to recapitalise banks. The stock 
solutions were completed when restructured, nationalised banks were returned to private 
ownership via the bank privatisation process. Various flow solutions were implemented 
including wider access for foreign-owned banks and allowing majority foreign 
ownership; 6 replacing underperforming bank management; revising managerial incentives; 
and restructuring businesses. Steps have also been taken towards adopting international 
standards in bank supervision and regulation (for instance, capital adequacy, loan 
classification, and loan loss provisioning) and improving the institutional environment 
(Lindgren et al., 2000). 
'A comprehensive review of the resolution strategies adopted in SE Asia can be found in the work of Claessens 
et al. (I 999a); Gochoco-Bautista et al. (2000); Hawkins (1999), and Lindgren et al. (2000). 
6 For a full discussion of the reform of regulations pertaining to foreign bank entry and ownership criteria see 
the following: Gochoco-Bautista (1999), Kawai and Takayasu (1999), Lindgren et al. (2000), Mo ntreevat 
(2000), and Nam (1999). 
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The impact of the crisis has been devastating. There has been a deep recession in all countries 
and the amount of non-perforining loans soared (see Table 4). At its peak, non-performing 
loans ratio amounted to 64% and 41.5% in Indonesia and Thailand, respectively. As a result, 
the fiscal costs of crisis resolution are far more than most other crises before. 7 Indonesia has 
suffered particularly badly with the highest fiscal cost for restructuring of financial system 
(51.4% of GDP), followed by Thailand and Korea (43.8% and 31.2% of GDP respectively). 
Malaysia and the Philippines were less affected, mostly due to the contagious effect, the 
fiscal cost for restructuring therefore only accounted for 7.2% and 0.5% of GDP, 
respectively. 
Table 4: Fiscal costs of the Asian financial crisis 1997 
Country Banking NPL Fiscal Cost Recovery Net Cost 
Crisis (% Loans) of Crisis (% of GDP) (% of GDP) 
(% of GDP) 
Indonesia 1997-2002 64.0 51.4 12.0 39.4 
orea 1997-2002 31.2 8.0 23.1 
Malaysia 1997-2001 24.6 7.2 3.2 4.0 
Philippines 1998- 15.0 0.5 
Thailand 1 1997-2002 ........... *' 41.5 ....... . ....... ...... ...... ............ 43.8 ... 9.0 34.8 
Notes: NPLs data including those in Asset Management Companies. 
Source: National Central Bank reports; World Bank (East Asian update, various issues); 
IMF country reports. 
After eight years since the crisis erupted, much effort from both governments and 
international organisations has been done trying to reform the financial sector. The following 
sections summarise the restructuring progress and its impact on SE Asian banking sectors. 
2.2.2.1. Progress in restructuring bank assets 
The progress of debt restructuring varies between countries. The transfer of non-performing 
loans to Asset Management Companies (AMCs) and the improvement in economic 
performance have helped banks to reduce bad debts substantially (see Table 3). Korea has 
7 The fiscal costs of the Asian 1997 financial crisis are only less than the cost of the Argentine crisis 1980-82 
with 55.1 % of GDP (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003). 
25 
made the biggest progress in restructuring its bad debts. The NPL ratio of Korea fell faster 
than any other crisis-affected countries, from its peak of 22.7% in 1999 to 2% by the end of 
2004. Indonesia has also made a large progress reducing their NPL ratio from 64% in 1999 
to 4.5% at end 2004. To the contrary, the Philippine banking system has shown a worrying 
rise in bad debts. The NPL ratio from just around 2.8% increased throughout the period from 
1997 to June 2002 and reached its peak of over 18%, before it fell to 15% at end 2002. 
However, with faster loan growth and some successful restructuring and foreclosures in 
following years, the ratio fell to 12.3% by end-2004, but it remains much higher than other 
countries. 
2.2.2.2. Recapitalising Banking Systems 
As a part of the reform programmes, four countries (except for the Philippines) have injected 
public funds into troubled financial institutions in order to reverse the deterioration of the 
balance sheet and also to raise capital adequacy ratios to international practice. In addition, 
capital adequacy regulations have been strengthened and reinforced since 1997 for all the 
countries. The results have been positive. As shown in Table 3, Indonesia proved to be the 
most successful country in recapitalising their banking system. The risk weighted capital 
ratio in Indonesian banking system moved from a negative 13% in 1998 and has improved 
substantially every year before reaching a very high level of 19.4% in end 2004. Banking 
systems in Malaysia, Thailand, and Korea have also gradually strengthened their capital 
positions. In contrast, the Philippine banks have experienced a slight decline in this safety 
ratio since the 1997 crisis. 
2.2.2.3. Consolidation of Financial Systems 
Asia's banking system was described as "over-banked" before the crisis but since then the 
number of commercial banks has declined considerably (Table 2). The pace and focus of 
financial sector restructuring and consolidation has tended to vary across countries. Since hit 
by the Asia crisis, Indonesia has largely consolidated the financial system. Out of 237 banks 
in 1997,69 insolvent banks have been closed, 22 weak and small banks were merged with 
larger banks and 17 other were taken over. The total number of commercial banks fell 
from 
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237 in 1997 to 134 at end-2004. In Malaysia, 71 domestic banking institutions were merged 
into 10 banking groups in 2001. The pace of consolidation in Korea was also very rapid, 
reducing the number of banks from 33 banks in the first year of crisis to 25 banks just one 
year later as the government closed 5 insolvent banks and merged other 9 banks. The total 
number of banks continued to fall to 14 domestic banks by the end of 2004. Thailand and 
Philippines have also consolidated their financial system although the pace is very limited. 
2.2.2.4. Further penetration of foreign banks 
The financial crisis in 1997 forced the countries to further liberalise their foreign bank entry 
policies. The recapitalisation of banking systems needed large amounts of new capital which 
could not be raised in local markets, leading the governments to relax foreign ownership 
restrictions by allowing foreign interests to hold more share or even a majority stake 
(Montgomery, 2002). Figure I shows that foreign bank entry in term of ownership limits (the 
maximum percentage of foreign ownership in a bank) have been largely liberalised after the 
crisis in all countries except Malaysia. All countries but Malaysia now allow almost 100% of 
foreign ownership compared to below 50% limit in the pre-crisis period. Consequently, 
foreign bank share (in term of total assets) has increased in all five countries since 1997 (see 
Table 2). The largest and fastest foreign penetration has been in Korea, the share of foreign 
assets increased from the lowest level (compared with other countries) in 1996 (7.3%) to the 
highest level in 2004 (35.7%). Foreign banks also have gained considerably more share in 
Indonesia and Thailand. The asset share of foreign banks grew from around 9% in 1996 to 
31.1% and 25.2% in 2004, respectively for Indonesia and Thailand. On the other 
hand, a 
lesser expansion of foreign banks is observed in Malaysia and the Philippines. 
This is 
because of the lesser restructuring activities in the Philippines and the relatively 
low foreign 
ownership limit in Malaysia (30%). 
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Figure 1: Change in limit of foreign ownership in domestic banks 
Thailand 
Philippines 
Malaysia 
Korea 
Indonesia 
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m 
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Notes: The figure shows the maximum percentages of foreign ownership in a bank. 
Sources: National Central Bank reports. 
2.2.2.5. Overall results 
It has been nine years since the Asia financial crisis erupted which led to the collapse of the 
East Asia's 'tiger' economies. Much effort has been done to restore market confidence, reduce 
the likelihood of a recurrence, and improve the long-term bank perfon-nance. The outcome is 
positive, banking systems have performed better and regained profitability to roughly the 
same level as before the crisis (Table 3). Overall, Korea and Malaysia have been making the 
fastest Progress in bank and corporate restructuring in the wake of the regional financial 
crisis. With the aggressive approach of the governments in restructuring, the banking systems 
are now in relatively good condition: all banks are now well capitalised, most NPLs have 
been identified and transferred, regulatory and supervisory have been strengthening, and 
financial institutions operate in a relatively competitive financial market. The recovering of 
Indonesian banking sector has also been very impressive. Although the pace of reform has 
been slower,, they have managed to become the best performer since 2002, in term of 
profitability as well as capitalisation. In the other end, the Philippines, though less affected by 
the crisis, is still experiencing difficulties. Profitability and NPLs of this banking sector is 
among the worst compared with other SE Asian banking systems. This reflects the economic 
difficulties in the Philippines in the recent years. 
Financial deregulation, governance and bank 
efficiency: A review of theoretical and empirical 
literature 
The literature has offered a diversity of theoretical arguments and mixed empirical evidence 
on the relationship between financial deregulation, corporate governance and bank 
efficiency. This section reviews both theoretical and empirical literature of (i) the relationship 
between financial deregulation and bank efficiency; and (ii) the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance. 
Financial deregulation and bank efficiency 
3.1.1. Theoretical framework 
The relationship between financial deregulation and bank efficiency has received a great deal 
of attention throughout the modem banking literature. Although the principal aim of financial 
deregulation is to improve the efficiency of banking system, theoretically, financial 
deregulation can either improve or worsen bank productive efficiency. Productive efficiency 
includes all cost and revenue efficiencies and can positively be affected by financial 
deregulation in three-mays, First, financial sector restructuring is expected to realise 
economies of scale and scope. Second, X-inefficiencies are postulated to fall as banks move 
--Wý' V4. 
closer to industry best practice. Third, the abnormal bank profits often associated with 
financial repression and oligopolistic markets are expected to erode (Molyneux et al., 1996; 
Gardener et al., 200 1; Williams and Intarachote, 2002). 
Financial deregulation with the loosening of structure and conduct rules, allowing entering of 
I 
new financial institutions and greater products and services,. would promote competition in 
the financial system. Competition is the main mechanism that is expected to improve 
productive efficiency. The creation of a competitive environment alters the operating 
behaviour of the financial firms themselves. They are forced to economise on resources and 
adopt cost-reducing technologies such as information technology. Financial deregulation 
provides a "supply-shock" and sets in motion a virtuous circle of decreasing costs and prices, 
which increases demand for financial products and services. Banks respond to changes in 
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customer demand by increasing output. The enhanced level of competition coerces banks into 
lowering costs and prices (Gardener et al., 2001; Williams and Intarachote, 2002). Similarly, 
Molyneux and Al-Jarrah (2003) note that increased competition induces banks to pay greater 
attention to the areas of pricing and upgrading the quality of their products and banks become 
more concerned about analysing and controlling their costs and revenues, as well as dealing 
with risks taken to produce acceptable returns. In this context, maximising--shareho. Ider 
weggitth and promoting improvements in productive efficiency have become much more 
important strategic targets for banks. 
Financial liberalisation may improve productive efficiency of domestic banks by exposing 
them to foreign financial sectors. Marcus (1996) argues that exposure to the operations of 
foreign competitors through both inward and outward direct investment may convey 
additional benefits to the domestic economy. It is a fact that bankers in formerly financially 
repressed regimes are likely to lack specific skills and knowledge, for instance in risk 
management. Inward foreign direct investment can benefit domestic banks by exposing them 
to new technologies, management techniques, corporate governance mechanisms etc. 
introduced by foreign investors. 8 Likewise, outward foreign investment by domestic banks 
may not only expose them to innovative products and processes, but also give them a better 
understanding of world markets and their foreign customers. Access to international markets 
allows domestic banks to diversify their activities and to seek for lower funding source costs 
as well as productive investment projects. All of these benefits can improve overall 
efficiency of the domestic financial system. 
Although financial deregulation can bring about many benefits for the domestic financial 
sector, it can also cause problems and worsen banký productive efficiency. First, financial 
deregulation and more competition mean banks have to seek new business in much wider 
fields of activity and this may changeý the nature of the ýa4§' riský- and reduce their 
competitive advantage. Second, financial liberalisation can magnify the risks and weaknesses 
of the banking system, especially when capital inflows are intermediated through poorly 
managed and ill-supervised banking systems. Hellman et al. (2000) notes that increased 
' Foreign direct investors may also discipline anti -competitive tendencies of domestic firms, especially in 
markets where domestic production is concentrated and domestic firms can exercise market power. 
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deposit rate competition as a result of financial liberalisation erodes profits and lowers 
franchise values, which in turn creates incentives for making risky loans'. In addition, the 
lending boom can exacerbate the maturity and risk mismatch.. between bank assets and -- 
liabilities; unregulated capital flows may be misallocated towards risky projects, speculative 
activities, the equity market, and cyclical sectors such as real estate. In the short run, the 
expansion of lending activity bids up (inflates) the price of assets in these markets generating 
an asset price bubble. Such bubbles inevitably lead to deterioration in bank portfolios as 
banks increase their holdings of 'inflated' assets and become heavily exposed to cyclical 
sectors., In such circumstances, high nonperforming loans and, therefore, greater writte-offs 
and deteriorating profitability are the obvious consequence. Efficiency of these weak and 
unregulated banking systems would even worsen following the liberalisation of financial 
systems (Corsetti et al., 1999; Hellmann et al., 2000). 
3.1.2. The empirical evidence on financial deregulation and bank 
efficiency 
Deregulation of the financial system has occurred in a number of nations with the expectation 
of improving the efficiency of financial systems. Despite the expectations, however, 
-I, - 
empirical studies to date have come up with mixed results and these results suggest that 
deregulation has different effects upon different bank types within a nation, and different 
deregulation measures have different effects on the efficiency of the banking sector. Next, we 
will -review studies in non-Asian countries and then focus on Asian and SE Asian countries. 
3.1.2.1. Deregulation and bank efficiency in non-SE Asian countries 
3.1.2.1.1. United States 
The deregulation of interest rates, portfolio restrictions (activities) in the U. S. during the 
1980s seemed to have little impact on efficiency levels of the banking sector. Humphrey and 
Pulley (1997) apply the thick frontier approach (TFA) to estimate changes in alternative 
profit efficiency of 683 banks with over $100 million in assets over the period 1977-1988. 
They find that the deregulation of interest rates in the early 1980s raised bank funding costs 
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and had a negative impact on profit efficiency; and the rates of return did not regain their pre- 
deregulation levels until the early 1990s. Further, they find that large banks-but not smaller 
banks- changed output prices and input use to mitigate and reverse the negative effect of 
deregulation on profits. This view is in line with the previous findings of Humphrey (1993), 
who uses the same data set and also reports a negative impact of the deregulation of interest 
rate on bank cost productivity with an average increase in cost ranging from 0.8% to 1.4% 
per year, and with small banks (with assets of $1004200 million) experiencing larger 
increases on average than large banks. 
Several studies use non parametric methodologies, which do not allow for random error, to 
examine the effects of deregulation on efficiency. Nonetheless, these studies provide 
consistent results with the studies using parametric methodologies. Grabowski et al. (1994) 
examine the response of banking firms to the 1980s deregulations by comparing the 
efficiency of a sample of 669 U. S. banks prior to deregulation (1979) and after deregulation 
(1983,1987). Using the non parametric DEA method, they find that whilst there was a 
decline in technical efficiency, the deregulation of the 1980s had no significant impact on the 
overall efficiency of the banking industry. Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) applying the DEA 
methodology to 150 small and 150 large U. S banks in 1979 and 1986 and find similar results. 
More specifically, they find that financial deregulation in the 1980s appears to have impacted 
on small and large banks differently. Small banks were more efficient in the pre-deregulation 
year, but this gap closed in the post-deregulation year. Overall, the average efficiency 
measures declined from 1979 to 1986. 
3.1.2.1.2. Spain 
Spain banks' experience was very much like their U. S. counterparts, i. e. efficiency of 
Spanish banks is found to decline in the more deregulated environment, contrary to 
expectations. 
Using the parametric thick frontier approach (TFA), Lozano-Vivas (1998) investigates the 
impact of deregulation of interest rates and geographical restrictions on cost efficiency of 88 
commercial banks and 55 savings banks in Spain over period 1985-1991. Her results suggest 
that deregulation was associated with a decrease in relative cost efficiency for commercial 
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banks but no change for savings banks. In addition, her results show that although saving 
banks, on average, were more efficient than commercial banks, they both experienced an 
increase in frontier costs of 3.30% and 2.68%, respectively, as a result of technical change 
during the deregulation period. Kumbhakar et al. (2001) use a longer time horizon 1986 - 
1995 to inspect the changes in profit efficiency of Spanish saving banks. They use a flexible 
variable standard profit function which incorporates time-varying technical efficiency and a 
value-added approach for an unbalanced panel dataset of 75 saving banks. Kumbhakar et al. 
find that deregulation, which led to the aggressive interest rate competition and the expansion 
strategy of branching networks, caused an initial decrease in profit efficiency. However, 
while technical profit efficiency reduced over time as a result of deregulation, saving banks 
experienced positive productivity growth defined as the sum of profit technical efficiency 
change and technical change. 
Previous studies using non-parametric approaches provide a mixed picture. Grifell-Tatje and 
Lovell (1996) employ DEA and Malmquist indexes to investigate the impact of deregulation 
on the productive efficiency of 65 Spanish savings banks and find a 5.5% annual productivity 
decline in the post deregulation period 1986-1991. However, in a later study, using the same 
methodology, they find the opposite results for a sample of 50 savings banks, and 67 
commercial banks during period 1986-1993 (Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1997). They explain 
the differences in results in term of the differences in output specifications between the two 
studies, and explain further that most of the measured productivity growth in Spanish 
banking in the post-deregulation period has been associated with the improvements in 
managerial efficiency. 
3.1.2.1.3. Norway 
In contrast to the U. S. and Spain, deregulation in Norway in 1984, which focused on the 
liberalisation. of the volume and the interest rates of bank lending, resulted in improvements 
of both efficiency and productivity of Norwegian banks. Using DEA and total factor 
productivity (TFP), Berg et al. (1992) examine the efficiency and productivity of Norwegian 
banks before and after deregulation based on the value-added approach. Their results show 
that during 1980-89 the productivity of banks declined initially in the pre -deregulation years, 
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mainly due to the banks raising their inputs and creating idle capacity in anticipation of 
increased competition created by the introduction of deregulation in 1984. However, 
productivity eventually rose rapidly post 1987, and was the result of large gains in technical 
efficiency (mostly of the least efficient banks). 
3.1.2.1.4. Australia 
The deregulation of foreign bank entry in Australia in the 1980s appeared to improve the 
efficiency of domestic banks. Using both parametric (SFA) and non-parametric approaches 
(DEA & Malmquist Indices), Sturm and Williams (2004) assess of the impact of foreign 
bank entry on the efficiency of 39 banks in Australia during the post-deregulation period 
between 1988 and 2001. They find that bank efficiency and productivity had increased post- 
deregulation and the competition resulting from diversity in bank types was important to 
prompt efficiency improvements. Further, they suggest that the foreign banks provided an 
important source of technological efficiency changes immediately post-deregulation. An 
earlier study using DEA by Avkiran (2000), however, reports an increase in productivity of 
ten domestic Australian banks over the period 1986 to 1995, but this increase was mainly due 
to technological progress rather than technical efficiency. 
3.1.2.1.5. Turkey 
As with Norway, financial deregulation in Turkey brought about more productivity and 
efficiency for the financial system. All the studies in Turkey use non-parametric DEA 
approaches. Zairn (1995) investigates the effects of liberalisation policies on the economic 
efficiency of Turkish commercial banks. He uses the intermediation approach to model bank 
behaviour, whereas the data were collected for the two years 1981 and 1990, representing the 
pre- and post-deregulation periods. Findings indicate that technical efficiency increased on 
average by 10%, while the difference between banks on technical efficiency decreased. In 
both pre- and post-deregulation periods, most of the inefficiency appears to be sourced in 
pure technical inefficiency. These findings are echoed by Isik and Hassan (2003) who utilise 
DEA-type Malmquist index to investigate the impact of financial deregulation introduced in 
the 1980s on the productivity, efficiency and technology of Turkish commercial banks 
between 1981 and 1990. Their results indicate that all forms of banks benefited from the 
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more liberal financial envirom-nent with significant productivity gains, which were driven 
mostly by efficiency increases rather than technical progress. More specifically, efficiency 
initially declined as banks tried to adapt to the new environment but eventually gained 
momentum and improved impressively after 1987. The increases in efficiency are mostly 
owing to improved resource management practices rather than improved scales of operations. 
3.1.2.1.6. Greece 
The deregulation of the financial system in Greece during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
seemed to benefit private banks more than public banks. Noulas (2001) examined the effect 
of banking deregulation on 19 Greek banks using the DEA approach. He finds that the effect 
of deregulation appeared to be positive only for the private banks. State banks were less 
efficient than the private banks and the gap widened during the period as the private banks 
increased their efficiency. 
3.1.2.1.7. Portugal 
The rapid deregulation from a previously repressed banking system in Portugal in the late 
1980s also brought about more efficiency for the banking sector. Major deregulations in 
Portugal included the lifting of credit ceilings, ending of administered interest rates, and 
giving freedom to open branches. Canhoto and Dermine (2003) quantify the impact of these 
deregulations on technical efficiency over time and across groups of 20 banks (12 old and 8 
new banks) over the period 1990-1995. Using the non-parametric DEA approach, they find 
an improvement in efficiency for the overall bank sample over time. The new banks were 
much more efficient than the old ones with an average efficiency score of 77% compared to 
62%, respectively. 
3.1.2.1.8. Pakistan and India 
Pakistan and India have very similar financial systems with a dominance of public sector 
banks and they both deregulated their heavily government intervened banking systems in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s. The deregulation of the banking sectors in the two countries 
appeared to yield favourable results. Using the DEA approach, Ataullah et al. (2004) 
compared the effect of liberalisation on the technical efficiency in banks in India and 
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Pakistan during 1988-1998 and concluded that the overall bank efficiency of the banking 
industry of both countries improved gradually over the years of post-liberalisation, especially 
after 1995. In addition, they report that whilst public sector banks in India experienced 
improvement in both pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency, public sector banks in 
Pakistan witnessed improvement in scale efficiency only. 
The results from the parametric approach are also in line the non-parametric approach. 
Applying alternative profit function for an unbalanced panel of 33 banks covered the period 
from 1981 through 2002, Bonaccorsi di Patti and. Hardy (2005) reported a moderate 
improvement in bank profit efficiency in the first round of financial market reforins in 199 1- 
1992. These improvements were due to an increase in revenues rather than reducing costs, 
compared to the period before the reforms. However, they report no positive impact from the 
second round of reforms (1998-2002), due to a negative contribution from business 
conditions. 
Other studies focusing on Indian financial deregulation, however, report a mixed picture. 
Bhattacharyya and Kumbhakar (1997) employ both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis to 
study the impact of liberalisation on 70 Indian commercial banks in the early years of 
deregulation from 1986 tol991. Overall, the results indicate that liberalisation had different 
impacts on different bank ownership types. Whilst there was a temporal improvement in the 
performance of foreign-owned banks, there was a temporal decline in the performance of 
Indian public sector banks, and virtually no trend in the performance of privately-owned 
Indian banks. However, this study essentially pertained to the pre-deregulation era since most 
banking sector reforms were initiated in 1991-92. A more recent study by Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar (2003) addresses this lacuna by covering both the pre- and post-liberalisation era from 
1985 to 1996. Applying the generalized shadow cost function and total factor productivity 
(TFP) for a sample of 27 public banks and 23 domestic private banks, the authors find no 
significant change in total factor productivity growth; and although private sector banks 
improved their performance, the perfon-nance gap between private and public sector banks 
did not narrow post-liberalisation. 
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3.1.2.1.9. Taiwan and China 
Financial deregulation in the early 1990s in Taiwan and in the mid 1990s in China is found to 
have had a favourable effect on the banking sectors. Empirical evidence Taiwan is based on 
the non-parametric approach. For Taiwan, using the DEA method, Shyu (1998) studied the 
operating efficiency of the banking industry for the pre- (1986-1989) and post-deregulation 
(1992-1995) periods. The author finds improvement in overall efficiency following 
deregulation with most banks close to being scale efficient. This result is supported by a 
more recent study by Chen (2001) using the same DEA technique. Chen (2001) works with 
41 Taiwanese banks over the period of 1988-1997 and also reports an increase in bank 
efficiency following deregulation. 
Chen et al. (2005) investigated the change in Chinese bank efficiency following the 
deregulation programme initiated by the government in 1995. The DEA method was used to 
estimate the efficiency of 43 Chinese banks over the period 1993 to 2000. Their results 
suggest that financial deregulation has improved the cost efficiency of the Chinese banking 
system. More specifically, both technical efficiency and allocative efficiency scores 
increased and peaked in 1997 then decreased slowly for the rest of the period due to the 
government tightening bank lending policy and the effect of Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
The results also 'indicate that the large state-owned banks and smaller banks were more 
efficient than medium sized banks. Berger, Hasan, and Zhou (2005) provided similar results 
for China. Using SFA on a data of 36 Chinese commercial banks, they found that the profit 
efficiency performance of Chinese banks has benefited from a more competitive environment 
created by more intensified foreign entry and competition during the transition period (1994- 
2001). 
3.1.2.2. Deregulation and bank efficiency in SE Asian countries 
Whilst there is a large volume of research on efficiency in developed countries, there is a 
paucity of efficiency studies in South East Asia. The majority of studies are country specific 
except Laeven (1999) and Williams and Nguyen (2005) who also studied five different 
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countries. The established literature mostly considers the relationship between financial 
deregulation and bank efficiency prior to the financial crisis of 1997. The following 
discussion summarises the literature of bank efficiency and financial deregulation in South 
East Asia. We first review the cross-country studies and then for each country. 
3.1.2.2.1. Cross-country study of East Asia bank efficiency 
The first cross-country study of Asian bank efficiency is Laeven (1999), who uses DEA to 
estimate efficiency in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand in the pre- 
crisis period 1992-96. Using DEA and an intermediation approach, Laeven's (1999) study 
covered 23% commercial banks in Indonesia, 96% in Korea, 97% in Malaysia, 57% in the 
Philippines and 100% in Thailand. He found that bank efficiency improved substantially in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand whereas the efficiency of banks in Korea and 
Malaysia remained roughly constant. The author continued to estimate the two-factor fixed 
effects regression model to explain the variation in DEA-estimated bank efficiencies both 
across ownership groups and through time. The results show that family-owned and foreign- 
owned banks increased efficiency relative to other banks whereas widely-owned banks 
decreased efficiency relative to other banks across the region during the period 1992-96. 
Furthermore, the author finds a positive time effect for the change in efficiency of the 
region's banking sector during 1992-93, and a negative time effect during 1994-95. 
Williams and Nguyen (2005) used SFA to investigate performance (profit efficiency and 
productivity) of SE Asian banks over 1990-2003. However, this study only focused on the 
relationship between bank governance and performance; it did not examine how performance 
of banks in each country changes over time. Nevertheless, they found that the average 
performance of SE Asian banks has improved over the long-term. I 
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3.1.2.2.2. Korea 
Studies in Korea offer mixed evidence on the effect of financial deregulation. Gilbert and 
Wilson (1998) employed Malmquist indexes of productivity to investigate the effect of 
privatisation and deregulation on the productivity of Kore an banks during 1980-94. These 
indexes were also decomposed into changes in technology and efficiency. They found that 
between 1980 and the mid-1990s, as Korea was privatising banks and deregulating its 
financial industry, banks dramatically changed their mix of inputs and outputs. These 
changes, when combined with technological developments, led to significant. improvements 
in the productivity of the Korean banking sector. 
However, the financial deregulation of 1991 is found to have little or no significant impact on 
private Korean banks. Hao et al. (2001) examines the productive efficiency of a sample of 19 
private Korean banks from 1985 to 1995. Using the stochastic frontier cost function 
approach, efficiency scores were determined for each bank in the sample. Overall, their 
results show that there is no inter-temporal improvement in either the mean or standard 
deviation of cost efficiency index over the sample period. Given the positive results reported 
in Gilbert and Wilson (1998), they suggest that the bulk of the efficiency gains reported by 
Gilbert and Wilson were probably realised between 1980 and 1985 - the time period 
immediately following the deregulation which began in 1980. 
3.1.2.2.3. Malaysia 
A negative effect of financial deregulation is found in Malaysia. Using the non-parametric 
DEA approach, Katib and Mathews (2000) analyse a panel of 20 commercial banks from 
1989 to 1995. They report the overall technical efficiency of banks ranges from 68% to 80% 
and deteriorated between 1989 and 1994. The results also show that best practice was 
provided by medium sized banks. The banks of smaller size had constant or increasing 
returns to scale, which implies that they were too small to realise scale efficiency. On the 
other hand, scale inefficiency existed in large banks, which implies that they were too large 
to operate business efficiently. The findings suggest that most commercial banks did not 
operate at constant returns to scale and that technical inefficiency was attributed to scale 
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inefficiency. A similar result is reported by Dogan and Fausten (2003) using the same 
technique for the period 1989-1998. Working on 21 domestic banks, their results indicate an 
erosion of banking productivity caused by the adverse effects of technological change due to 
a reduction in the labour intensity of banking activity. 
The parametric approach evidence is provided by Okuda and Hashimoto (2004) for the 
period from 1991 to 1997. Using SFA and a panel data of 19 Malaysian domestic 
commercial banks, Okuda and Hashimoto find financial liberalisation in Malaysia was 
accompanied by an increase in bank operational costs and negative technological progress. In 
addition, they report that the average cost efficiency score of Malaysian commercial banks 
was 83% and the small and medium sized banks were more cost efficient than large sized 
banks. However, contrary to Katib and Mathews' result, economies of scale were observed 
for large banks. 
3.1.2.2.4. Thailand 
Mixed evidence is also found in Thailand. The positive outcome of financial deregulation is 
reported by Leightner and Lovell (1998), who investigated the Thai banking industry from 
both the bank objectives (profit-oriented) and the government's perspectives (economic 
growth-producing) from 1989 to 1994. Using non-parametric DEA technique, the authors 
constructed Malmquist growth indexes and productivity indexes for each Thai bank and 
foreign-owned banks for 1989-1994. They report that as bank objectives are used the 
average productivity of Thai bank fell for one or two years but subsequently rose for three to 
four years. In contrast, most banks had rising growth relative to best practice in every single 
year. When the Bank of Thailand objectives are used, similar levels of rapid growth relative 
to best practice are found, but total factor productivity declined for Thai banks and increased 
for foreign banks. The authors explained the possible reasons for this, in meeting Bank of 
Thailand objectives, Thai banks as a result of financial liberalisation, switched resources out 
of net interest income, which is more directly tied to Bank of Thailand objects. 
On the contrary, other studies in Thailand suggest financial liberalisation adversely affected 
bank efficiency. Williams and Intarachote (2002) use stochastic frontier analysis and find 
bank profit efficiency decreased at an increasing rate over time from 1990-1997. On average, 
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Thai banks lost 2.66% of potential profits to inefficiency in 1990 but in 1997 they lost 38.5%. 
They suggest that financial liberalisation increased financial fragility because of technical 
regress and a poorer efficiency performance despite the Bank of Thailand's intentions to 
bring about an improvement in bank efficiency via an increase in competition. This view is 
supported by Okuda and Mieno (1999) who also use SFA and find financial liberalisation 
increases the variance of Thai bank cost inefficiency between 1985 and 1994. In addition 
they report that the average cost efficiency of Thai's banks was just over 77%, and the large 
banks were the most cost efficient whereas medium-sized banks exhibited a greater variation 
in their efficiency performance. 
In short, studies of the effects of financial deregulation on bank efficiency in SE Asia mostly 
focus on period before 1997. The empirical evidence shows mixed results for Korea and 
Thailand and a negative outcome for Malaysia. One cross-country study provides positive 
evidence for Indonesia and the Philippines, whereas the other shows the average performance 
of SE Asian banks has improved over time. On average, Korean banks were found to be 
amongst the most efficient in East Asia (85%), following by Malaysian (82%), Thai (80%), 
the Philippine (55%) and Indonesian (49%). Also, different bank sizes and ownership 
structures were found to response to financial deregulation differently. 
3.2. Bank governance and efficiency performance 
The sub . ect of corporate governance and performance has received a great deal of attention 
in the modem firm behaviour literature. Ownership structures affect the way in which firms 
are managed and controlled and therefore different ownership structures can lead to very 
different behaviour of firms toward risk and return. The ownership-performance nexus in 
financial firm can be considered in the context of the agency theory (principal-agent 
framework) and public choice theory. According to agency theory, principal-agent problems 
can occur whenever there is separation between ownership and control whereby management 
(agent) may operate the firm in their own interests and not in the best interest of the 
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shareholder (principal) (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Similarly, public choice theory assumes that all individuals (managers, 
shareholders, bureaucrats, politicians etc. ) seek to maximize their own utilities. Both theories 
take incentives and market discipline as a key determinant of behaviour and performance. 
The possibility of principal-agent problems in banks raises the question as to which is the 
most appropriate governance structure for banks. The issue of bank governance is 
complicated by several factors such as the quality of bank regulation and supervision, the 
highly leveraged balance sheet structure, the opaqueness of bank assets, government financial 
safety nets policies, the level of development of markets, and the institutional environment 
which conditions the overall effectiveness of financial markets (Macey and O'Hara, 2003; 
Levine, 2004). Governance affects performance and the performance-ownership question 
may be restated to ask why bank management may not minimize production costs or 
maximise output, which is central to the established efficiency literature (Leibenstein, 1966; 
Farrell, 1957). Agency problems are a source of inefficiency because they explain why 
envirom-nental pressures, which influence the responses and effort of management, may fail 
to coerce maximal effort from managers. In highly competitive markets, environmental 
pressures are intensified and expected to strengthen management's incentive to be efficient. 9 
In less competitive environments, the incentive for management to lower costs and raise 
efficiency is weakened (Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). 
Asian banking is characterised by strong ties between lenders and borrowers. As producers of 
private information, banks may resolve asymmetric information problems through long 
lasting client relationships. Through relationship banking, banks share risks and profits with 
customers whilst transaction costs and borrowing costs can be lowered. The close ties 
between banks and their corporate borrowers in SE Asia were deepened through governance 
structures that facilitated connected lending which is postulated to enhance the benefits of 
relationship banking (Djankov et al., 2003). A priori relationship banking may offer an 
alternative to the disciplining role played by external capital markets. However, there are 
possible adverse outcomes should the benefits of relationships be expropriated by banks 
9 Other potentially important environmental pressures include the nature of the regulatory environment; market 
structure; entry and exit conditions; and the bureaucratic nature of the organisation. 
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and/or banks caution customers from investing in risky, though profitable, investment 
opportunities (Nam, 2004). 
The following sections will review the literature on different types of governance and related 
issues and discuss how they may affect bank performance. More specifically, we review (i) 
state ownership and privatisation; (ii) concentrated ownership vs. diffused ownership; (iii) 
foreign ownership and foreign acquisitions; (iv) domestic merger and acquisitions (M&A). 
3.2.1. State ownership and privatisation 
3.2.1.1. Theoretical framework 
A survey of banking systems around the world shows that state ownership is widespread, 
particularly in developing countries (see Barth et al., 2001 a). In 1999, government controlled 
banks held more than 30% of banking sector assets in a quarter of the developing countries 
while that only true for 20 developed countries surveyed (Barth et al., 2001a). 10 In SE Asia, 
state ownership of commercial banks was used to assist national economic development 
policies. The notion of economically efficient state-owned banks, however, is contentious 
and revolves around alternative views of government benevolence. There are four principal 
reasons explaining why state ownership tends to be less efficient than private ownership. 
First, state-ownership is associated with inefficiency because state institutions are often 
created for social, non-profit objectives such as economic and social development. " Second, 
regardless of government's objectives, state banks still perform poorly because of severe 
agency problems. According to agency theory and public choice theory, bureaucrats in state 
10 La Porta et al. (2002) also survey government ownership of banks in 92 countries around the world and find 
that government ownership of banks is large and pervasive with mean of 41.6 percent at 1995; and government 
ownership is larger in countries with low levels of per capita income, underdeveloped financial systems, 
interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. 
11 Megginson (2005) outlines the theoretical rationale for state ownership of commercial banks. The underlying 
assumption is of a benevolent government controlling a country's banking system to finance economic 
development when private capital is scarce. State-owned banks allocate credit to preferred industrial sectors and 
finance investments whose social returns exceed financial returns. State ownership also can help mitigate 
problems of market failure (such as pollution and monopoly) (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988) and reduce 
asymmetric infori-nation problems between principal (public) & agent (bank) when complete contracts cannot 
be 
written and enforced (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Megginson, 2005). 
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banks as well as politicians involved will work to maximise their individual self-interests and 
political power rather than the owners (taxpayers) benefits. 12 Megginson (2005) notes that 
state-ownership per se is inefficient by design because state institutions may be used to 
reward political support. Becker and Stigler (1974) and Levine (2004) also suggest that 
government maximises its own welfare rather than social welfare. Thus, government may see 
banks as a source of fiscal revenue which could induce increased risk taking and a poor 
allocation of assets. This could be exacerbated by weak regulatory and supervisory 
frameworks which allow well-connected borrowers to become even more highly leveraged 
(Claessens et al., 2000a). 
Third, the lack of discipline and supervision is another main reason causing inefficiency of 
state-owned banks. It is improper for the state to act as both owner/manager and regulator of 
its own banks (Caprio and Levine, 2002). This is because owners have less incentive to 
carefully monitor managerial performance (because they bear all the costs of doing so but 
reap only a fraction of the rewards), and because there are few methods of effectively 
disciplining state-owned bank managers in the event that sub-par performance is detected 
(Megginson, 2005). Finally, state-owned banks in developing countries often dominate the 
banking sectors and have a large influence on the economies; the too-big-to-fail or too- 
important-to-fail policies and the fact that state-owned banks operate with soft budget 
constrains would allow inefficient banks to survive. 
Private sector ownership is expected to reduce agency problems thereby promoting efficiency 
gains because shareholders exercise due diligence and monitor managerial perfon-nance. The 
resulting policy implication is privatisation of state-owned commercial banks which is 
expected to improve bank efficiency and boost financial sector performance. The central 
tenet in favour of bank privatisation is the expected effectiveness of capital markets in 
constraining agency problems by disciplining the actions of management, especially with 
respect to risk. Efficient capital markets can instil discipline by creating incentives that 
realign management behaviour and shareholder value maximisation (Megginson, 2005). 
12 Bureaucrats in state banks may seek to advance their political careers by catering to special interest groups 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In addition, bureaucrats are by nature risk averse and will therefore more likely to 
undertake less risk than is optimal from the taxpayers' point of view (Arun and Turner, 2004). 
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3.2-1-2. Empirical evidence on state ownership of commercial banks 
Although state-owned banks are expected to be less efficient than their private competitors, 
the evidence is mixed. There are very few studies of the relative performance of state-owned 
bank in European countries. Using the SFA, Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (200 1) find that 
German public savings banks and mutual cooperative banks are relatively more cost and 
profit efficient than their private sector competitors for the period 1989 to 1996. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, state banks are found to be less efficient than private-owned banks in 
Greece (Noulas, 2001). Similarly, Bonin et al. (2002) find that profitability (measured by 
return on assets and return on equity) was significantly higher for fully private banks than for 
banks with some state ownership in the six European transition economies of Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania in 1999 and 2000. This result is 
echoed by a recent study of Bonin et al. (2005a) who report private banks were significantly 
more cost and profit efficient in these transition economies. Unlike the results for the 
European transition economies, state-owned banks in Turkey are found to be more cost 
efficient than banks in private hands. Altunbas et al. (1994) use SFA and find no significant 
different between state-owned banks and privately-owned Turkish banks from 1991-1993. 
Zaim. (1995) uses DEA to study the changes in efficiency of Turkish banks over the period 
1981 to 1990. The author reports that state-owned banks are more efficient than private- 
owned banks. Likewise, Isik and Hassan (2003) after controlling for market, portfolio, size, 
corporate and other bank characteristics, find that, in general, domestic private banks were 
significantly less efficient than state-owned banks. 
Studies in Asia provide mixed results. Studies using DEA of Bhattacharya et al. (1997) for 
the period 1986-1991, and Sathye (2003) for the period 1992-1999, both report that public 
sector banks in India were significantly more efficient than private sector banks. Likewise, a 
study using SFA for the period 1992-1999 also reports a similar result for India (Shanmugam 
and Das, 2004). For Taiwan, Peng and Wang (2004) use SFA and find that government- 
owned or government-contro I led banks were the most cost efficient. Empirical evidence 
for 
Pakistan, however, favours private banks. Hardy and Patti (2001) analyse cost and profit 
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efficiency of 33 Pakistani banks from 1981 to 1988 and conclude that on average state banks 
were less efficient (both cost and profit) than private banks. Similarly, a study for Korea 
using SFA reports that cost efficiency is negatively correlated with the level of government 
ownership (Hao et al., 2001). 
3.2.1.3. Empirical evidence on bank privatisation 
Whilst there is a substantial body of empirical literature of privatisation of non-financial 
firms, empirical evidence for banking is limited and appears more recently. ' 3 This is due to 
the fact that data on bank privatisation is difficult to obtain and data from state-owned banks 
is always opaque and suffers from a lack of transparency. This section will review empirical 
studies in developed countries, transition economies, developing, middle- and low-income 
countries including Asian countries. 
Several studies in developed countries (OECD countries) show a positive effect of 
privatisation on bank performance. Verbrugge et al. (1999) compare the pre- and post- 
privatisation performance changes for 32 banks in OECD countries and document moderate 
performance improvements in profitability, fee income and capital adequacy from 1981 to 
1996. Braz (1999) analyses the impact of re-privatisation of Portugal state-owned banks after 
1990 and shows that the privatised banks improve productive efficiency significantly after 
privatisation and they expanded their branch networks more rapidly compared with other 
state banks. Finally, Otchere and Chan (2003) analyse the impact of the privatisation of 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia's (CBA's) from 1991-1996. They report that CBA's long- 
run stock price performance improved significantly as the proportion of government 
ownership decreased and the financial and operating performance (CAMEL criteria) of CBA 
improved significantly after privatisation and even outperformed its rivals and became the 
most profitable bank in Australia once fully privatised. 
Privatisation in transition economies appears to be successful but conditional on of the 
involvement of foreign banks. In a study of seventeen transition economies of Eastern 
13 See Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) for extensive review of the literature on 
the impact of privatisation on performance of non-financial firms. 
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Europe and the former Soviet Union from 1995 to 1998, Grigorian and Manole (2002) find 
that bank privatisation does not result in statistically significant improvements in efficiency 
for banks which did not involve in a transfer of controlling share to foreign owners. This 
finding is confirmed by Bonin et al. (2005b), who find that attracting a strategic foreign 
owner in the privatisation process improves both bank profit and cost efficiency (derived 
from SFA) in six Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) transition economies over 1994-2002. 
Their results support the strategy of privatisation of large state-owned banks by selling them 
to strategic foreign investors after recapitalisation and cleaning the balance-sheets. Moreover, 
the fact that the early-privatised banks are more efficient than later-privatised banks (in the 
late 1990s) suggests that privatisation benefits need time to be fully realised in transition 
economies. Finally, regarding methodology, their empirical results indicate that financial 
performance measures (e. g. ROA, ROE) are not sufficient to detect the impact of bank 
privatisation in transition countries. 
Empirical studies in developing, middle- and low-income countries give mixed results on 
effects of bank privatisation. Boubakri et al. (2005) examine the post-privatisation 
performance of 81 wholly or partially privatised banks in 22 developing countries over the 
period 1986-1998. They find that privatisation alone does not seem to significantly impact 
on profitability (return-on-equity) or operating efficiency (net interest margins). Regarding 
risk taking behaviour, they find that banks controlled by industrial groups took the highest 
risk exposure, followed by locally controlled banks, whilst foreign-owned banks took the 
least exposure. In middle- and low-income countries, Otchere (2005) uses a sample of 18 
banks (most of them were partially privatised) from nine countries, and finds only a marginal 
improvements in the post-privatisation operating performance. In Africa, privatisation of 
state banks also brings about mixed results. A positive impact is found in Nigeria by Beck et 
al. (2005b), who focus on the effect of privatization on nine state banks that were completely 
privatised during the period 1990-2001. Privatisation resulted in significant increases in ROE 
and decreases in non-performing loans, even in an inhospitable envirom-nent for financial 
intermediation. In addition, their results suggest negative effects of the continuing minority 
government ownership on the perfonnance of many Nigerian banks. However, a study in 
Egypt by Omran (2003) finds no significant changes of bank performance (profitability, 
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capital risk, asset quality, efficiency) following two years of privatisation of 12 Egyptian 
state banks between 1996 and 1999. 
Evidence from Latin America generally supports privatisation policy. Nakane and Weintraub 
(2005) examine the privatisation experience of 14 Brazilian banks over the period 1990- 
2001. The authors find that state-owned banks were significantly less productive than 
private-owned banks and that privatisation has had a positive impact on bank productivity. 
These results are in line with findings of Beck et al. (2005a) for 18 Brazilian state banks after 
the collapse of the industry in 1995. As expected, they report from 1995 to 2003 privatised 
banks improved performance (increasing ROA and ROE and decreasing overhead costs); 
however, restructured banks with remaining government ownership did not. For Argentina, 
Clarke and Cull (2002) analyse the privatisation process of provincial banks in Argentina and 
find that privatised provincial banks improved performance (net worth) after privatisation 
(period 1991-1996). This result is echoed by Berger et al. (2005). Using profit and cost 
efficiency derived from SFA, they find that Argentine state-owned banks have poor long- 
term performance; those selected for privatisation had particularly poor performance 
beforehand; and these banks significantly improved following privatisation. 
Empirical studies of effect of bank privatisation focusing on Asia are limited. Bonaccorsi di 
Patti and Hardy (2005) examine the impact of privatisation on the relative performance of 
two Pakistani privatised banks between 1981 and 2002. They find that the banks that were 
eventually privatised had the lowest cost and profit efficiency; privatised banks improved 
their profit efficiency in the period immediately following their privatisation (1993-1997), 
but only one significantly improved in the subsequent years (1998-2002). Likewise, Williams 
and Nguyen (2005) find that bank privatisation in SE Asia was associated with better profit 
efficiency performance compared with other types of bank governance. However, unlike 
Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy (2005), Williams and Nguyen find the benefits of bank 
privatisation tended to take longer time to be realised. 
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3.2.2. Concentrated versus widely-held ownership 
3.2.2.1. Theoretical framework 
The potential benefits of market discipline in terms of enhancing efficiency can be mitigated 
by the behaviour of private owners. The literature discusses this issue in terms of 
concentrated (or closed) versus widely-held shareholdings. According to Claessens et a]. 
(2000a), around two-thirds of listed corporations in Asia are part of a large group, controlled 
either by a corporation or family, which own the majority of voting rights creating closed or 
concentrated ownership. In its favour, this model of governance creates an internal market for 
factor products, which in the absence of an efficient external market could lead to efficiency 
improvements by lowering transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Claessens et al., 
1999b). Claessens and Fan (2002) note that transaction costs among family members and 
closely affiliated corporations face a lower degree of information asymmetry and fewer hold- 
up problems, which may otherwise prevail in transactions among unaffiliated parties. 
Concentrated ownership can also mitigate the "free rider problem" of corporate control, 
which, in the presence of dispersed shareholders, leads to little incentive for any one 
shareholder to exercise corporate control (Berle and Means, 1932). Finn efficiency therefore 
may be greater at firms with concentrated ownership because the owners may be better 
placed to monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986,1997). However, there are anomalies 
associated with concentrated ownership. Controlling shareholders may expropriate against 
minority shareholders particularly when legislation concerning investor protection is weak or 
non-existent (Claessens et al., 1999c). Controlling owners may also transfer profits to other 
companies they control. The importance of large groups in a national economy allows these 
firms to solicit privileges from government which creates a non-optimal allocation of 
resources thereby increasing economic inefficiency (Claessens et al., 2000a). 
Closed ownership of groups is facilitated through pyramiding, the appointment of preferred 
managers, cross-ownership and the (infrequent) use of shares that have more votes (La Porta 
et aL, 1999). Families commonly use pyramiding to extend their control across many firms. 
Family ownership could improve firm efficiency because of moral hazard arguments: 
namely, the family has too much wealth tied up in its business to allow managers to engage 
in agency behaviour such as expense preference behaviour and choice of project risk (see 
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Akella and Greenbaum, 1988; Peristiani and Wizman, 1997). 14 Similarly, family firms have a 
strong incentive to assure that capital is deployed sparingly and used intensively and that 
production costs are tightly managed (Brickley and Dark, 1987). Compared with widely-held 
ownership, planning horizons of family-owned firms may be longer and unsusceptible to the 
short-term vagaries of the market 15 . Family ownership may ease difficulties associated with 
corporate management (Morck and Yeung, 2004). 16 
However, closed ownership can create problems that cause inefficiency in performance. 
First, family or company-controlled firms are usually run by principal owners or their heirs 
who are not professional. Second, the pyramiding technique can create agency problems 
which might be more severe than those found in widely-held firms. Since there is no market 
for corporate control when a family or large entity controls over 50 percent of voting rights, 
this creates an entrenchment agency problem, and majority owners can expropriate against 
outside (minority) owners (Morck and Yeung, 2004). The pyramid concept allows majority 
owners to spread their influence into entities further down in the group structure without 
requiring any fresh injection of capital. This feature of the pyramid structure may give rise to 
tunnelling which exists when the controlling shareholder moves wealth out of firms whose 
cash flows mainly go to public shareholders and into firms whose cash flows accrue mainly 
to the controlling shareholder (see Johnson et al., 2000). The agency problems of 
entrenchment and tunnelling may be further compounded if the controlling owners are able to 
exert considerable political influence through the transfer of resources further down in the 
group structure to secure political favour. In other words, other people's money is used by the 
14 There are several theories explaining the choice of family ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suggest that 
family will try to maintain control the firm when the "amenity potential" is large. Amenity potential is non- 
pecuniary private benefits of control such as pleasure from keeping family name or privileges in participating in 
or even influencing exciting social, political, and cultural events (this particularly true in sports or the media 
industries). Burkart et al. (2003) argue that the quality of legal protection of outside shareholders (from 
expropriation by the insiders) will determine the choice of family staying in control. When legal protection of 
outside investors is very good, there is no need for monitoring, and the best arrangement is a widely held. When 
shareholder protection is poor, the founder's ability to control expropriation is too limited, and management 
stays with his family even when someone else cans run the firm better (Burkart et al., 2003; Shleifer and 
Wolfenzon, 2002). Likewise, the weak property right systems in Asia may also explain why family-run business 
groups have been the dominant organizational forms (Claessens and Fan, 2002). 
15 This may be because professional managers in widely-held firms usually have planning horizons concurrent 
with their expected careers which is generally short-term (Morck and Yeung, 2004). 
16 Morck and Yeung (2004) review the associated empirical literature concerning these points in non-financial 
firm. 
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owner to secure benefits that accrue only to the owner (see Morck and Yeung, 2003). 
Especially in more opaque economies, inefficient family-owned, company-owned firms can 
survive, irrespective of their performance because of agency problems. 
Contrary to closed or concentrated ownership (family-owned and company-owned), widely- 
held firms are considered to be more efficient due to their ability to limit the degree of 
undesirable interference from investors; for their professional managers; and for their ability 
to manage large-scale, technologically complex and capital intensive industries such as in 
banking. 17 However, this Anglo-Saxon pattern of corporate governance is not free from 
agency problems, which stem from conflicts of interests between professional managers and 
dispersed (outside) shareholders. Indeed, the free rider problem may occurr in widely-held 
firms when there is little incentive on any one shareholder to exercise corporate control 
(Berle and Means, 1932). 
3.2.2.2. Empirical evidence on concentrated versus widely held ownership 
in banking 
The large volume of empirical research on the effect of concentrated ownership and widely- 
held ownership on firm performance in developed countries generally finds a positive 
relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance. 18 Empirical research 
on this issue in banking is very rare, however. So far, as far as we are aware, there are only 
three studies which examine the impact of different ownership structures on financial firm 
performance in East Asia. Claessens et al. (1999c) documents the relation between 
ownership structures (family, state, widely-held financial institutions, and widely-held 
corporations) and market valuation (defined as the excess value of a firm as the ratio of the 
firm's actual value to its imputed value) of both financial institutions and non-financial 
institutions in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Using 2,658 East Asian publicly-traded corporations in 1996 they 
find, in general, higher control rights (more concentrated ownership) are associated with 
lower market valuation, especially when cash-flow rights were low and control rights were 
" Widely held banks are prevalent in developed financial markets such as the US and Europe. Levine et al. 
(2004) find that stronger legal protection of shareholders is positively connected with countries having more 
widely held banks. 
'8 See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for review of related literature in non-financial firms. 
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high. Looking at different ownership structures separately, they find that whilst family 
control is negatively associated with market valuationý no evidence of such relationship is 
found for state and widely-held control. Finally, similar to family control, high control by 
financial institutions has a negative relationship with market valuation in the case of Japan. 
Laeven (1999) investigates the risk taking behaviour and efficiency of banks organised under 
different ownership structures in five East Asian countries from 1992-1996. He finds that 
family-owned and foreign-owned banks increased efficiency relative to other banks, whereas 
widely-owned banks showed a decrease in efficiency relative to other banks across the region 
during the period 1992-96. Regarding bank risk-taking, he finds foreign-owned banks were 
relatively risk averse and took little risk compared to family-owned and company-owned 
banks. Laeven identifies the banks that were eventually restructured (either through merger 
or recapitalisation) as being characterised as more risky (measured as excessive credit 
growth), mostly family owned or company owned, and almost never foreign owned. Also for 
SE Asian countries, Williams and Nguyen (2005) provide mixed evidence concerning the 
relative profit efficiency performance of banks under different ownership types. For example, 
their results suggest that whereas the average financial-owned bank achieved a better profit 
efficiency performance in Indonesia and Korea, it was the poorest performer in the 
Philippines and Thailand. Further, widely-held banks had the highest profit efficiency 
performance in the Philippines and Thailand whilst the average family-owned and company- 
owned bank underperformed in Indonesia and Korea. 
3.2.3. Foreign ownership and acquisitions 
3.2.3.1. Theoretical framework 
Traditionally, SE Asian authorities have regulated foreign bank entry and equity participation 
of foreign investors in domestic financial institutions. The supporting arguments are not 
economic. Rather they emphasise the need of the state to influence domestic commercial 
banks for monetary policy and development policy purposes. Financial deregulation allowed 
greater foreign involvement on economic grounds. Foreign bank penetration 
is expected to 
52 
increase competition to foster efficiency gains, and to import international best practice and 
implementation of superior technology. 
Theoretically, foreign banks can be either more or less efficient than domestic banks 
according to the home field advantage hypothesis and the global advantage hypothesis 
proposed by Berger et al. (2000). Under the home field advantage, domestic banks are 
relatively more efficient than foreign bank because foreign banks face organisational 
diseconomies in operating and monitoring institutions from abroad. Operating costs will be 
much higher for persuading managers to work overseas. It will also be more difficult and 
costly in monitoring the behaviour and measuring the performance of overseas managers. 
Moreover, foreign banks face much higher degree of information asymmetries compared 
with domestic banks and that make it difficult for them to develop local market relationships, 
particularly with households, small and medium enterprises. Finally, there are other barriers 
that foreign banks must overcome before they can fully compete with domestic banks such as 
problems associated with operating in a different cultural, linguistic, regulatory environment 
and even bias against foreign institutions. 
According to the global advantage hypothesis, some foreign banks can overcome cross- 
border disadvantages and operate more efficiently than the domestic institutions. These 
foreign banks are more efficient because they have superior technology and management 
skills, which will reduce costs and increase revenues by spreading best practice policies over 
more resources. In addition, foreign banks can offer superior quality or variety of services 
that they have comparative advantages (such as serving multinational clients, better access to 
international capital markets etc. ) and hence can diversify risks and achieve higher expected 
returns. A limited form of the global advantage hypothesis, however, proffers that only 
foreign banks from countries characterised inter alia by a strong regulatory and supervisory 
environment, a more intense level of competition that positively affects 
bank efficiency, 
well-developed markets and an educated labour force, can carry their efficiency advantage 
overseas (Berger et al., 2000; Williams and Intarachote, 2002). 
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3.2-3-2. Empirical evidence on foreign ownership and acquisitions in 
banking 
3.2.3.2.1. Non-Asian country studies 
There is a growing empirical literature of the relative performance of foreign and domestic 
banks. Empirical evidence from efficiency studies in industrialised countries generally 
supports the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis, which confers that, only 
foreign banks from some more competitive and advance markets countries are more efficient 
than domestic banks. Berger et al. (2000) evaluate the relative efficiency (cost and alternative 
profit efficiency) of foreign versus domestic commercial banks in five countries-France, 
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They find that foreign banks on 
average were less efficient than domestic banks. However, in three of the five home 
countries, foreign banks from at least one other nation were more efficient on average than 
domestic banks. More notably, US domestic banks were more profit efficient than foreign 
banks and they carried this efficiency advantage into European markets making them 
generally more profit efficient than domestic European banks (Berger et al., 2000). Another 
cross-country study of Miller and Parkhe (2002) for fourteen different nations (Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom) finds that domestic banks were more 
profit efficient than foreign banks (including the US banks). Similarly, some other studies 
focused on the US also report foreign banks were on average less efficient than domestic US 
banks in terms of profit efficiency (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996) and cost efficiency (Nolle, 
1995; Hasan and Hunter, 1996; Mahajan et al., 1996; Chang et al., 1998). 
Some other studies in the EU find that foreign institutions have about the same average 
efficiency level as domestic institutions. Vander Vennet (1996) finds that foreign banks in 
EU countries, three years after entering domestic markets through acquisition, have about the 
same cost efficiency level as domestic banks. Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (1998) find no 
significant difference of profit efficiency between the two groups in Spain. In Australia, 
however, the evidence is mixed. Interestingly, using the same DEA methodology, Sathye 
(2001a) finds that foreign banks were less efficient than domestic banks for a single year 
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1996 whereas Stun-n and Williams (2004) report the opposite results for the period 1988- 
200 1, which support the limited form of the global advantage hypothesis. 
In contrast to findings in developed countries, evidence from transition and developing 
countries shows that foreign banks can overcome cross-border disadvantages and appear to 
be more efficient than domestic banks. These findings generally support the global advantage 
hypothesis. Several recent studies of foreign ownership and performance focus on a single 
country. Isik and Hassan (2002) use both the DEA and SFA and report a superior efficiency 
performance of foreign banks compared with the domestic counterparts over the 1988-1996 
period in Turkey. This result is also in line with the previous study by Zaim (1995) for 
Turkish banks. For Croatia, using DEA, Jemric and Vujcic (2002) find that foreign banks are 
more efficient than domestic banks from 1995 to 2000. For Hungary, Hasan and Marton 
(2003) use SFA and show that foreign banks and banks with higher foreign ownership 
involvement were more profit efficient. They also find that foreign bank entry has had 
positive effects on the Hungarian banking system, making the whole banking system 
operated more efficiently during the transitional process from 1993 to 1998. Studying Polish 
banks from 1997 to 2000, using distribution-free approach, Nikiel and Opiela (2002) 
conclude that foreign banks (with focus on servicing foreigners and business customers) were 
more cost-efficient but less profit-efficient than other Poland domestic banks. For Argentina, 
Berger et al. (2005) find that foreign banks perform somewhat more poorly than domestic 
banks; and there was relatively little performance improvement or deterioration associated 
with foreign bank acquisitions. 
As with the individual country studies, cross-country studies of foreign ownership in 
developing and transition economies yield similar results. Grigorian and Manole (2002) use 
the DEA approach to estimate bank efficiency in seventeen transition economies of Eastern 
Europe and former Soviet Union from 1995 to 1998. They find strong evidence that foreign 
controlling ownership was associated with greater efficiency. Weill (2003) reports that 
foreign banks operated in Czech Republic and Poland were more cost efficient than their 
domestic peers in 1997. Bonin et al. (2005a) use SFA to analyse the performance of banks in 
eleven transition economies. They show that banks with majority foreign ownership (but 
without a strategic foreign owner) were more efficient by cost and profit measures, while 
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strategic foreign ownership improved only cost efficiency. In another paper, focusing on six 
relatively more advanced economies within the above eleven economies, they find an 
improvement of profit efficiency of privatised banks with controlling foreign owner. 
However this is not true for cost efficiency since no improvement in cost efficiency is found 
for these foreign-controlled banks (Bonin et al., 2005b). However, Fries and Taci (2005) 
report that privatised banks with majority foreign ownership were among the most cost 
efficient in 15 East European countries. 
3.2.3.2.2. Asian country studies 
There are only limited studies comparing efficiency between foreign and domestic banks in 
Asia. For India., Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Sathye (2001b) both find that foreign banks 
were somewhat more efficient than domestic private banks in the period 1986-1991 and 
1997-1998, respectively. Similar results are also found for the period from 1992 to 1999 by 
Shanmugarn and Das (2004). 
Focusing on SE Asian countries, Hao et al. (2001) find bank cost efficiency is positively 
correlated with foreign equity ownership in Korea from 1985 to 1995. For Thailand, 
Leightner et al. (1998) show that foreign banks operated with a higher level of efficiency 
compared with their domestic peers from 1989 to 1994. Also in Thailand, Williams and 
Intarachote (2002) find no difference of profit efficiency between foreign and Thai domestic 
banks for the period 1990-1997. However, they report that Japanese-owned banks are 
significantly more efficient, which supports the limited version of the global advantage 
hypothesis. A cross-country study of Williams and Nguyen (2005) finds that, amongst SE 
Asian countries, only in Korea was the long-term profit efficiency performance of foreign 
acquisitions greater than it was before governance change. 
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3.2-4. Domestic merger and acquisitions 
3.2.4.1. Theoretical framework 
Domestic consolidation (merger and acquisition or M&A) in the banking industry is 
undertaken for a wide variety of reasons. However, four main motives are often put forward 
to justify M&A activity, including: to exploit economies of scale or scope and improve X- 
efficiency; to increase in arket power; to diversify business and reduce risk; and d ue to 
managerial or government motives. 19 Consolidation of banking sectors in SE Asia, 
particularly in Malaysia, have been primarily motivated by government efforts to restructure 
the banking sectors and promote safe, sound and efficient financial systems in the aftermath 
of the Asian financial crisis. 
Consolidation is expected to improve efficiency in the banking sector in several ways. First, 
and perhaps the most commonly quoted source of potential gains from M&As, is the 
exploitation of scale economies. Economies of scale theory show that firms can reduce per- 
unit costs by increasing their scale of operation. Banks that increase their size by merging 
with others may have the opportunity to access cost-saving technologies, or to spread fixed 
costs over a larger base, thus reducing average costs and improving profitability. Second, 
consolidation can help banks achieve scope and product mix efficiencies of universal-type 
institutions (Berger et al., 2000). Molyneux et al. (1996) suggest that economies of scope can 
generate cost savings from delivering goods and services jointly through the same 
organisation rather than through specialised providers. Consolidation creates opportunities 
for banks to reduce per-unit costs due to synergies involved in producing multiple products 
within the same firm. Cost economies from consolidation may be realized from eliminating 
duplication in branch networks, functions and staff; or sharing physical inputs like offices or 
computer hardware; employing common information systems, investment departments, 
account service centres, or other operations; reusing managerial expertise or information. 
Finally, consolidation can improve X-efficiency in the sense that it leads to the replacement 
of inefficient managers with more efficient managers, and applying the 
best practice and 
advanced management techniques from both sides to the new entity. 
See Dermine (2002) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on consolidation motives. 
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3.2-4.2. Empirical evidence on the impact of domestic M&A on bank 
efficiency 
Over the last twenty years, substantial research has been devoted to the question whether or 
not M&As in the banking industry improve the efficiency of consolidating firms. Most 
studies in this area, however, concentrate on developed countries, especially the US and, to a 
lesser extent, the EU countries. Only two studies look at developing markets. 
3.2.4.2.1. Evidence from developed countries 
Studies in developed markets generally find mixed evidence of efficiency gains from 
domestic M&A activities. Overall, findings suggest that M&As have little impact on cost 
efficiency but have positive impact on profit efficiency when the revenue side is considered. 
3.2.4.2.1.1. Effect of domestic M&As on cost efficiency 
The evidences on the effects of the domestic M&A deals on cost efficiency in general are 
inclusive and vary by time and country. 
US bank M&As in the 1980s and early 1990s are found to have little or no impact on 
cost efficiency. 
Berger and Humphrey (1992) use the distribution-free approach to study the efficiency 
effects of bank mega mergers (in which each bank has over $1 billion in assets) occurring 
during the 1980s. They find that, on average, cost efficiency gains from mega mergers were 
very small and insignificant. These results were true even in very favourable conditional 
cases in which the acquirer was more efficient than the acquired bank or in which both banks 
had overlapping local markets. Shaffer (1993) employs the thick frontier approach to 
simulate the potential effects of hypothetical mergers between pairs of large banks in 1989 on 
cost efficiency. His results, from comparing predicted costs of 20,000 random pairings 
among 210 banks, show a very small, insignificant average cost saving 
(0.98%) after the 
deals, with larger improvements for inter-state mergers (than intra-state) and a substantial 
increase in costs for mergers among banks with assets exceeding 
$10 billion. Contrary to 
Berger and Humphrey (1992), Shaffer finds that there were potentially 
large X-efficiency 
gains from mergers between the most efficient 
banks and other banks providing that 
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managerial efficiencies from most efficient banks were transferred to its partners. Also 
during the 1980s, Peristiani (1997) uses the distribution-free approach to analyse the effects 
of 4,900 commercial and savings bank mergers in the U. S. He concludes that acquirers failed 
to improve X-efficiency after the mergers and this is true even for merger cases within the 
same market. This result is confirmed by DeYoung (1997) for US banks during the 1980s. 
DeYoung uses the thick frontier approach (TFA) for 338 M&A deals and reports that: only 
58% of deals gained improvement in cost efficiency; equally sized mergers yielded smaller 
than average cost efficiency improvements; and acquirers who had more experiences in 
M&A activities achieved higher efficiency improvements. 
Given the limited cost efficiency gains from previous merger studies, Rhoades (1998) 
analyses nine selected case studies. The M&As took place from the mid-to-late 1980s to the 
early 1990s. All mergers were horizontal (in-market) mergers; all of the acquirers were 
committed to cost cutting; and all of the acquirers were more efficient than their targets. 
Using TFA and financial ratio analysis Rhoades concludes that only four of the nine mergers 
were successful in improving cost efficiency. He explains that the main reason for this failure 
may be the difficulty in integrating data processing systems and operations. Other studies 
using simple cost ratios to analyse the cost efficiency effects of mergers in the US also find 
no substantial change in cost performance associated with bank mergers (Rhoades, 1993; 
Srinivasin, 1992; Pilloff, 1996). 
Studies of M&As in the EU give mixed cost efficiency effects. 
Vander Vennet (1996) uses SFA and a set of financial ratios to investigate cost efficiency 
effects of 422 domestic M&A transactions in 10 EU countries in the period 1988-1992. He 
finds that even though the acquirers were more efficient than the target banks, full 
acquisitions which involve large acquirers absorbing smaller competitors tend to deteriorate 
efficiency. However, contrary to DeYoung's (1997) findings for the US, Vander Vennet's 
results show that domestic mergers of equal partners in the EU improve cost efficiency 
significantly. For Italy, Resti (1998) uses DEA and finds Italian acquiring banks were 
significantly less efficient than the acquired banks; and the merged banks, on average, 
significantly improved cost efficiency after the merger, however, but tended to decrease 
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again in the third year. Similar to Vander Vennet (1996), Resti also finds greater efficiency 
gains when mergers are between two equally-sized banks and between banks operating in the 
same local markets. Cost efficiency gains are also found in Norway by Humphrey and Vale 
(2004) for 26 bank mergers over 1988-1997. 
Deterioration of bank efficiencies following M&As are found in Spain and Germany. For 
Spain, Lozano-Vivas (1998) finds that (using the thick frontier approach) bank mergers over 
1985-1991 period failed to generate significant reductions in costs for the average merging 
bank. This result is supported by a study using SFA by Carbo and Humphrey (2004) for 20 
mergers between saving banks over 1986-2000. For Germany, applying SFA to model 283 
mergers among Bavarian cooperative banks during the years of 1989-1997, Lang and Welzel 
(1999) find no evidence that pre-merger efficiency advantages of acquiring banks can 
transfer into the post-merger banks even after five or eight years. Instead, their results show a 
deterioration of cost efficiency following the mergers. 
3.2.4.2.1.2. Effect of domestic M&As on Profit Efficiency 
In contrast to cost efficiency, profit efficiency is found to improve following consolidation in 
the US whilst mixed evidence is found for European countries. 
Domestic M&As and profit efficiency evidence in the US 
Akhavein et al. (1997) use SFA and find that banking mega-mergers of the 1980s (69 deals 
from 1981-1989) significantly improved profit efficiency on average and most of the 
improvement is from increasing revenues rather than input (cost) efficiencies. In addition, 
they also report that improvements in profit efficiency are largest for the banks with the 
lowest efficiencies prior to merging, which had more capacity for improvement. This result is 
found for US mergers during the 1990s by Berger (1998) and more recently by Berger and 
Mester (2003). Both studies look at US bank mergers, large and small, from 1990 to 1997, 
and find that mergers improve profit efficiency and they ague that this efficiency gain could 
be achieved by shifting the composition of assets from securities to higher yielding 
loans to 
take advantage of diversification gains from the mergers. A similar result 
is reached when 
risk is incorporated in modelling profit efficiency (Hughes et al., 
1999). Based on data of 
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mergers of bank holding companies (BHCs) in the early 1990s, Hughes et al. conclude that 
merger banks experienced clear gains in efficiency and "the benefits of consolidation are 
strongest for those banks engaged in interstate expansion and, in particular, interstate 
expansion that diversifies banks' macroeconomic risk7' (p. 292). Some other studies using 
simple ratio analysis in the US also find improvement in the revenue side from M&A deals 
(see Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Spindt and Tarhan, 1993). 
Domestic M&As and evidence on productivity & profit efficiency gains in European 
and other developed countries 
Empirical research on the effect of domestic M&As on bank efficiency taking account of 
revenue side in European countries yields mixed results. Haynes and Thompson (1999) use 
an augmented production function approach to analyse the productivity effects of mergers of 
93 UK building societies over the period 1981-1993. As with findings in the US for the 
revenue side, the results indicate significant and substantial productivity gains following 
acquisition. These gains were not the result of economies of scale but from transferring of 
assets to the control of more productive managements. For Spain, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell 
(1996) report that consolidation of six Spanish saving banks during period 1986-1991 did not 
generally improve or reduce productive efficiency (derived from Malmquist indexes) in 
savings banks, and this due to the fact that consolidating savings banks catch up with best 
practice savings banks more slowly than other savings banks do. A similar result is found by 
Cuesta and Orea (2002) using different methodology (SFA) for Spanish saving banks 
mergers during the period 1985-1998. Cuesta and Orea find that the technical efficiency of 
merger banks decreased immediately following the deals but gradually increased after few 
years. 
Limited studies in developed Asian countries also provide mixed evidence on efficiency 
effects of domestic M&As. For Australia, using DEA, Avkiran (1999) finds that while 
acquiring banks (eight banks involved in M&As) were more efficient than target banks, the 
acquiring bank did not always maintain its pre-merger efficiency. On the contrary, using the 
same methodology, Liu and Tripe (2002) find mergers increased bank efficiency 
for six bank 
mergers between 1989 and 1998 in New Zealand. 
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3.2.4.2.2. Evidence from developing countries 
Empirical research on the efficiency effects of domestic M&As in developing countries is 
rarer. Lin (2001) uses SFA to estimate the cost inefficiency of 43 Taiwan commercial banks 
during the 1997-99 period. The author finds that, in contrast to findings in most developed 
countries, banks engaging in mergers in Taiwan, on average, improved cost efficiency. Later 
studies report similar findings. Peng and Wang (2004) also use SFA and report that bank 
mergers could enhance cost efficiency without need to reduce bank employees. The banks 
involved in mergers were generally small and established after the banking sector was 
deregulated (after 1991). More recently, using the same methodology for 46 Taiwanese 
commercial banks of which 13 banks engaged in mergers during 1997 and 1999, Lin (2005) 
finds that mergers between banks with different cultural backgrounds improved cost 
efficiency, whereas little or no cost efficiency improvement is found for mergers between 
homogeneous banks and between sound and unsound banks. Finally, Williams and Nguyen 
(2005) find that domestic M&As in SE Asia improved profit efficiency performance in the 
short-term but deteriorated in the long-term implying a temporary efficiency gain. 
In summary, the empirical findings generally suggest that whilst there is little or no 
improvement in cost efficiency associated with domestic M&As activities, profit efficiency is 
found to significantly improved following the deals. This due to the fact that profit efficiency 
is a more comprehensive measure, which embodies the efficiency effects for both costs and 
revenues, and also includes diversification effects (Berger et al., 1999). Consolidating banks 
tend to change the output mixes by shifting their asset portfolios from securities to higher 
yielding loans to take advantage of diversification gains from the mergers and therefore 
improve profit efficiency (Benston et al., 1995; Hughes et al., 1996; Berger and Mester, 
2003). 
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4. Data and methodology 
This section presents the methodology and data to be used to estimate bank efficiency in the 
five Asian crisis-affected countries. It will begin with the discussion of the bank production 
process, efficiency concepts, alternative estimation methods and the methods that will be 
employed in the study. Having chosen the methodology, it then describes data sources and 
the classification of data that will be used to construct the variables in the efficiency model. 
Finally, the constructed variables will be explored in detail to understand the structure of 
banking systems in each country as well as the environments in which banks operated. 
4.1. Methodology 
4.1.1. Bank production process: input and output choice 
Before understanding how to estimate bank efficiency we need to define the production 
process in banking. As with many other firms, banks can be viewed as financial firms that 
employ certain input resources and transform them into certain outputs. However, due to 
their multi-product nature, it is difficult to fully capture the wide range of bank activities. 
Problems arise as we cannot be certain of what constitutes banks' inputs or outputs. This is 
because unlike manufacturing firms, banks provide financial services rather than identifiable 
physical products and some products such as deposits can be treated as both output and input 
(in transforming into loans). As such, there is no consensus as to the precise definition of 
what banks produce and how service output can be measured. The bank efficiency literature 
has developed different approaches in choosing output and input, of which two main 
approaches are: the 'production approach' and the 'intermediation approach' (see Sealey and 
Lindley, 1977; Humphrey, 1985; Berger and Humphrey, 1990). 
In general, both the production and intermediation approaches agree to treat physical capital 
and labour as inputs used in bank production process. However, they are different in how to 
view deposits and how banks' inputs and outputs should be measured. The production 
63 
approach treats deposit as a part of outputs since it views bank as producers of services of 
which deposits are also one type of services provided. Because deposits are treated as output, 
this approach does not consider interest costs. The intermediation approach on the other hand 
sees deposits as a category of inputs since it views banks as financial intermediaries linking 
savers and investors rather than producing deposit and loan account services. Under this 
view, banks rely on deposit as input to produce other outputs such as loans and other eaming 
assets (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). As a result, this approach takes into account both interest 
costs and operating costs. With regard to measurement of outputs and inputs, the production 
approach use physical quantities such as the number of deposits or loan accounts, number of 
transactions perforined. On the other hand, the intermediation approach measures banks' 
outputs by the value of accounts or transactions rather than their quantities. 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) note that both approaches are imperfect because neither fully 
captures the dual role of financial institutions, which includes both the provision of 
transaction and document processing services, and the transfer of funds from savers to 
borrowers. Nevertheless, each approach has some advantages. The production approach may 
be better for evaluating the efficiencies of branches of financial institutions, because branches 
primarily process customers documents for the institution as a whole, and branch managers 
typically have little influence over bank funding and investment decisions. On the other hand, 
the intermediation approach may be more appropriate for evaluating entire financial 
institutions because this approach is inclusive of interest expenses, which often are a large 
part of total costs. Moreover, the intermediation approach may be superior for evaluating the 
importance of frontier efficiency to the profitability of financial institutions, since the 
minimisation of total costs (and not just production costs) is needed to maximise profits 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
In addition to the above two main approaches, there are other possible methods of assigning 
financial values to input and output categories: the 'value-added approach' and the 'user cost 
approach' (Berger and Humphrey, 1990). Under the value-added approach, all items on both 
sides of the balance sheet may be identified as inputs or outputs, depending on 
how much 
value added they contribute to a bank. For example, categories such as 
loans and deposits 
which have substantial value added will be treated as 
important outputs while government 
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securities are considered as 'unimportant' output because of their low value added. The user 
cost approach determines whether a final product is an input or an output on the ground of its 
net contribution to total bank revenue. Under this approach, a category is considered as 
output if its financial returns exceed the opportunity cost of funds (on asset side) or if its 
financial costs are less than the opportunity costs of funds (on liability side); otherwise it is 
an input (Hancock, 1985). 
In this study, we use the intermediation approach suggested by Sealey and Lindley (1977) for 
several reasons. First, because we evaluate efficiency of a bank as a whole, not for each 
branch, the intermediation approach is more suitable than the production approach. Second, 
data on quantity of accounts or transactions in SE Asian banks is not available for using the 
production approach. Third, because We also consider profit efficiency, as Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) suggest, the intermediation approach may be superior for evaluating the 
importance of frontier efficiency to the profitability of financial institutions. Finally, since 
most prior efficiency studies in SE Asia use the intermediation approach, using the same 
approach will allow us to compare easily our results with the previous findings. 
4.1.2. Definition of bank efficiency 
The efficiency concept, at micro economic (firm) level, is a relative measure of performance 
which shows how well a firm is to convert inputs into outputs. A firm is considered to be 
efficient if it can produce in an optimal manner in term of three criteria: size, product-mix 
and management. Based on these criteria, the banking literature has identified three main 
types of efficiency: scale economies, scope economies and X-efficiency. 
Scale economies refer to the potential benefits from increasing the size of production. Scale 
economies exist if average per unit costs decline as output increases, for example spreading 
fixed cost over more units of output and making better use of specialised labour and capital 
inputs. If average costs remain the same as output increases we have constant returns to scale, 
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and if they decrease we have diseconomies of scale. A fully scale efficient firm will operate 
at optimal scale of output which is the lowest point on the long-run average cost curve, where 
all the possible economies of scale have been achieved and the firm is not large enough to 
experience diseconomies of scale (Sinkey, 1992; Molyneux et al., 1996; DeYoung, 1997). 
Scope economies refer to the potential cost savings brought about by synergies involved in 
producing multiple products (product-mix) within the same firm, such as in universal 
banking. Potential costs savings may be realised from sharing inputs like offices, personnel, 
technology, and customers' information. Unlike scale economies, which are related to 
declining average costs for additional unit output produced, scope economies are related to a 
decline in the total cost when outputs are produced jointly in a single firm (branch) compared 
with producing them separately in different specialised firms (branches) (see Sinkey, 1992; 
Molyneux and Iqbal, 2004). Economies of scope are said to exist if the cost of joint 
production is less than the sum of the costs resulting from independent production. On the 
contrary, diseconomies of scope exist if joint production costs are higher than the sum of the 
independent production costs. 
X-Efficigncy, introduced by Leibenstein (1966), relates to efficiencies which are not derived 
from scale economies (size) or scope economies (product-mix) but from superior 
management quality and use of technology. Leibenstein (1966) notes that the nature of the 
management, the environment in which firm operates, and the incentives employed are 
important determinants of X-inefficiency, and these factors are in turn influenced by the 
degree of competition. In his view, X-inefficiency is mainly due to lack of competitive 
pressure or the fin-n does not have the opportunity to observe and learn from other more 
efficient firms in the industry. In general, the concept of X-efficiency incorporates both 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiena refers to banks' ability to 
either maximise outputs given level of inputs or minimise inputs given levels of outputs, 
whereas allocative efficiency reflects banks' ability to combine input and output in optimal 
proportions given prevailing prices. Failure to achieve both technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency results in X-inefficiency, which is measured as the deviation of bank 
from the optimal or "best-practice" frontier- a predicted frontier observed in the industry 
(Molyneux et al., 1996; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
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X-efficiency can be cost or profit X-efficiency depending on whether one wishes to take 
account for input side (cost X-efficiency) or both input and output sides (profit X-efficiency). 
In this sense, X-inefficiency reflects managerial ability to control costs and/or maximise 
revenues. Cost X-efficiency tells us how close the estimated cost of a bank is to the estimated 
best-practice (lowest) bank cost. Profit X-efficienc shows how close the estimated profit of 
a bank is to the maximum or best-practice bank profit. Berger and Mester (1997) note that the 
ideal instrument to study the relative efficiency of different firms would be the profit 
function. The profit efficiency concept is considered to be superior to cost efficiency for 
evaluating the overall performance of the firm because, first, it accounts for inefficiency on 
both the input side and output side. Second, profit efficiency is based on the more accepted 
economic goal of profit maximisation, which requires that the same amount of managerial 
attention be paid to raising a marginal dollar of revenue as to reducing a marginal dollar of 
costs (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997). 
Therefore, the ideal concept to study the relative efficiency of the different kinds of banks 
would be a standard profit function. However, a standard profit function requires reliable 
price data for outputs, which are generally unavailable. Instead, we use a non-standard profit 
function (NSPF) to estimate alternative profit efficiency which provides a measure of how 
close a bank comes to earning maximum profits given its output levels rather than its output 
prices (Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). It should also be noted that, according to Berger and 
Mester (1997), the alternative profit specification is preferred over standard profit 
specification when (1) there are differences in the quality of banking services, (2) markets are 
not perfectly competitive so that banks might have some market power in pricing their 
outputs, (3) outputs are not completely variable, so that banks can not achieve every output 
scale and product mix, and (4) output prices are not available. Khumbhakar (2006), however, 
argues that because duality results do not hold for NSPF, the only use of NSPF is to estimate 
profit inefficiency (profit loss due to technical inefficiency). For example, one cannot obtain 
estimates of returns to scale, input elasticities from the estimated nonstandard profit function. 
It will be pointed out later that SE Asian banks are very different in terms of 
balance sheet 
structure and the quality of service provided; they also operate under 
different market 
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structures, regulations. Therefore, it is more appropriate to employ the alternative profit 
specification for cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, the standard profit function 
requires an assumption of perfectly competitive markets which is not a realistic assumption 
for developing banking systems such as in SE Asia since markets are still considered to be in 
their developing stage. 
In this study, we will focus on estimating cost X-efficiency and alternative profit X- 
efficiency for SE Asian banks since X-efficiencies have been shown to be more important in 
determining overall firm and market performance than scale or scope efficiencies (Berger 
and Humphrey, 199 1). In their review of bank efficiency, Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) 
indicate that X-inefficiencies account for on the order of 20% or more of costs in banking, 
while scale and product mix inefficiencies are usually found to account for less than 5% of 
costs. Similarly, a later survey by Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggests that X-efficiencies 
are within range of 20 to 30 percent, and they tend to dominate the effects of scale and scope 
economies. The next session will briefly review different methods which can be used to 
estimate X-efficiency. 
4.1.3. Estimation of efficiency 
Estimation of efficiency dates back to the pioneering work of Farrell (195 7), who proposed a 
deterministic non-parametric method for measuring the technical efficiency of a firm in an 
industry by estimating a production frontier. Since then, several extensions of Farrell's model 
have been developed but most models are still based on his idea where there is a best-practice 
frontier against which relative efficiency is estimated. So far, however, there is no consensus 
as to the preferred method for determining the best-practice frontier. In general, these 
methods differ primarily in term of the functional form of the best practice-frontier and 
whether or not the random error is taking into account. Based on these criteria, there are 
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broadly two approaches used to estimate efficiency frontier: non-parametric and parametric 
approaches. 20 
4.1.3.1. Non-parametric approaches 
Non-parametric or linear-programming approaches do not specify any specific functional 
form of the best-practice frontier. Also, these approaches do not account for random error in 
estimating efficiency. There are two main non-parametric approaches: Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH). 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) was developed by Charnes et al. (1978) based on 
Farrell's (1957) work. Technically, it is a linear programming technique used to construct the 
efficient frontier and to measure efficiency relative to the constructed frontiers. The efficient 
frontier is approximated through an envelope of hyper-planes in input/output space. More 
specifically, the efficient frontier is formed as the piecewise linear combinations that connect 
the set of 'best-practice observations', yielding a convex production possibility set. This 
explains why DEA does not require the explicit specification of the form of the underlying 
production relationship (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). In DEA, the inefficiency score of a 
firm is calculated in relative to the best practice firm in the efficient frontier. 
The Free Disposal Hull approach (FDH), developed by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984) is 
a special case of DEA. This approach differs from DEA in that it does not take into 
consideration the convexity assumption of the production possibility set, which means that 
the points on lines connecting the DEA vertices are not included in the frontier. Therefore, 
the FDH production possibilities set is composed only of the DEA vertices and the free 
disposal hull points interior to these vertices (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Because FDH 
frontier is either congruent with or interior to the DEA frontier, FDH will typically generate 
20 Previous studies also use financial ratios as measure of bank efficiency. However in this study we only focus 
on efficiency derived from more complicated econometric techniques due to many shortcomings of using 
financial ratios. For example, Berger et a]. (1993) argue that financial ratios may be misleading indicators of 
efficiency because they do not control for product mix or input prices. As such, studies using a cost-to-asset 
ratio implicitly assume that all assets are equally costly to produce and all locations have equal costs of doing 
business. 
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larger efficiency estimates than DEA (Tulkens, 1993). The FDH approach allows for a better 
approximation or "envelopment" of the observed data when the assumption of convexity is 
incorrect. 
The main advantage of these non-parametric approaches is that they do not need to make 
prior assumptions regarding the functional form of the best-practice frontier. In addition, 
non-parametric methods like DEA can work with limited sample sizes (Evanoff and 
Israilevich, 1991). However, the key drawback to the nonparametric approaches lies in their 
assumption of no random error which may allow for measurement errors in data to affect 
efficiency scores. As such, any deviation from the estimated frontier is considered as 
inefficiency which may be overestimated. 
4.1.3.2. Parametric approaches 
Unlike non-parametric approaches, parametric approaches assume an explicit functional form 
to estimate the best-practice frontier. In addition, these approaches avoid the shortcoming of 
non-parametric approaches by taking account of random errors when estimating inefficiency. 
There are three main parametric approaches to the estimation of the best-practice frontier: 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), Distribution Free Approach (DFA) and Thick Frontier 
Approach (TFA). These approaches defer primarily in the assumed distributions of the 
random error (or stochastic) tenn. 
The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) was developed by Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977). SFA specifies a functional form for the cost, profit or production 
function (which could include environmental factors) and allows for random error. This 
model assumes that the inefficiency term (ýL) follows an asymmetric distribution (because 
inefficiencies cannot be negative), while the random error term (v) follows a symmetric (two- 
sided) standard normal distribution. The total error term is given by 6 == ýt + v. 
Both the 
inefficiencies and the random error are assumed to be orthogonal to the 
inputs, outputs, 
environmental factors or other exogenous variables specified 
in the estimating equation 
(Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). The estimated inefficiency of any 
firin is taken as the conditional 
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mean or mode of the distribution of the inefficiency term (ýL) given the observation of the 
composed error term (e) (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
The Stochastic Frontier approach is quite flexible in dealing with data. It allows researchers 
to work with both cross-sectional data as well as panel data. However, the half-normal 
assumption for the distribution of inefficiency is claimed to be rather inflexible, other more 
flexible distributions, such as the truncated normal or the gamma distributions may be more 
appropriate (Greene, 1990; Stevenson, 1980; Yuengert, 1993; Mester, 1996). However, this 
may make it difficult to separate inefficiency from random error since the truncated normal 
and gamma distributions may be close to the symmetric normal distribution assumed for the 
random error (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). There is no consensus as to the most appropriate 
type of distribution of the inefficiency term (ýi), for example, whilst Greene (1990) maintains 
that the distributional assumptions do not have much impact on the efficiency estimates, 
Bauer et al. (1998) argue that any arbitrarily chosen distributional assumptions can lead to 
significant error in estimating individual firm efficiencies. 
The distribution-free approach (DFA) also specifies a functional form for the frontier, but 
unlike SFA, DFA makes no strong assumptions regarding the specific distributions of the 
inefficiencies or random errors. Under this approach, the efficiency differences are assumed 
to be stable, whereas random error tends to average out to zero over time (Berger et al., 1993; 
Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Therefore, unlike SFA, DFA usually requires a panel data set 
with reasonable time period so that the random error term finds enough time to be average 
out to zero. Under DFA, inefficiency for each firm is the difference between its average 
residual and the average residual of the firm on the frontier, with some truncation performed 
to account for the failure of the random component to average out to zero (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). Another way is to use fixed effects estimation, with a separate dummy 
variable specified for each finn. Each firm's dummy variable coefficient represents its 
inefficiency score (Lang and Welzel, 1996). Consequently, DFA provides only one 
efficiency estimation over the period analysed. Therefore this approach may not be useful if 
efficiency is changing over time due to financial or regulatory reform, technical change, 
business cycle, or other influences. 
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The Thick Frontigr Approach (TFA), proposed by Berger and Humphrey (1991), assumes 
that random errors are deviations from predicted performance values within the highest and 
lowest performance quartiles of observations (stratified by size class), while inefficiencies 
are the deviations in predicted performance between the highest and lowest quartiles. This 
approach imposes no distributional assumptions on either the inefficiencies or the random 
error, except to assume that inefficiencies differ between the highest and lowest quartile and 
that random error exists within these quartiles (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). An advantage 
of this approach is that it reduces the effect of extreme points in the data since the 
inefficiencies estimated are obtained against the most cost/profit efficient 25% of firms (the 
thick frontier), rather than a single most cost/profit efficient firm. However, the main 
drawback of this approach is that it does not provide efficiency for individual firm but for 
general level of overall efficiency of the industry. 
Given the differences between parametric and non-parametric approaches, efficiency levels 
or ranks derived from these two approaches are generally different (see Bauer et al., 1998). It 
is not possible to determine which of the two major approaches dominates the other since the 
true level of efficiency is unknown. There is a lack of agreement among researchers 
regarding a preferred frontier model. The parametric approaches have the shortcoming of 
imposing a particular functional form that presupposes the shape of the frontier. If the 
functional form is misspecified, measured efficiency may be confounded with the 
specification errors. Although the nonparametric approaches can avoid imposing functional 
form on the frontier, they do not allowing for random error owing to luck, data problems, or 
other measurement errors. If random error exists, measured efficiency may be confounded 
with these random deviations from the true efficiency frontier (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
However, compared with the non-parametric approaches, the parametric approaches are 
found to be more consistent with the standard nonfrontier measures of performance (ROA, 
ROE, cost ratios, etc. ); and they are also more consistent with what are generally believed to 
be the competitive conditions in banking markets (Bauer et al., 1998). 
Within parametric approaches, we use SFA because it allows us (i) to estimate efficiency for 
individual banks (which is not available in TFA) in order to investigate effect of ownership 
types on bank efficiency, (ii) to examine the shift in efficiency levels over time (which is 
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again not avai able in DFA) due to financial deregulations and reforms in SE Asian banking. 
The remaining concern is which functional form should be used for the best-practice frontier 
in SFA. To tackle the problem arising when the true functional form of the relationship is 
unknown we use the Fourier flexible functional form. This functional form is expected to 
greatly increase the flexibility of the frontier by allowing for many inflection points and by 
including essentially orthogonal trigonometric terms that help fit the frontier to the data 
wherever it is most needed (Gallant, 198 1; Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The Fourier 
dominates the translog functional form that is commonly applied in bank efficiency studies 
(see Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997). For example, Ivaldi et al. (1996) 
find the Fourier better captures sample heterogeneity compared with the translog, and the 
local point estimate produced by the translog functional form is inappropriate to approximate 
the true or underlying technology of an industry. Humphrey and Vale (2004) find that Fourier 
cost function is better than translog in predicting efficiency gains from mergers. 
4.1.4. Preferred econometric framework 
This section presents our preferred methodology for estimating bank performance. We use 
stochastic frontier and Fourier flexible functional form methodologies to estimate bank cost 
and alternative profit efficiency (Section 4.1.4.1). In the model, bank inefficiency is 
expressed as a function of a vector of governance indicators (Section 4.1.4.2). Since we 
estimate a common frontier, the two bank performance measures are reported in rank order 
(Section 4.1.4.3). 
4.1.4.1. Stochastic frontier and functional form methodologies 
In this study, cost and alternative profit inefficiencies are estimated using the stochastic 
frontier and Fourier flexible form methodologies and under the intermediation approach. 
SFA incorporates a two component error term. The first error component is symmetric and 
captures the random variation of the frontier across 
firms, statistical noise, measurement 
error, and random shocks that are external to the 
firm's control. The second error component 
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is a one-sided variable that captures inefficiency in relation to the frontier. With regard to the 
Fourier flexible functional form, following Berger and Mester (1997), we apply the 
trigonometric Fourier terms only for output, leaving the input price effects to be defined 
entirely by the translog terms .21 The bank production process is modelled using the 
intermediation approach which considers banks to be financial intermediaries that purchase 
input in order to generate earning assets (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). 
Our cost and profit function model estimates a cross-border best practice efficiency frontier. 
This is a contentious choice because it assumes that fundamental cross-country differences 
can be controlled for (see Berger et al., 2000). Nevertheless, our options are limited given the 
small numbers of commercial banks in each country (except Indonesia). We control for 
differences in various types of bank risk including credit risk (asset quality) and 
capitalisation. 22 Additionally, we specify five country specific economic indicators as well as 
banking sector structure indicators, which have been applied elsewhere to control for cross- 
border differences 
. 
23 Controlling for cross-country differences is important because different 
countries have very different banking technologies, regulatory conditions and economic 
environments. The bank efficiency literature shows that these differences could induce 
significant differences of bank efficiency across countries if they are not controlled for (Fried 
et al., 1999; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Chaffai et al., 200 1; Lozano-Vivas et al., 200 1; 
Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Tone, 2001; Drake et al., 2006). 
The cost and alternative profit efficiency model has three outputs, two variable inputs and 
two fixed netputs. Fixed netputs are used in the model to account for their effects on variable 
costs and profits due to substitutability or complementarity with variable netputs (outputs and 
inputs) (Berger and Mester, 1997). The model specification for the cost function and 
alternative profit function are shown in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), respectively: 
21 Following Berger and Mester (1997), 10% is cut off each end of the [0,2n] interval so that the zi span [0.1 x 
27r, 0.9 x 27c] in order to reduce approximation problems near endpoints. The formula for zi is 0.2a -gxa+ ýt x 
variable, where [a, b] is the range of the variable being transformed, and ji -= (0.9 x 2n - 
0.1 x 2n)/(b-a). 
22 See McAllister and McManus (1993), Mester (1996), Berger and Mester (1997), and Hughes et al. (2001). 
23 Details on environmental variables are shown in Apendix 1. 
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In(VC) , used 
in cost function, is the natural logarithm of variable cost (including 
interest expenses and operating costs); 
In(OP) . used 
in alternative profit function, is the natural logarithm of operating profit 
where a constant term, 0, is added if any bank reports an operating loss. (0 is equal to 
the absolute of minimum operating profit plus one so that the natural log is taken of a 
positive number); 
33 
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T is a time trend; 
ln(Q, ) is the natural logarithm of bank output (loans, other earning assets, net 
noninterest income); 
In(p) is the natural logarithm of i'ýh variable input prices, including the prices of 
financial capital (interest paid on deposits and short-term funding costs) and labour 
(personnel and other administrative expenses); 
ln(Z, ) is the natural logarithm of fixed netput quantities (physical capital and equity); 
ln(Riski) is the natural logarithm of bank risk indicators; credit risk (loan loss 
reserve/gross loans), liquidity risk (gross loans/customer deposits), and capital risk 
(equity/assets); 
ln(Countryi) is the natural logarithm of country specific factors; GDP Per capita, 
population density (population per km), deposit density (deposits per km), mean 
equity assets (indicator of the state of regulation), and mean loans-deposits (indicator 
of the efficiency of intermediation) and Herfindahl Hirschman Index of concentration 
of banking sector (HHI); 
X, are the adjusted values of the log of output in (Q) such that they span the interval 
[0,21u]; 
Ci are random variables which are assumed to be identical and independently 
distributed, N(O, aeý ); 
, ui are non-negative random variables which 
are assumed to account for inefficiency 
and are assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at zero of the 
N(m,,, (7 P, 
) distribution, where: m,, = Z,, a 
where 
Z,, is a px I vector of governance variables which may influence the 
efficiency banks; and 6 is an I xp vector of parameters to be estimated. 
In cost equation (1), "+ Inui " denotes the inefficiency that increases costs, 
whereas "- Inu in alternative profit equation (2) denotes the inefficiency that 
reduces profits. 
p, ? \,, W, 01 ý5 K5 Qý tu, a, b, p and X are the parameters to 
be estimated using 
maximum likelihood methods. 
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Standard asymmetry of the second order parameters has to be imposed on the translog 
portion of the function: nkr = f2rkandO)ki = (Oki. In addition, the following linear restrictions 
on (1) and (2) are necessary for linear homogeneity in input prices: 
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L V/ 
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In these models, cost, profit and output variables are normalised by equity capital( Z2 ). This 
normalisation controls for heteroskedasticity, scale biases, and other estimation biases. 
Larger banks tend to have higher profits for a given set of prices thank to their size advantage. 
The normalisation by equity capital makes dependant variables equally achievable for all 
banks. Equity capital is preferred over fixed assets because first, it provides a more economic 
meaning since the dependant variable in profit function essentially becomes ROE, a common 
measure of profitability. Second, equity capital is generally much larger than fixed assets in 
banking and therefore it can be better used to normalise large cost, profit and output variables. 
Similarly, all the cost, profit, price of financial capital terms are normalised by the price of 
labour, P2. in order to impose linear homogeneity on the model (Berger and Mester, 1997, 
1999). 
4.1.4.2. Technical inefficiency effects model 
Our preferred methodology is the technical inefficiency effects model of Battese and Coelli 
(1995). This is a "one-step" procedure in which the inefficiency effects (, "j) are expressed 
as an explicit function of a vector of firm-specific variables (Zi, ) and a random error. 
24 This 
one-step procedure is proved to be superior compared with the "two-step" methods, 
in which 
the first step is the estimation of a standard model that ignores the effect of 
Z,, on 
24 The "one-step" model was proposed by Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991). 
However, the Battese and Coelli's (1995) model differs with the previous models. 
In Battese and Coelli's 
(1995) model, allocative efficiency is imposed and the 
first-order profit maximising conditions are removed. 
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inefficiency, and the second step is a regression of some measure of inefficiency on Z,,, It 
has long been recognised that such a two-step procedure will give biased results, because the 
model estimated at the first step is misspecified, i. e. it suffers from an omitted variables 
problem (Caudill and Ford, 1993; Caudill et al., 1995; Battese and Coelli, 1995; Wang and 
Schmidt, 2002). 
Using the technical inefficiency effects model, we can directly determine the effect of bank 
governance, and changes therein following the restructuring programmes on bank 
inefficiency. Following Berger et al. (2005) we select a vector of governance indicators as 
predictors of bank inefficiency; in addition, and following Nakane and Weintraub (2005), we 
specify two exit variables (closed and absorbed) due to changes in the composition of the 
panel dataset following bank restructuring. The Berger et al. (2005) method captures the 
static, selection, and dynamic effects of changes in bank governance on bank performance. 
The governance indicators are specified by dummy variables. The static dummy is applied to 
banks whose ownership or governance structure did not change between 1985 and 2004. The 
static governance indicators show domestic private-owned banks, state-owned and foreign- 
owned banks. The selection dummy is given to banks that were selected for either foreign 
acquisition, domestic M&A, restructuring, or privatisation. There are two dynamic variables 
allowing us to separate the short-term effects of governance change from the longer term. 
The short-term dynamic dummy variable of I is given to banks when a governance change 
takes place and for each year afterwards. The long-term dummy variable is applied in the 
second year after the governance change has taken place and it equals two in that year, three 
in the next year and so on. The static dummy variable that identifies domestic private-owned 
banks is excluded from the model, which allows the coefficients to be interpreted with 
respect to domestic private ownership. Theoretically, the repeal of the state ownership is 
expected to co-ordinate the behaviour of banks selected for privatisation with that of 
domestic private-owned banks: that is, to increase shareholder value through profit 
maximisation. 
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The technical inefficiency effects model is shown in Eq. (3). 
Ineffi, = (50 +, 5, closed+ o52absorbed + 453For - all 
+ i5, State - all + i55Sel - 
For + (56Sel_pri + (57Sel -M&A+ 
58Sel 
- 
Res 
+ o59For_ST + i5loPri_ST + o5jIM &A- ST+g 2Res - 
ST 
+(5,3For_LT+ 05,4Pri_LT+ 
g, 
5M& A_LT +05,6Res-LT 
+(5,71n(Assets)+ '5,8Year + i5, gYear 
2+W 
it 
A description of the variables in Eq. (3) is presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Description of governance indicator variables 
Indicator (5 Description 
Exit variables 
Closed 15, 
Absorbed 052 
(3) 
Dummy indicating a bank was closed down by the authorities after the financial 
crisis of 1997. Equals I for closed bank, 0 otherwise 
Dummy indicating bank assets and liabilities were transferred to another bank 
after the financial crisis of 1997. Equals I for absorbed bank, 0 otherwise 
Static governance indicators 
Dummy indicating a domestic private-owned bank in which there was no change 
Dom-Pri in governance between 1985 and 2004. Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank. 
Excluded from the model as the base case 
For_aII (33 
Dummy indicating a foreign-owned bank in which there was no change in 
governance between 1985 and 2004. Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank 
State_all 45 
Dummy indicating a state-owned bank in which there was no change in 
4 governance between 1985 and 2004. Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank 
Selection governance indicators 
Sel-For (55 
Dummy indicating a bank that underwent at least one foreign acquisition between 
1985 and 2004. Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank 
Sel Pri 05 
Dummy indicating a state-owned bank that was privatised (either fully or 
6 partially) between 1985 and 2004. Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank 
Sel-M&A (57 
Dummy indicating a bank that underwent at least one domestic M&A between 
1985 and 2004. Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank 
Dummy indicating a domestic bank that was restructured between 1985 and 2004. 
Sel-Res '58 Equals I or 0 for all periods for a bank. Note: we define restructuring to 
include 
nationalisation, public sector recapitalisation, and government-induced M&A 
Dynamic governance indicators (short term and long term) 
Dummy indicating the years following foreign acquisition. Equals 0 before 
For_ST 59 acquisition and I after. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo foreign 
acquisition. 
Pri ST (510 
Dummy indicating the years following bank privatisation. Equals 0 prior to 
privatisation and I after. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo privatisation. 
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Table 5: Description of governance indicator variables (continue) 
Indicator 
M&A ST 
Res ST 
For_LT 
Pri-LT 
M&A_LT 
Res LT 
Description 
(511 
(512 
Dummy indicating the years following domestic M&A. Equals 0 prior to domestic 
M&A and I after. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo a domestic M&A 
Dummy indicating the years following bank restructuring. Equals 0 prior to bank 
restructuring and I after. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo restructuring 
Dummy indicating the years following foreign acquisition. Equals 0 prior to 
acquisition and 2,3,4,..., afterwards. Starts in the second year following the 
governance change. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo foreign acquisition 
Dummy indicating the years following privatisation. Equals 0 prior to 
privatisation and 2,3,4,..., afterwards. Starts in the second year following the 
governance change. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo privatisation 
Dummy indicating the years following domestic M&A. Equals 0 prior to M&A 
and 2,3,4,..., afterwards. Starts in the second year following the governance 
change. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo M&A 
Dummy indicating the years following restructuring. Equals 0 prior to 
restructuring and 2,3,4,... afterwards. Starts in the second year following the 
governance change. Equals 0 for all banks that did not undergo restructuring 
(513 
(514 
(515 
(516 
Control variables 
In(Assets) (517 
Year (518 
Year' (519 
wit 
The natural logarithm of bank total assets in real (1995) US dollars (million) 
Trend variable (1985 = 2004= 20) 
Quadratic term of trend variable 
Error term 
4.1.4.3. Rank analysis 
In order to circumvent some of the anomalies associated with performance levels especially 
when they are drawn from a common frontier, we follow the recommendations of Berger and 
DeYoung (2002) and Berger et al. (2004) and report rank order bank performance. Berger et 
al. (2004) claim ranks are more comparable across countries and over time because the 
performance levels '... may be very different, depending on conditions in the nation and time 
period' (Berger et al., 2004, p. 14). Thus, we estimate and report the average rank 
perfon-nance according to bank governance structures in each country. For example, we 
convert the estimated profit efficiencies of Indonesian banks into a rank order and calculate 
sample means and standard deviations for each type of bank governance. 
The conversion to 
ranks is carried out using the formula (orderit - 1)/(nt - 1), where orderit 
is the place in the 
ascending order of the ith bank in the tth period in terms of 
its efficiency level and nt is the 
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number of banks in the country in the period. The bank with the poorest Performance has the 
rank of 0 [(1 - 1)/(nt - 1)] whereas the best performing bank has the highest rank of I [(nt - 
1)/(nt - 1)]. The interpretation of the rank ordering is as follows. Let us assume the average 
rank profit efficiency of banks selected for privatisation in one country equals 0.80. This 
means the average bank selected for privatisation is more efficient than 80% of banks in that 
country during the period. 
4.2. Data classification and analysis 
4.2.1. Data sources and classification 
The bank financial statements data were sourced from the BankScope and IBCA databases 
whilst macroeconomic data were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics and 
the Asian Development Bank. In order to qualify bank ownership, we relied on the 
aforementioned databases., bank websites, and academic sources that have detailed changes in 
banking ownership including privatisations. 2S 
Table 6 shows the number of banks and sample coverage by year and country. Our dataset 
covers 250 commercial banks between 1985 and 2004 yielding a sample of 2,713 
observations. The dataset is an unbalanced panel and some discussion is needed to explain 
changes in the sample. The fall in the number of banks between 1996 and 1998 was mostly 
due to bank closures and absorptions (transfers of assets and liabilities to other banks) and 
mainly applied to Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, Korea. In Malaysia, the policy of creating 
"anchor banks" as holding companies mostly explains the drop in bank numbers after 1999. 
Although Indonesian banks in the sample are relatively higher than other countries, they 
cover only around 35% of total commercial banks in this country. In general, number of 
banks and sample coverage increased over time, with the highest sample coverage 
in 
25 See Ariff et al. (2001), Batunanggar (2002), Chou (2000), Enoch et al. 
(2001a), Gochoco-Bautista (1999), 
Halim (2000), Ji and Park (1999), Kang (2003), Kawai and Takayasu (1999), Kim and Lee 
(2004), Kim (1999), 
Lindgren et al. (2000), Megginson (2005), Oh (2001), Oh 
(1999), Pangestu and Habir (2002), and Ro (2001). 
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Malaysia, followed by the Philippines. The low coverage rate in Korea and Thailand and 
Indonesia is partly due to unavailable data of foreign banks. For instance, from 1994 the 
sample covers almost 100% of domestic banks in Korea and Thailand. 
Table 6: Numbers of banks and sample coverage (%) by country and year; 1985-2004 
Year Indonesia 1 Korea 1, Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
I 
Total 
1 52% 61 n. a 15 n. a 1985 16 14% 15 
........... 
I 
.......... 
n. a n. a .......... i- .......................... . .. ................. ...................... .................. ... . ... ............... - ---- ------- ........ ........... .... .... . ....... ...................... ......... . ... . ........... . ............................. .......................... 52% 79 1986 17 15% 18 n. a 15 n. a 14 1 45% 15 
........ . ....... I ........ ... I ............ . .... ............................ ............................. . .... t .......... .............. .............. ... ......... . 
I-- 
iI ...................... ..................... ...... ...... . .................................. 
i 86 15 16 16 1987 20 19 i1i........... ........ ... ........ ............. I ............. ............................ .................. . .............. ........... ......... . ... .... ...... ................. ... ................................... ......... . .......... ..... .......... ............... . ............ ... ..... . ............ 52% 89 1988 22 n. a 17 n. a 16 53% 1 15 . ............. ............. I .......... .... ..... ........... ................ ........................... 20% 19 
... ........ .... ....... ............................. ............. .......... ........ ............... .......... ................ ......... ....................... .......... ........... ................ 1989 23 n. a 22 17 16 15 
1 93 
..... ..... .... .............. ..... ............... .I.. ................. 4. ....................................................... 
...... ............. ....... ... 
........................ ................ ............. ............ ......... ... .... .. 
4.... .... ............. 
............ .... . ... . ...... . ................................... ................ .............. .7 
........ ........ ............. 1990 ý 26 15% 22 29% 
1 20 1 54% 17 57% 15 52% 100 
...... ...... . ............ . ............................ . ....... .... . ................................................ .... ...... ............ .............. ................... ................. ..... ................... . ............. ... .......... ......... ........... ... ........ .......... ...... ......... ........ ......... 0 15 112 
......... ... ...... .......... .................. ... .... ......... .............. 1991 34 
26 2 17 
.............. ..................................... ..... ................ ................................... ................... .................................. . ........ ................ ................................. .... ... . ............ ...... ... 1 52% 144 4% 19 15 1992 61 34% 29 n. a 1 20 15 59% 1 ............... ... .......... . ........................ . .......... ................. ........... .... ....... ................................... ........ ... .... .... .................... 7 ........................ ........................ ................. _ ........... ........... . ............................. ................. .............. .......... ..... .................... 1993 30 17 22 15 
155 71 
................ .... ................ .......................... . ........ ... . ................................. ......... ........................ ..... ...... ..................................... . ......................... ........ ...... ........... . ........... ........ ...... ............. ..... ............. 
. .......... ...... . ....... ............ ... 
............ .................... 140% 
70% 22 67%; 15 1994 80 30 
52% 173 1 39% 1 26 
.......... . ... . ........ ..... ........ ............. . ............ ..... ............ ...................... 
.... ....... .......................... ...................... ........... .................. ......... .......... 
.............. .... .............. ....... ............. .......... ....... ..... ........ ..... T .......... 
1995 86 29 16 
198 30 37 1 
........... ............. ...... .............................. ............... . ......... ........ .................. ....... ...... . .......... .................. ................. . ................... ................................... . .............................. 
... . ... ..... ...... ...... ..... . ....... ...................... ........ ............... 30 55% 201 61%: 17 
... ........ . 1996 85 : 43%, 31 142%1 38 100% ......................... ....... ...... . ............................................ . ....... . ... . ....... . ..................... . ............. . ...... ......... ........ .............. ................... ........ ....................... ......... . ............................. ........................ 
. ......... ................ 
38 34 18 191 32 
4 ...... ... ....... ............. .......... .... 1997 69 ....... . ........ ................ ........... ................... ......... .... ........................... ........... 0 66% 15 76 66 32% 23 30% 37 10( 
41% 1 
........... ............. ........... .................... ..... . ............................ ... . ......................... .... .................. . ............... QQR .......... I .................... . ................................... .... ............. . ....... I 15 172 
i 34 36 .... ..................... ................................... 21 1999 66 i ............. .................. ... . ... . .................... ...... ...... . ...... .............. ..... ..... . ......... 
...................................... * ...... 
..... ......... . ............ .. 
------ -- ------ -- ---- ----- ------------------- I ................. ................................. ................ ... . ...... 15 44% 147 0 27 61% 0 ... ........ 2000 59 39% 29% 27 i ....................... 19 1 ... ......... ....... . ..................... .............................. ..... .................... ................... ........ ........ ..... .............. ......... .......... ... ........... ....... ......................... . .......... .................. ........ . ........................................... ................. 137 1 15 19 26 .......... ...................... ... . ... ........ . 2001 53 ........................ ........... ............... ............... . ................. . ...... ................... .......... .............. . .................................. ........................... . ... .................. ............... . ........... . ............ ........... 15 48% 140 71% 10000 
... ..... . .................... .... . ..... ... ........ ..... 27 18 31% ...... . ..... .................... .............. ............................ 35% 2002 50 : ................................ . .................................. .... ............. Ii ...... . ......... ....... . ...... 
2003 47 
.............. 
]LOD 30 
... ........ .... ..... ..................... .... .......... .................................. 25 ................................. ................ .................. ......... . ... . .... . ...................... ... . ................. ......... . ..................... ................... 124 15 50% 24 -lao/ 57% A 1) 1)1)0/- 4 ..... ..................................... .................. ... . ...... ZUU4 0 JLU m ýý a /w :-: -............... ........................ . ......... ............ ........ ............ .............................. ............. ................... ................. ........ ........ ... . ................ ..................... .... . ............ . ............. - .......... .... . ............. 
994 459 498 
ACK 
Sources: National Central Banks' reports; BankScope and author's estimates 
We have data for at least 20 years for 20% of the sample, 
10 years for more than 54% of the 
sample, whilst 91% of the sample report 
for at least five of the 20 years. 
Table 7 reports 
sample classification by ownership 
type and country. The static governance 
indicators 
identify banks that did not undergo any change to 
their governance between 1985 and 2004. 
Of these banks roughly 17.4% of Indonesian were 
domestic private-owned compared with 
over 36% of Filipino 
banks and less than 7% of Korean banks and 
Thai banks, whereas there 
82 
was no static domestic private-owned bank in Malaysia. Malaysia had the largest amount of 
foreign ownership at 27.3%, followed (in descending order) by Indonesia (17.4%), the 
Philippines (9.9%), Korea, and Thailand (2.8% and 0%, respectively). State ownership was 
limited to Korea, Thailand (9.5% and 8.5%, respectively), and Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines albeit to a lesser extent (4.6%, 3.8% and 3.2%, respectively). 
Table 7: Sample classification by ownership type and country, 1985-2004 (%) 
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand Total 
--- ----- - --- - Dome * te 17.4 
........... ...,. --Pr 
. 
............. ............................... I Foreiiin All 17.4 
............................. . ...... - .............. .................................... State All 4.6 
...... . ............ --. 1 ......... ............. . ...... ...... . ..... --- ... ...... ........... .. Sel Forei 19.7 
__ . . _... 
gn 
....... .... .... ...... ................. - ............................ . .... Sel Pri 5.4 
. ... . ....... - ..... .......... ... ........... ................ ........................ Sel M&A 2.7 
I.... - ............................ . ............ . .............. .... I ............... I ................... Sel Res 4.2 
-. - ................. ...... ........................ . .................. Closed 17.5 
................... . ............. . .......................................... ............... ........................ Absorbed 11.1 
Family 26.1 
.................... ............. ... - ....................................... Company 12.8 
------------ ....... . ................. ......... ................ ....... . .......... I ..................... Financial 2.5 
Widely 1 17.2 
6.1 
2.8 
........ ....... 
14.3 
................. - 28.9 
1.7 
8.0 
9.8 
.................... 18.9 
0 
9.8 
I ............. 6.3 
..................... 52.3 
Sources: BankScope and author's estimates 
0 
... . ............ 27.3 
..................... 3.8 
0 
0 
..................... 6.9 
...................... 35.2 
. .... . ........ 0 
....... .......... 26.7 
20.5 
..................... T-9 
17.3 
................. 18.7 
_] 
36.8 
................... 9.9 
3.2 
6.8 
.................. 
22.0 
................... 0 
.................... 
17.1 
48.5 
.................... 4.6 
................... 8.1 
..................... 17.8 
6.9 
0 
............. .... .. 8.5 
.................... 19.3 
.................... 9.2 
..................... 8.2 
...................... 29.7 
...................... 4.2 
............ 14.1 
60.8 
.................... 0 
........... .... ... 0 
7.5 
14.4 
13.7 
5.5 
.... .... .......... 12.9 
8.3 
.................. 7.2 
12.7 
................. 8.7 
............... 16.7 
28.3 
................. 8.4 
................. 6.5 
..... ........ -.. - 22.4 
The bank restructuring process has led to substantial changes in bank governance across SE 
Asia. The selection governance indicators show four types of change. The percentage of 
banks selected for foreign ownership was higher in Indonesia, Thailand and Korea (19.7%, 
19.3% and 14.3%, respectively), but lower in the Philippines (6.8%), whereas there was no 
bank selected for foreign in Malaysia. A larger percentage of banks were selected for 
privatisation, domestic M&A, and restructuring. In Korea, 28.9% of banks were selected for 
privatisation compared with 9.2%, 5.4%, and 3.0% in Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, respectively. The main governance change in the Philippines was due to 
domestic M&A with 22% of banks selected compared with 8.2% in Thailand, 6.9% in 
Malaysia, 2.7% in Indonesia and 1.7% in Korea. The percentage of banks selected for 
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restructuring was highest in Malaysia (35.2%), as bank holding companies were created 
under government direction, and Thailand (29.7%). Whilst 8.0% and 4.2% of banks were 
selected for restructuring in Korea and Indonesia, we remind the reader, that the national 
authorities either nationalised troubled banks or used other forms of public intervention in the 
restructuring process. The process ended with privatisation which implies that the banks 
selected for privatisation had been restructured. 
Our two exit variables identify banks selected for closure and banks whose business was 
absorbed by healthier institutions. A greater proportion of banks were closed in Indonesia 
(17.5%) and Korea (9.8%) compared with Thailand and the Philippines (4.2% and 1.3%, 
respectively) and Malaysia (0%). More than 26% of Malaysian banks were selected for 
absorption compared with 18.9%, 17.1%, 14.1 %, and 11.1 %, respectively, in Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. 
In addition, and similar to Laeven (1999), we further categorise the sample to distinguish 
between different ownership forms: family-owned, company-owned, financial-owned, and 
widely-held. Family-owned means that a handful of families own the majority of the voting 
rights. Following Laeven (1999), majority voting rights are defined as having over 33% of 
the voting rights, which in general is identical to owning more than 33% of the shares, 
although in some cases there is a large difference between ownership of control rights and 
ownership of cash flow rights. Similarly, company-owned means that a handful of companies 
own the majority of the voting rights, and financial-owned means that the bank is owned 
mainly by other financial institutions or financial holding companies. Widely-held means that 
there is no majority owner, but that the shares are widely-held, possibly amongst some 
minority owners, who each owns between 5% and 33% of shares. According to this 
definition, family-owned is the most popular ownership type in the five countries (28.3%). 
More than 60% of banks in Thailand were family-owned, which is the highest, followed by 
the Philippines (48.5%), Indonesia and Malaysia (26.1 % and 20.5%, respectively), whereas 
there was no family-owned bank in Korea. Widely-held ownership was the second popular in 
these countries and the level was similar in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines (roughly 
18%) but much higher in Korea (52.3%) and lower in Thailand (7.5%). The high level of 
widely-held ownership in Korea suggests that Korean banks had better corporate governance 
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structure compared with four other countries. The level of company- and financial-owned 
ownership was lower compared with the above two ownership types with overall 8.4% and 
6.5%., respectively. Whilst the percentage of company-owned banks was higher in Indonesia 
(12.8%) and Korea (9.8%), there were more financial-owned banks in Malaysia (17.3%) (due 
to the fact that bank holding company was more popular in Malaysia than in other countries), 
but there were no company or financial-owned banks in Thailand. 
4.2.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8 shows the mean and standard deviation of the variables that will be included in the 
cost and alternative profit functions by bank governance indicator in each country across 
1985-2004. Generally, the average asset size of banks varies considerably by country and 
across governance indicator. On average, Korean banks were the largest followed by Thai 
and Malaysian banks, whereas banks in Indonesia and the Philippines were roughly four 
times smaller. In all countries but Thailand, stated-owned banks and particularly banks 
selected for privatisation were significantly larger than other bank ownership types. On the 
contrary, banks which were closed or absorbed, family and foreign banks are relatively 
smaller than other bank ownership types in all countries. With regard to other asset items, 
contrary to foreign banks and closed banks, stated-owned banks and banks selected for 
privatisation invested heavily in fixed assets, customer loans and other earning assets. This 
data suggests that foreign banks played a relatively small role in these countries during the 
period, mostly due to the heavy restrictions on their operations. Because of the restrictions 
mostly on interest-related activities, foreign banks focused on non-interest services and 
achieved higher non-interest income (as percentage of total operating income) in all countries 
compared with relatively low level of this income in state-owned banks. Overall, banks in 
Korea and Thailand were more diversified in their activities and gained more non-interest 
income compared with Indonesian banks, which still concentrated on interest-income 
business. 
As far as input prices are concerned, the price of financial capital was similar in Korea, the 
Philippines and Thailand (average 6.2%), but much higher in Indonesia (average 11%) and 
lower in Malaysia (average 4.7%). Re-examining the data by ownership shows no clear 
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pattern of price of financial capital. For instance, company-owned banks paid the highest 
price for funds in Indonesia (13%) and the Philippines (7.8%) but relatively low in Korea 
(6%). Similarly, closed banks paid the highest price in Thailand (8.9%) but lowest in the 
Philippines (4.81/o). Banks in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand paid similar labour cost (average 
0.9%), however, this level was higher in the Philippines (average 1.5%) and Indonesia 
(average 1.3%). In all countries, foreign banks and widely-held banks paid the average levels 
of labour cost whereas state-owned banks had relatively low cost of labour. Interestingly, 
labour cost was the same for restructuring banks (0.8%) in Korea, the Philippines and 
Thailand. 
With regard to risk indicators, in most countries, foreign banks were much safer; they were 
more liquid and better capitalised. On the other hand, banks selected for privatisation and 
restructuring were undercapitalised (particularly in Indonesia). In Korea, the Philippine and 
Thailand, they also held high percentage of loan loss reserves to total loans (LLR). Family, 
closed and absorbed banks appeared to be amongst the most risky groups. They had lower 
level of LLR (in all countries), lower level of liquid assets (in Indonesia and Thailand), and 
were undercapitalised in most countries. Similarly, stated-owned banks also appeared to be 
risky as (i) they had liquidity problems in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand; (ii) they 
experienced capital inadequacy problems in Malaysia; and (iii) they had more LLR in 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. 
Finally, total operating profit and variable cost varied considerably across countries and bank 
governance types. Banks in the Philippines and Malaysia achieved higher operating profit 
(as percentage of total assets) while Indonesian banks paid greater variable cost (as 
percentage of total assets). The lowest average operating profit was made by state-owned 
banks (except in the Philippine and Thailand), while the highest profit maker was recorded 
by foreign banks in Indonesia and Malaysia. However, foreign banks in Malaysia and Korea 
faced the highest variable costs, which was similar to company banks in the Philippines. 
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Table 9 reports the mean and standard deviation of the bank risk and environmental variables 
at country level. Generally speaking, the proportion of liquid assets to total assets was lower in 
Thailand, at 10.8%, but more than double and similar in other countries (roughly 24%). 
However, the level of loan loss reserves to gross loans varies considerably across countries 
ranging from the highest level in Malaysia (8.1 %) to the lowest level in Korea (2.1 %). In term 
of capitalisation, banks in the Philippines were among the better capitalised whereas the least 
capitalised banking system was Thailand, where banks were most severely affected by the 
crisis. 
Table 9: Mean and standard deviation of environmental variables ($m at 1995 prices) 
Bank risk indicators 
....................................... . .......................... .............. LLR/ Gross loans 0.070 
(0.118) 
................................ 
ýýq.. as sets/As sets 0.252 Lýq 
........ ........ .................... .... .......... . ......... . ............................... . ............. . ..... (0.161) 
........ .......... . ........................................................................ ........... ....... I .............. Equity/Assets 0.095 
............ . ....... ..................................................................... .............................................. 
ýýO. 
146) 
................................ Main condition variables 
...... ....... ....... ..... .... GDP p er cap ita($m1 70 5 
................. . .......... . .... . ........... . ........ I ... . ........ I ... . ... ....................................... I ........... (1202) 
Population density 
........... .... .................... ................................................. 
on per km) 
...... A, ..................... . I. - Deposit density ($m) 
(Deposits per km) 
0.104 
Banking structure and regulation variables 
. ............ . ......................... . ......... ... . .............. . .............. ............................ ........................................... HHI 1 0.116 
102 
................... (7) 
.................... 0.07 
0.024 
.......................................... (0.021) 
...................................... 0.220 
............................................. (0.095) 
.......... I ............... . ........ . 0.072 
..................... I ............ . (0.053) 
10579 
................................................. 
............ 
(ý. Q) 
............ 454 
...................... - ............................. (21) 
...................................................... 4.92 
(0*07) 
............... 
I 
............. 
Q. 64) 
..................... I ............... ............................... 
- ............... . ... . ... . .......... 
(C. on. c. e. n. t, r. a. ti. o. n) 
.............................. ............ 
ý01.03-6. ). 
... .... ........ ........ .... ... . ... Avg equity/assets 0.080 
................... . ...................... ............. . ...... ............. .... . ........... . ...... ...... ............... ............ .......... (Regulation) 
. ................... 
(0.054) 
.................. I ... .......... I .............. ...................... Avg loans/deposits 1.463 
... ........... : ý! e .......... .... ..................... 1- .............. ............... ....................................... -. - (Intermediation) (0.242) 
0.081 
........... (. ö... 0 .. 9.. ö 
..... .... .... Ö2.. 7 .. 3................ 
........................... > ....................... (0.142) 1 
.............. . ...................... ................... 0.088 
........................................................ (0.065) 
4407 
.............................................. (1469) 
................................................ 64 
................................................. (8) 
........................................................ 23.54 
0.046 
............................. (0.036) 
............................... 0.274 
(.. 0..... 0.9.6. ) 
...................... 
(0.076) 
1280 
................................ ............... ............ ...... (532) 
............................... . ................................. 235 
........................ ....................... .. (26) 
..................................................................... 0.10 
(12.5 2) 
.......... 
I................... (0.07) 
.......... .................... ............. ................................ 
(0.019) 
.......................................... 
0.109 1 0.100 
.............................................. ..... . ........ . .... ...... ............. .... . ... (0..... 0.2-9. ) 
........... 
I 
........ 
(.. 0... 
-0.0.0. 
). 
I ....... ... ... ... . .... ..... .... ... 0084.......... 0.165 
......... ...... . .... .... .................. ý0.. 037) (0.048) 
........ ...... .......................... .......... . ... . ............ .... ...... ........... 1.130 1 1.449 
................................... ..................................... (0.083) 1 (0.247) 
0.046 
- ........... ..... I -. - (0.063) 
............ - ............ 
0.068 
(0.037) 
2413 
.............................. ................. (995) 
................... .......... I ..................... 114 
..................................................... (7) 
............................................... .......... 23.97 
...... . ....... .......................................... (13.84) 
0.120 
........................................................ (0.040) 
................................... I .................... 0.089 
................... ........................... (0.031) 
..................................................... 0.785 
........................................................ (0.151) 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses; HHI (Herfindahl Hirschman Index) is calculated as 
the sum of squared deposit market shares of all banks by year in each country. 
Source: BankScope, Asian Development Bank. 
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Table 9 shows descriptive statistics of the two broad categories of variables, namely, "main 
condition" (or macroeconomic variables) and "banking structure and regulation" variables. 
Firstly, regarding the main condition variables, Korea had the highest GDP per capita, which 
was over twice as much as the next largest GDP per capita country, Malaysia. The Philippines 
and Indonesia, on the other hand, have relatively low GDP per capita compared to other East 
Asia countries. As far as other two main condition variables are concerned, again, Korea and 
especially Malaysia had much higher deposit density (or density of demand) than other 
countries. Population density was also seen the highest in Korea, followed by Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia. 
Generally speaking, the banking industry in East Asia was moderately concentrated during the 
26 
period . With the exception of the Thai banking sector, the degree of concentration expressed 
by the HHI index in other countries is quite similar. Thailand was the most concentrated 
banking system in the region, followed by Indonesian banking sector. In terms of the ability of 
transforming deposits into loans, banks in Indonesia and the Philippines are more efficient 
(1.4), followed by Korea (L 3 3), Malaysia (L 13) and Thailand (0.7 8). 
" We use HHI as measure of concentration since it accounts for both the number and relative size of players 
in 
the industry and is therefore preferred to other measures of concentration. The 
higher the value, the less 
competitive the market appears to be. In the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, the U. S. Department of Justice 
stated that if HHI <0.1, the industry is unconcentrated; 
if RHI between 0.1 and 0.18, the industry is moderately 
concentrated; and if HH1 > 0.18, the industry is 
highly concentrated. 
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5. Empirical results and discussion 
5.1. The evolution of bank efficiency in SE Asia, 1985-2004 
This section examines the evolution of bank efficiencies in SE Asia from 1985 to 2004. As far 
as we are aware, this is the first efficiency study that covers such a length period in SE Asia. 
By covering the long time period we can examine the effect of financial deregulation, 
financial crisis and restructuring on bank performance. The objective is to establish whether 
there are differences in efficiencies across the periods. We separate the pre- and post- 
deregulation periods by the largely deregulation dates (see Table 1) where significant progress 
of financial deregulation has been made. These periods are presented in Table 10. For all 
countries, the bank crisis period is from 1997 to 1999 whereas the recovering period (post- 
crisis) is from 2000 to 2004. The estimated mean efficiency scores and t-tests of differences 
(improvements or declines) in mean efficiencies across periods are shown in Table 11.27 In 
addition to the t-tests, we also conduct robustness checks using non-parametric Wilcoxon 
Mann-Whitney tests. Because the results from the t-tests and Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney tests 
are mostly identical we only present the t-test results. The results of Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney 
tests can be seen in Appendix 2. 
Table 10: A chronology of evolutions of SE Asian banking 
Post- Pre- Crisis Post-crisis deregulation deregulation 
Indonesia 1985-1988 1989-1996 1997-1999 2000-2004 
. ....... ............................ ........ ...... I ......................... .................. . .............................................. ........................................... .......... . ............ ............... I .................. ........... ....... . ............ I ..... .... . ... . .................................. 1992-1996 1997-1999 2000-2004 1985-1991 Korea 
................... 
1985-1991 1992-1996 1997-1999 2000-2004 Malaysia 
...... .............. ...... ..................... .... .... ... ......... ..... I ................. ............................................................... ............................ ..................... ........... ................ . ......... . ..................... ................... .. *........... ............. * .......... ......... 1986-1989 1990-1996 1997-1999 2000-2004 Philippines 
.................................. .......... .......... ........................................ ...................... ................... . .................................... .... . ........... ..... ............. .... ........................ ....................................................... ................. ............... Thailand 1997-1999 2000-2004 1985-1990 1991-1996 
27 The estimated mean bank efficiencies can also 
be viewed graphically in Appendix 2. 
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We first discuss the evolution of profit efficiencies in each SE Asian country in pre- 
deregulation period. In general, the pattern is quite similar for most countries. From 1985 to 
1987, profit efficiency was relatively low, except the Philippines. This is expected since during 
the 1980s (1983-1988) these countries faced financial crises or/and economic difficulties. 
However from the late 1980s to the early 1990s (from 1988 to 1993) profit efficiency 
gradually improved in all countries, indicating that their banking sectors had gradually 
recovered from the earlier difficulties. This was the solid background for the governrnent 
authorities to decide further deregulating their banking system. 
We now focus on the overall significance of the deregulatory initiatives on the performance of 
SE Asian banking. The standard t-test is used to test for improvements of efficiency of SE 
Asian banking sectors in post-deregulation. The results suggest there is a positive relationship 
between financial deregulation and bank profit efficiency in all the countries, except for the 
Philippines, although we acknowledge that other factors may also be at work. Indeed, the data 
show profit efficiency increased post-deregulations, albeit with varying lags and degrees 
across countries. Indonesia appears to be the most successful country for their financial 
deregulation programme, followed by Korea. The Indonesian banking sector started to 
improve performance steadily four years following the large deregulation programme in 1988. 
Their average profit efficiency increased from the lowest level to a comparable level with 
other countries from 1995. Likewise, three years after financial deregulation (in 1991), the 
performance of the Korean banking sector improved considerably, from around 78% to 
81.5%, and became the most profit efficient performer in SE Asian ever since. Financial 
deregulation in Malaysia and Thailand also seems to have a positive impact on the banking 
sectors, albeit with lesser extent. The average profit efficiency level of these banking sectors 
increased from 75.8% and 72.9%, respectively for Malaysia and Thailand, before deregulation 
to 78.2% and 77.3%, respectively, post-deregulation. On the other hand, it appears there is no 
significant effect of financial deregulation on the profit efficiency of the Philippine banking 
sector. Up to 1988, one year prior to financial deregulation, the Philippine bank, on average, 
was more profit efficient compared with bank in other countries. But in the first year of 
financial deregulation 1989, bank profit efficiency declined considerably from 78% to 74%, 
before it increased again through out next three years and reached a peak of 80% in 1992. 
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However, this efficiency gains seemed not to be sustainable in the long-term as profit 
efficiency fell again and returned to the pre-deregulation period level from 1994. 
The Asian crisis affected bank efficiency to varying degrees across countries. The t-test results 
shows that the profit efficiencies of all SE Asian banking sectors were significantly affected 
by the 1997 Asian crisis. However, whereas banks in Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines 
have managed to overcome the crisis without losing too much of profit efficiency, Indonesian, 
and particularly Thai banks have been the most affected. Indeed, Thailand was the only 
country where profit efficiency level dropped dramatically to the lowest level (78%) 
throughout the three years 1997-1999, which was even lower than the pre-deregulation level. 
The second most affected country was Indonesia, however, they managed to recover relatively 
quickly from 72.8% in 1998 to 80% in 2002, and remained as the second highest profit 
efficiency country ever since. As expected, the Philippine bank efficiency was the least 
affected because they were less suffered by the crisis in terms of liquidity and bank runs. 
Most the countries started to recover their performance from 2000, where the profit efficiency 
levels of the banking sectors converged to around 76%. Since then, Korea showed a 
remarkable recovery to the pre-crisis level of 80.5%, and remained as the best performer, 
followed by Indonesia. Malaysia, ranked third in 2004, thanks to their significant performance 
improvement in 2002 - one year following the completion of the consolidation programme. 
On the other hand, the profit efficiency of Thai banks have fluctuated since the crisis (around 
the same level of 76% in 2000), and the performance of the Philippine banks have also been 
worsen after the crisis. Indeed, Philippine banks have been losing more and more potential 
profit efficiency to inefficiencies since the crisis. 
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A slightly different picture emerges from the estimated cost efficiency model. With the 
exception of Indonesia, the test results show no significant improvement in the average bank 
cost efficiency. In Indonesia, however, the average bank cost efficiency significantly improved 
from 82.1 % pre-deregulation to 84.2% post deregulation. As with profit efficiency, bank cost 
efficiency of all countries converged to a similar level in 1994 but diverged again thereafter. 
Thailand was also the most severely hit by the financial crisis. Finally, and also consistent with 
profit efficiency, in post-crisis, Korea remained as the most cost efficient banking sector, 
followed by Indonesia. However, the order changed for the least efficient group as Thailand 
became the least cost efficient country instead of the Philippines. 
Taken as a whole, Korea seemed to be the most efficient (both cost and profit) banking system 
in SE Asia. The effect of financial deregulation appears to be clearly positive for Indonesia (for 
both cost and profit efficiency), and to a lesser extent, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand (for profit 
efficiency only). On the other hand, financial deregulation seems to have no impact on bank 
efficiency in the Philippines. Overall, our results are largely consistent with the previous 
studies in Korea (Hao, et al., 2001; and Gilbert and Wilson, 1998). For example, Hao et al. 
(2001) also report no inter-temporal improvement in the cost efficiency of Korean bank from 
1985 to 1995. However, for Thailand and Malaysia, our results somehow differ with the 
previous studies. For instance, Okuda and Mieno (1999) and Williams and Intarachote (2002) 
report a negative result of financial deregulation on Thai banks whilst we find the opposite. 
This is likely because our sample covers a longer period compared with the previous studies. 
Likewise, for Malaysia, Okuda and Hashimoto (2004) find an increase in cost efficiency of 
Malaysian banks from 1991 to 1997 whereas our results show no significant change. The 
inconsistency of results can be explained by differences in the sample use. Whilst the previous 
studies use domestic Malaysian banks only, our sample cover both domestic and foreign banks. 
Comparing with Laeven (1999) our findings are consistent with his positive result for 
Indonesia but inconsistent with his findings for other countries. For example, Laeven finds that 
financial deregulation in the Philippines period 1992-1996 was accompanied by an increase in 
bank efficiency but we find no significant difference. 
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With regard to the impact of the 1997 crisis, we find that the Asian crisis affected bank 
efficiency to varying degrees across countries. Indonesian and particularly Thai banks have 
been the most affected. The restructuring programme was, perhaps, the most successful in 
Korea and Indonesia as it helped the banking systems improved efficiencies considerably since 
the crisis. Since 2001, Indonesian banking system has become the second most efficient 
banking sector in SE Asia, after Korea. The fast recovery of Indonesian bank efficiency was 
unexpected given that the process of financial restructuring has been slow compared with other 
countries. On the contrary, though the Philippine banking system was less severely affected by 
the crisis, their profit efficiency perfon-nance still trailed behind other banking systems in the 
region, which was mostly, perhaps, due to the difficult economic conditions in this country in 
the last few years (IMF, 2004). 
5.2. Bank profit inefficiency and bank governance in SE Asia 
The relationship between profit (or cost) inefficiency and the governance indicators is given by 
the estimated coefficients from the technical inefficiency effects model in Eq. (3). The 
coefficients are shown in Table 12, which shows the relationships between both profit 
inefficiency and cost inefficiency and bank governance. The coefficients are derived from 
estimating the common efficient frontier. 28 
Focussing on the two exit variables, the estimated coefficients show closed banks (6, ) and 
absorbed banks (6, ) were significantly less efficient (both profit and cost) than the control 
group of private-owned domestic banks (at 1% significant level). Thus, the decisions made by 
the authorities can be supported on economic grounds. On the contrary, the static governance 
indicators show foreign banks (6, ) operating in SE Asia were significantly more profit efficient 
than domestic private-owned banks (at the 1% level) but there was not a statistically significant 
difference between the profit inefficiencies of state-owned banks (6, ) and domestic private- 
owned banks. However, the reverse is true for cost efficiency model, i. e. state-owned 
banks 
28 See Appendix 4 for details of coefficients of the estimated common efficient frontiers. 
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were statistically more cost efficient than domestic private-owned banks (at the 1% level) 
while this was not the case for foreign banks. 
The coefficients on the selection governance indicators are as expected. F or instance, the 
coefficients on banks selected for foreign acquisition (6, ) are highly significant (at 1% and 10% 
level for profit and cost model, respectively), which implies foreign banks carefully selected or 
cherry-picked relatively more efficient SE Asian banks for acquisition. Domestic banks 
acquired other banks (M&As) (6, ) were significantly more efficient (at 1% level for both cost 
and profit models) than domestic private-owned banks; and banks selected for restructuring 
(6, ) were also more cost efficient than the control group (at 1% level). Finally, the positive and 
significant (at 10% level) profit coefficient of banks selected for privatisation (6, ) suggests that 
the SE Asian authorities selected the relatively less profit efficient banks to privatise. 
The dynamic selection indicators show the effect of governance changes in the short-term and 
long-term. All the long-term coefficients, except selected for privatisation in cost model, are 
statistically significant at 1% or 5% levels suggesting that the long-term governance changes 
have been successful. However, while only domestic M&A (6,, ) yielded significant short-term 
profit efficiency gains, other policies such as easing restrictions on foreign banks, the policies 
of bank privatisation and restructuring take longer time to realise. A similar finding is also 
reported by Bonin et al. (2005b) for Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which suggests that 
privatisation benefits would need time to be fully realised. Finally, there seems to be a trade-off 
between profit efficiency gains and cost efficiency gains in short-term for bank selected for 
foreign and, to lesser extent, bank selected for restructuring. For instance, banks selected for 
foreign (6, ) and restructuring (612) experienced declining profit efficiency in the short-term 
whereas cost efficiency improved immediately. 
100 
Table 12: Technical inefficiency effects: Inefficiency and governance indicators 
Variable Para- 
meter 
Profit efficieng 
................ . ............ ... i- 
1 Cost efficiency ............... ................... ...... . .... .................. ......... ........... .......... . ...... ........ . .......... Coeff Std err T-Stat Coeff 7T7$t err T-Stat 
Intercept 
...... ...................... ........ I ......... ................... ........... -16.61 
6 -1.401 1 0.252 1 -5.56 -2.11 1 0.13 .......... ........... .................................... .... .1................... . ........ . ...................... .......................................... ........... . ... . ............ .... .... .............. . .. -..................................... . .... ..................... Exit variables 
Closed ........... .... ......... . ....... .............. ........ . ......... ........................................ .................... ...... 1 0.423 0.121 3.49 1i ....................................... 
0.21 1 
. ........................ 
0.06 3.36 
I. -I ............ .I................. .............................. .... ..... .... .......... .................... .............. Absorbed 1.212 1 0.124 62 9.79 1 0.12 0.04 .................... *"*"2*"-, *. ***5" 8 ................ -. - .......... . ................. ... . ... . ....................... ......................................... . ......... .... ............................ ................................................ . ... .................... ... . ... .... ............... ........... . ... . ...... ..... ... ............... Static. gpvernance indicators .................... .......................................... 
......... . ............. ..... ......... ........ For all 0.629 63 0.124 -5.07 -0.08 1 0.06 -1.34 ...... . ................. -, .............. ...................... ....... ........ .............. . ........ ................... .... 4 ........... . .......................................... ................ ... ................. .... .... .... .......................... . ... 1 ........................................... .............. ................... ..... . .... ... 
......... .. *...... ........... ...... ......... ** .................... . ........... ............. ............. . ........... -* .... ................ .......... ......... . .... ** ...... ..... . ....... ....................... .... ....... ............... ........ ......... 
State all 6 -0.350 0.252 -1.39 -0.62 4 0.08 -8.23 .... . ............. - ............................................. .. Selection governance indicators 
. ................. ........... . ....... . ................ .................. .... . ........................................... ............... .............. . ................. ..... ....... ............. ...................... .......... ............................................... ........... .............. .... ........ ... . ... ......... -- ... ........ ..................... Sel For 5 -1.098 0.175 -6.28 -0.12 0.06 -1.90 .............. ...... . ....... .... . ....... . ............ ... ....... ..... . ........ ............ . ... ............................................ Sel Pri 66 0.450 0.266 1 1.69 0.06 1 0.08 0.72 
................. ................. ............ ............................... ............ ...................... Sel M&A 0.126 13.94 1 -0.23 0.06 -3.68 
Sel Res 
-1.7571 .................................. ...... .................. ............. 
-0.347 0.231 1 -1.50 -0.22 0.06 -3.58 8 
............ ............... ................ ............................................. ... ........ .... ... ........ ................... 
Dvnamic selection - short term ....... ........ ...... ..... .... ........................ I .................................................................................... I For ST 
... ....... . .......... ........ Pri ST 
M&A ST 
Res ST 
p 0.956 0.393 2.43 -0.38 0.09 -4.21 610 ............ ................................ ...... . .............. ................................................... ... .......................... . ................................... I ................. i 0.368 0.614 0.60 -0.21 0.11 -1.97 
611 i 
1.365 0.255 1 5.34 -0.08 0.08 -1.02 12 
DVnamiC selection - long term .............. ......... . ................. . .......... . ...... ........................... w ......... ..... . ... ........................... . .............. ............... . ........ . ............................ ............................................... ........... ................ ........ - .......... ........... ... . ... ... .... ... .... .... .... ......... ....... . ........ For LT 613 -0.068 0.022 -3.03 -0.06 0.03 -2.02 ............ ............ . ................. ............ ........ ...................................... ....................................................... ....... ... ............. .... . *"*, *"* ... .......... ................................................. . ... .r...................................................... . ................................................ Pri LT 614 ; -0.156 1 
0.020 1 -7.92 ! -0.02 1 0.02 1 -1.53 
..... ........................ 
.................... . ........ ... ........................... .... ........ ............. . ....... . ... . ... ............... ..................................... .................... ...................... 
L -0.083 0.017 -4.82 -0.08 0.01 -15.14 
Aix ............ .T -------------- .......... . ........ ....... 
.... ........ .... . ... ... . ... . ...... . ... . ...... ................................. I .................... ......... ................... ... . ......... ....... ...................... ..... ....... ......... ....... .... ........ . ..................... ......... ................ ........ . ............ ....... ............. 
-0.048 616 0.020 -2.3 5 -0.08 Res LT ...................... ......................... .... ................. . ... . ...................................... .... ........ . ................ . ............... .................. 
-. 2.... 2.. 2 
........ .... ... ............................ ...................... ............... * ................ ..................... Control variables 
Ln(Assets) -0.312 1 0.102 -3.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.79 617 1 ............... ................................... I ............. ...... . ........ ... . ................................ .................... .......... .................... ...................................................... ...... . ............ .................. .... .... ..... ................. ......................................... ........ . ........ .... ........ ... ... ..... ............ .................. . ...... 0.01 -21.44 Year 619 -0.858 1 0.031 1 -27.49 -0.31 ........................................................ ........................................ 0.038 0.02 0.00 23.44 0.001 1 27.10 619 
Source: Author's estimation 
Bank size (617), however, was significantly and inversely related to bank inefficiency implying 
large commercial banks were more profit efficient than smaller institutions in SE Asia. A 
similar result is also reported by Leightner and Lovell (1998) for Thai banks. Finally, the time 
coefficient (6, ý) is negative and 
highly significant (at 1% level), suggesting that SE Asian 
banks improved their efficiencies over time. 
-0.308 0.144 i -2.14 -0.08 0.11 -0.71 
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5.3. Rank order bank performance by governance indicator and 
country 
Our results show some of the earliest cross-border evidence concerning the effects bank 
governance changes have had on bank performance in SE Asia. We report bank performance 
as the mean rank order bank efficiencies by bank governance indicator and by country (see 
Tables 13) . 
29 We segment the results of the static domestic private-owned banks, banks 
selected for closure, and banks whose assets were absorbed by other banks to show bank 
performance under alternative private governance structures. We first compare bank 
performance across governance indicators in each and across countries, and then report bank 
performance before and after changes in governance. We quantify post-governance bank 
performance into the dynamic short term and long term. However, we remind the reader of the 
small number of banks in some of the sub-samples. 
5.3.1. Comparison of bank performance across governance indicators 
As shown in Table 14, there was large variations in banks' rank order alternative profit and 
cost efficiency across governance indicators and countries. As expected, banks involved in 
domestic M&A (acquirers) and foreign banks on average achieved the highest rank profit 
efficiency (53.6% and 52.4%, respectively), followed by domestic private-owned banks 
(50.9%). State ownership on the other hand tends to result in lower ranks of profit efficiency 
(average 48.8%) but still outperformed banks selected for restructuring (48.3%) and banks 
selected for privatisation (48%). In all countries, the poorest profit efficiency performance 
groups were absorbed banks and closed banks (47.2% and 46.8%, respectively). This result is 
as predicted since the poor performing banks were more likely to be absorbed by healthier 
banks and, in addition, it justifies the action of the authorities, which was based on economic 
grounds. 
The results for rank order cost efficiency, in general, are consistent with rank order profit 
efficiency for the lowest efficiency bank groups. For example, closed and absorbed 
banks still 
29 Note that, we first convert the estimated efficiencies into rank order efficiencies 
for each country. Then, we 
calculate the mean and standard deviation of these rank order efficiencies 
for each bank ownership type. 
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experienced the lowest rank order cost efficiency (46.8% and 47.2%, respectively); and banks 
selected for restructuring and for privatisation still performed poorly (48.3% and 44.8%, 
respectively). However, the rank order cost efficiency results differ with that of rank order 
profit efficiency for the higher performance groups. Banks selected for foreign acquisition 
emerged as the best performers in terms of rank order cost efficiency (52.1%), followed by 
state-owned banks (50.8%), while foreign banks became the third ranked (49%) but still 
managed costs better than private domestic-owned banks (44.9%). 
We continue our analysis by examining the difference in performance of each bank governance 
type across countries. Overall, domestic private-owned banks performed at the average level of 
rank order performance for both profit and cost efficiency; however, they were the worst 
performers in Korea and among SE Asian countries in terms of rank order profit efficiency 
(44.2%). Interestingly, domestic private-owned banks in Thailand, which were the largest 
banking group in size, experienced the lowest rank order cost efficiency (in Thailand and 
across countries, 32.1%) but achieved the highest rank order profit efficiency performance 
(5 8.1 %). This result suggests that domestic private-owned banks in Thailand were more profit 
oriented; they might have achieved higher profitability thanks to spending more costs, e. g. for 
marketing and customer services. 
Foreign banks in Malaysia were more efficient compared with their foreign partners in other 
countries because they were the best performers of rank order cost efficiency amongst the 
countries (52.8%) and they also came second in rank order profit efficiency (53.90/o), after 
Indonesia (55.5%). On the contrary, foreign banks in Korea underperformed compared with 
their competitors in other countries (as well as within Korea) in both rank cost efficiency 
(45.4%) and profit efficiency (50%). State-owned banks in Indonesia and Korea were amongst 
the worst perfon-ners across SE Asian countries for both rank cost and profit efficiency 
performance, whereas the reverse was true for their state partners in Thailand and 
Malaysia. 
Indeed, even within Korea, state-owned banks were also relatively inefficient compared with 
private-owned banks; and this result is consistent with the 
finding of Hao et al. (2001) for 
Korea in period 1985-1995. Finally, state-owned bank in the Philippines was the 
best manager 
of cost efficiency (57%) but was also the worst performer 
in rank profit efficiency (37.9%). 
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Our next discussion concerns family, company, financial and widely-held banks. We note 
again that this is a different way of classifying our sample. Following this way of classification, 
the full sample also includes foreign (all) banks, state-owned banks and exiting banks (closed 
and absorbed). Unsurprisingly, foreign banks were still the best rank order profit efficiency 
performers (average 52.4%), followed by widely-held banks (5 1 %) and financial-owned banks 
(50.8%), whereas the poorest performing groups were financial -owned, family-owned, 
absorbed and closed banks (average 47%). Again, the rank order cost efficiency results were 
fairly consistent with that reported by rank order profit efficiency with some changes taking 
place in the rank of the leading performance group. Indeed, widely-held became the most rank 
cost efficient bank group (51.1%, instead of rank second), followed by, surprisingly, state- 
owned banks (50.81/o), foreign bank (50.4%) and financial-owned bank (50.2%). The poor 
performance result of family and company banks is predictable since previous studies show 
that family- and companied-owned banks were among the most risky banking groups (Laeven, 
1999) and associated with lower market valuation (Claessens et al., 1999c). 
Comparing across countries reveals that, for both rank order cost and profit efficiency, widely- 
held banks performed* better in Thailand and Malaysia, while financial-owned bank were 
stronger in Malaysia and Korea. On the other hand, whilst Indonesia had serious low 
efficiencies problem with both family- and company-owned bank, these problems were faced 
by company-owned banks in Malaysia, the Philippines and Korea (profit efficiency side for 
Korea only), and by family banks in Thailand. Finally, even though family banks in Malaysia 
and the Philippines operated poorly in terms of rank order cost efficiency, their rank profit 
efficiency was relatively strong and comparable with other bank ownership type in their 
countries. 
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5.3-2. Effect of dynamic governance changes on bank performance 
We now turn our analysis to discuss the effect of governance's changes (foreign acquisition, 
privatisation, and restructuring) on bank performance. To reveal the effect of governance 
change, we discuss the dynamic changes in mean rank order efficiencies both before and after 
the event occurs. Overall, the results indicate the success of policies such as bank 
privatisation, encouraging foreign bank entry, and restructuring (consolidating) national 
banking sectors (see Table 14). 
Foreign ownership of domestic banks in SE Asian was limited before the crisis 1997. 
However, during the financial restructuring that took place following the 1997 crisis, a number 
of domestic banks were nationalised by government bodies, cleaned up and eventually sold to 
new owners. Some of the new owners are foreign banks. We have identified 30 banks where 
foreign banks acquired formerly domestic banking assets. Generally speaking, domestic banks 
before foreign acquisition, except in Korea and the Philippines, were less efficient compared 
with other bank ownership types. However, these banks successfully improved their 
performance significantly in both short-term and long-term and become one of the strongest 
rank order profit efficiency performers. Although improvement of these new foreign banks in 
term of rank order cost efficiency was not as strong as in profit side, their rank cost efficiency 
in the long-term was greater than it was before in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
Rank cost efficiency first declined in short-term in Indonesia and Thailand but subsequently 
increased in long-term, whereas it increased sharply in short-term but declined in long-term in 
the Philippines. In contrast with the behaviour of foreign banks in the above countries, foreign 
banks in the Philippines selected or "cherry-picked" the most rank order profit efficient 
domestic banks to acquire. However, though obtaining the most efficient banks, they failed to 
maintain their efficiency in both short-term and long-term. A similar finding is found for 
Korea but on cost efficiency side. This result for Korea is somehow in contrast to Hao et al. 
(200 1) who find that bank cost efficiency is positively correlated with 
foreign equity 
ownership in Korea over 1985-1995. However, we find profit efficiency 
(instead of cost 
efficiency) was higher for banks with foreign ownership in Korea. 
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The number of bank privatisations in SE Asia has increased following bank restructuring. A 
priori we expect the performance of the banks selected for privatisation to improve over time: 
some of these banks have new management; bad assets were transferred to asset management 
companies; and the banks were recapitalised. Indeed, the privatisation policy has been 
successful in improving efficiency performance (either cost or profit or both) in every country. 
Indonesia appeared to be the most successful country since both rank order cost and profit 
efficiencies increased considerably immediately (in the sboirt-tem), and their mean rank order 
efficiencies in the long-term were the highest compared with their competitors in other SE 
Asian countries. In other countries, there was a trade-off between cost and profit efficiency. 
For example, in the Philippines and Thailand, privatisation led to immediate and long-term 
profit efficiency gains while the opposite was found for cost efficiency. Korea was the only 
country where mean rank profit efficiency declined following privatisation, however, their 
cost efficiency rank improved significantly and became the second highest long-term rank cost 
efficiency performance (49.1 %), after Indonesia (49.6%). 
As noted before, in post-crisis, SE Asian authorities restructured many banks by injecting 
fresh capital and sanitising bad debt. This restructuring sample also includes the institutions 
selected as survivors which absorbed other banks' business (mostly in Malaysia); and includes 
banks whose privatisation has been delayed. Looking at the pre-restructuring performance of 
this bank group, it emerges that the government authorities in all countries but Indonesia 
selected relatively efficient banks (either in rank order profit or cost) to restructure (instead of 
closing them down or letting them be absorbed). In Thailand, and to lesser extent, Malaysia, 
banks before restructuring were amongst the strongest cost efficiency performers. This is an 
expected result since govermnents are more likely to rescue more efficient banks. 
Furthermore, whilst there was some decline in rank order profit efficiency immediately after 
restructuring, the long-term dynamic selection indicators show profit efficiency gains. For 
instance, restructured banks have become relatively strong rank order profit efficiency 
performers, ranked second (55.1%) in Korea and Thailand and ranked third 
in Indonesia 
(56.3%) and Malaysia (51%). As with privatisation, Indonesia appeared to 
be the most 
successful country in restructuring their banks as these banks improved their performance 
considerably in both cost and profit efficiency. 
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Due to the extensive bank restructuring there was a limited number of voluntary domestic 
M&A cases in the sample with the majority of banks selected for domestic M&A located in 
the Philippines. As expected, before M&As, the average bank selected for domestic M&A was 
characterised with relatively high rank order profit efficiency (in all countries) and high rank 
cost efficiency in Indonesia and the Philippines. What is more, these relatively strong 
acquiring banks continued to consolidate their profit performance further in long-term (though 
there were some declines in short-term) and reached the highest rank performance in 
Indonesia (72.3%), second highest in Korea (54.4%) and in the Philippines (55.5%). Again, 
there was trade-off between cost efficiency and profit efficiency gains of this banking group in 
all countries. For example, whilst rank profit efficiency increased in long-term the reverse was 
true for cost efficiency in Indonesia, Korea and the Philippines. Malaysia was the only country 
where rank cost efficiency of acquiring banks improved while rank profit efficiency worsened 
in long-term. This result for Malaysia contrasts to findings in most developed countries, but is 
consistent with findings for Taiwan (Lin, 2001; Peng and Wang, 2004; and Lin, 2005). 
Overall, except Malaysia, our results are in line with previous studies in the US (e. g. Akhavein 
et al., 1997; Berger, 1998; and Berger and Mester, 2003), where M&As are found to improve 
profit efficiency rather than cost efficiency. 
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Conclusion 
We have empirically investigated the relationship between bank performance and bank 
governance for a sample of SE Asian banks from 1985 to 2004. This time period was 
characterised by financial deregulation, the 1997 crisis, and substantial bank restructuring, 
which has led to changes in bank governance. Generally speaking, the severity of the crisis in 
1997 necessitated a change in bank ownership as governments nationalised or intervened in a 
large number of troubled banks. The process of bank restructuring logically concludes with 
bank privatisation; the return of banking system assets to private hands. Employing both the 
alternative profit efficiency and cost efficiency concepts which are estimated using the Fourier 
flexible functional form and stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995) we find 
several interesting results. 
First, we find that financial deregulation in SE Asia was based on a strong recovery of the 
banking sector (in terms of efficiency performance) from financial crises or/and economic 
difficulties in these countries during the 1980s. Furthermore, financial deregulation appeared 
to have a strong positive effect on banking sector in Indonesia (in term of both cost and profit 
efficiency), whereas it is also found to improve efficiency of banking sectors in Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand, but only on the profit efficiency side. On the other hand, the results 
suggest that financial deregulation had no impact on bank perforinance in the Philippines. 
With regard to the impact of the 1997 crisis, we find that the financial crisis resulted in an 
increase in the amount of potential efficiencies being lost to inefficiencies. Yet, the efficiency 
estimates show that the Philippine, Korean and Malaysian banks were more able to weather 
the crisis whereas Indonesian and particularly Thai banks have been the most affected. The 
restructuring programme has been the most successful in Indonesia and Korea as it helped 
Indonesian banks to become the second most efficient banking sector since 2001, while 
Korean banks have been able to maintain their best performer position. On the contrary, 
though the Philippine banking system was less severely affected by the crisis, their 
performance has been worsening due to the unfavourable economic condition 
in this country 
since the 1997 crisis. 
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Comparing bank performance across governance indicators, we find a large variation in 
banks' rank order alternative profit and cost efficiency. Overall, and as expected, foreign 
banks on average were among the strongest performers, followed by widely-held banks and 
financial-owned banks, whereas state-owned banks tend to result in lower levels of 
efficiencies. In addition, our result supports previous findings regarding the problems with 
family and company ownership. In all countries, the poorest efficiency performing groups 
were company-owned, family-owned, absorbed and closed banks (in descending order). Thus, 
the decision to shut down a number of banks can be supported on the economic ground of low 
efficiency. We note that the majority of banks whose operations ceased were either family 
owned or company owned. 
Examining the effect of bank governance changes, our results imply economic justification for 
polices such as bank privatisation, encouraging foreign bank entry, and restructuring 
(consolidating) national banking systems. SE Asian authorities tended to select the relatively 
less profit efficient banks to Privatise and bank privatisation has raised bank performance to 
levels in excess of pre-privatisation bank performance. Similarly and except for the 
Philippines, banks taken over by foreign institutions were less efficient prior to the governance 
change. However, these banks have improved profit efficiency performance considerably and 
become one of the strongest profit efficiency performers in long-term. Concerning banks 
selected for restructuring, our results suggest that government authorities tended to select 
relatively efficient banks to rescue and the results have been very encouraging in long-term. 
Indeed, our evidence suggests that while only domestic M&A yielded significant short-term 
efficiency gains, the benefits of other policies such as easing restrictions on foreign banks, the 
policies of bank privatisation and restructuring take longer time to realise. 
Our findings are important given the progress of restructuring and privatisation (mainly) 
remains incomplete. We recommend that the government authorities should continue to 
support the policies of privatisation, widening the access of foreign 
banks, and particularly 
encouraging voluntary M&A between domestic financial institutions. 
In addition, ownership 
of domestic banks should be encouraged to be dispersed widely rather than concentrating 
in 
the hands of family or companies. 
III 
Our final point regarding methodology, we note that cost efficiency and alternative profit 
efficiency are not always consistent. In several cases, there is a trade-off between these two 
types of efficiency measures. For instance, banks may want to achieve higher profitability by 
spending more costs for marketing and customer services. Instead, banks may engage in 
skimping behaviour, i. e. they save costs in short-term by spending less on customer screening 
which could increase problem loans and therefore reducing their profitability over the long- 
term (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004). Hence, using cost efficiency measure 
alone, as with majority of previous studies, would not fully capture behaviour of banking firm 
in a dynamic environment. 
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Appendix 1: Environmental variables and their expected relationship with bank efficiency 
Variable Why use? Expected 
sign 
related to 
efficiency 
Countries with higher GDP per capita are assumed to have banking systems 
operating in a mature environment and resulting in more competitive 
GDP per capita interest rates and profit margins. At the same time, these mature banking N 
systems are likely to exert more activities that can diversify banks' 
services, making them less risk and higher profitability. 
.... . ..................... ............ ........... . ...... . .......... Population ...................... . .................................................................... ................................................................................ .............................. ............................................... ................................... .......... ............... ........ .................. . This variable measures the characteristics of the demand for banking ................. . ....... .... ... . ........ ..... 
density products. We assume that banking industries in countries with higher 
(population per density of population are likely to have clients consuming more banking N 
km) products and therefore have higher revenue and higher profit efficiency. 
........ ............. ... . .... ...... ... .... .. .... . ........................................ .... . ... . ........... . ......... I .............................. .... .... .... I ............................. ................... . ........ ..................... . ............................ - ...... I .................................. ..... ........ ........ ... .... ..... The average capital ratio is used as a proxy for regulatory conditions. The . .......................... ..................... 
influence of capital regulation on bank efficiency level can be either 
negative or positive. For example, Berger and DeYoung (1997) assert that 
the higher the capital ratio of the banks, the lower the bad loan levels, it 
being less necessary to incur additional expenses to recover these loans, 
Mean equity and they will therefore appear more efficient. Dietsch et al. (2000) argue 
assets (mean that well -capital 
i sed banks will be more efficient because banks with less 
equity-to-total equity capital 
implies higher risk taken at greater leverage, which normally or 
assets) results 
in greater borrowing costs. 
A low capital ratio can cause moral hazard behaviour. Thus, banks with 
solvency problems may undertake risky business, investing in very 
profitable activities, and will therefore appear profit efficient in the short 
term, although they will probably pay the consequences of their risky 
behaviour in the long term (Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002). 
...... . ........................ .............. ............ ... ............. II.. . .......... .......... I ....................... . ... . ... . .... I .......... .... . ........ ............................................. .... .... ............. . ................. ........ ...................... .... ........ .... . ........................................... This variable captures differences between banking industries in terms of ... ............ ..................... Mean loans- their ability to convert deposits into loans. It is assumed that, other thing deposits being equal, the more deposits are converted into loans, the higher bank (indicator of the profitability is. However, it should be noted that a high intermediation ratio 
N 
efficiency of but with a low loan portfolio quality is likely to reduce profitability due to intermediation) loan write-offs. 
.... ................................................................ ... ....................... -. 1 ................... . .... . ......... I ............................................................................................................................ ... ................................. ........... .... ........ .................. .... ... .......... ... .... . ............................. . ... HH1 captures the differences in the degree of concentration of the banking 
........... ............................. 
industries. This index is calculated as the sum of squared deposit market 
Herfindahl shares of all banks by year in each country. Higher concentration may be 
Hirschman associated with either higher or lower profit efficiency. Under the 
Index of 4collusion' hypothesis, higher concentration enables banks to earn 
concentration of abnormal profits, that is, if a small number of banks dominate a banking or 
banking sector sector, then it is easier and (less costly) for them to collude (implicitly or 
(HHI) explicitly) than if the number of banks is large (Molyneux et al., 2001). On 
the other hand, Leibenstein (1966) note that if higher concentration is a 
result of market power, concentration and costs go in the same direction. In 
this case, higher concentration would lead to lower profitability. 
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Appendix 2: Bank alternative profit efficiency in SE Asia, 1985-2004 
0.60 ý 
0.55 
KR, MY: Largely 
Deregulation: 91 
Acceleration: 
93-96 
Indonesia -a Korea - Malaysia 
Philippines A Thailand ---x- Average 5 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Notes: Largely deregulation denotes the dates where significant progress of financial 
deregulation has been made. 
Source: Author's estimates 
x Average 5 
0.65 11 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 
Source: Author's estimates 
Appendix 2: Bank cost efficiency in SE Asia, 1985-2004 (continued) 
g Indonesia a Korea - Malaysia 
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Appendix 4: Maximum likelihood parameter estimation of the cost and alternative profit Fourier function, 1985-2004. 
Variable Para- Prorit efficienc Cost efficieRc y ... .................. ............................. .......... . .......................................... ......... ............ .................... ....... ........ ....... ....... .............. ..................... ................. . ... ........ .... ............. .... . ... meter I Coeff , Std. err 
ý T-Stat ý, Coeff , 
1 Std. err . T-Stat Constant 7 -25.921 0.9205 -28.16 39.490 0.9356 42.21 a .......... ........................ ....... ..... ............... ............ iý ............... .... ....... . .......... ...................................... Year 
. ... ... . ............ . ... I Year 
............... .... InQ I 
.......... I .......... I. 
-0.007 0.0333 -0.21 0.040 0.0105 3.82 ....................... .................... ............... .......... ............. ................................................. . ............ ... ......... .............. ....................... ...... . ........... . .. 0.005 0.0004 12.87 -0.001 0.0005 -2.15 .......................... ............................... I .................. ............................... ................. ..... ....... . .............. .................... .... ... . .................... . ............ ..... . *- ------ .............................. . ....... ............................... .......... -14.998 0.4083 -36.73 4.060 0.3046 13.33 ............... ........................... I .......... .................... . ............ InQ2 3.531 1 0.4994 1 7.07 1 -3.370 0.4604 -7.32 .................................................. --. 1 .................. .......... ............... ........................... ................ I. n-Q. 3 
I. - . ....... . .. I 
................................. .................. I ............................ . ... .......... ............ 
8.970 0.6209 30.55 -5.400 0.4783 -11.29 ............ ................ 
I 
... .............. InPI/P2 0.945 0.1790 5.28 0.790 0.0711 11.11 
. ... ........... ......... . ............................................ ........ ................ 
Y. 1- ............. i .............. ........... I ........... I .......... i ........... ........ . .... ........................... ....... . ............................. . ............ ......... ......... . ................................ ...... . ............. ............................................. -1 ................ 
................ 
InZI/Z2 0.061 0.1743 0.35 0.080 0.0656 -1.22 .................. ....... ........................ ..................... ....... ......... .......... .... . ........ . .................. ........ ..... ... .............................. .... .... ... . ... . ... ........ ........................... ................................................. InQ I* InQ 10 0.084 0.0442 -1.90 0.430 0.0406 10.59 .... ....... ...................... .............. . ... . .......................... ................... li ............ . .................. . ........... I ...................... iý ................ ... . ................................. ........... ......... ............................. . ............ ......... ............ .... . ...... .... . ................................. InQ I* InQ2 0.0279 1 4.87 0.010 1 0.0102 0.98 012 0.136 
nQII nQ 3 ....................... ......... ........ . .......... 
013 
-9.933 0.1647 -60.31 6.740 0.1440 46.82 
InQ2 InQ2 0 -0.687 0.0560 1 -12.27 0.090 11 0.0552 1.63 22 ..... ... . ....... ............. .................. I ........................ . ....................... ..... .............. ............................ I .... ......... .......... ........... ........ . ....... ...................... ............ . ................ . ....................... T ...................................................... ............... ............................. .. 
InQ2 InQ3 3.670 0.1927 19.05 -2.320 0.1210 -19.18 
023 
........... . ....... . ....... . ... . ........... . ..................... ............ . ............ . ............ ........................................................ .................................................... ..................... ................. . .............. ............ . ..... ........................ . ......... ......................... ............................ . ................................................. InQ3 * InQ3 033 18.251 1 0.0685 266.42 -8.760 0.0619 -141.54 ............................ ..... ......... .......... ............. 
InPI/P2 2 
.......................................................................... 
InPI/P2*InZI/Z2 
............... ... .................. ]ý ................. ...... In ZI/Z2 
...... . ................... 
0.010 0.0029 3.45 -2.16 
0.0045 4.71 0.010 0.0017 6.01 
Tull 0.017 1 0.0131 1 1.30 1 -0.010 0.0080 -1.25 InQl* InPI/P2 1-jnQ2 InP .I .- /P2 . 
II 0.096 0.0085 11.23 0.060 0.0032 18.95 
-0.020 0.0093 
3.06 0.032 1 0.0107 2.98 0.010 0.0033 1 
InQ3 * InPI/P2 031 0.397 1 0.1005 1 3.95 0.060 1 0.0375 1 1.6 .......................... .... ...................... . ....... ............. ...................... . ......... ............ ...................... . ........ ... . 1- ................... ........................ . ........ . ........................ I ............................. InQ I* InZ I /Z2 ------- ---- * -- 
InQ2 * InZ I /Z2 
...... ..... ................ ... ............................. . ....... 
-0.017 1 0.0098 -1.74 -0.020 0.0030 -6.63 Kil 
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Appendix 4: Maximum likelihood parameter estimation (continued) 
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Paper 2: 
Determining Management Behaviour in 
Asian Banking 
Abstract 
This paper determines management behaviour for Asian commercial banks between 1985 and 
2004. Following the Granger causality approach employed by Berger and DeYoung (1997) for 
US banks and by Williams (2004) for European banks, we examine the intertemporal 
relationships between loan loss provision, efficiency and capitalisation for Asian banks. In so 
doing, we provide a robustness test of the earlier results for US and European banks. The 
possible relationships between the variables imply different modes of management behaviour 
namely bad management, bad luck, skimping, and moral hazard behaviour. The econometric 
results suggest that the most pressing management problem for Asian banks is the 
combination of bad management, bad luck and moral hazard behaviour. Generally speaking, 
the Asian findings are more consistent with previous results from the US than from Europe. 
The problems of bad management and bad luck are common across most Asian banking 
sectors but they appear particularly pronounced in China and Indonesia. 
Keywords: X-efficiency, loan loss provision, credit risk, capitalisation, stochastic frontier 
analysis, optimal lags 
JEL classification: G2 1, G28, C 14, D2 1. 
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I. Introduction 
The process of financial liberalisation constituted a major change in competitive conditions for 
banks operating in emerging Asian economies. Formerly protective regulations were 
dismantled as competition was actively encouraged in banking sectors that were characterised 
by undercapitalised banks, and diverse bank ownership ranging from family control to banks 
belonging to large industrial conglomerations. However, in competitive markets, 
environmental pressures such as bank regulations and the organisational structures of markets 
and firms condition the response and effort of management towards improving X-efficiency 
(Button and Weyman-Jones, 1992). Differences in bank organisational structures, for instance, 
in terms of their ownership might explain variations in X-inefficiencies because of principal 
agent problems that offset the conditioning effect that environmental pressure brings to bear 
on managerial effort. ' This is an empirical issue, which has received considerable attention in 
the bank efficiency literature albeit yielding somewhat mixed or inconclusive results (see 
Verbrugge and Goldstein, 1981; Verbrugge and Jahera, 1981; Cebenoyan et al, 1993; Mester, 
1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Cummins and Zi, 1998; Altunbas et al, 2001; Laeven, 
1999; Gilbert and Wilson, 1998; Hao et al., 2001; Katib and Mathews, 2000; Drake and Hall, 
2003; Okuda and Hashimoto, 2004; Leightner and Lovell, 1998; Okuda and Mieno 1999; 
Williams and Intarachote, 2002; Williams and Nguyen, 2005). One limitation of the bank 
ownership-efficiency literature is that, in general, it simply determines whether banks 
' Principal-agent problems may exist whenever there is a break between ownership and control and they are 
thought to explain differences in the performance of firms operating under different ownership models. The 
efficiency-ownership nexus appears to rest on the trading of equities and the transfer of ownership rights. 
Whereas the capital market disciplines the management of joint stock firms, this has been erroneously 
misinterpreted to imply that joint stock firms are more efficient than non-joint stock firms. Agency problems are 
expected to be more severe in family-owned, company-owned and mutual financial institutions and they could 
cause utility maximising managers to pursue individual objectives that do not maximise stakeholder value or 
enhance firrn efficiency (see Altunbas et al, 2001). Some features of agency problems include a captive board of 
directors, passive or indifferent depositors, and the absence of shareholders, which implies that there is less 
external discipline applied to mutual banks' management. The resulting agency costs can arise in three different 
ways: expense preference behaviour, self-selection of management quality, and choice of project risk 
(see 
Peristiani and Wizman, 1997). 
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organised under one ownership model are significantly more efficient than banks organised in 
another way. Whilst this literature is informative for bank regulators and policy makers 
especially when subsequent analyses quantifies the differences in the characteristics of 
efficient and inefficient banks, it says little about management behaviour. 
As a complement to those studies that differentiate efficiency levels between ownership 
models, there is a smaller literature that relates aspects of bank management with efficiency. 
For instance, DeYoung et al (2001, pp. 1212-13) have studied the management structure of 
small US banks finding that management behaviour is aligned with shareholder interests 
through incentive and monitoring procedures at the most profit efficient banks. 2 There is 
empirical evidence of the quiet life hypothesis amongst US banks in the sense that the 
structure of banking markets, through the level of concentration and its implications for firm 
behaviour, is positively related to bank cost inefficiency (Berger and Hannan, 1998). 
Managerial prudence in terms of a higher level of bank capitalisation has been found to be 
positively related to earnings (expected bankruptcy costs hypothesis) and efficiency (moral 
hazard hypothesis) (Berger, 1995 and Mester, 1996, respectively). These findings are 
particularly relevant in the light of current regulatory discussions as to what constitutes the 
optimal amount of bank capital. 
Another approach to understanding management behaviour considers the intertemporal 
relationships between cost efficiency, problem loans, capitalisation, and credit risk (see Berger 
and DeYoung, 1997). The signing and direction of these intertemporal relationships is 
construed as evidence of specific types of management behaviour, namely bad management, 
bad luck, skimping and moral hazard behaviour. Granger causality methods show the 
intertemporal ordering of the variables and can identify which type of management behaviour 
exists although it is noted that management behaviour is not mutually exclusive and it is 
2 DeYoung et al (2001, pp. 1212-13) suggest that bank owners can incentivise hired managers to align owner and 
manager interests by granting managers an ownership stake in the bank. However, they find that 
bank 
performance is negatively related to the size of managers' stake. Whilst there are difficulties associated with 
monitoring managerial performance, providing managers with an ownership stake 'underscores the 
importance of 
managerial shareholdings as a control mechanism ... '. 
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possible that banks may display characteristics of more than one behavioural type. Berger and 
DeYoung (1997) used US commercial banking data from the 1990s to estimate their model, 
and they found the following results: exogenous increases in problem loans tend to lead to 
reductions in cost efficiency (support for the bad luck hypothesis); exogenous declines in bank 
cost efficiency tend to lead to increases in problem loans (support for the bad management 
hypothesis); among the most efficient banks, exogenous increases in cost efficiency tend to 
lead to increases in problem loans (support for skimping behaviour); and among the least-well 
capitalised banks, exogenous reductions in capital tend to lead to increases in problem loans 
(support for moral hazard behaviour). Williams (2004) contends that these results cannot be 
generalised to European banks. In European banks there is support for the bad management 
hypothesis especially at weakly capitalised banks, and there is evidence to suggest the most 
cost efficient European banks engage in skimping behaviour. 
The Asian financial crisis uncovered weaknesses in national banking sectors. However, there 
is little empirical evidence on how banks were managed in Asia; indeed, management 
behaviour may have played a contributing factor to those weaknesses which, once apparent, 
exacerbated the crisis. Therefore, our aim is to test for the presence of four prescribed modes 
of management behaviour in Asian banks. In so doing, the paper extends the existing literature 
by applying the methodology used to identify modes of management behaviour at US banks 
(Berger and DeYoung, 1997) and European banks (Williams, 2004) to Asian banks. Thus, we 
apply the Granger causality framework to a large sample of Asian commercial banks from 
1985 to 2004. The panel dataset contains 2,870 observations (before lags are taken) of 
commercial banks from the following countries: China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. 
The results of the Granger causality tests for Asian commercial banks are more consistent with 
the findingsof Berger and DeYoung for US commercial banks compared with the findings of 
Williams (2004) for European banks. The evidence suggests that the most pressing problem 
for Asian banks is the combination of bad management, bad luck and moral hazard behaviour. 
Although bad management and bad luck are common problems to banks in most Asian 
banking sectors, they appear to be particularly pressing in China and Indonesia. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section two has two sub-sections. In sub- 
section one, the four management hypotheses are reviewed whilst the econometric model used 
to test the intertemporal relationships between the variables is presented in sub-section two. 
Section three describes the efficiency methodology that is used to estimate operating cost 
efficiency and alternative profit efficiency. The estimates of the Granger causality tests are 
discussed in two sub-sections in section four; first, at the Asian level and second, by country. 
A third sub-section in section 4 discusses the economic effects of management behaviour. 
Section five offers some conclusions. 
2. Management Behaviour 
2.1 Expected relationships between variables 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) have identified four modes of management behaviour. They are 
so-called bad management, bad luck, skimping behaviour, and moral hazard behaviour. Each 
behavioural mode maybe identified through the intertemporal ordering of the relationships 
between loan loss provision, efficiency, and capitalisation. Whilst Berger and DeYoung used 
the amount of problem loans as their indicator of asset quality, following Williams (2004) we 
3 have selected loan loss provision as our indicator because of data limitations. The discussion 
below outlines each of the management hypotheses and the expected relationships between the 
variables. 
Bad management could be one of the main causes explaining low cost efficiency. Bad 
management hypothesis implies that low cost efficiency Granger-causes larger amounts of 
loan loss provision (implying deteriorating asset quality) because management fails to control 
3 Loan loss provisions are subject to managerial discretion and may be over or under stated in any given year. 
They have been chosen mainly because of insufficient data on problem loans. The use of provisions does present 
some anomalies. For instance, in equation [2] the independent variable LLP is partly endogenous to management 
behaviour. This implies that bad luck could be deterministic and not random. 
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operating costs, which immediately realises low cost efficiency suggesting that poor 
managerial practice causes an increase in loan loss provision after a lag. In badly managed 
banks, low levels of cost efficiency signal poor senior management quality. Poor managers do 
not adequately control or monitor operating expenses and loan portfolio management is weak. 
Specifically, so-called bad managers exhibit the following tendencies. They are not adept at 
credit scoring and select a relatively high proportion of investments with low or negative net 
present values; collateral is improperly valued; and customers are not sufficiently monitored in 
order to ensure compliance with the loan contract. Indeed, several of these characteristics have 
been identified in the principal agent literature as examples of expense preference behaviour 
(Peristiani and Wizman, 1997) and the quiet life hypothesis (Berger and Hannan, 1998). 
Skimping behaviour might exist in the most cost efficient banks. Managers that engage in 
skimping behaviour tend to reduce the amount of bank resources that are expended on 
monitoring and underwriting lending business. The outcome affects the quality of loans and 
the level of cost efficiency because bank managers face a trade-off between short-term 
operating costs and future loan quality. The decision facing management is should they 
minimise short-term operating costs through reducing expenditure on monitoring borrowers in 
an attempt to enhance profitability. Therefore, management might postpone dealing with 
deteriorating asset quality until an unspecified future date. Skimping behaviour gives the 
misleading impression that banks are cost efficient in the short-term because fewer resources 
are supporting the same quantity of output, which suggests that the amount of loan loss 
provision will increase over time. The skimping hypothesis predicts an expected positive 
relationship between cost efficiency and loan loss provision with the former Granger-causing 
increases in the latter. The difference between bad management and skimping is that Granger 
causality from cost efficiency to loan loss provision is negative for the former hypothesis and 
positive for the latter. Following a recommendation by Berger and DeYoung (1997), we re- 
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test for skimping behaviour using estimated alternative profit efficiency as the measure of 
bank efficiency in place of estimated operating cost efficiency. 4 
Bad luck can be a reason for low cost efficiency. According to the bad luck hypothesis, 
exogenous events increase loan loss provision (reducing asset quality) that Granger causes a 
decrease in cost efficiency. As a consequence, management must allocate additional resources 
including greater managerial effort to deal with this adverse situation, which in turn raises 
operating costs. Operating costs could increase for several reasons; monitoring delinquent 
borrowers and valuing collateral; if default occurs, seizing, storing and disposing of collateral; 
maintaining the bank's record on safety and soundness to regulators and market participants; 
allocating extra resources to protect the quality of existing loans; and diverting senior 
management away from their daily responsibilities. Whereas bad luck has the opposite 
temporal ordering to bad management, both hypotheses predict that loan loss provision is 
negatively correlated with cost efficiency. 
Finally, moral hazard behaviour suggests that managers of thinly capitalised banks are less 
risk averse because the upside risk of low capitalisation outweighs the downside risk. In other 
words, expected return is positively related to the amount of risk assumed by bank 
management whilst the bank has relatively less capital to lose in the event of default. The 
moral hazard hypothesis predicts that low bank capitalisation Granger-causes an increase in 
loan loss provision (a deterioration of asset quality). 
2.2 Econometric modelling of management behaviour 
We adopt the Granger causality framework used by Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams 
(2004) in their studies of US and European banks, respectively. The different types of 
4 We use estimated profit efficiency to re-test for skimping behaviour because skimping 
behaviour reduces output 
quality, which affects both costs and revenues. As problem loans 
increase bank costs rise because, for example, 
of the need for increased monitoring of borrowers. Revenues, on the other 
hand, will be lost because of rising 
problem loans. 
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management behaviour are predicted by the intertemporal relationships between loan loss 
provision, efficiency, and capitalisation. 
The structure of equations [1-3] shows that each dependent variable is regressed on annual 
lags of it and the lags of two other main variables. For instance, a significant relationship 
between current and past (lagged) cost efficiency would imply that the latter contains 
information that improves our prediction of current cost efficiency. In other words, the level of 
cost efficiency in period(s) i Granger cause cost efficiency in yearj. 
Equation [I ] tests the bad management hypothesis. A priori bad management predicts a 
negative relationship between loan loss provision and lagged X-efficiency. A positive 
relationship between the two variables, however, suggests skimping behaviour. It is expected 
that the more efficient banks are most likely to engage in skimping behaviour. Therefore, 
equation [1] is re-estimated for a sub-sample of the most efficient banks. Equation [1] also 
tests moral hazard behaviour using a sub-sample of thinly capitalised banks. We expect a 
negative relationship between loan loss provision and lagged capitalisation. Equation [2] tests 
the bad luck hypothesis. We expect an inverse relationship between operating cost efficiency 
and lagged loan loss provision. 
LLPj' t=f, 
(LLPi'lag, XEFFi'lag, CAPi Iag, 
LTAi'lag, Yr, 
)+6 P] 
XEFFi,, f2(LLPi jag, XEFFi'lag, CAPi'lag, LTA j'jag' Yr, 
)+ 
620 [2] 
CAIý-'t f3 
(LLPi'lag, XEFFi, 
lag, 
CAIý 
Iag, 
LTAi, 
lag, 
Yrt)+ F3i, 
t [3] 
The bad management, skimping and moral hazard hypotheses are tested using the estimated 
parameters of equation [1] whilst the bad luck hypothesis is tested using the estimated 
parameters of equation [2]. Equation [3] is included to complete the model, and 
is not used to 
test any of the four hypotheses. Following Berger and DeYoung (1997), we check to see 
whether the estimated parameters of equation [3] make economic sense 
in a Granger-causal 
framework. 
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Equations [1-3] are estimated using OLS techniques and they specify the following variables. 
The ratio of loan loss provision-to-loans (LLPi, t) is an indicator of asset quality. Two estimates 
of efficiency are used in this study (X-EFFi, t). Following the recommendation of Berger and 
DeYoung and in addition to estimating operating cost efficiency, we also estimate alternative 
profit efficiency (see footnote 4). The ratio of equity-to-total assets is the measure of bank 
capitalisation and indicates the size of banks' financial cushion for absorbing losses emanating 
from the loan portfolio (CAPi, t). In order to control for risk and other factors we specify two 
control variables in each equation. The ratio of loans-to-assets (LTAi, t) is a proxy of credit 
risk. Whereas Berger and DeYoung (1997) specified the ratio of risk weighted assets-to-total 
assets, like Williams (2004) we are limited by data restrictions. A priori loan intensive balance 
sheets increase credit risk and are more costly to maintain, which should increase the pressure 
on bank management to improve efficiency. The inclusion of a set of dummy variables 
(YEARt) for each time period inter alia controls for changes in the macroeconomic 
environment as well as changes in technology. 
3. Cost and Profit EfficienCY5 
The combination of technical and allocative inefficiencies is commonly referred to as X- 
inefficiency and is regarded as a measure of the quality of management (see Leibenstein, 
1966). Technical inefficiency results from bank management employing too much input to 
produce output whereas allocative inefficiency arises from management's 
failure to react 
optimally to the relative price of input. The concept of cost efficiency measures the 
distance of 
a bank's cost relative to the cost of the best practice bank when both 
banks produce the same 
output under the same conditions. More specifically, cost efficiency 
is the estimated cost a 
particular bank faces if it is to produce its output as efficiently as the most efficient 
bank 
divided by the actual cost for the bank adjusted for random error. Profit efficiency 
is the ratio 
of predicted actual profit to predicted maximum profit, which could 
be earned if a bank was as 
efficient as the best practice bank after adjusting 
for random error. Profit inefficiency 
5 This section provides the main points of methodology used 
to estimate operating cost and alternative profit 
efficiency. More details on estimation of efficiency can 
be found in Paper 1, section 4, pages 63-80. 
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estimates may be interpreted as the amount of profit that is being lost to inefficiency and it 
emphasises that bank management should pay attention not only to the marginal cost of 
raising financial resources, but also to the raising of marginal revenue. 
Whereas data for loans, assets, capital, and loan loss provision are available from banks' 
financial statements, efficiency must be estimated. We estimate two types of bank efficiency. 
The cost efficiency measure is operating cost efficiency, which is chosen over variable cost 
efficiency because the resources that may be expended because of bad luck, bad management, 
and skimping and moral hazard behaviour impact either on staff costs or non-interest 
expenses. In support, the bank efficiency literature reports that operating costs comprise the 
bulk of bank cost inefficiencies (Berger and Humphrey, 1991). Alternative profit efficiency is 
chosen over standard profit efficiency because of data limitations. 
Inefficiency is estimated using the stochastic frontier and Fourier flexible form methodologies. 
Stochastic frontier analysis was proposed by Aigner et al (1977), Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977). These models have a two component error term. 
The first error component is symmetric and captures the random variation of the frontier 
across firms, statistical noise, measurement error, and random shocks that are external to the 
firm's control. The second error component is a one-sided variable that captures inefficiency 
relative to the frontier. Jondrow et al (1982) enhanced the methodology by developing a 
method for estimating firm-level inefficiency. 
We estimate bank efficiency using the stochastic frontier model of Battese and Coelli (1995) 
in which the inefficiency term is drawn from a truncated normal distribution. The model is a 
"one-step" procedure in which the stochastic frontier is specified using the Fourier flexible 
functional form whilst the level of firm inefficiency is determined by a vector of 
environmental and firm-specific variables that a priori are postulated to affect inefficiency 
(see Wang and Schmidt, 2002, for a discussion of one-step and two-step methods). The 
importance of specifying environmental variables in order to avoid bias in efficiency models 
has been noted in the existing literature (see Fried et al., 1999; Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 
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2000; Chaffai et al. 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al, 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al, 2002; Tone, 2001; 
Drake et al., 2006). 6 
The cost and profit functions are specified using the Fourier flexible functional form. The 
Fourier is a semi-nonparametric approach and is used to tackle the problem arising when the 
true functional form of the relationship is unknown. Gallant (1981,1982), Mitchell and 
Onvural (1996), Ivaldi et al (1996), and Berger et al (1997) note that the Fourier is a global 
approximation, which can represent a broader range of cost structures than other functional 
forms. For instance, the Fourier has been shown to dominate the conventional translog 
functional form that has been commonly applied in bank cost studies (see Mitchell and 
Onvural, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997) whereas Ivaldi et al (1996) finds that the Fourier 
better captures sample heterogeneity than the translog. In addition, the local point estimate 
produced by the translog functional form is found to be inappropriate to approximate the true 
or underlying technology of an industry (Ivaldi et al, 1996). Following Berger and Mester 
(1997), this study applies the trigonometric Fourier terms only for output, leaving the input 
price effects to be defined entirely by the translog terms. 7 The bank production process is 
modelled according to the intermediation approach which considers banks to be financial 
intermediaries that purchase input in order to generate earning assets (Sealey and Lindley, 
1977). The operating cost efficiency and alternative profit efficiency models have three 
common outputs but the former model has one input compared to two in the latter model. 
Standard restrictions of linear homogeneity in input prices and symmetry of the second order 
parameters are imposed; operating cost and the output variables are normalised by equity 
capital, following arguments discussed by Berger and Mester (1999). 
The model specification for the operating cost function is shown in equation [7]: 
6 See Appendix I of Paper I (p. 13 1) for the details of the environmental variables. 
7 Following Berger and Mester (1997), 10% is cut off each end of the [0,2n] interval so that the zi span [0.1 x 27c, 
0.9 x 2n] in order to reduce approximation problems near endpoints. The 
formula for zi is 0.27c -Rxa+gx 
variable, where [a, b] is the range of the variable being transfon-ned, and ýt -= 
(0.9 x 2n - 0.1 x 27r)/(b-a). 
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[7] 
InOC is the natural logarithm of operating costs (we do not use financial costs since 
management behaviour mostly impacts on operating cost only); 
InQj is the natural logarithm of bank output (customer loans, other earning assets, and net non- 
interest income); 
InPk is the natural logarithm of e input price (the price of labour = personnel expenses/total 
assets); 
ln(Z, ) is the natural logarithm of rý' fixed netput quantity (physical capital and equity); 
ln(Countryi) is the natural logarithm of country specific factors; GDP per capita, population 
density (population per km), deposit density (deposits per km), mean equity assets (indicator 
of the state of regulation), and mean loans-deposits (indicator of the efficiency of 
intermediation) and Herfindahl Hirschman Index of concentration of banking sector (HHI); 
Zi are the adjusted values of the log of output lnQi such that they span the interval [0,2n]; 
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v, are identical and independently distributed random variables, which are independent of the 
ýti, which are non-negative random variables that are assumed to account for inefficiency. 
In the alternative profit function, InOP is the natural logarithm of operating profit (=net 
interest revenue + net other operating incomes), where a constant term, 0, is added if any bank 
reports an operating loss. (0 is equal to the minimum operating profit plus one so that the 
natural log is taken of a positive number. ) 
a, T, P, ký W, 0, ý, Y,, 0, m, a, b, and X are the parameters to be estimated using maximum 
likelihood methods. 
The estimated parameters of the cost and profit functions are shown in Appendix 1. We make 
no attempt to control for asset quality or risk in the arguments of the cost and profit functions. 
This is because it is unknown if problem loans are exogenous (due to bad luck) or endogenous 
(due to bad management or skimping). Arguably, problem loans should be controlled for if 
they are exogenous and cause lower bank efficiency whereas endogenous problem loans 
should not be controlled because managerial practice lowers efficiency. 8 
4. Empirical results 
Equations [1-3] were estimated for the sample of Asian commercial banks using data from 
1985 to 2004.9 An F-test procedure supported the specification of four lagged periods in each 
model. Management behaviour is determined by a significant relationship between a 
dependent variable and the sum of the lagged coefficients on a particular explanatory variable. 
Subsequently, equations [1 -3] were re-estimated for each of the seven countries. 
Generally speaking, there is weak statistical support to suggest the presence of the different 
types of management behaviour. In some cases, our ex ante predictions were not realised ex 
post. Possible explanations for the weak statistical associations include the sample size and the 
use of loan loss provision which may be subject to management discretion and therefore could 
contain an element of endogeneity. 
8For a discussion of the case for specifying asset quality and risk as arguments in cost 
functions see McAllister 
and McManus (1993), Mester (1996), Berger and Mester (1997), and Hughes et al (200 1). 
9 Note that the data of the Philippine and Vietnamese commercial banks are only available from 1986 to 2004 
and from 1990 to 2004, respectively. 
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Table I shows the descriptive statistics for the Asian banks sample. In total, there are 2,155 
observations. Mean Asian bank operating cost efficiencies show little variation across 
countries and are in the region of 80% which is consistent with estimates in the established 
bank efficiency literature. Similarly, mean alternative profit efficiencies are in the region of 
75-78% implying that Asian banks lose up to 25% of potential profit to inefficiencies. The 
mean ratio of loan loss provision-to-loans shows greater cross-country variation: asset quality 
is highest in Korea (2.74%) and worst in Indonesia (13.53%). As expected, mean bank 
capitalisation (equity-to-assets) is highest in countries not directly affected by the 1997 
financial crisis; namely, Philippines (15.06%), Vietnam (11.04%) and China (10.56%). The 
least capitalised banking sectors are found in Korea (7.22%) and Thailand (6.64%). In terms 
of loan-intensity, there is little variation with mean loans-to-assets ratios in 50-60% range; 
Thailand is an outlier at 76.12%. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Mean and Standard Deviation (four lags) 
Country 
Cost Profit 
efficiency efficiency 
Indonesia 566 
Korea 324 
Malaysia 325 
Philippines 288 
Thailand 230 
China 281 
Vietnam 141 
0.8229 
(0.0582) 
0.8085 
(0.0939) 
0.8042 
(0.0920) 
0.7946 
(0.1022) 
0.7838 
(0.1054) 
0.7945 
(0.1064) 
0.7812 
(0.1178) 
0.7453 
(0.0708) 
0.7781 
(0.0571) 
0.76597 
(0.0576) 
0.7625 
(0.0516) 
0.7474 
(0.0914) 
0.7511 
(0.1103) 
0.7725 
(0.0564) 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses 
Source: BankScope 1991,2000,2005. 
LLP/Loans 
0.1353 
(0.5203) 
0.0274 
(0.0248) 
0.0825 
(0.1143) 
0.0501 
(0.0413) 
0.0652 
(0.0957) 
0.0357 
(0.1870) 
0.0314 
(0.0184) 
Equity to Loansto 
assets 
0.0906 
(0.1502) 
0.0722 
(0.0482) 
0.0918 
(0.0537) 
0.1506 
(0.0704) 
0.0664 
(0.0345) 
0.1056 
(0.1521) 
0.1104 
(0.1070) 
assets 
0.5918 
(0.2065) 
0.5645 
(0.1150) 
0.5760 
(0.1464) 
0.5638 
(0.1122) 
0.7612 
(0.1321) 
0.5158 
(0.1360) 
0.5889 
(0.1638) 
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4.1 OLS estimates of Granger causality tests for Asian banks 
We discuss the estimates of the Granger causality tests in equations [1-3] for Asian banks. 
Table 2 shows the OLS estimates of Granger causality tests in loan loss provision equation 
[1]. A priori an inverse relationship between loan loss provision and lagged cost efficiency 
indicates bad management whereas a positive relationship suggests skimping behaviour. The 
lagged cost efficiency coefficient is found to be significantly negative at the I percent level of 
significance, which is strong statistical evidence that Asian bank managers exhibit 
characteristics of bad management. In other words, a decrease in cost efficiency temporally 
precedes an increase in loan loss provision (worsening asset quality). The relationship between 
loan loss provision and lagged loans-to-assets (an indicator of credit risk) is strongly positive 
suggesting that banks with more loan-intensive balance sheets have poorer asset quality. 
Arguably this reflects concerns about the opacity of assets and transparency in reporting in 
emerging market banking systems, as well as the impact of personal relationships and directed 
lending on asset quality. 10 
On the recommendation of Berger and DeYoung (1997) we re-test for evidence of either bad 
management or skimping behaviour using estimated profit efficiency as the efficiency 
measure instead of cost efficiency. This is done because the concept of cost efficiency 
classifies banks that increase costs in order to generate higher revenues as inefficient whereas 
alternative profit efficiency is not beset by this problem (see Berger and Mester, 1997). The 
parameter estimates are shown in lower part of Table 2 and we note the results are robust to 
the change in measured efficiency. 
'0 A set of literature discusses the importance of information production when 
banks lend to opaque borrowers. 
This literature identifies the types of bank organisational structure that best facilitate the production of so-called 
'soft' information that is an important aspect of relationship banking (see Berger et al, 200 1 a, b; Berger and Udell, 
2002). 
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Table 2: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Loan Loss Provision Equation [11 
Asian 7 Indonesia Korea Malaysia 
_ ____Philiepines 
Thailand China Vietnam 
Using O perating Cost Efficiency Estimates 
XEFF-I -0.0578** -0.2159** -0.0084 0.0108 -0.0186 0.0132 0.0361** -0.1197* * 
(-5.41) (-10.23) (-1.65) (0.26) (-1.00) (1.29) (3.03) (-16.75) 
XEFF-2 -0.0683** -0.1936** -0.0157** 0.0009 0.0380* 0.0173 -0.0818** 0.0464** 
(-6.13) (-9.58) (-2.66) (0.02) (2.25) (1.32) (-5.46) (5.63) 
XEFF-3 0.0137 0.1121** 0.0038 0.0296 0.0251 -0.0759** -0.0656** -0.0696** 
(1.49) (2.80) (0.98) (0.82) (1.65) (-6.98) (-5.77) (-9.78) 
XEFF-4 0.0213 0.0983** -0.0 191 0.0106 0.0066 -0.0446** 0.0127 0.0589** 
(2.00) (4.82) (-3.77) (0.3 0) (0.49) (4.26) (1.19) (6.92) 
XEFF-T -0.0912** -0.1991** -0.0394** 0.0519 0.0511 -0.0900** -0.0986** -0.0840** 
(4.37) (-3.72) (-3.91) (0.67) (1.58) (4.00) (-3.99) (-5.40) 
LTA-1 0.1355** 0.4036** -0.0277 -0.0917 -0.0175 -0.0271 0.0360* -0.0628** 
(6.03) (17.75) (-1.75) (-1.70) (-0.69) (-1.04) (2.48) (-5.83) 
LTA-2 0.0022 0.0999** 0.0169 0.0533 -0.0258 -0.0753** -0.0133 0.0477** 
(0.16) (3.46) (0.83) (0.75) (-0.86) (-3.77) (-1.29) (3.41) 
LTA-3 0.0097 -0.0770* -0.0144 -0.0586 -0.0029 0.2294* -0.0590** 0.0072 
(0.74) (-2.73) (-0.74) (-0.84) (-0.10) (14.32) (-3.70) (0.52) 
LTA-4 -0.0156 -0.2663** 0.0159 0.0210 0.0134 0.0278 0.2259* 0.1349** 
(-1.47) (-11.99) (1.20) (0.39) (0.58) (1.95) (19.83) (13.32) 
LTA-T 0.1318** 0.1602** -0.0093 -0.0760 -0.0328 0.1548** 0.1896** 0.1270** 
(-1.47) (-11.99) (1.20) (0.39) (0.58) (1.95) (19.83) (13.32) 
Using Profit Efficiency Estimates 
XEFF-I -0.0634** -0.1836** 0.0255* -0.1354 -0.0926** -0.0301** -0.0609** 
0.0022 
(4.97) (-16.49) (2.49) (-1.81) (-7.96) (-3.25) (7.52) (0.13) 
XEFF-2 0.0081 0.0551 -0.0641** 0.1674 0.0799** -0.0306* 
0.0159 -0.0784** 
(0.88) (1.76) (4.27) (1.00) (3.94) (-3.32) (1.73) (-7.79) 
XEFF-3 -0.0421 -0.1308** 0.0258** 0.0739 -0.1385** 
0.0105 0.0031 0.0013 
(-3.63) (-14.35) (4.41) (0.59) (-5.33) (1.14) (0.34) (0.11) 
XEFF-4 0.0094 0.0848** -0.0341 0.0591 0.0768** -0.0119 -0.0335** 
0.0039 
(0.91) (3.76) (-3.60) (0.62) (5.03) (-1.29) (-3.68) (0.43) 
XEFF-T -0.0880** -0.1745** -0.0469* 
0.1650 -0.0744* -0.0620** -0.0754** -0.0711 
6 - 
(-3.99) (4.24) (-2.20) (0.68) (-1.96) (-3.36) (4.23) (-2.81) 
Notes: 
This table shows the main results only. The full results are shown 
in Appendix 2 and I 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LTA-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients 
(e. g. LTA-I+LTA-2+... +LTA-4). 
T-statistics are in parentheses. 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 
5% level, respectively. 
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In order to test for skimping behaviour by Asian banks, a sub-sample of the most efficient 
banks is constructed. The sub-sample of the most cost efficient banks comprises banks whose 
efficiencies are greater than the median efficiency in each of the four lagged periods. A similar 
sub-sample is constructed using estimated profit efficiency as the efficiency measure. 
Equation [1] is re-estimated using the sub-samples of the most efficient banks and the 
parameter estimates are shown in Table 3. The relationship between loan loss provision and 
lagged cost efficiency is insignificant which rejects any notion of skimping behaviour by cost 
efficient Asian banks. When estimated profit efficiency is the efficiency measure, we find a 
consistent result. The findings do not suggest that Asian banks show any tendencies towards 
skimping behaviour. 
Moral hazard behaviour is tested using equation [1] and a sub-sample of thinly capitalised 
Asian banks. The moral hazard hypothesis suggests that thinly capitalised banks assume 
additional portfolio risk, which eventually Granger causes an increase in loan loss provision. 
We test for evidence that Asian bank management engages in moral hazard behaviour using a 
sub-sample of the least capitalised banks, which is defined as those institutions with equity-to- 
assets below the sample median in the first lagged year. Therefore, we investigate the nature 
of the relationship between loan loss provision and lagged capitalisation. The parameter 
estimates of this model are shown in the final two columns of Table 3. In the first of these two 
columns, estimated cost efficiency is the efficiency measure whilst alternative profit efficiency 
is the measure in the latter column. The negative parameter estimate of lagged capitalisation 
implies that increases in bank capitalisation Granger cause a reduction in loan loss provision 
(interpreted as an improvement in asset quality). In addition to finding evidence of moral 
hazard behaviour at thinly capitalised Asian banks, there is a significant inverse relationship 
between loan loss provision and lagged cost efficiency offering strong statistical evidence that 
thinly capitalised Asian banks are characterised by bad management. The results are robust as 
to the selection of estimated cost or profit efficiency. 
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Table 3: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Loan Loss Provision Equation [1] 
for Sub Samples of Data 
Cost 
Skimping 
CAP-1 0.3772** 
(12.54) 
CAP-2 0.0044 
(0.35) 
CAP-3 -0.0392** 
(-3.44) 
CAP-4 -0.0802** 
(-6.83) 
CAP-T 0.2623** 
(7.20) 
YCEFF-l -0.0917** 
(4.26) 
XEFF-2 0.0383** 
(2.65) 
XEFF-3 0.0090 
(0.45) 
XEFF-4 0.0014 
(0.07) 
XEFF-T -0.0430 
(-1.12) 
Profit 
Skimping 
0.0668** 
(6.41) 
-0.0905** 
(-8.47) 
0.1512** 
(14.53) 
0.0263 
(2.19) 
0.1537** 
(7.05) 
0.0441 
(4.35) 
-0.0230 
(-1.70) 
-0.0387 
(-1.84) 
0.0622** 
(3.86) 
0.0447 
(1.42) 
Cost 
Moral hazard 
0.0361** 
(2.99) 
0.0827** 
(7.22) 
-0.1814** 
(-14.58) 
-0.0911 
(-5.16) 
-0.1536** 
(-5.64) 
-0.0631** 
(-5.79) 
-0.0740** 
(-5.73) 
0.0136 
(1.16) 
0.0115 
(0.84) 
-0.1119** 
(-4.52) 
Profit 
Moral hazard 
0.0326** 
(2.61) 
0.0801 
(7.14) 
-0.1755** 
(-16.43) 
-0.0815** 
(-8.08) 
-0.1444** 
(-6.47) 
0.0775** 
(6.74) 
-0.1492** 
(-13.32) 
0.0552** 
(3.56) 
-0.0422** 
(-2.74) 
-0.0587* 
(-2.17) 
Notes: 
This table shows the main results only. The full results are shown in Appendix 4. 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. CAP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients (e. g. CAP- I+ CAP-2+... + CAP-4). 
The dependent variables are in the columns whilst the predictors are in the rows. 
T-statistics are shown below each predictor. 
LLP is the dependent variable used to test for skimping behaviour and moral hazard behaviour. 
The sample used to test the skimping hypothesis is above median efficiency across the period 
lag -I to lag -4. 
The first XEFF measure is cost efficiency whilst the latter is profit efficiency. 
The sub-sample used to test the moral hazard hypothesis is that of the least capitalised 
banks, that is, banks 
with a ratio of equity-assets below the median level of 0.0819 in lag-l. 
The XEFF variable in the first column for the skimping hypothesis model and the moral 
hazard hypothesis 
model is operating cost efficiency whilst profit efficiency is used in the second column. 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Bad luck is modelled using equation [2] and it implies that deteriorating asset quality 
measured as an increase in loan loss provision is exogenous to the influence of management. 
Thus, an increase in loan loss provision Granger causes a decrease in bank cost efficiency, 
which suggests that after loans go bad bank management expends additional operating costs in 
trying to remedy the situation. Bad luck is identified by an inverse relationship between cost 
efficiency and lagged loan loss provision. We find strong statistical evidence that increases in 
loan loss provision Granger causes a decrease in measured cost efficiency, which implies that 
Asian bank management suffers from bad luck (see Table 4). The results are robust to the 
selection of estimated cost or profit efficiency (see Appendix 6). 
In order to complete the econometric model presented in equations [1-3] we estimate the 
capitalisation equation [3] for Asian banks. There are several possible outcomes that provide 
useful information to policy makers about management behaviour with respect to 
capitalisation. Should an increase in loan loss provision Granger cause an increase in 
capitalisation, it could imply that management responds to worsening asset quality by 
replenishing bank capital. Should a decrease in cost efficiency Granger cause a decrease in 
bank capitalisation, it could be interpreted as suggesting that cost-inefficient banks have low 
earnings, which Granger cause a reduction in capital. We find an insignificant relationship 
between capitalisation and lagged loan loss provision", yet a significant positive association 
between capitalisation and lagged cost efficiency which is consistent with the stated 
hypothesis. On the contrary, it implies cost efficient banks use this advantage to boost 
capitalisation thereby improving risk profile (see Table 5). 
" However, we note that the relationship between capitalisation and lagged 
loan loss provision is sensitive as to 
the selection of estimated cost or profit efficiency. When profit efficiency 
is used, this relationship becomes 
positively significant (see Appendix 8). 
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Table 4: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in X-cost Efficiency Equation [21 
Asian 7 
LLP-1 -0.0585** 
(-6.53) 
LLP-2 -0.0819** 
(-9.01) 
LLP-3 0.0107 
(1.36) 
LLP-4 0.0091 
(1.00) 
LLP-T -0.1206** 
(-6.88) 
Rý(adj) 51.10 
N 2155 
Notes: 
Indonesia Korea 
__ 
Malaysia 
-0.0412** 
(-3.12) 
-0.0305** 
(-2.54) 
-0.0228 
(-1.44) 
0.0107 
(1.05) 
-0.0838** 
(-3.23) 
40.90 
566 
-0.0180 0.0289 
(-1.55) (0.39) 
0.0254* -0.0267 
(1.91) (-0.67) 
-0.0401 0.1043 
(-3.90) (1.41) 
-0.0863** -0.0375* 
(-5.45) (-2.01) 
-0.1190* * 0.0691 
(-4.61) (0.61) 
40.70 40.83 
324 325 
PhilipEines 
-0.0184 
(-0.92) 
-0.0208 
(-0.73) 
0.0534** 
(3.90) 
-0.0274* 
(-2.08) 
-0.0133 
(-0.34) 
36.56 
288 
Thailand 
0.0201 
(0.99) 
0.0113 
(0.59) 
-0.0926** 
(-8.90) 
-0.0765** 
(-7.06) 
-0.1377** 
(4.34) 
60.32 
230 
China 
-0.0603** 
(-5.66) 
-0.0597* 
(-2.01) 
0.0312 
(I. 11) 
-0.0949** 
(-3.94) 
-0.1837** 
(-3.77) 
45.30 
281 
Vietnam 
-0.0565** 
(-5.23) 
0.0187 
(1.29) 
-0.0831 
(-6.44) 
0.0136 
(1.31) 
-0.1073** 
(4.38) 
42.80 
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This table shows the main results only. The full results are shown in Appendix 5. 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LLP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients (e. g. LLP- I+ LLP-2+... + LLP-4). 
T-statistics are in parentheses 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
Table 5: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Capitalisation Equation [3] 
Asian 7 Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines 
LLP-1 0.0257 0.0648 -0,0926* 0.0429** -0.0686** 
(0.68) (1.84) (-2.44) (4.15) (-3.36) 
LLP-2 0.0132 0.0586 0.0276 -0.0163 -0.0824** 
(0.34) (1.62) (0.88) (-1.62) (-2.80) 
LLP-3 0.0011 0.0012 0.0232 0.0110 0.0828** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.69) (1,04) (7.01) 
LLP-4 0.0018 0.0058 0.0422 0.0616** -0.0713** 
(0.04) (0.12) (1.38) (4.79) (-3.34) 
LLP-T 0.0418 0.1304 0.0003 0.0992** -0.1394** 
, 
(0.51) (1.72) (0.01) (4.51) (-3.22) 
W(adj) 54.60 36.60 64.50 60.40 60.10 
N 2155 566 324 325 288 
Thailand 
0.0072 
(0.48) 
-0.0719** 
(-5.87) 
0.0341** 
(3.02) 
-0.0736** 
(-6.50) 
-0.1042** 
(4.15) 
41.40 
230 
China 
0.0091 
(0.90) 
0.0129 
(1.03) 
-0.0366** 
(-3.65) 
-0.0806** 
(-6.20) 
-0.0951** 
(4.13) 
54.97 
281 
Vietnam 
-0.0455 
(0.00) 
0.0307 
(0.00) 
-0.0600 
(0.00) 
-0.0387 
(0.00) 
-0.1134* * 
(-5.06) 
54.56 
141 
Notes: 
This table shows the main results only. The full results are shown 
in Appendix 7 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LLP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients 
(e. g. LLP-1+ LLP-2+... + LLP-4) 
T-statistics are in parentheses 
Operating cost efficiency measure is used. 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 
1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
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The robustness of the estimates from model [3] is tested by dividing the sample into sub- 
samples of thinly capitalised and high-capitalised Asian banks. First, we investigate whether 
management at low and highly capitalised banks responds differently to changes in loan loss 
provision. Second, these relationships are re-estimated replacing estimated cost efficiency as 
the efficiency measure with estimated profit efficiency. The results of the re-estimations of 
equation [3] are shown in Table 6. 
At thinly capitalised Asian banks, an increase in loan loss provision Granger causes a 
statistically significant decrease in bank capitalisation irrespective of which efficiency 
measure is specified. The negative relationship between capitalisation and lagged loan loss 
provision suggests that management at thinly capitalised banks use up capital resources which 
has adverse implications for banking sector stability. On the contrary, for the sub-sample of 
highly capitalised Asian banks an increase in loan loss provision Granger causes an increase in 
bank capitalisation; this suggests bank management respond to worsening asset quality by 
replenishing bank capital. Again, the finding is consistent across choice of estimated 
efficiency. There is strong statistical evidence that an increase in profit or cost efficiency 
Granger causes an increase in bank capitalisation at thinly capitalised Asian banks suggests 
profit inefficient managers use their additional revenues inter alia to supplement reserves 
thereby improving the strength of the bank in the eyes of regulators and other market 
participants. 
156 
Table 6: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Capitalisation Equation [31 for 
Sub Samples of Data 
I COST PROFIT I 
High 
Constant 0.0855* 
(2.31) 
LLP-1 0.0538** 
(7.85) 
LLP-2 -0.0039 
(-0.53) 
LLP-3 0.0385** 
(4.68) 
LLP-4 -0.0065 
(-0.70) 
LLP-T 0.0820** 
(5.16) 
XEFF-I -0.0454** 
(4.21) 
XEFF-2 -0.0683** 
(-5.86) 
XEFF-3 0.0082 
(0.79) 
YCEFF-4 0.0131 
(1.25) 
XEFF-T -0.0924* 
(-2.14) 
W(adj) 50.10 
N 475 
Thin 
0.0753* 
(2.13) 
0.0003 
(0.03) 
0.0135 
(1.67) 
-0.0879** 
(-lO. 84) 
0.0018 
(0.22) 
-0.0723** 
(-4.32) 
-0.0319** 
(-2.94) 
-0.0102 
(-i. 01) 
0.0718** 
(7.88) 
0.0878** 
(8.47) 
0.1176** 
(5.81) 
64.30 
1165 
High 
-0.0852* 
(-2.37) 
0.0426** 
(6.18) 
-0.0018 
(-0.25) 
0.0368** 
(4.98) 
-0.0055 
(-0.57) 
0.0721** 
(4.59) 
0.0360** 
(3.45) 
0.0618** 
(2.63) 
-0.0850** 
(4.09) 
-0.0598* 
(-2.45) 
-0.0470 
(-1.14) 
54.40 
475 
Thin 
0.0708* 
(2.35) 
0.0007 
(0-07) 
0.0120 
(1.32) 
, -0.0890** 
(-9.78) 
0.0015 
(0.17) 
-0.0748** 
(4.00) 
-0.0172 
(-0.98) 
0.1704** 
(8.70) 
-0.0126 
(-0.74) 
-0.0067 
(-0.34) 
0.1338** 
(3.61) 
64.70 
1165 
Notes: 
This table shows the main results only. The full results are shown in Appendix 9. 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LLP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients (e. g. LLP- I+ LLP-2+... + LLP-4). 
The dependent variables are in the columns whilst the predictors are in the rows. 
T-statistics are shown below each predictor. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of equity-to-assets. 
Thinly capitalised savings banks are defined as reporting a ratio of equity-to-assets below the median for 
CAP- I and high capitalised banks report higher than the median (of 0.0819). 
The first XEFF measure is cost efficiency whereas profit efficiency is the second measure. 
_* and 
** statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tail test). 
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4.2 OLS estimates of Granger causality tests for banks at 
country level 
Separate estimates of equations [1-3] were carried out for the seven countries included in this 
paper. Whilst the signs of the intertemporal relationships between the variables indicate 
different types of management behaviour, the statistical relationships are relatively weak 
(except where noted). 
From Table 2, we see the estimates of the Granger causality tests in the loan loss provision 
equation [1] for each country. The negative relationships between loan loss provision and 
lagged cost efficiency imply bad management for Indonesian, Korean, Thai, Chinese and 
Vietnamese banks. For Indonesian, Thai, Chinese and Vietnamese banks there is also strong 
evidence that increases in credit risk Granger cause an deterioration in asset quality. The 
above findings of bad management and deteriorating asset quality are robust to changes in the 
efficiency measure: indeed, we observe there is statistical evidence (at the 5% level) of bad 
management at Filipino banks when alternative profit efficiency is selected as the measure of 
bank efficiency; however, there is no evidence of skimping behaviour across Asian banking 
sectors (no significant positive relationships between loan loss provision and lagged 
efficiency). 
Table 4 shows the estimates of the Granger causality tests in the X-efficiency equation [2]. 
Specifically, we test for bad luck when [exogenous] increases in loan loss provision Granger 
cause a reduction in bank cost efficiency. The parameter estimates show a significant 
relationship for Indonesian, Korean, Thai, Chinese and Vietnamese banks. The results imply 
that banks in the aforementioned countries show contemporaneous and statistically significant 
evidence both of bad luck and bad management. 
The capitalisation equation [3] is estimated for each country to complete the econometric 
model. An increase in loan loss provision Granger causes an increase in capitalisation only for 
Malaysian banks suggesting managers respond to deteriorating asset quality by eventually 
augmenting bank capital. Similarly, managers of Malaysian banks react to a 
decrease in bank 
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cost efficiency by capital augmentation. However, increases in loan loss provisions Granger 
cause decrease in bank capital in the Philippines, Thailand, China and Vietnam. Of these 
countries, an increase in cost efficiency leads to a rise in bank capital in China only, whilst a 
rise in the level of credit risk lowers bank capital in Vietnam only (see Table 5). 
4.3 The economic effects of management behaviour 
Our final objective is to examine the economic effects of management behaviour (see Table 
7). In the second column of the Table, we show the sign and level of statistical significance of 
the observed relationships; the majority of relationships are found to be significant at the 1% 
level. The economic effects are calculated as follows: the economic effect of bad management 
is measured in terms of the effect that a one standard deviation decrease in cost efficiency has 
on the cumulative increase in loan loss provision over four years; the economic effects of 
skimping are measured in terms of a one standard deviation increase in measured efficiency 
causing an increase in loan loss provision; the economic effects of moral hazard behaviour are 
measured in terms of a one standard deviation reduction in capitalisation causing an increase 
in loan loss provision; and finally, the economic effects of bad luck are measured in terms of a 
one standard deviation increase in loan loss provision causing a decrease in measured 
efficiency. 
Focusing attention on Asian banks as a whole, the economic effect of bad management, 
measured as a one standard deviation decrease in the level of estimated cost efficiency 
(from 
0.7985 to 0.7061), predicts a cumulative increase in loan loss provision of 10.41% over four 
years. The economic effects of bad luck, however, are much lower. A one standard 
deviation 
increase in loan loss provision (from 0.0725 to 0.3693) predicts a cumulative reduction 
in 
estimated cost efficiency of only 4.69% over four years. 
Using sub-samples of Asian banks, we measure the economic effect of skimping 
behaviour. 
From Table 3, we recall that there is no evidence of skimping behaviour at efficient 
Asian 
banks when estimated cost efficiency is the measure. 
The effect of a one standard deviation 
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increase in cost efficiency (from 0.8411 to 0.8997) predicts a cumulative reduction in loan loss 
provision of 4.23% (from 0.0621 to 0.0596) over four years. However, an increase in 
measured profit efficiency for the most profit efficient Asian banks (from 0.7909 to 0.8042), 
predicts a cumulative increase in loan loss provision (from 0.0598 to 0.0604) over just under 
1% over four years. Although this suggests skimping behaviour, we note that the statistical 
relationship is insignificant. 
The economic effect of moral hazard behaviour is calculated for the least capitalised sub- 
sample of Asian banks. It is hardly surprising to observe the relatively large standard deviation 
in the level of bank capitalisation given the problems facing Asian banks over the period. 
Hence, a one standard deviation decrease in capitalisation (from 0.0499 to -0.0341) predicts a 
cumulative increase in loan loss provision (from 0.0720 to 0.0857) over four years, which 
constitutes an increase of 16.07%. On average, the economic effect of moral hazard behaviour 
outweighs the effects of bad management and bad luck. 
Subsequently, we calculate the economic effects of management behaviour for banks in each 
country. Generally speaking, the economic effects of bad management far outweigh the effects 
of bad luck. Problems appear to be particularly acute in China and Vietnam: a one standard 
deviation reduction in measured efficiency predicts a cumulative increase in loan loss 
provision of 22.71% and 23.96% over four years, respectively. In Korea, Thailand and 
Indonesia we observe the same relationship though the magnitude of the increase in loan loss 
provision ranges from 7.89% (Indonesia) to 12.70% (Thailand). On the contrary, a reduction 
in efficiency predicts a cumulative improvement in asset quality over four years in Malaysia 
and the Philippines but these results are tentative evidence of skimping behaviour. 
The economic effects of bad luck predict a cumulative decrease in measured cost efficiency in 
all but one country (Malaysia). The largest falls in efficiency arising from deterioration in 
asset quality are observed in Indonesia (5.30%) and China (4.32%). However, small changes 
in efficiency are reported for Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. Taken together, the 
economic effects of bad management and bad luck appear to impact most on Chinese banks 
and Indonesian banks compared with banks in other Asian countries. 
160 
Table 7: Economic Effects of Management Hypotheses 
c Effects of Bad Management 
Sign & sig 
Asian-7 
Indonesia 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Philippines 
-@I% 
-@I% 
-@I% 
+ n. s. 
+ n. s. 
Thailand -@I% 
China -@I% 
Vietnam 1% 
Economic Effects of Skimping2 
Mean XEFF I std dev I LLPIL LLPIL T 
0.7985 0.7061 0.0725 0.0809 
0.8229 0.7647 0.1353 0,1469 
0.8085 0.7146 0.0274 0.0311 
0.8042 0.7122 0.0825 0.0777 
0.7946 0.6924 0.0501 0.0449 
0.7838 0.6784 0.0652 0.0747 
0.7945 0.6881 0.0357 0.0462 
0.7812 0.6634 0.0314 0.0413 
% change 
10.41 
7.89 
11.90 
(6.14) 
(11-64) 
12.70 
22.71 
23.96 
sign & Sig Mean XEFF I std dev T LLPIL LLP/L T% change 
Cost eff - n. s. 0.8411 0.8997 0.0621 0.0596 (4.23) 
Profit eff + n. s. 0.7909 0.8042 0.0598 0.0604 0.98 
Economic Effects of Moral Hazard 3 
Sign & Sig Mean CAP I SO dev I LLPIL LLPIL T% change 
Low-cap -@I%0.0499 -0.0398 0.0720 0.0857 16.07 
Economic Effects of Bad Luck 4 
Sign & Sig Mean LLP 1 std dev XEFF XEFF % change 
Asian-7 -@I%0.0725 0.3693 0.7985 0.7627 (4.69) 
Indonesia -@I%0.1353 0.6556 0.8229 0.7793 (5.30) 
Korea -@I%0.0274 0.0522 0.8085 0.8055 (0.37) 
Malaysia + n. s. 0.0825 0.1968 0.8042 0.8121 0.98 
Philippines - n. s. 0.0501 0.0914 0.7946 0.7941 (0.07) 
Thailand -@ 1% 0.0652 0.1609 0.7838 0.7706 (1.68) 
China 1% 0.0357 0.2227 0.7945 0.7601 (4.32) 
Vietnam 1% 0.0314 0.0498 0.7812 0.7792 (0.25) 
Notes: 
1. The economic effects of bad management are measured in terms of a one standard deviation decrease in 
measured efficiency causing an increase in loan loss provision. In the final column, parentheses indicate a 
reduction in problem loans. 
2. The economic effects of skimping are measured in terms of a one standard deviation increase in measured 
efficiency causing an increase in loan loss provision. Two sub-samples of the most cost efficient and the most 
profit efficient Asian banks are used. 
3. The economic effects of moral hazard behaviour are measured in terms of a one standard deviation reduction 
in capitalisation causing an increase in loan loss provision. The sub-sample of the least capitalised Asian banks is 
used. 
4. The economic effects of bad luck are measured in terms of a one standard deviation increase in loan loss 
provision causing a decrease in measured XEFF In the final column, parentheses indicate a reduction 
in XEFF. 
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Conclusions and Implications 
We employ the Granger causality estimates to infer different types of management behaviour 
at Asian commercial banks. The inference is based on specific intertemporal relationships 
between loan loss provision, efficiency, and capitalisation. This paper contributes to the 
existing literature as a robustness test of the Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004) 
results for US and European banks, respectively. This section will discuss whether the US and 
European findings are robust with respect to the Asian results reported herein. 
For Asian banks, there is very strong statistical evidence to support the bad management 
hypothesis (that poorly managed banks tend to make more poor quality loans) and the bad 
luck hypothesis (that banks with high loan loss provision suffer a reduction in operating 
efficiency). Breaking the sample into sub-samples according to the level of bank capitalisation 
provides further statistically strong evidence of bad management at thinly capitalised Asian 
banks. There is also significant statistical evidence of moral hazard behaviour (that poorly 
capitalised banks suffering reductions in capital will take greater risks and hence, on average, 
end up with higher loan loss provision). In addition, for the most cost efficient Asian banks 
our evidence rejects the skimping behaviour hypothesis although there is statistically weak 
evidence to suggest skimping behaviour when estimated efficiency is measured by alternative 
profit efficiency. At the country level, there is significant evidence of bad management and 
bad luck affecting national banking sectors in Asia (except for Malaysia and the Philippines). 
The twin problems appear to be particularly pressing in China and Indonesia. Our estimated 
results of economic effects of different types of management behaviour show that, on average, 
the economic effect of moral hazard outweighs the effects of bad management and bad luck. 
In general, the Asian results are largely consistent with the findings of Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) for US commercial banks which were found to be affected by bad management and 
bad luck as well as exhibiting skimping and moral hazard behaviour. The difference is the lack 
of evidence to suggest skimping behaviour at Asian banks. This makes the Asian results 
different from those obtained for European banks with the exception that bad management is 
common to both sets of banks. 
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The finding of bad management, bad luck and moral hazard behaviour at Asian commercial 
banks has policy implications for bank regulators and supervisors, and bank owners and 
managers. We concur with Berger and DeYoung (1997) and emphasise the importance of 
efficiency (and the need to test the robustness of different efficiency measures) in the 
intertemporal relationships. The policy implication is that bank regulators and supervisors 
(and bank management) should adopt more sophisticated measures of bank performance for 
regulatory purposes. For bank owners and managers, bad management might be an outcome of 
the diverse range of ownership models in Asian banking. Indeed, several of the characteristics 
of bad management and moral hazard behaviour are associated with agency problems. 
Notably, Asian bank managers have faced significant pressures and managerial challenges 
during the 1990s such as financial liberalisation and issues pertaining to capital adequacy. 
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Appendix 1: Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation - Operating Cost and 
Alternative Profit Functions, 1985-2004. 
Variable Para- 
meter 
I Profit efficien i Operating cost efficiency 
Coeff Std. err T-Stat T-Stat Coeff Std. err 
Constant _ -22.217 ...... . ..... . ............................... 
__ 0.9665 -22.99 30.490 0.9917 1 
- 30.75 
Year Tj -0.004 0.0350 -0.12 0.044 0.0111 3.99 Year2 ........... I ..... 0.006 ........ 0.0004 15.32 -0.004 0.0005 -7.92 InQI -8.748 0.4287 -20.40 4.006 0.3229 12.41 
InQ2 
. ............. .... ........ .... ... 
6,708 
.... ............. 
0.5244 
............ -- -- 
12.79 
. -4.037 
0.2880 -14.02 InQ3 P3 
. ..... . ......... . ........ 
14.919 -- - ----- 0.6520 ....... . ...... .. . 22.88 -5.124 0.5070 -10.11 InPIAP2 0.392 0.1079 ----- 3.63 ----- 0 0.99 0.0754 13.13 
InZI/Z2 0.141 0.1830 0.77 1 -0.075 
__ 0.0695 -1.07 
InQI * InQI oil 1 -0.188 0.0464 -4.05 1 0.234 1 0.0430 5.44 
InQ I* InQ2 012 0.103 0.0293 3.5 1 0.011 0.0108 1.04 
InQ I* InQ3 013 -7.430 0.1729 -42.96 6.027 1 0.1526 39.50 
InQ2 * InQ2 022 -0.821 0.0588 -13.97 0.093 1 0.0585 1.59 
InQ2 InQ3 023 6.854 0.2023 33.88 1 -2.720 1 0.1282 1 
_ 
-21.21 
InQ3 InQ3 031 23.164 0.0719 322.03 1 -6.276 0.0656 -95.66 2 InPI/P2 0.201 0.0190 10.58 1 0.045 0.0034 13.50 
InPI/P2*InZI/Z2 C211 -0.091 0.0097 -9.36 0.023 0.0031 7.55 2 In ZI/Z2 0.034 0.0047 7.27 0.028 0.0018 15.65 
InQI* InP1/P2 ....... 1 UJI 11 
..... ... 0.038 0.0137 2.76 
- ---- - ----- -0.023 
0.0085 -2.76 
InQ2 InPl/P2 1021 0.044 0.0113 3.87 0.029 0.0035 8.37 
InQ3 InPI/P2 
........... .............. .... 
0.447 0.1055 4.23 0.0398 0.073 1.85 
InQI InZI/Z2 KII 
. -0.028 ................................ 0.0103 .-. -2.71 ...... -0.032 0.0032 -10.10 
InQ2 InZI/Z2 K21 -0.006 ..... .............. .... ....... 
0.0076 
............ . 
0.021 0.0055 
.......... 
3.88 
InQ3 InZI/Z2 -0.046 ............ I .............. 
0.0992 -0.46 -0.084 0.0393 -2.15-. 
InQI T 0.020 0.0024 8.3§ -0.009 0.0016 -5.54 
InQ2 T 
. -0.040 .... . .... 
0.0020 -19.46 0.008 0.0042 1 1.86 
InQ3 T ..... ... 1ý23 1 ... .. 0.071 0.0187 3.80 0.027 0.0110 2.40 
InPl/P2 T -0.002 0.0030 -0.68 ........... -0.014 ....... .......... 
0.0019 -7.30 
InZI/Z2 T -0.002 0.0020 -1.02 0.0020 0.010 4.81 
c0sx I a, i -5.612 0.9945 -5.64 
1 7.290 1.0054 7.25 
sinxI b1 7.348 1.0255 7.16 -2.520 1 1.2114 -2.08 
cosx2 a2 6.638 1.0163 6.53 -3.990 1.0311 -3.87 
sinx2 b2 -5.227 0.9833 .... -5.32 
1 
....... 
1.710 1 0.8875 1.93 
cosx3 a3 -4.569 
.... 0.9753 ... . . ... -4.68 11.810 0.9804 12.05 
sinx3 . ...... . ......... b3 
1 13.294 1.0189 13.05 -12.620 1.0210 -12.36 
C(X I +x 1) all -5.931 0.7327 -8.10 
6.300 0.7178 8.78 
S(XI±3ý1) b 6.981 0.7969 8.76 -7.620 i 
0.6059 
i -12.58 - 
c(xl+x2) a, 
' t- -ý 
-1.987 0.7699 
0 7513 
-2.58 
53 2 ...... 
9.590 1 
240 12 
0.6750 
8 0 649 
14.21 
84 18 
s(x I +x2) I -1.900 1 . 1 . . . . 
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Appendix 1: (continued) 
Variable Para- 
meter 
i Profit efficiency 
... . ... ... ....... - ------ r- ------------ T", -, Coeff I Std. err T-Stat ! I 
Operating cost efficiency 
i Std. err I T-Stat Coeff 
c(x I +x3) a13 
i 2660 097 34 -2.73 1 6.992 1 
i 0.9222 1 7.58 
.. -. SI +x3) (X 
...... 
b ......... 1,3 
........ ... 
2.911 0.99, 2.93 ......... ... -3.452 
............ .... . ... 
1.0282 -3.36 
c(x2+x2) . . a22 .... .......... 3.268 0.7550 1 4.33 -1.028 0.5406 -1.90 
s(x2+x2) b22 -1.385 1 0.6426 -2.15 1.041 0.5406 
c(x2+x3) -------- ----- - ------- ---- --------- a23 6.059 0.9891 
......................... ............. -1 ............. 
------ 6.13 
....... . ..... . .... . .... 
------- 
-2.265 0.9752 -2.32. - s(x2+X3 b 23 -6.182 1 0.9608 -6.43 4.067 1 
1 165 
0.9116 
0 8268t- 
4.46 
1 41 c(x3+x3) -5.873 0.8600 -6.83 . . . 
s(x3+x3) 33 ......... ..................... 9.427 019450 -3.155 0.8374 1 -3.77 
c(2*xl+x2) a, 12 .............. . ....... ...... ..... ........................ ........ -0.662 1 0.1943 11 ... ..... . ... . . . . . . . . 4 . ............ .. ..... . ......... 
............. .... 
-3.41 -0.104 0.0742 -1.40 ... ........... . s(2*xl+x2) .......... . .......... 
. .................... 
112 
. ...... ........ 
. . .... .... ... .. .. . ... . 1- 1- .. . 1 -0.1 19ý ..... . ..... .... ..... .... 
. I. . 0.1880 i i 
.................................. -0.64 
1 
........ .......... . ..... ........ . ....... -0.136 .... . .............. 
0.0848 1 -1.61 
c(2*xl+x3) a, 13 -3.676 1 0.7350 -5.00 1.454 0.6254 2.32 
s(2*xl+x3) b, 13 .............. ... . ....... ....... ... .... . .. 4.342 ........... .................... ... 0.7623 5.70 -1.622 0.6254 -2.59 
c(xl+2*x2) a122 0.598 ........................ .... ...... .... . ..... 0.1859 ...... . ... .... ..... ............ .. .. .. . 
...... ........... . ...... 3.22 1 0.065 
..................... . ............... . ...... . ............ .................... .... ...... 
0.0742 
. ............. . ............. 
0.88 
s(xl+2*x2) 
b122 . 
-0.098 11 
. . ... .. ... 0.1512 -0.65 0.092 0.0742 1! 1.24 . ...... c(x 1 +2+3) a123 ...... .... ...... . ........... -2.628 0.7487... ' -3.51 1.027] 0.6784 . ....... ...... 
1.51 
s(x 1 +2+3) 
b123 
-1.614 -2.16 1.169 0.6466 -------- 
1.81 
c(xl+2*x3) ........ ..... ... -4.689 1 
...... . ....... 0.8096 . ..... . .......... ............ -5.79 2.017 0.7420 2.72 
s(xl+2*x3) .... . ................... 
. ............. ........ .. b133 4.221 -2.548 0.7314 -3.48 
c(2*x2+x3) a223 3.009 0.7518 4.00 1 -1.051 0.5194 -2.02 
s(2*x2+x3) b --- ------------ 223 . ..... .......... ................... 
. .... 
-1.413 1 
...... ...... ........ . .............. 0.6416 . .............. . -2.20 1.026 0.5512 1 1.86 
c(x2+2*x3) a233 
............. .............. 1.533 1 0.920 1.67 1 -1.643 0.7844 -2.09 
s(x2+2*x3) 
. ............... ......... . 
233 -1.598 1 0.7907.. -ý ...... ...... 
2 0.068 b 
. .... .......... 
0.7102 0.10 
- "- 
GDP per capita Xi -0.089 0.0242 ...... .... -3.67 --------- - ------ . 
034 0.0106 -3. 23 
Pop density X. 2 -0.024 ....... ..... -1.27 
0032 1 0,0106 1 3.06 
Deposit Density 0.070 
.............. 
0.0084 
.... . .................... .......... 
8 37 
. .... ..... . ..... . ....... 
0.006 
... 
0.0016 4.00 
Loan/Deposit -0.040 0.0215 
1 
-1. 89 -0.032 0.0212 -1.53 
CAP regulation) 
------ ----------- 
X ý5 
......... . ................. 2.113 0.2520 
.................... . 
8.38 -0.313 0.0848 -3.70 
fffH (Cus Dep) 
..... 
X6 .......... . 0.0315 1 -0.070 1 1. ..... .... . ...... . .......................... T ... . ...... *, -* ............. *- .......... I...... .. 
-2.22 ........ - .................... .... ..... 
0.042 11 
...... ...... 
0.0106 1 3.94 
22 + Cý ...... .. 1.275 1 0.0357 35.72 1 0.376 0.0106 35.43 CTS C7, 
U2 CF 
2 
: 
........... ...... . ... . ..... . .... ............ ..... . ... ...... ................ .......... 
0.998 0.0053 190.11 
.......... 
1.339 
.............. .... .... 
709.56 0.0019 
Y 
Log-likelihood 
I- 
........... ....... . ...... .............. . .......... ........... .. .... -927.00 1591.16 
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Equation [11 Using Operating Cost Efficiency Estimates 
Constant 
LLP-1 
LLP-2 
LLP-3 
LLP-4 
LLP-T 
CAP-1 
CAP-2 
CAP-3 
CAP-4 
CAP-T 
Y, EFF-I 
XEFF-2 
XEFF-3 
XEFF-4 
XEFF-T 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
LTA-3 
Asian 7 Indonesia Korea Malaysia 
-0.2303* -0.1252 0.0384* 0.0448 
(-2.16) (-0.19) (2.14) (0.71) 
0.6279** 0.6050** 0.3300** 0.8117** 
(22.86) (10.38) (5.91) (14.20) 
0.2741 0.2896** 0.1271 -0.0636 
(8.82) (4.66) (1.86) (-0.91) 
0.1455** 0.1743 * -0.0351 -0.0051 
(4.37) (2.64) (-0.50) (-0.09) 
-0.3041** -0.2784 0.0421 -0.083 1* 
(-4.54) (-1.45) (0.62) (-2.18) 
0.7434** 0.7906** 0.4640** 0.6600** 
(8.70) (3.59) (3.52) (5.80) 
0.2251 0.3861* 0.0928* 0.0918 
(3.05) (2.29) (1.93) (0.67) 
0.1358 0.1682 -0.0263 -0.0911 
(1.59) (0.91) (-0.40) (-0.48) 
0.0712 0.0031 -0.0155 0.0173 
(0.83) (0.02) (-0.25) (0.12) 
-0.1659* -0.3517 0.0090 0.0497 
(-2.11) (-l. 84) (0.25) (0.43) 
0.2661 0.2057 0.0600 0.0677 
(0.82) (0.56) (0.55) (0.23) 
-0.0578** -0.2159** -0.0084 0.0108 
(-5.41) (-lO. 23) (-1.65) (0.26) 
-0.0683** -0.1936** -0.0157** 0.0009 
(-6.13) (-9.58) (-2.66) (0.02) 
0.0137 0.1121 ** 0.0038 0.0296 
(1.49) (2.80) (0.98) (0.82) 
0.0213* 0.0983** -0.0 191 0.0106 
(2.00) (4.82) (-3.77) (0.30) 
-0.0912** -0.1991** -0.0394** 
0.0519 
(-4.37) (-3.72) (-3.91) (0.67) 
0.1355** 0.4036** -0.0277 -0.0917 
(6.03) (17.75) (-1.75) (-1.70) 
0.0022 0.0999** 0.0169 0.0533 
(0.16) (3.46) (0.83) (0.75) 
0.0097 -0.0770* -0.0144 -0.0586 
Philieeines 
-0.0070 
(-0.24) 
0.6961** 
(10.20) 
0.1774 
(1.84) 
-0.2715* 
(-2.37) 
0.1048 
(1.33) 
0.7068** 
(3.87) 
-0.1271 * 
(-2.17) 
0.2528** 
(3.35) 
-0.1383* 
(-2.19) 
0.0049 
(0.12) 
-0.0077 
(-0.06) 
-0.0186 
(-i. 00) 
0.0380* 
(2.25) 
0.0251 
(1.65) 
0.0066 
(0.49) 
0.0511 
(1.58) 
-0.0175 
(-0.69) 
-0.0258 
(-0.86) 
-0.0029 
Thailand 
-0.0032 
(404) 
0.7045** 
(13.27) 
-0.0467 
(-0.86) 
-0.1561** 
(-2.81) 
0.0851 
(1.65) 
0.5867** 
(5.47) 
-0.7527** 
(-3.57) 
0.1735 
(0.75) 
0.0690 
(0.30) 
0.3088 
(1.59) 
-0.2014 
(-0.46) 
0.0132 
(1.29) 
0.0173 
(1.32) 
-0.0759** 
(-6.98) 
-0.0446** 
(4.26) 
-0.0900** 
(4.00) 
-0.0271 
(-1.04) 
-0.0753** 
(-3.77) 
0.2294** 
China 
-0.0578 
(-0.68) 
0.2434* 
(18.80) 
-0.2195** 
(-8.96) 
0.0810 
(1.63) 
-0.0620 
(-1.39) 
0.0429 
(0.59) 
-0.0747 
(-0.41) 
0.3194 
(1.27) 
0.0960 
(0.58) 
-0.0081 
(407) 
0.3326 
(0.90) 
0.0361** 
(3.03) 
-0.0818** 
(-5.46) 
-0.0656** 
(-5.77) 
0.0127 
(1.19) 
-0.0986** 
(-3.99) 
0.0360* 
(2.48) 
-0.0133 
(-1.29) 
-0.0590** 
Vietnam 
0.0149 
(0.99) 
0.7445** 
(14.87) 
0.1130* 
(2.10) 
-0.0842 
(-1.58) 
0.1763** 
(3.43) 
0.9496** 
(9.10) 
-0.0203 
(-0.85) 
0.0378 
(1.29) 
-0.0354 
(-1.53) 
0.0084 
(0.72) 
-0.0094 
(-0.21) 
-0.1197* * 
(-16.75) 
0.0464** 
(5.63) 
-0.0696** 
(-9.78) 
0.0589** 
(6.92) 
-0.0840** 
(-5.40) 
-0.0628** 
(-5.83) 
0.0477** 
(3.41) 
0.0072 
170 
(0.74) 
LTA-4 -0.0156 
(-1.47) 
LTA-T 0.1318 ** 
(4.21) 
y1990 -0.0037 
(-0.08) 
y1991 -0.0118 
(-0.26) 
Y1992 -0.0027 
(-0.06) 
Y 1993 -0.0042 
(-0.09) 
Y1994 -0.0053 
(-0.12) 
Y1995 -0.0157 
(-0.36) 
Y1996 -0.0143 
(-0.34) 
Y1997 -0.0063 
(-0.15) 
y1998 0.1301** 
(5.98) 
y1999 0.0606** 
(2.80) 
Y2000 0.0286 
(1.29) 
Y2001 0.0358 
(1.60) 
Y2002 0.0028 
(0.13) 
Y2003 0.0051 
(0.23) 
Y2004 -0.0093 
(-0.41) 
R2(adj) 51.5 
N 2,155 
(-2.73) 
-0.2663** 
(-11.99) 
0.1602** 
(3.12) 
0.0096 
(0.05) 
-0.0513 
(-0.29) 
-0.0008 
(O. OQ) 
0.0346 
(0.20) 
0.0454 
(0.26) 
-0.0030 
(-0.02) 
-0.0247 
(-0.16) 
-0.0041 
(-0.03) 
0.4165** 
(5.11) 
0.3150** 
(3.86) 
0.3067* 
(3.34) 
0.3067** 
(3.34) 
0.0181 
(0.10) 
0.0650 
(0.37) 
-0.0205 
(-0.12) 
53.2 
566 
(-0.74) (-0.84) (-0.10) 
0.0159 0.0210 0.0134 
(1.20) (0.39) (0.58) 
-0.0093 -0.0760 -0.0328 
(-0.27) (-0.61) (-0.61) 
-0.0359 0.0080 
(-0.62) (0.34) 
-0.0047 -0.0465* 0.0064 
(-0.07) (-2.18) (0.71) 
-0.0028 -0.0105 -0.0033 
(-0.04) (-0.47) (-0.37) 
0.0233 -0.0088 -0.0088 
(0.40) (-0.41) (-0.97) 
0.0281 -0.0423 -0.0105 
(0.50) (-1.85) (-1.10) 
0.0414 -0.0412 -0.0068 
(0.74) (-1.94) (-0.75) 
0.0256 -0.0300 -0.0073 
(0.45) (-1.39) (-0.77) 
0.0119 -0.0143 0.0042 
(0.22) (-0.66) (0.44) 
0.0410** 0.0127 0.0192* 
(6.80) (0.64) (2.07) 
0.0351** -0.0153 0.0241 * 
(5.67) (-0.82) (2.54) 
0.0286** -0.0216 0.0102 
(4.37) (-1.08) (1.03) 
-0.0535 -0.0148 0.0258* 
(-0.74) (-0.72) (2.74) 
0.0044 -0.0159 0.0265** 
(0.06) (-0.78) (2.83) 
0.0613 -0.0314 0.0146 
(0.85) (-1.54) (1.54) 
0.0340 -0.0410 0,0181 
(0.49) (-1.92) (1-90) 
58.3 66.3 53.1 
324 325 288 
(14.32) 
0.0278 
(1.95) 
0.1548** 
(3.94) 
-0.0011 
(-0.05) 
-0.0105 
(-0.46) 
-0.0036 
(-0.16) 
-0.0043 
(-0.19) 
-0.0059 
(-0.25) 
-0.0078 
(-0.32) 
0.0126 
(0.53) 
0.0387 
(1.57) 
0.0798* 
(3.00) 
0.0771* 
(2.94) 
-0.0221 
(-0.85) 
-0.0183 
(-0.73) 
0.0726** 
(3.02) 
0.0357 
(1.44) 
0,0480 
(1.83) 
64.5 
230 
(-3.70) (0.52) 
0.2259** 0.1349** 
(19.83) (13.32) 
0.1896** 0.1270** 
(7.16) (5.16) 
0.0067 
(0.13) 
0.0285 
(0.57) 
0.0181 
(0.36) 
0.0227 
(0.45) 
0.0267 
(0.56) 
0.0309 
(0.67) 
0.0410 -0.0543 
(0.91) (-0.78) 
0.0123 -0.0417 
(0.28) (460) 
0.0533 -0.0681 
(1.23) (-0.98) 
0.0494 -0.0321 
(1.14) (-0.48) 
0.0524 0.0249 
(1.22) (0.38) 
0.0949* -0.0448 
(2.18) (-0.71) 
0.0861* -0.0603 
(1.98) (-0.93) 
0.0577 -0.0679 
(1.33) (-1.07) 
0.0742 -0.0414 
(1.72) (-0.65) 
66.2 44.3 
281 141 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LLP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients (e. g. LLP- I+ 
LLP-2+... +LLP-4). 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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[11 using Profit Efficiency Estimates 
Constant 
LLP-1 
LLP-2 
LLP-3 
LLP-4 
LLP-T 
CAP-1 
CAP-2 
CAP-3 
CAP-4 
CAP-T 
XEFF-I 
XEFF-2 
XEFF-3 
XEFF-4 
XEFF-T 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
LTA-3 
Asian 7 
0.1009 
(1.01) 
0.6182** 
(22.46) 
0.2738** 
(8.83) 
0.1456** 
(4-37) 
-0.2951** 
(-4.42) 
0.7426** 
(8.69) 
0.2049** 
(2.76) 
0.1611 
(1.88) 
0.0329 
(0.38) 
-0.1348 
(-1.71) 
0.2641 
(1.62) 
-0.0634** 
(4.97) 
0.0081 
(0.88) 
-0.0421 
(-3.63) 
0.0094 
(0.91) 
-0.0880** 
(-3.99) 
0.1367** 
(4.22) 
-0.0015 
(-0.06) 
0.0138 
Indonesia Korea 
0.4729 
(1.24) 
0.5724** 
(9.75) 
0.2808** 
(4.57) 
0.1660* 
(2.53) 
-0.2052* 
(-2.11) 
0.8141** 
(5.62) 
0.3762* 
(2.22) 
0.2114 
(1.14) 
-0.0691 
(-0.36) 
-0.1964 
(-i. 01) 
0.3221 
(0.44) 
-0.1836** 
(-16.49) 
0.0551 
(1.76) 
-0.1308** 
(-14.35) 
0.0848** 
(3.76) 
-0.1745 ** 
(-4.24) 
0.6200** 
(27.46) 
0.1081 ** 
(3,78) 
-0.1078 ** 
0.0276 
(1.01) 
0.3269** 
(5.80) 
0.1404* 
(2.04) 
-0.0501 
(-0.70) 
0.0564 
(0.82) 
0.4736** 
Malaysia Philipeines Thailand China 
0.0039 
(0.05) 
0.7852** 
(13.60) 
-0.0688 
(-1.00) 
0.0008 
(0.01) 
-0.0795* 
(-2.08) 
0.6378** 
0.0853 
(1.81) 
0.7047** 
(10.50) 
0.1358 
(1.41) 
-0.2217 
(-1.92) 
0.1010 
(1.27) 
0.7198** 
(3.94) 
-0.1649** 
(-2.61) 
0.2921** 
(3.48) 
-0.1554* 
(-2.27) 
0.0118 
(0.29) 
-0.0164 
(-0.12) 
-0.0926** 
(-7.96) 
0.0799** 
(3.94) 
-0.1385** 
(-5.33) 
0.0768** 
(5.03) 
-0.0744* 
(-1.96) 
-0.0139 
(-0.54) 
-0.0285 
0.0903 
(1.07) 
0.7373** 
(13.96) 
-0.0056 
(-0.10) 
-0.1224* 
(-2.25) 
0.0863 
(1.67) 
0.6956** 
(6.56) 
-0.6431** 
(-3.13) 
0.0338 
(0.15) 
0.2730 
(1.19) 
0.2609 
(1.36) 
-0.0754 
(-0.18) 
-0.0301** 
(-3.25) 
-0.0306* 
(-3.32) 
0.0105 
(1.14) 
-0.0119 
(-1.29) 
-0.0620** 
(-3.36) 
0.0293 
(1.86) 
-0.0407* 
(-1.98) 
0.1491 ** 
-0.0357 
(-0.61) 
0.2446** 
(18.80) 
-0.2216** 
(-9.00) 
0.0802* 
(2.00) - 
-0.0712 
_(- 
1.5 8) 
0.0320 
(0.48) 
-0.0501 
(-0.28) 
0.2891 
(1.14) 
0.0815 
(0.48) 
0.0058 
(0.05) 
0.3263 
(-0.88) 
-0.0609** 
(-7.52) 
0.0159 
(1.73) 
0.0031 
(0.34) 
-0.0335** 
(-3.68) 
-0.0754** 
(4.23) 
0.0187 
(0.75) 
-0.0216* 
(-2.08) 
-0.0103 
(3.55) (5.62) 
0.0957* 0.0429 
(1.98) (0.31) 
-0.0296 -0.0389 
(-0.44) (-0.20) 
-0.0310 0.0194 
(-0.51) (0.13) 
0.0277 0.0319 
(0.77) (0.27) 
0.0627 0.0553 
(0.58) (0.18) 
0.0255* -0.1354 
(2.49) (-1.81) 
-0.0641** 0.1674 
(4.27) (1.00) 
0.0258** 0.0739 
(4.41) (0.59) 
-0.0341** 0.0591 
(3.60) (0.62) 
-0.0469* 0.1650 
(-2.20) (0.68) 
-0.0336** -0,1054** 
(3.25) (-3.09) 
0.0225 0.0429 
(1.09) (1.16) (-0.95) 
-0.0133 -0.0731* -0.0024 
Vietnam 
0.0152 
(0.78) 
0.7316** 
(14.34) 
0.1234* 
(2.40) 
-0.0869 
(-1.69) 
0.1803** 
(3.52) 
0.9484** 
(9.26) 
-0.0132 
(-0.53) 
0.0123 
(0.42) 
-0.0153 
(-0.67) 
0.0030 
(0.25) 
-0.0132 
(-0.29) 
0.0022 
(0.13) 
-0.0784** 
(-7.79) 
0.0013 
(0.11) 
0.0039 
(0.43) 
-0.0711 
(-2.81) 
-0.0095 
(-0.91) 
0.1103** 
(8.19) 
-0.0020 
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(0.0) 
LTA-4 -0.0193 
(-0.76) 
LTA-T 0.1298* 
(2.47) 
Y1990 0.0175 
(0.38) 
y1991 0.0029 
(0.06) 
Y1992 0.0118 
(0.25) 
Y1993 0.0305 
(0.64) 
Y1994 0.0235 
(0.49) 
Y1995 0.0170 
(0.37) 
Y1996 0.0163 
(0.36) 
Y1997 0.0301 
(0.67) 
y1998 0.1629** 
(6.35) 
y1999 0.0775* 
(2.99) 
Y2000 0.0723** 
(2.73) 
Y2001 0.0544* 
(2.09) 
Y2002 0.0303 
(0.67) 
Y2003 0.0373 
(0.82) 
Y2004 0.0147 
(0.32) 
W(adj) 51.2 
N 2155 
(-3.84) 
-0.2027** 
(-9.18) 
0.4176** 
(8.19) 
0.0815 
(0.45) 
0.0568 
(0.32) 
0.0205 
(0.11) 
ý 
0.1734 
(0.96) 
0.1187 
(0.66) 
0.0974 
(0.58) 
0.0622 
(0.39) 
0.1224 
(0.74) 
0.5334* 
(7-99) 
* 
0.3996** 
(4.00) 
0.4694** 
(4.80) 
0.3796** 
(3.93) 
0.1077 
(0.60) 
0.1577 
(0.85) 
0.0578 
(0.32) 
50.1 
566 
(-1.15) (-2.35) (-0-08) (8.27) 
0.0178 0.0373 0.0056 0.0295* 
(1.33) (1.12) (0.24) (2.13) 
-0.0067 -0.0984 -0.0392 0.1673 ** 
(-0.23) (-1.45) (-0.72) (4.85) 
-0.0177 -0.0001 -0.0084 
(-0.30) (0-00) (-0.35) 
0.0137 -0.0621 * 0.0016 -0.0046 
(0.21) (-2.90) (0.17) (-0.16) 
0.0605 -0.0304 -0.0058 0.0035 
(0.90) (-1.35) (-0.61) (0.11) 
0.0521 -0.0304 -0.0084 0.0155 
(0.82) (-1.28) (-0.84) (0.51) 
0.0559 -0.0624** -0.0099 0.0340 
(0.88) (-2.62) (-0.96) (1.15) 
0.0935 -0.0617 -0.0051 0.0134 
(1.45) (-2.74) (-0.54) (0,43) 
0.0606 -0.0532* -0.0018 0.0378 
(0.94) (-2.27) (-0.17) (1.09) 
0.1738* -0.0399 0,0074 0.0543 
(2.71) (-1.67) (0.70) (1.51) 
0.4587** -0.0153 0.0246* 0.1112* 
(6.72) (-0.66) (2.38) (2.93) 
0.4062** -0.0454 0.0287* 0.0712 
(5.70) (-1.92) (2.64) (1.71) 
0.3039** -0.0424 0.0112 -0.0297 
(3.99) (-1.92) (0.97) (-0.77) 
0.0058 -0.0413 0.0240* 0.0557 
(0.07) (-1.83) (2.24) (1.51) 
0.0363 -0.0429 0.0267** 0.0837* 
(0.47) (-1.85) (2.60) (2.42) 
0.1034 -0.0560* 0.0160 0.0554 
(1.31) (-2.47) (1.54) (1.46) 
0.0728 -0.0656** 0.0189 0.0850* 
(0.96) (-2.80) (1.88) (2.05) 
58.7 67.3 68.7 57.3 
324 325 288 230 
(-0.37) (-0.15) 
0.2478** 0.0129 
(11.25) (1.26) 
0.2345** 0.11 U** 
(5.25) (4.66) 
0.0247 
(0.40) 
0.0046 
(0.08) 
-0.0028 
(-0.04) 
-0.0081 
(-0.13) 
0.0001 
(0.00) 
-0.0101 
(-0.16) 
0.0085 -0.0388 
(0.14) (-0.47) 
-0.0167 0.0027 
(-0.27) (0.03) 
0.0240 -0.0233 
(0.39) (-0.28) 
0.0256 0.0044 
(0.42) (0.06) 
0.0208 0.0699 
(0.34) (0.91) 
0.0622 -0.0144 
(0.99) (-0.19) 
0.0520 -0.0190 
(0.83) (-0.25) 
0.0247 -0.0031 
(0.39) (-0.04) 
0.0474 -0.0088 
(0.75) (-0.12) 
66.5 54.3 
281 141 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LLP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients (e. g. LLP- 
I ... LLP-4). 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 4: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Loan Loss Provision Equation 
[11 for Sub Samples of Data 
cost 
Constant 
LLP-1 
LLP-2 
LLP-3 
LLP-4 
LLP-T 
CAP-1 
CAP-2 
CAP-3 
CAP-4 
CAP-T 
XEFF-I 
Y, EFF-2 
XEFF-3 
Y, EFF-4 
XEFF-T 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
LTA-3 
Skimping 
0.1528 
(0.46) 
0.1463 ** 
(13.53) 
-0.0183 
(-1.70) 
0.2138** 
(20.47) 
-0.1613** 
(-14.67) 
0.1805** 
(8.40) 
0.3772** 
(12.54) 
0.0044 
(0.35) 
-0.0392** 
(-3.44) 
-0.0802** 
(-6.83) 
0.2623** 
(7.20) 
-0.0917** 
(-4.26) 
0.0383** 
(2.65) 
0.0090 
(0.45) 
0.0014 
(0.07) 
-0.0430 
(-1.12) 
0.0734** 
(2.87) 
-0.0315 
(-1.19) 
-0.0377 
Profit 
Skimping 
0.5461 
(1.22) 
0.1539** 
(15.89) 
-0.1325** 
(-11.36) 
0.2338** 
(17.28) 
-0.1006** 
(-9.00) 
0.1547** 
(6.67) 
0.0668** 
(6.41) 
-0.0905** 
(-8.47) 
0.1512** 
(14.53) 
0,0263* 
(2.19) 
0.1537** 
(7.05) 
0.0441 
(4.35) 
-0.0230 
(-1.70) 
-0.0387 
(-1.84) 
0.0622** 
(3.86) 
0.0447 
(1.42) 
0.0212* 
(2.32) 
-0.0237* 
(-2.06) 
0.0238* 
cost 
Moral hazard 
-0.213 1 
(-2.77) 
0.8790** 
(23.17) 
0.0866 
(1.71) 
0.0175 
(0.92) 
-0.1092* 
(-2.26) 
0.8739** 
(10.68) 
0.0361** 
(2.99) 
0.0827** 
(7.22) 
-0.1814* * 
(-14.58) 
-0.0911 
(-5.16) 
-0.1536** 
(-5.64) 
-0.0631** 
(-5.79) 
-0.0740** 
(-5.73) 
0.0136 
(1.16) 
0.0115 
(0.84) 
-0.1119** 
(-4.52) 
0.3096** 
(30.77) 
-0.0494* 
(-2.46) 
-0.0820** 
Profit 
Moral hazard 
-0.0515 
(-0.77) 
0.8810** 
(23.22) 
0.0852 
(1.67) 
0.0173 
(0.91) 
-0.1041 * 
(-2.15) 
0.8794** 
(10.71) 
0.0326** 
(2.61) 
0.0801** 
(7.14) 
-0.1755** 
(-16.43) 
-0.0815** 
(-8.08) 
-0.1444** 
(-6.47) 
0.0775** 
(6.74) 
-0.1492** 
(-13.32) 
0.0552** 
(3.56) 
-0.0422** 
(-2.74) 
-0.0587* 
(-2.17) 
0.3047** 
(16.67) 
-0.0405 
(-1.54) 
-0.0903** 
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(-1.71) 
LTA-4 0.0501 
(1.68) 
LTA-T 0.0543 
(1.04) 
Y1990 -0.0065 
(-0.24) 
y1991 -0.0289 
(-1.07) 
Y1992 0.0011 
(0.04) 
Y1993 0.0058 
(0.22) 
y1994 -0.0033 
(-0.13) 
y1995 -0.0133 
(-0.56) 
Y1996 -0.0069 
(-0.29) 
Y1997 0.0016 
(0.07) 
y1998 0.1241** 
(5.12) 
y1999 0.0107 
(0.41) 
Y2000 -0.0305 
(-1.24) 
Y2001 -0.0100 
(-0.42) 
Y2002 0.0003 
(0.01) 
Y2003 -0.0183 
(-0.77) 
Y2004 -0.0098 
(-0.41) 
W(adj) 64.50 
N 1066 
(2.22) 
-0.0194* 
(-2.34) 
0.0020 
(0.10) 
-0.0664 
(-0.65) 
-0-1124 
(-1.24) 
-0.0523 
(-0.57) 
-0.0461 
(453) 
-0.0469 
(-0.56) 
-0.0646 
(-0.79) 
-0.0573 
(-0.71) 
-0.0673 
(-0.83) 
0.0877 
(1.08) 
-0.0649 
(-0.77) 
-0.0352 
(-0.43) 
-0.0683 
(0.84) 
-0.1114 
(-1.36) 
-0.0505 
(0.62) 
-0.0247 
(0.30) 
54.40 
1066 
(-3.88) 
0.0516** 
(3.04) 
0.2297** 
(6.52) 
-0.0036 
(-0.12) 
-0.0268 
(-0.92) 
-0.0099 
(-0.34) 
-0.0025 
(-0.09) 
-0.0016 
(-0.06) 
-0.0151 
(-0.53) 
-0.0144 
(-0.52) 
0.0033 
(0.12) 
0.1949* * 
(7.09) 
0.0691 
(2.48) 
0.0118 
(0.42) 
-0.0021 
(-0.08) 
0.0071 
(0.26) 
0.0009 
(0.03) 
-0.0060 
(-0.22) 
58.80 
1165 
(-3.68) 
0.0472** 
(2.69) 
0.2211** 
(5.02) 
-0.0032 
(-0.11) 
-0.0195 
(-0.67) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
0.0087 
(0.30) 
0.0136 
(0.46) 
0.0015 
(0.05) 
0.0023 
(0.08) 
0.0195 
(0.66) 
0.2105** 
(7.07) 
0.0869** 
(2.87) 
0.0200 
(0.65) 
0.0159 
(0.53) 
0.0228 
(0.77) 
0.0148 
(0.50) 
0.0100 
(0.34) 
63.40 
1165 
Notes: The dependent variables are in the columns whilst the predictors are in the rows. 
T-statistics are shown below each predictor. 
LLP is the dependent variable used to test for skimping behaviour and moral hazard behaviour. 
The sample used to test the skimping hypothesis is above median efficiency across the period lag -1 to lag -4. The 
first XEFF measure is cost efficiency whilst the latter is profit efficiency. 
The sub-sample used to test the moral hazard hypothesis is that of the least capitalised banks, that is, banks with a 
ratio of equity-assets below the median level of 0.0819 in lag- 1. 
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The XEFF variable in the first column for the skimping hypothesis model and the moral hazard hypothesis model 
is operating cost efficiency whilst profit efficiency is used in the second column. 
Variables with '-T' (e. g. LLP-T) are the sums of the lagged coefficients (e. g. LLP-1+ LLP-2+. . . +LLP-4). ** and * indicate statistically significant at I% and 5% level, respectively (two-tail test). 
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Appendix 5: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in X-cost Efficiency Equation [21 
Asian 7 Indonesia Korea 
_ 
Malaysia Philippines Thailand China Vietnam 
Constant 0.6729** 0.7918** 0.8058** 0.7355** 0.8718** 0.6862** 0.6399** 0.6724** 
(21.53) 
LLP-1 -0.0585** 
(-6.53) 
LLP-2 -0.0819** 
(-9.01) 
LLP-3 0.0107 
(1.36) 
LLP-4 0.0091 
(1.00) 
(12.26) 
-0.0412** 
(-3.12) 
-0.0305** 
(8.46) (9.10) 
-0.0180 0.0289 
(-1.55) (0.39) 
0.0254* -0.0267 
(10.06) 
-0.0184 
(-0.92) 
-0.0208 
(5.77) 
0.0201 
(0.99) 
0.0113 
(6.21) (4.24) 
-0.0603** -0.0565** 
(-5.66) (-5.23) 
-0.0597* 0.0187 
(-2.54) (1.91) 
-0.0228 
(-1.44) 
0.0107 
(1.05) 
(-0.67) (-0.73) (0.59) (-2.01) (1.29) 
-0.0401** 0.1043 
(-3.90) (1.41) 
-0.0863** -0.0375* 
(-5.45) (-2.01) 
0.0534** 
(3.90) 
-0.0274* 
(-2.08) 
LLP-T -0.1206** -0.0838** -0.1190** 0.0691 -0.0133 
(-6.88) 
CAP-1 0.0130 
(I. 11) 
CAP-2 -0.0092 
(-0.61) 
CAP-3 -0.0345* 
(-2.26) 
CAP-4 0.0006 
(0.05) 
CAP-T -0.0301 
(-1.09) 
XEFF-I 0.0371** 
(4.07) 
YCEFF-2 0.0361** 
(3.96) 
XEFF-3 0.0381** 
(4.15) 
XEFF-4 -0.0123 
(-1.34) 
YCEFF-T 0.0990** 
(5.41) 
LTA-1 0.0023 
(0.11) 
LTA-2 -0.0134 
(-0.49) 
LTA-3 0.0255 
(0.93) 
(-3.23) 
0.0088 
(0.52) 
-0.0118 
(-0.64) 
-0.0363* 
(-1.92) 
0.0293 
(1.53) 
-0.0101 
(-0.27) 
0.0683** 
(5.86) 
-0.0259* 
(-2.01) 
-0.0103 
(-1.00) 
-0.0038 
(-0.32) 
0.0284 
(1.21) 
0.0346 
(1.52) 
-0.0337 
(-1.17) 
0.0111 
(0.39) 
(-4.61) (0.61) 
0.0181 0.0457** 
(0.71) (2.60) 
-0.0693* -0.0120 
(-1.97) (-0.49) 
-0.0532 0.1192* * 
(-1.65) (6.32) 
0.0292 0.0248 
(1.55) (1.66) 
-0.0753 0.1777** 
(-1.31) (4.62) 
-0.0180 0.0299 
(-1.35) (0.56) 
-0.0187 -0.0474 
(-0.70) (-0-90) 
-0.0043 0.0140 
(-0.35) (0.30) 
-0.0018 -0.0162 
(-0.15) (-0.37) 
-0.0428 -0.0198 
(-1.25) (-0.20) 
0.0231 0.0518** 
(0.28) (2.69) 
0.0165 -0.0440** 
(0.15) (-4.18) 
0.0131 0.1375** 
(0.13) (14.38) 
(0.34) 
0.2283** 
(13.29) 
-0.0789** 
(-3.90) 
0.0911 
(4.91) 
-0.1069** 
-(9.26) 
0.1336** 
(3.89) 
-0.0524* 
(-2.11) 
-0.0432 
(-1.46) 
-0.0511 
(-2.06) 
-0.0223 
(-1.12) 
-0.1690** 
(-3.37) 
-0.1748* 
(-2.34) 
0.1054 
(1.20) 
0.1082 
(1.27) 
-0.0926** 
(-8.90) 
-0.0765** 
(-7.06) 
-0.1377** 
(-4.34) 
-0.0156 
(-1.48) 
-0.0098 
(-0.80) 
0.0773** 
(6.27) 
-0.0103 
-(0.60) 
0.0416 
(1.56) 
0.0160 
(0.64) 
0.1156* * 
(5.65) 
0.0697* 
(2.55) 
-0.0107 
(-0.42) 
0.1906** 
(3.87) 
-0.0523** 
(-4.13) 
-0.0840** 
(-7.49) 
0.0140 
(1.04) 
0.0312 -0.083 1** 
(l. 11) (-6.44) 
-0.0949** 0.0136 
(-3.94) (1.31) 
-0.1837** -0.1073** 
(-3.77) (-4.38) 
-0.0110 0.0513** 
(-0.93) (3.43) 
0.0525** -0.0111 
(5.08) (-1.04) 
0.0855** -0.0133 
(4.27) (-1.30) 
-0.0034 0.0526** 
-(0.24) (4.29) 
0.1236** 0.0795** 
(4.27) (3.26) 
-0.0477 -0.0192 
(-1.52) (-0.64) 
0.0739** 0.1827** 
(4.46) (17.57) 
0.1460** -0.0481** 
(12.02) (-4.67) 
0.0163 0.0310** 
(1.44) (2.97) 
0.1884** 0.1465** 
(4.82) (4.21) 
-0.0093 -0.0209 
(-0.91) (-1.85) 
-0.0452** -0.0862** 
(-3.63) (-5.87) 
0.0651** -0.0041 
(5.61) (-0.28) 
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LTA-4 -0-0086 
(-0.42) 
LTA-T 0.0057 
(0.12) 
Y1990 -0.0021 
(-0.15) 
Y1991 -0.0122 
(-0.91) 
Y1992 -0.0186 
(-1.39) 
Y1993 0.0014 
(0.10) 
Y1994 0.0035 
(0.26) 
Y1995 -0.0140 
(-1.10) 
Y1996 -0.0165 
(-1.34) 
Y1997 -0.0179 
(-1.46) 
Y1998 -0.0326** 
(-2.66) 
Y1999 -0.0075 
(-0.61) 
Y2000 -0.0015 
(-0.12) 
Y2001 -0.0037 
(-0.29) 
Y2002 -0.0170 
(-1.39) 
Y2003 0.0051 
(0.41) 
Y2004 0.0001 
(0.00) 
R2(adj) 51.10 
N 2155 
-0.0101 
(-0.46) 
0.0019 
(0.04) 
0.0214 
(1.16) 
0.0381* 
(2.13) 
-0.0049 
(-0.28) 
0.0479** 
(2.72) 
0.0197 
(1.13) 
0.0119 
(0.73) 
0.0236 
(1.54) 
0.0278 
(1.79) 
0.0272* 
(2.31) 
0.0328* 
(1.93) 
0.0386* 
(2.19) 
0.0212 
(1.23) 
0.0285 
(1.65) 
0.0182 
(1.04) 
0.0462** 
(2.66) 
40.90 
566 
-0.0636 
(-0.90) 
-0.0109 
-(0.06) 
-0.0425 
(-1.38) 
-0.0101 
(-0.30) 
0.0286 
(0.85) 
-0.0719* 
(-2.31) 
0.0006 
(0.02) 
-0.0465 
(-1.57) 
-0.0768* 
(-2.56) 
-0.0027 
(-0.09) 
-0.0521 
(-1.63) 
-0.0107 
(-0.33) 
0.0051 
(0.15) 
0.0061 
(0.16) 
-0.0180 
(-0.47) 
0.0025 
(0.07) 
-0.0373 
(-1.01) 
40.70 
324 
-0.0253 
(-1.37) 
0.1200** 
(3.98) 
-0.0198 
(-0.66) 
-0.0467 
(-1.71) 
-0.0691 
(-2.44) 
-0.0058 
(-0.21) 
-0.0061 
(-0.21) 
-0.0272 
(-1.00) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
-0.0918** 
(-3.31) 
-0.0840** 
(-3.34) 
-0.0515* 
(-2.16) 
-0.0038 
(-0.15) 
-0.0102 
(-0.39) 
-0.0240 
(-0.92) 
0.0093 
(0.36) 
0.0038 
(0.14) 
40.83 
325 
-0.0912 
(-1.35) 
-0.0523 
-(0.33) 
(0.00) 
-0.0256 
(-0.96) 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
0.0062 
(0.23) 
0.0432 
(1.55) 
0.0284 
(1.06) 
0.0496 
(1.78) 
0.0026 
(0.09) 
-0.1071** 
(-3.92) 
0.0069 
(0.25) 
-0.0208 
(-0.72) 
0.0145 
(0.52) 
0.0334 
(1.21) 
0.0250 
(0,90) 
0.0520 
(1.86) 
36.56 
288 
-0.0432** 0.0103 0.1352** 
(-3.66) (0.63) (12.72) 
-0.1655** 0.0209 0.0240 
-(6.72) (0.81) (0.93) 
0.0287 -0.0075 
(0.91) (-0.12) 
-0.0140 -0.0290 
(-0.43) (-0.48) 
-0.0021 -0.0523 
(-0.07) (-0.87) 
0.0705* -0.0153 
(2.23) (-0.25) 
0.0722* 0.0138* 
(2.18) (-2.38) 
0.0365 0.0094 
(1.08) (-1.68) 
0.0664* 0.0147* 0.0793 
(1.99) (-2.70) (-1-09) 
0.0823* -0.0929 0.1681 * 
(2.38) (-1.77) (-2.29) 
-0.0093 -0.0145 0.0492 
(-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.68) 
0.0068 -0.0400 -0.0607 
(0.18) (-0.76) (-0.86) 
0.0204 -0.0669 -0.0306 
(0.56) (-1.28) (-0.45) 
-0.0646 -0.0934 -0.0051 
(-1.84) (-1.77) (-0-08) 
-0.1126** -0.0981 -0.0625 
(-3.34) (-1.86) (-0-91) 
0.0558 -0.0359 -0.0436 
(1.61) (-0.68) (-0.65) 
0.0330 -0.0206 -0.1246 
(0,90) (-0.40) (-1.87) 
60.32 45.30 42.80 
230 281 141 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. 
and * indicate statistically significant at 
I% and 5% level, respectively (two-tail test). 
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Appendix 6: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in X-Profit Efficiency Equation [21 
Constant 
LLP-1 
LLP-2 
LLP-3 
LLP-4 
LLP-T 
CAM 
CAP-2 
CAP-3 
CAP-4 
CAP-T 
Y. EFF-I 
XEFF-2 
XEFF-3 
XEFF-4 
Y, EFF-T 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
LTA-3 
Asian 7 
0.3366** 
(28.28) 
-0.0750** 
(-5.84) 
0.0379 
(1.72) 
0.0063 
(0.46) 
-0.0932** 
(-8.69) 
-0.1240** 
(4.02) 
0.0617** 
(6.97) 
-0.0294** 
(-2.88) 
0.0525** 
(5.77) 
-0.0093 
(-0.99) 
0.0755-** 
(4.02) 
0.5510** 
(27.58) 
-0.0317 
(-1.46) 
0.0388 
(1.85) 
-0.0129 
(-0.82) 
0.5451** 
(13.79) 
0.0170* 
(1.97) 
-0.0060 
(-0.54) 
0.0013 
(0.12) 
Indonesia Korea 
0.2991 ** 
(10.30) 
-0.0772* 
(-17.27) 
0.0079 
(1.69) 
0.0037 
(0.74) 
0.0018 
(0.25) 
-0.0638** 
(-5.87) 
0.0806** 
(6.26) 
-0.0013 
(-0.12) 
0.0151 
(1.31) 
0.0139 
(1.18) 
0.1082** 
(4.56) 
0.5156** 
(17.74) 
0.0114 
(0.55) 
0.0860** 
(4.27) 
-0.0281 
(-0.86) 
0.5849** 
(11.19) 
0.0211 
(1.23) 
0.0189 
(0.87) 
-0.0060 
(-0.28) 
0.2012** 
(5.50) 
-0.1143 
Malaysia Philippines Thailand China 
0.1586* 
(5.31) 
0.0114 
* 0.0656* 
(1.71) 
0.0995** 
(4.00) 
0.0041 
(0.14) 
-0.1082** 
(-4.44) 
0.0122 
(0.49) 
0.0077 
(0.15) 
0.1847** 
(15.87) 
-0.0932** 
(-5.01) 
0.1151 ** 
(7.20) 
-0.0525** 
(-3.89) 
0.1541** 
(5.08) 
0.7444** 
(11.14) 
-0.0133 
(-0.16) 
0.1997* 
(2.54) 
-0.0191 
(-0.42) 
0.9117** 
(6.49) 
0.0112 
(0.53) 
0.0063 
(0.26) 
-0.0686** 
(-2.88) 
0.2842** 
(7.16) 
0.0091 
(0.88) 
0.0110 
(1.02) 
-0.0757** 
(-6.77) 
-0.0395** 
(-3.06) 
-0.0952** 
(4.19) 
0.0993** 
(4.71) 
-0.0188 
(-1.78) 
0.0800** 
(7.46) 
-0.0333 
(-1.69) 
0.1272** 
(3.91) 
0.4481** 
(13.71) 
-0.0533 
(-1.50) 
0.1987** 
(5.00) 
-0.0564 
(-1.63) 
0.5372** 
(7.51) 
-0.0496 
(-1.61) 
0.0417 
(1.10) 
0.0115 
(0.25) 
0.4945 ** 
(24.41) 
-0.0432** 
(-4.43) 
0.0127 
(1.00) 
-0.0347** 
(-3.21) 
-0.0220* 
(-2.11) 
-0.0873** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0159 
(-1.27) 
0.0469** 
(2.76) 
0.0361* 
(2.02) 
-0.0097 
(-0.97) 
0.0575* 
(1.96) 
0.6539** 
(13.40) 
-0.3185** 
(-5.54) 
0.1222* 
(2.08) 
-0.0301 
(-0.70) 
0.4275** 
(4.08) 
0.1043** 
(3.57) 
-0.0951 
(-2.66) 
-0.0342 
(-1.02) 
(-1.51) (0.92) 
0.2489* -0.0195 
(2.70) (-1.16) 
-0.0167 
(-0.17) 
0.0248 
(0.27) 
0.1428 
(0.80) 
0.0334 
(0.51) 
0.0554 
(0.62) 
-0.0779 
(-0.95) 
-0.0481 
(-1.00) 
-0.0371 
(-0.25) 
0.6966** 
(25.27) 
0.0686* 
(2.48) 
-0.0819** 
(-3.48) 
0.0292 
(0.99) 
0.7126** 
(13.11) 
0.0268 
(1.23) 
0.0176 
(0.63) 
-0.0224 
(-0.85) 
0.0238 
(1.92) 
-0.0057 
(-0.38) 
0.0100 
(0.35) 
0.0957* 
(6.95) 
-0.0472 
(-1.94) 
* 
-0.0687* * 
(-2.50) 
0.0839* 
(5.51) 
0.0637 
(1.51) 
0.6771 
(17.83) 
0.1022* 
(2.90) 
0.0307 
(0.80) 
-0.0301 
(- 1.11) 
* 
* 
* 
0.7799** 
(11.16) 
0.0457* 
(2.17) 
-0.0298 
(-1.09) 
0.0086 
(0.31) 
Vietnam 
0.3136** 
(5.66) 
-0.0426** 
(4.18) 
-0.0185 
(1.71) 
0.0105 
(0.57) 
-0.0496** 
(4.61) 
-0.1002** 
(-3.87) 
0.0611 
(5.83) 
-0.0169 
(-1.27) 
0.0397** 
(3.77) 
-0.0101 
(-0.90) 
0.0738** 
(3.23) 
0.1824** 
(16.98) 
-0.0583** 
(-5.25) 
0.0094 
(0.24) 
0.0858** 
(3.87) 
0.2193 
(4.60) 
0.0206 
(0.70) 
-0.0237 
(462) 
-0.0161 
(-0.42) 
179 
LTA-4 -0.0228** 
(-2.75) 
LTA-T -0.0105 
(-0.53) 
Y1990 -0.0125* 
(-2.25) 
Y1991 -0.0196** 
(-3.56) 
Y1992 -0.0003 
(-0.05) 
Y1993 0.00 1ý 
(0.27) 
Y1994 0.0078 
(1.37) 
Y1995 -0.0033 
(-0.59) 
Y1996 0.0002 
(0.04) 
Y1997 -0.0057 
(-1.06) 
Y1998 -0.0352** 
(-6.47) 
Y1999 0.0089 
(1.63) 
Y2000 -0.0019 
(-0.35) 
Y2001 -0.0106 
(-1.94) 
Y2002 -0.0085 
(-1.59) 
Y2003 -0.0170** 
(-3.13) 
Y2004 -0.0217** 
(-3.95) 
W(adj) 52.60 
N 2155 
-0.0182 
(-1.08) 
0.0158 
(0.41) 
-0.0081 
(-0.58) 
-0.0477** 
(-3.52) 
-0.0149 
(-1.09) 
-0.0178 
(-1.29) 
0.0051 
(0.37) 
-0.0130 
(-1.02) 
-0.0148 
(-1.22) 
-0.0336** 
(-3-19) 
-0.0506** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0045 
(-0.33) 
0.0087 
(0.61) 
-0.0270 
(-1.93) 
-0.0437** 
(-3.18) 
-0.0372** 
(-2.64) 
-0.0191 
(-1.38) 
50.32 
566 
-0.0153 -0.0264 
(-0.85) (-1.28) 
0.0066 -0.0020 
(0.14) (-0.04) 
0.2238** 0.0059 
(2.87) (0.69) 
0.0486 -0.0114 
(0.56) (-1.38) 
0.0001 -0.0112 
(0.00) (-1.27) 
0.1194 0.0050 
(1.40) (0.55) 
0.1786* 0.0183* 
(2.09) (1.98) 
0.0659 0.0062 
(0.76) (0.71) 
0.0678 -0.0004 
(0.78) (-0.04) 
-0.0386 -0.0102 
(-0.45) (-1-10) 
0.0308 
(1.59) 
-0.0203 
(-0.45) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
-0.0016 
(-0.21) 
0.0265** 
(3.40) 
0.0297** 
(3.63) 
0.0115 
(1.36) 
0.0126 
(1.63) 
0.0030 
(0.35) 
0.0028 
(0.33) 
0.0353 0.0337 
(0.90) (1.36) 
0.0389 0.0087 
(0.50) (0.14) 
-0.0249* -0.1812** 
(-2.25) (-8.62) 
-0.0253 -0.0488* 
(-1.88) (-2.45) 
0.0260 -0.0867** 
(1.78) (-3.80) 
0.0211 -0.0687** 
(1.49-) (-3.11) 
0.0350* -0.0898** 
(2.43) (-4.04) 
0.0008 -0.1036** 
(0.05) (-4.76) 
0.0056 -0.0793 
(0.34) (-3.69) 
-0.0168 -0.0892** 
(-1.00) (-4.20) 
-0.1137** -0.0983** -0.4400** -0.0315** -0.0072 
(4.80) (-3.48) 
0.3981 0.0202* 
(4.16) (2.23) 
-0.0315 -0.0020 
(-0.31) (-0.23) 
-0.0679 -0.0133 
(-0.64) (-1.52) 
-0.0874 -0.0114 
(-0.85) (-1.27) 
-0.1035 -0.0136 
(-0.98) (-1.54) 
-0.1207 -0.0278** 
(-1.18) (-3.07) 
56.70 64.12 
324 325 
(-0.85) (-6.41) 
0.0056 0.0270 
(0.63) (1.38) 
-0.0072 0.0026 
(-0.77) (0.15) 
-0.0039 0.0204 
(-0.44) (1.18) 
0.0158 0.0196 
(1.88) (1.26) 
-0.0063 0.0054 
(-0.74) (0.31) 
-0.0256** 0.0075 
(-3.11) (0.38) 
58.32 53.20 
288 230 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level, respectively 
(two-tail test). 
(4.63) 
-0.0926** 
(4.39) 
-0.0840** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0773** 
(-3.59) 
-0.0716** 
(-3.31) 
-0.0824** 
(-3.76) 
-0.0950** 
(4.37) 
56.43 
281 
0.0102 
(0.35) 
-0.0091 
(-0.13) 
-0.0183 
(-0.77) 
-0.0174 
(-0.76) 
-0.0258 
(-1.10) 
-0.0281 
(-1.28) 
-0.0190 
(-0.87) 
-0.0376 
(-1.70) 
-0.0343 
(-1.60) 
-0.0654** 
(-3.07) 
-0.0716** 
(-3.58) 
52.50 
141 
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Appendix 7: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Capitalisation Equation [31 
using Operating Cost Efficiency Estimates 
LLP-1 
Asian 7 
0.0257 
(0.68) 
LLP-2 0.0132 
(0.34) 
LLP-3 0.0011 
(0.02) 
LLP4 0.0018 
(0.04) 
LLP-T 0.0418 
(0.51) 
CAP-1 0.5162** 
(23.79) 
CAP-2 0.0468 
(1.87) 
CAP-3 0.1082** 
(4.27) 
CAP-4 0.0628** 
(2.72) 
CAP-T 0.7339** 
(15.41) 
XEFF-I -0.0125 
(-1.10) 
XEFF-2 -0.0187 
(-1.72) 
XEFF-3 0.0778** 
(7.43) 
XEFF-4 0.0729** 
(6.72) 
XEFF-T 0.1195** 
(5.48) 
LTA-1 -0.0869** 
(4.08) 
LTA-2 0.0355 
(1.29) 
LTA-3 0.0013 
(0.05) 
LTA-4 -0.0025 
Indonesia 
0.0648 
(1.84) 
0.0586 
(1.62) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
0.0058 
(0.12) 
0.1304 
(1.72) 
0.3465** 
(7.91) 
0.0659 
(1.37) 
0.0833 
(1.70) 
0.0433 
(0.87) 
Korea Malaysia 
-0.0926* 0.0429** 
(-2.44) (4.15) 
0.0276 -0.0163 
(0.88) (-1.62) 
0.0232 0.0110 
(0.69) (1.04) 
0.0422 0.0616** 
(1.38) (4.79) 
0.0003 0.0992** 
(0.01) (4.51) 
1.0010** 0.8598** 
(17.48) (14.12) 
-0.1784* 0.2186** 
(-2.25) (2.59) 
0.1292 -0.0572 
(1.78) (-0.88) 
-0.0732 -0.0255 
(-1.73) (-0.49) 
0.5390** 0.8786** 0.9957** 
(5.65) (6.82) 
-0.0028 0.0146 
(-0.31) (1.22) 
-0.0021 -0.0108 
(-0.23) (-0.85) 
0.0853** -0.0024 
(8.14) (-0.20) 
-0.0031 -0.0202 
(-0.31) (-1.74) 
0.0772** -0.0187 
(3.97) (-0.78) 
-0.1277** -0.0446* 
(-6.71) (-2.37) 
0.0127 0.0457 
(0.84) (1.88) 
-0.0154 0.0086 
(-1.16) (0.37) 
0.0054 -0.0048 
(7.48) 
-0.0284** 
(-2.67) 
0.0035 
(0.34) 
-0.0630** 
(-6.25) 
0.0028 
(0.27) 
-0.0850** 
(4.11) 
-0.0157 
(-0.66) 
-0.0344 
(-1.10) 
-0.0126 
(-0.40) 
0.0323 
Phili 1)U ines Thailand China 
-0.0686** 
(-3.36) 
-0.0824** 
(-2.80) 
0.0828** 
(7.01) 
-0.0713** 
(-3.34) 
-0.1394** 
(-3.22) 
0.8481** 
(14.08) 
0.1002 
(1.29) 
-0.1508* 
(-2.32) 
0.0494 
(1.22) 
0.0072 
(0.48) 
-0.0719** 
(-5.87) 
0.0341 ** 
(3.02) 
-0.0736** 
(-6.50) 
-0.1042** 
(-4.15) 
0.7034** 
(31.92) 
0.0583* 
(2.04) 
0.0518 
(1.79) 
-0.0839** 
(-3.19) 
0.8470** 0.7297** 
(6.79) 
0.0109 
(0.57) 
-0.0216 
(-1.24) 
0.0017 
(0.11) 
0.0260 
(1.85) 
0.0170 
(0.51) 
-0.0452 
(-1.73) 
-0.0313 
(-1.02) 
0.0590* 
(1.98) 
-0.0523* 
(13.72) 
-0.0185 
(-1.17) 
-0.0092 
(-0.62) 
0.0630** 
(4.51) 
-0.0033 
(-0.24) 
0.0321 
(1.10) 
-0.0402 
(-1.78) 
0.1096** 
(4.01) 
-0.1162* * 
(-3.54) 
0.0308 
0.0091 
(0.90) 
0.0129 
(1.03) 
-0.0366** 
(-3.65) 
-0.0806** 
(-6.20) 
-0.0951** 
(-4.13) 
1.1143** 
(15.37) 
-0.2451** 
(-2.43) 
0.0271 
(0.41) 
0.1115* 
(2.42) 
1.0079** 
(6.79) 
-0.0186 
(-1.36) 
-0.0208 
(-1.71) 
0.0605** 
(5.67) 
0.0484** 
(4.65) 
0.0695** 
(2.94) 
-0.0167 
(-0.49) 
-0.0402 
(-0.97) 
0.0176 
(0.46) 
0.0049 
Vietnam 
-0.0455 
(0.00) 
0.0307 
(0.00) 
-0.0600 
(0.00) 
-0.0387 
(0.00) 
-0.1134* * 
(-5.06) 
0.7994** 
(9.14) 
-0.1742 
(-1.62) 
-0.0884 
(-1.04) 
0.1085* 
(2.43) 
0.6452** 
(3.84) 
0.0304* 
(2.06) 
-0.0050 
(-0.30) 
-0.0513** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0106 
(-0.54) 
-0.0364 
(-1.08) 
-0.0818** 
(-6.84) 
0.0131 
(1.14) 
0.0273* 
(2.44) 
-0.0845** 
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(-0.12) 
LTA-T -0.0526 
(-1.08) 
Y1990 -0.0024 
(-0.17) 
Y1991 -0.0008 
(-0.06) 
Y1992 -0.0012 
(-0.09) 
Y1993 -0.0053 
(-0.40) 
Y1994 0.0058 
(0.43) 
Y1995 0.0005 
(0.04) 
Y1996 0.0004 
(0.03) 
Y1997 -0.0066 
(-0.54) 
Y1998 -0.0629** 
(-5.13) 
Y1999 -0.0055 
(-0.45) 
Y2000 0.0071 
(0.58) 
Y2001 0.0009 
(0.07) 
Y2002 0.0098 
(0.79) 
Y2003 -0.0003 
(-0.02) 
Y2004 -0.0069 
(-0.55) 
Rý(adj) 54.60 
N 2155 
(0.50) 
-0.1250** 
(4.22) 
-0.0059 
(-0.12) 
-0.0123 
(-0.26) 
-0.0144 
(-0.32) 
-0.0194 
(-0.. 42) 
-0.0068 
(415) 
0.0067 
(0.16) 
-0.0009 
(402) 
-0.0132 
(-0.33) 
-0.2332** 
(-5.72) 
-0.0724 
(-1.64) 
0.0327 
(0.71) 
0.0211 
(0.47) 
0.0417 
(0.93) 
0.0223 
(0.49) 
0.0068 
(0.15) 
36.60 
566 
(-0.31) (1.36) (-2.20) (1.07) (0.17) (-7.20) 
0.0049 -0.0304 -0.0698 -0.0160 -0.0344 -0.1259** 
(0.12) (-0.55) (-1.26) (-0.28) (-0.48) (-5.49) 
-0.0396** 0.0164 0.0000 0.0006 -0.0097 
(-5.72) (1.59) (0.00) (0.08) (-0.48) 
-0.0348** 0.0102 0.0063 0.0044 0.0047 
(4.63) (1.08) (0.68) (0.56) (0.23) 
-0.0277** 0.0065 0.0067 0.0054 0.0036 
(-3.65) (0.66) (0.73) (0.70) (0.18) 
-0.0247** 0.0006 -0.0055 0.0072 -0.0065 
(-3.52) (0.06) (-0.59) (0.93) (-0.32) 
-0.0037 0.0094 0.0036 0.0098 0.0212 
(-0.55) (0.93) (0.36) (1.21) (1.10) 
-0.0282 0.0140 0.0042 0.0127 0.0029 
(4.23) (1.49) (0.45) (1.54) (0.16) 
-0.0281** 0.0022 0.0016 0.0116 -0.0029 0.0328 
(4.16) (0.23) (0.16) (1.42) (-0.16) (1.29) 
-0.0471** 0.0172 0.0021 -0.0326** 0.0108 0.0499 
(-7.19) (1.79) (0.21) (-3.86) (0.61) (1.94) 
-0.0363** 0.0064 0.0199* -0.0003 0.0089 0.0424 
(-5.07) (0.73) (2.08) (-0.04) (0.51) (1.67) 
-0.0138 0.0086 0.0073 0.0027 0.0091 0.0248 
(-1.87) (1.04) (0.75) (0.30) (0.52) (1.01) 
-0.0266** 0.0071 0.0033 0.0028 0.0111 0.0247 
(-3.42) (0.81) (0.32) (0.31) (0.64) (1.04) 
-0.0161 0.0135 0.0145 0.0112 0.0010 0.0395 
(-1.87) (1.48) (1.50) (1.31) (0.06) (1.71) 
-0.0253** 0.0192* 0.0080 0.0080 0.0158 0.0334 
(-2.92) (2.13) (0.83) (0.97) (0.90) (1.39) 
-0.0235** 0.0052 0.0103 0.0177* 0.0038 
0.0269 
(-2.72) (0.58) (1.05) (2.09) (0.22) (1.15) 
-0.0183* 0.0022 0.0013 0.0112 -0.0012 
0.0438 
(-2.21) (0.23) (0.13) (1.25) (-0.07) (1.88) 
64.50 60.40 60.10 41.40 54.97 54.56 
324 325 288 230 281 141 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
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Appendix 8: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Capitalisation Equation [31 
using Profit Efficiency Estimates 
Constant 
LLP-1 
LLP-2 
LLP-3 
LLP-4 
LLP-T 
CAP-1 
CAP-2 
CAP-3 
CAP-4 
CAP-T 
Y, EFF-I 
XEFF-2 
XEFF-3 
XEFF-4 
XEFF-T 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
LTA-3 
Asian 7 
0.0470 
(1.60) 
0.023 1 
(2.85) 
0.0135 
(1.48) 
0.0020 
(0.20) 
0.0152 
(0.77) 
0.0538* 
(2.14) 
0.5124** 
(23.49) 
0.0575* 
(2.28) 
0.0990** 
(3.88) 
0.0688** 
(2.97) 
0.7376** 
(15.39) 
-0.0329** 
(-2.69) 
0.0998** 
(4.22) 
-0.0242* 
(-2.05) 
0.0888** 
(4.69) 
0.1316** 
(3.79) 
-0.0872** 
(4.10) 
0.0315 
(1.14) 
0.0017 
-0.0065 
(-0.06) 
0.0694 
(1.53) 
0.0677 
(1.88) 
0.0027 
(0.10) 
0.0090 
(0.18) 
0.1488 
(1.83) 
0.3377** 
(7.63) 
0.0784 
(1.61) 
0.0671 
(1.34) 
0.0484 
(0.95) 
0.5316** 
(5.48) 
-0.1900** 
(-14.15) 
0.3479** 
(24.96) 
-0.0917** 
(-6.64) 
0.0507** 
(4.53) 
0.1169* * 
(4.45) 
-0.1388** 
(-7.27) 
0.0135 
(0.91) 
-0.0171 
0.0035 
(0.11) 
-0-0955 
(-2.49) 
0.0308 
(0.98) 
0.0346 
(0.98) 
0.0307 
(0.98) 
0.0007 
(0.01) 
* 
1.0050** 
(17.51) 
-0.1708* 
(2.16) 
0.1096 
(1.51) 
-0.0624 
(1.47) 
0.8814** 
(6.84) 
0.0253 
(0-85) 
0.0368 
(1.24) 
-0.0824* 
(-2.43) 
0.0348** 
(3.34) 
-0.0203* 
(-1.96) 
0.0282* 
(2.47) 
0.0490** 
(4.15) 
0.0918** 
(4.16) 
0.8530** 
(13.98) 
0.2220** 
(2.63) 
-0.0653 
(-1.00) 
-0.0329 
(-0.64) 
0.9769** 
(7.34) 
0.0941** 
(2.63) 
0.0716 
(1.63) 
-0.0833** -0.0212 
(-3.06) (-0.61) 
0.0114 0.0054 
(0.46) (0.13) 
-0.0098 0.1499 
(-0.18) (1.90) 
-0.0493 -0.0284 
(2.66) (-1.19) 
0.0427 -0-0337 
(1.75) (-1.09) 
0.0141 -0.0118 
0.0773 
(1.60) 
-0.0517 
(-1.77) 
-0.0824** 
(-2.81) 
0.0860** 
(7.23) 
-0.0712** 
(-3.27) 
-0.1193 * 
(-2.47) 
0.8617** 
(13.24) 
0.0597 
(0.69) 
-0.1212 
(-1.72) 
0.0438 
(1.04) 
0.8440** 
(6.21) 
0.0552** 
(2.74) 
-0.1463 ** 
(-13.84) 
0.0708** 
(3.22) 
-0.0602* 
(-2.23) 
-0.0806 
(-1.94) 
-0.0470 
(-1.76) 
-0.0298 
(-0.96) 
0.0641 
-0.0146 
(-0.49) 
0.0076 
(0.49) 
-0.0747** 
(-5.92) 
0.0237 
(1.82) 
-0.0743** 
(-6.19) 
-0.1177* * 
(-4.42) 
0.6870** 
(31.70) 
0.0722* 
(2.51) 
0.0095 
(0.47) 
-0.1059** 
(-3.93) 
0.6629** 
(13.47) 
0.0430* 
(3.02) 
0.0455** 
(2.78) 
-0.0446 
(-1.77) 
0.1000** 
(9.30) 
0.1439** 
(4.12) 
-0.0474* 
(-2.06) 
0.1080** 
(3.84) 
-0.1170** 
0.0180 
(0.76) 
0.0083 
(0.81) 
0.0106 
(1.02) 
-0.0286* 
(-2.34) 
-0.0912** 
(-7.50) 
-0.1008** 
(-4.47) 
1.1191 
(15.26) 
-0.2404** 
(-2.35) 
0.0187 
(0.28) 
0.1143* 
(2.43) 
1.0 117* 
(6.73) 
-0.0140* 
(-1.96) 
0.0611 
(7.44) 
-0.0130 
(-1.42) 
0.0340** 
(4.78) 
0.0681** 
(4.28) 
-0.0268 
(-0.78) 
-0.0197 
(0.47) 
-0.0054 
Vietnam 
-0.0650 
(492) 
-0.0477** 
(4.63) 
0.0367** 
(3.37) 
-0.0714** 
(-6.55) 
-0.0304** 
(-2.80) 
-0.1127* * 
(-5.25) 
0.8470** 
(9.40) 
-0.2098* 
(-1.97) 
-0.0734 
(-0.89) 
0.1069* 
(2.45) 
0.6707** 
(4.00) 
0.0524** 
(4.89) 
-0.0442** 
(-3.11) 
0.0474** 
(3.74) 
-0.0146 
(-1.19) 
0.0411 
(1.64) 
-0.0775** 
(-4.37) 
0.0129 
(1.28) 
0.0272** 
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(0.06) (-1.27) (0.61) 
LTA-4 0.0004 0.0068 -0.0035 
(0.02) (0.38) (-0.22) 
LTA-T -0.0537 -0.1356** 0.0040 
(-1.10) (-4.12) (0.10) 
Y1990 -0.0025 0.0038 -0.0349** 
(-0.18) (0.08) (-5.07) 
y1991 -0.0060 0.0026 -0.0313** 
(-0.45) (0.06) (-4.07) 
Y1992 -0.0080 -0.0307 -0.0233** 
(-0.58) (-0.66) (-2.92) 
Y1993 -0.0080 -0.0116 -0.0205** 
(-0.58) (-0.24) (-2.73) 
Y1994 0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0008 
(0.01) (-0.02) (-0.11) 
Y1995 -0.0057 0.0049 -0.0243** 
(-0.42) (0.11) (-3.19) 
Y1996 -0.0068 -0.0040 -0.0256** 
(-0.52) (-0.09) (-3.34) 
Y1997 -0.0122 -0.0136 -0.0429** 
(-0.92) (-0.32) (-5.66) 
y1998 -0.0693** -0.2318** -0.0315** 
(-5.16) (-5.31) (-3.89) 
y1999 -0.0146 -0.0786 -0.0070 
(-1.08) (-1.67) (-0.83) 
Y2000 0.0063 0.0431 -0.0211 * 
(0.46) (0.88) (-2.34) 
Y2001 -0.0078 0.0181 -0.0134 
(-0.58) (0.38) (-1.44) 
Y2002 0.0019 0.0331 -0.0172 
(0.14) (0.70) (-1.89) 
Y2003 -0.0059 0.0200 -0.0183* 
(-0.44) (0.41) (-1.96) 
Y2004 -0.0146 0.0131 -0.0127 
(-1.08) (0.28) (-1.41) 
W(adj) 55.30 39.70 54.10 
N 2155 566 324 
(-0.38) (2.13) (-3.42) (414) (2.68) 
0.0330 -0.0546* 0.0063 0.0126 -0.0736** 
(1.41) (-2.24) (0.22) (0.43) (4.28) 
-0.0409 -0.0673 -0-0500 -0.0392 -0.1111** 
(-0.74) (-1.20) (-0.86) (-0.54) (-3.89) 
0.0102 0.0000 0.0064 0.0012 
(1.05) (0.00) (0.77) (0.05) 
0.0045 0.0056 0.0116 0.0052 
(0.47) (0.58) (1.16) (0.22) 
-0.0001 0.0031 0.0128 0.0143 
(-0.01) (0.32) (1.17) (0.53) 
-0.0052 -0.0086 -0.0138 -0.0020 
(-0.50) (-0.84) (-1.31) (-0.08) 
0.0015 0.0046 -0.0146 0.0275 
(0.14) (0.43) (-1.41) (1.05) 
0.0037 0.0058 -0.0106 0.0055 
(0.37) (0.59) (-0.97) (0.22) 
-0.0093 0.0011 -0.0153 0.0055 0.0108 
(-0.90) (0.10) (-1.26) (0.22) (0.36) 
0.0051 0.0036 -0.0598** 0.0166 0.0294 
(0.48) (0.33) (4.76) (0.67) (1.00) 
-0.0037 0.0203 -0.0296** 0.0156 0.0131 
(-0.36) (1-90) (-2.23) (0.62) (0.44) 
0.0032 0.0073 -0.0181 0.0116 0.0049 
(0.32) (0.65) (-1.24) (0.47) (0.17) 
-0.0010 0.0040 -0.0193 0.0131 0.0032 
(-0.10) (0.34) (-1.43) (0.53) (0.11) 
0.0019 0.0154 -0.0215 0.0073 0.0123 
(0.19) (1.39) (-1.67) (0.29) (0.44) 
0.0104 0.0053 -0.0109 0.0223 0.0096 
(1.02) (0.50) (-0.94) (0.88) (0.35) 
-0.0023 0.0081 -0.0067 0.0103 0.0005 
(-0.23) (0.76) (-0.51) (0.40) (0.02) 
-0.0067 0.0017 -0.0208 0.0028 0.0230 
(-0.65) (0.16) (-1.43) (0.11) (0.90) 
61.30 69.80 42.60 54.80 50.60 
325 288 230 281 141 
Notes: T-statistics are in parentheses. 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
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Appendix 9: OLS Estimates of Granger-causality Tests in Capitalisation Equation [31 for 
Sub Samples of Data 
COST 
Constant 
LLP-1 
LLP-2 
LLP-3 
LLP-4 
LLP-T 
CAP-1 
CAP-2 
CAP-3 
CAP-4 
CAP-T 
XEFF-I 
XEFF-2 
XEFF-3 
YCEFF-4 
XEFF-T 
LTA-1 
LTA-2 
LTA-3 
High 
0.0855* 
(2.31) 
0.0538** 
(7.85) 
-0.0039 
(-0.53) 
0.0385** 
(4.68) 
-0.0065 
(-0.70) 
0.0820** 
(5.16) 
0.9851** 
(23.66) 
-0.0832 
(-1.63) 
0.0138 
(0.35) 
-0.0027 
(-0.10) 
0.9130** 
(11.21) 
-0.0454** 
(4.21) 
-0.0683** 
(-5.86) 
0.0082 
(0.79) 
0.0131 
(1.25) 
-0.0924* 
(-2.14) 
-0.0552* 
(-2.42) 
-0.0025 
(-0.09) 
0.0353 
Thin 
0.0753* 
(2.13) 
0.0003 
(0.03) 
0.0135 
(1.67) 
-0.0879** 
(-lO. 84) 
0.0018 
(0.22) 
-0.0723** 
(-4.32) 
0.2676** 
(8.44) 
-0.0379 
(-1.06) 
0.0420 
(1.28) 
0.0084 
(0.25) 
0.2800** 
(4.18) 
-0.0319** 
(-2.94) 
-0.0102 
(-i. 01) 
0.0718** 
(7.88) 
0.0878** 
(8.47) 
0.1176* * 
(5.81) 
-0.1271** 
(-11.80) 
0.0788** 
(7.67) 
-0.0615** 
PROFIT 
High 
-0.0852* 
(-2.37) 
0.0426** 
(6.18) 
-0.0018 
(-0.25) 
0.0368** 
(4.98) 
-0.0055 
(-0.57) 
0.0721** 
(4.59) 
0.9930** 
(23.13) 
-0.0669 
(-1.25) 
-0.0119 
(-0.30) 
0.0040 
(0.15) 
0.9183** 
(10.92) 
0.0360** 
(3.45) 
0.0618** 
(2.63) 
-0.0850** 
(4.09) 
-0.0598* 
(-2.45) 
-0.0470 
(-1.14) 
-0.0620** 
(-2.84) 
-0.0004 
(-0.01) 
0.0344 
Thin 
0.0708* 
(2.35) 
0.0007 
(0.07) 
0.0120 
(1.32) 
-0.0890** 
(-9.78) 
0.0015 
(0.17) 
-0.0748** 
(4.00) 
0.2673** 
(8.43) 
-0.0237 
(-0.66) 
0.0361 
(1.10) 
0.0171 
(0.51) 
0.2969** 
(4.41) 
-0.0172 
(-0.98) 
0.1704** 
(8.70) 
-0.0126 
(-0.74) 
-0.0067 
(-0.34) 
0.1338** 
(3.61) 
-0.1302** 
(-12.07) 
0.0670** 
(6.54) 
-0.0601 
185 
(1.29) 
LTA-4 -0.0452* 
(-2.23) 
LTA-T -0-0676 
(-1.37) 
Y 1990 -0.0313 
(-1.51) 
Y1991 -0.0284 
(-1.39) 
Y1992 -0.0162 
(-0.78) 
Y1993 -0.0269 
(-1.29) 
Y1994 -0.0106 
(-0.50) 
Y1995 -0.0245 
(-1.26) 
Y1996 -0.0207 
(-1.10) 
Y1997 -0.0275 
(-1.47) 
Y1998 -0.0503** 
(-2.68) 
Y1999 -0.0162 
(-0.86) 
Y2000 -0.0259 
(-1.37) 
Y2001 -0.0141 
(-0.74) 
Y2002 -0.0034 
(-0.18) 
Y2003 -0.0265 
(-1.40) 
Y2004 -0.0378* 
(-1.97) 
W(adj) 50.10 
N 475 
(-6.07) 
0.0205* 
(2.02) 
-0.0893** 
(4.32) 
0.0063 
(0.36) 
0.0082 
(0.48) 
0.0063 
(0.38) 
0.0058 
(0.35) 
0.0147 
(0.90) 
0.0102 
(0.62) 
0.0110 
(0.69) 
0.0014 
(0.09) 
-0.0865** 
(-5.41) 
-0.0352* 
(-2.17) 
0.0011 
(0.07) 
-0.0070 
(-0.43) 
-0.0042 
(-0.26) 
0.0003 
(0.02) 
0.0024 
(0.15) 
64.30 
1165 
(1.25) 
-0.0435* 
(-2.15) 
-0.0715 
(-1.45) 
-0.0324 
(-1.55) 
-0.0352 
(-1.66) 
-0.0215 
(-0.99) 
-0.0286 
(-1.29) 
-0.0161 
(-0.72) 
-0.0325 
(-1.57) 
-0.0309 
(-1.51) 
-0-0338 
(-1.63) 
-0.0578** 
(-2.78) 
-0.0205 
(-0.98) 
-0.0276 
(-1.30) 
-0.0231 
(- 1.11) 
-0.0107 
(-0.52) 
-0.0322 
(-1.54) 
-0.0427* 
(-2.03) 
54.40 
475 
(-5.87) 
0.0212* 
(2.05) 
-0.1021 ** 
(-4.90) 
0.0057 
(0.33) 
0.0044 
(0.26) 
0.0026 
(0.15) 
0.0058 
(0.34) 
0.0127 
(0.74) 
0.0067 
(0.39) 
0.0088 
(0.52) 
0.0005 
(0.03) 
-0.0879** 
(-5.10) 
-0.0432* 
(-2.46) 
0.0059 
(0.33) 
-0.0103 
(-0.59) 
-0.0076 
(-0.44) 
-0.0009 
(-0.05) 
-0.0015 
(-0.09) 
64.70 
1165 
Notes: 
The dependent variables are in the columns whilst the predictors are in the rows. 
T-statistics are shown below each predictor. The dependent variable is the ratio of equity-to-assets. 
Tbinly capitalised savings banks are defined as reporting a ratio of equity-to-assets below the median for 
CAP- I and high capitalised banks report higher than the median (of 0.0819). 
The first XEFF measure is cost efficiency whereas profit efficiency is the second measure. 
** and * indicate statistically significant at 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
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Paper 3: 
Can Bank Regulators "Mimic" the Market Using 
Accounting data? Evidence from South East Asia 
Abstract 
A World Bank survey of bank regulation suggests bank regulators should set standards that 
"mimie" those which are demanded by well-informed private investors. Notwithstanding the 
difficulties of designing appropriate regulatory systems, we employ panel data methods and 
multinomial logit models to work out the best set of accounting variables that can be use to 
monitor bank financial health status in SE Asia. We first utilise the panel data methods to 
empirically investigate the relationship between accounting-based and capital market-based 
measures of banking risk for a sample of listed SE Asian banks before and after the 1997 
financial crisis. We introduce an alternative measure of systematic risk and compare its 
performance to a standard static CAPM estimate. Our preferred risk measure is estimated 
using a bivariate asymmetric VARMA-GARCH model that allows good and bad news to 
affect the variance and covariance of returns asymmetrically. The results allude to the 
superiority of this measure. We find the relationship between aceounting-based and market- 
based risk measures strengthens over time. Furthermore, the results from multinomial logit 
model confirm that the safety index, equity capital, variation in customer deposits, bank 
liquidity and loan loss reserves are good measures of bank risk. Our recommendation for 
bank regulators is to use these accounting indicators to monitor bank financial status and to 
prevent bank failures in future. 
JEL Classification. - C23, G21, G28 
Keywords: Risk, bank regulation, accounting measures, financial ratios, CAPM, asymmetric 
VARMA-GARCH, multinomial logit model, early warning system, SE Asia, banks 
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1. Introduction 
A World Bank survey of bank regulatory and supervisory practices identifies considerable 
disparities in regulatory practices across national banking systems. It suggests that bank 
regulators should "set capital standards that mimic those that would be demanded by well- 
informed, undistorted private-market participants" (Barth et al., 2001a, p. 9). 
Notwithstanding the debate surrounding the *relationship between capital requirements and 
incentives for risk-taking' , the design of appropriate regulatory systems is becoming an 
increasingly difficult task. Bank regulators must contend with new risks arising from 
financial innovation like the growth in derivative and off-balance-sheet products, which are 
facilitating a change towards the evaluation of risk management systems rather than 
individual transactions or portfolio positions (Stiglitz, 1998). The problems of regulatory 
design are even more difficult in emerging market economies (EMEs) where the regulatory 
framework "may well differ markedly from those of more developed countries because the 
risks are greater, the regulatory capacities are weaker, and information is poorer" (Stiglitz, 
19993 p. 1514). 2 
Our objective is to test whether the accounting measures of risk can be used to predict bank 
failure and distress in SE Asia. In the other words, we aim to build up an early warning 
system (EWS) using accounting measures of bank risk that can detect problem 
banks. 3A 
good early warning system is particularly important for bank regulators for several reasons. 
Fir st and foremost, it could help prevent future bank failures and minimise 
fiscal bailout 
costs. This is particularly necessary for SE Asian countries where the effect of the 
1997 
financial crisis have been devastating and the fiscal bailout costs have 
been greater than most 
1 For a fuller discussion of this point, the reader is referred to 
discussion and references cited by Barth et al. 
(2001 a) and Stiglitz (1998,1999). 
2 Foreign bank entry poses another challenge to bank regulators in EMEs. 
Claessens and Jansen (2000) note the 
apparent consensus that greater foreign competition acts as a stimulant 
to bank regulation and supervision. 
3 Unlike studies using macroeconomic data to identify the causes of 
bank or currency crisis (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999; Demirgiig-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002; Schmukler et al., 2004; 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2004), our study focuses on bank level data to predict 
failure and distress of individual banks. 
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other financial crises (Honohan and Klingebiel, 2003). 4 The need for an effective EWS in SE 
Asia also stems from the fact that the Asian crisis was not predicted neither by economists, 
academics nor international financial organisations and rating firms. EWS could provide 
bank regulators with early identification of potential problem banks that allows them to take 
corrective action early before these banks turn into problem cases. Further, although EWS 
can not replace on-site examination, it can help regulators allocate their scare resources to 
those banks in most need of attention. Finally, EWS models help to identify causes of failures 
or factors that affect bank financial health. This information is important because it provides 
bank managers, regulators and investors with a better understanding of bank operations, 
which could assist them in decision making. 
Typically, regulators construct measures of banking risks from accounting data. This 
approach does not consider a capital market-based assessment of banking risks that could 
contain valuable information about future risks. Several studies show that market information 
can be used to signal problem banks long before being identified by regulators (Flannery, 
1998; Curry et al., 200 1; Krainer et al., 2002). The possibility of discrepancies between 
alternative risk measures emphasises the importance of reconciling consistency between 
accounting-based and market-based measures. This is particularly important in EMEs where 
the number of listed banks tends to be limited. Yet, there is a paucity of literature on the 
relationship between market-based and accounting-based measures of banking risk with the 
salient studies concentrated on the US. Our study for EMEs is necessary because experience 
in the US can not be transferred automatically to other emerging countries where banks 
operate in very different environments compared with the US. 
This study extends the existing literature on the two related areas - the relationship between 
accounting-based and market-based risk measures, and bank failure prediction models - by 
focusing on the five SE Asian countries which were most affected by the 1997 financial 
crisis, namely, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. We use a 
dataset 
of financial statements of commercial banks in these countries (Williams and 
Nguyen, 2005), 
and select the listed banks as our sample. Only the listed banks are chosen 
because we want 
' See Paper 1, Table 4, page 25 for details on bailout costs of SE Asian countries. 
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to reconcile the consistency between accounting-based and market-based measures of bank 
risk. Share price data is sourced from Datastream. 
The analysis is carried out over two intervals between 1991 and 2004, that is, before and after 
the 1997 financial crisis. This exercise is particularly important given the policy context in 
SE Asian banking. Prior to the post-crisis reforms, the Asian economic model was 
characterised by the presence of large, dominant corporate and family-owned corporations 
and banks whose interconnections gave rise to connected lending. This feature downplayed 
the role of external finance and capital market monitoring, and it was compounded by an 
underdeveloped institutional environment including weak bank supervision and regulation, 
which helped to create opaque banking systems (Williams and Nguyen, 2005). 5 This was the 
environment facing banks when financial deregulation was implemented in the early 1990s. 
Whilst deregulation presented banks with greater opportunities, it required that banks 
monitor and manage an expanding set of risks. Following the 1997 financial crisis, an 
extensive bank restructuring process began in 1998. Restructuring centred around sanitising 
domestic banking systems and recapitalising troubled institutions typically via a programme 
of bank nationalisation, transfer of bad debts to asset management companies, liquidity 
6 injections, and privatisations (including removing barriers to wider foreign participation). 
Steps have also been taken towards adopting international standards in bank supervision and 
regulation (for instance, capital adequacy, loan classification, and loan loss provisioning) and 
improving the institutional environment (Lindgren et al., 2000). 7 
In addition to extending the literature to an emerging economies context, our methodological 
approach constitutes several developments. First, whilst the earlier literature uses either 
5 Currie (2000) discusses the quality of bank regulatory conditions in SE Asia prior to the 1997 crisis. 
6 IMF loans to Thailand, Korea and Indonesia tended to be conditional upon the authorities resolving a number 
of inherent problems in national banking systems. The recipients were required to establish appropriate 
institutional frameworks, close unviable financial institutions, strengthen viable financial institutions, deal with 
impaired assets, improve corporate governance in financial and non-financial firms, improve the bank 
supervisory and regulatory process, promote transparency in financial transactions, further open domestic 
financial markets, and reform labour markets (Goldstein, 2001; IMF 1999a, b; IMF, 2003; Lindgren et al., 
2000). 
7A comprehensive review of the resolution strategies adopted in SE Asia is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
the interested reader, we recommend the excellent syntheses of Claessens et al. (1999), Gochoco-Bautista et al. 
(2000), Hawkins (1999), and Lindgren et al. (2000). 
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ordinary least squares (OLS) or Ridge regression to study the link between accounting-based 
and market-based measures of risk, we improve the methodology by using panel data 
techniques which could limit multicollinearity and estimation bias problems. Second, unlike 
pervious studies estimating systematic risk from static market models (using OLS) or a 
symmetric GARCH model, we extend the inethodology by estimating a time-varying 
conditional beta using an asymmetric VARMA (vector autoregressive moving average) 
GARCH model. The asymmetric model specification allows the variance of stock price 
returns to respond differently to the arrival in the market of good and bad news, while the 
VARMA specification with conditional variance and covariance terms can capture the 
8 dynamic interaction between stock and market portfolio returns in mean equations. Third, 
the earlier literature often uses various accounting ratios representing the CAMEL rating 
indicators (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earning and Liquidity), whereas 
we also include a safety indicator (Z-score) (Hannan and Hanweck, 1988) in our models to 
capture banks financial health. Finally, unlike most other studies working with only two 
states of financial distress ("failed" or "non-failed"), we use multinomial logit models to 
analyse simultaneously three states of financial distress, namely, "exiting" (being closed or 
absorbed), "restructured" (distressed), and "healthy". The separation between distressed 
banks and healthy banks is important because it reflects the continuum of the bank financial 
health. 
We expect the results to have implications for bank regulators. First, the specification of the 
asymmetric VARMA-GARCH model is expected to realise a more accurate estimate of 
systematic risk since it incorporates the fact that markets tend to respond 
differently to good 
and bad news. Subsequently, it is important to determine which accounting-based measures 
are most consistent with the more sophisticated estimate of systematic risk. 
Second, we 
conduct the analysis from 1991 to 1997 and 1998 to 2004 as well as across 
1991 to 2004. 
This should shed some light as to whether either the accounting-based or market-based risk 
measures were correctly reflecting an increasing 
level of risk as economies overheated and 
asset quality problems mounted prior to the 1997 crisis. 
After 1998, considerable policy 
8 Evidence of the asymmetric response of equity volatility to positive and negative news 
is documented by 
several authors including Engle and Ng (1993), Glosten, 
Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), Kroner and Ng 
(1996), Martens and Poon (200 1), Blair, Poon, and Taylor (2002), and Brooks and 
Henry (2002). 
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initiatives have sought to inter alia improve bank regulation and supervision, and the quality 
of information provided to the authorities by banks. A priori one might reasonably expect the 
accounting-market-based relationship to strengthen over time in SE Asia. Our analysis across 
the pre- and post-crisis periods could help us understand how this relationship changes over 
time. This information is crucial in developing an effective EWS model for SE Asian 
countries since the pre-crisis 1997 model is likely to be impropriate in post-crisis. As far as 
we are aware, this is one of the earliest studies that attempt to build up an early warning 
system for SE Asia in post-crisis period. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents the methodology. The data are discussed in Section 4. Our results are 
reported in Section 5 and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1.1. Accounting-based and capital market-based literature 
The underlying theoretical relationship between market-based measures of risk and 
accounting measures is based on reciprocal interactions between market information and 
banking firm risk and return profile reflected in accounting data. On the one hand, market 
information reflects the underlying risk and return profile of a bank. On the other 
hand, 
market signals can affect the operations of a bank thereby changing 
its risk and return profile. 
For example, a bank might respond to market signals by changing management 
decisions 
regarding its asset allocation strategies, sources of funding, capital, or risk management 
practices. Empirical work on this relationship is limited and most 
focuses on the US market. 
Only one non-US study has been carried out recently for Japan. 
9 
See Appendix I for a summary of the literature. 
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The early work that examines the relationship between capital-based measures of risk and 
accounting measures of risk in banking was conducted by Pettway (1976) for a sample of 38 
large banks and bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US from 1971 to 1974. In this study, 
banks' market beta and price earning (PE) ratio were regressed against several accounting 
measures of risk: capital-to-risk assets ratio, pay out ratio and earnings stability. The study 
finds that the amount of bank equity is a significant determinant of a bank's PE ratio in 1972 
and 1974 and of a bank's market beta in 1974. Whilst the payout ratio is found significantly 
and inversely associated with both PE ratio and beta in 1972, only the earnings stability 
measure is significantly related to beta in 1972. Given these results, Pettway (1976) 
concludes that the study did not find investors very sensitive to the presence of unacceptable 
levels of risk due to thin capital ratios. 
Jahankhani and Lynge (1980) use OLS regression to examine the degree of association 
between accounting measures of risk and two market-determined measures of risk for a 
sample of 95 US. banks and BHCs. They use quarterly data for the period 1972 through 
1976. Total risk (standard deviation of returns) and systematic risk (market beta) are used as 
market-based measures of risk, whilst accounting measures of risk are stood for by seven 
accounting ratios. They find that, whilst only three accounting measures, the dividend payout 
ratio, coefficient of variation of deposit and loan-to-deposit are significantly related to banks' 
systematic risk, all accounting measures, except loan-to-deposit, are significantly associated 
with total risk. Given that the leverage and loan loss ratios only are statistically significant in 
the total risk model, the authors suggest that these ratios are firm-specific factors and do not 
significantly affect banks' systematic risk. 
Mansur et al. (1993) employ OLS and Ridge regression to investigate the relationship 
between two market measures of risk (total risk and market beta) and seven accounting risk 
indicators for a sample of 59 US commercial banks from 1986 to 1990. The results from OLS 
regression show that only the liquid assets ratio is significantly related to total risk, whereas 
two indicators, loan loss reserve-to-loans ratio and coefficient of variation of deposit, are 
found to be statistically significant in the market beta model. However, when ridge regression 
is employed, the authors find no evidence of a relationship between these set of accounting 
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measures and market measures of risk. Compared with the previous study of Jahankhani and 
Lynge (1980), the authors conclude that accounting ratios failed to explain the variability of 
market-determined risk, and it seems that the association of accounting and market 
determined measures of risk have weakened over time. 
Hassan (1993) utilises OLS regression to test the relationship between several accounting 
risk measures, including seven off-balance-sheet variables, and three market measures of 
risk: total risk, systematic risk (market beta) and bank implied asset risk, calculated from the 
Ronn-Verma option pricing model. The study finds evidences that OBS items reduce bank 
total risk but do not affect bank systematic risk. Moreover, most of the other accounting risk 
measures, including the leverage ratio, Herfindahl index of diversification of bank's asset 
portfolio, interest rate risklo, loan loss reserve ratio and dividend payout ratio, are statistically 
significant and with coefficients the same sign as in previous studies. Hassan also suggests 
that implied asset risks are a better proxy for total risk in a regulated banking industry. 
Using OLS and Ridge regression, Elyasiani and Mansur (2005) investigate the links between 
accounting variables and banks' market beta and foreign exchange rate beta for 52 Japanese 
banks in the period 1986-1996. The bank market beta and exchange rate beta are generated 
from a multi-index GARCH. Among the accounting variables, cash and due from other banks 
(liquid assets), assets held in trading and dealing accounts, loan loss provision (LLP) and 
customer deposits are found to be significantly related to market beta while only non-interest 
income and foreign exchange denominated assets are statistically significant 
in the foreign 
exchange beta model. Interestingly, and unlike the US cases, the Japanese 
bank market beta 
is negatively associated with provision for loan losses and the 
link of the market-based risk 
measures and the financial ratios is weaker for the Japanese 
banks than those found in the 
existing US literature. 
10 Calculated as absolute dollar differences between rate sensitive assets 
(RSA) and rate sensitive liabilities 
(RSL) over total assets, where RSA and RSL are those scheduled 
to be repriced or mature within one year (see 
Hassan (1993). 
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2.1.2. Predicting bank failures using accounting variables 
This section reviews the salient literature on the prediction of bank failure and accounting 
variables. The literature will be reviewed according to developments of methodology, 
whereas we will review studies on SE Asian countries separately. Details on each study such 
as sample employed, variables and their signs and significance status are provided in 
Appendix 2. 
Early studies of bank failure 
The literature on the prediction of bank failure can be traced back to Secrist (1938) who 
suggested that accounting data could be used to distinguish failed banks from non-failed 
banks. This idea later materialised in Beaver (1966) for non-financial firms, and Meyer and 
Pifer (1970) for banking firms. The latter study used multivariate regression (OLS). Using a 
sample of 60 US banks from 1948 to 1965, Meyer and Pifer find that the variables employed 
(various financial ratios and variables measuring trends and variation) could predict 
bankruptcies up to two years in advance, with approximately eighty per cent of the 
observations correctly classified. Most signs of variables correspond with a priori 
expectations, however, surprisingly, the ratio of questionable loans to total assets is 
insignificant in the year prior to failure. 
Literature using Discriminant Analysis 
From 1975 to 1980, the literature is dominated with studies using discriminant analysis (DA). 
Sinkey (1975) applied linear DA to identify the financial characteristics which distinguish 
between I 10 pairs of problem and non-problem banks in the US. The results indicate that, 
amongst a set of ten financial ratios, the efficiency and other-expense variables appeared to 
be important early-warning signals (1969-197 1) while the loan-volume and loan-quality 
variables were more important in 1972 (after the majority of the banks were recognised as 
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problems) than in the earlier years. Using the same techniques in a later study, Sinkey (1977) 
suggests that some accounting variables (such as net-operating-income-to-total-assets and 
cost-to-income ratio, after tax returns and capital adequacy ratio) could be used to identify 
problems at the large Franklin National Bank from two to three years before its failure in 
1974. In another study, the Sinkey focuses on substandard loans to discriminate 143 
problems from 163 non-problem banks in the US in 1974. Among 21 variables employed, 
tests showed that the net capital ratio (adjusted for all loss, doubtful and substandard loans) 
was the most accurate variable separating problem and non-problem banks. Moreover, 
Sinkey finds that the failed banks had large volumes of substandard loans (relative to their 
capital and reserves) sixteen to twenty-two months before failure; however, most banks with 
low net capital ratios did not fail (Sinkey, 1978). 
Unlike Sinkey, Altman (1977) uses quadratic discriminant analysis (instead of linear) to 
discriminate between 107 non-problems, 49 temporary-problems and 56 serious-problems 
US saving and loan (S&L) associations. A system of 12 variables including 7 financial ratios 
and 5 trend variables are found to be significant in classifying S&L's. Among these 
variables, net operating income-to-gross-operating income and its trend, net-worth-to-total- 
assets, real-estate-owned-to-total assets, were found most useful within the system. Overall, 
the study could predict actual S&L performance up to 3 semi-annual reporting periods prior 
to a specified critical date. Rose and Scott (1978) compare the linear and quadratic DA 
models in discriminating 69 pairs of failed and non-failed US banks during the years 1965- 
1975. Overall,, the linear models performed better than quadratic models, except for the years 
immediately preceding failures. Quadratic functions were better in classifying solvent banks 
while linear functions were more successful in classifying failed banks. Examining 
factors 
affecting bank failures, they find failed banks displayed substantially 
higher liquidity risk 
(high loans/assets ratio), lower bank earnings, employee benefits and municipal securities. 
Pettway and Sinkey (1980) propose a dual-screening mechanism using 
both discriminant 
analysis and market information to identify problems at 
33 large listed US banks. Two 
accounting ratios (cost/income and securities/assets) are used 
in discriminant-analysis models 
to predict failures while the market signal of 
bank failure is considered as six weeks of 
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successive reduced cumulative firm-specific residuals. The study finds that the dual- 
screening technique provides an earlier warning and that it would have scheduled 
examinations for six of the largest banks which subsequently failed at least one full year 
before the beginning of the classifying examination. Moreover, the test for potential type-11 
error using a sample of six non-failed banks using the dual-screening technique did not flag 
any of these banks as problem banks during a three-year test period. Given these results they 
conclude that the market for equity shares of large banks was efficient in translating public 
information into current share prices, and the combination of accounting and market 
information can be helpful to identify large problem banks that need the priority attention of 
supervisory authorities. 
Literature using Logit or Probit models 
Logit models found their way in bank failure literature in the later half of the 1970s with the 
study of Martin (1977). Realising some shortfalls of DA models, Martin utilises binary logit 
analysis to estimate the probability of bank failures for a sample of 5,700 US banks of which 
58 banks were identified as failures at some time between 1970 and 1976. Among 25 
financial ratios, four variables, capital-to-risk-assets, commercial-loans-to-total loans, charge- 
offs-to-net-operating-income and net-income-to-total-assets, were found to be significant 
in 
predicting bank failure. Furthermore, the model is found to perform better when there were 
more failures included during 1975-76. The author suggests that early warning models may 
be of most interest in moderate adversity periods rather than in times which are either 
better 
or substantially worse. With regard to classification accuracy, 
logit and discriminant models 
yielded similar results (Martin, 1977). Stepwise selection techniques were employed 
to 
develop both a binary logit model and DA model in a study of US 
banks by Espahbodi 
(1991). Espahbodi finds that the four most important variables in distinguishing 38 
failed 
banks from 35 non-failed banks, regardless of method of analysis, were 
loan-revenues-to- 
operating-income; interest-income-on-state-and-local-govermnent-obligations-to-operating- 
income; deposit-interest-to-operating-income; and time-and-saving-deposits-to-demand- 
deposits. In general, the results show that the logit model provided slightly 
better 
classification accuracy one year before 
failure, but the discriminant model performed better 
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in two years prior to failure. However, the results are in favour of the logit model when the 
two models are tested by ex-post forecasts of failure. Using binary logit models for bank 
failures from 1985 to 1988 in the US, Dar-Yeh et al. (1997) find that, like in some previous 
US studies, higher equity capital, profitability, and liquidity tend to yield a lower failure rate. 
Furthermore, the ratio of past-due-loans-to-total-assets was the most stable factor 
contributing to bank failure over the period. 
The early studies using logit models focus on US banks. Recently, this model has been 
applied to investigate the factors that effect bank failures in Venezuela. Using a sample of 36 
banks, of which 17 were failed during period 1994-1995, Molina (2002) shows that the two 
most important variables related to bank failures were profitability (ROA) and liquidity 
(government-bonds-to-assets). Other variables such as bank capitalisation, return on 
investments, and financial expenses were also found to be significant, but with less influence 
on bank failure. Interestingly, the results indicate that less efficient banks (with a higher 
proportion of operating costs) were more likely to survive. 
In addition to logit models, the probit model is used in the bank failure literature. Crowley 
and Loviscek (1990) compare the accuracy of probit models with other methods. To avoid 
the time-series problem prevailing in most previous studies, a random sample of 76 solvent 
banks and 38 small commercial banks that failed in the same year 1984 is selected. The 
results show that probit and logit models yield identical results and both perform much 
better 
than the linear probability (OLS) and DA models. Moreover, besides some operating 
income 
and expense variables, the indicators of loan-portfolio 
diversification (including the 
Herfindahl index) contributed significantly in predicting bank failure. Cole and 
Gunther 
(1998) use the probit models to compare off-site monitoring and on-site examination 
in 
predicting bank failure in the US in the period 1988-1992. 
For off-site monitoring, they use a 
probit model to estimate the relationship between a set of seven 
CAMEL type financial ratios 
for 13,966 US banks and the likelihood of bank failure. For comparison, the on-site 
CAMEL 
ratings on individual banks are used to predict 
failures. Cole and Gunther find that both 
CAMEL ratings and the off-site probit model provide a good prediction 
of bank failure. 
However, the infori-nation content of examination ratings could 
decay fairly quickly. In 
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addition, they find the ability of CAMEL ratings to identify bank failure matched or 
exceeded that of the off-site model only when the ratings were based on examination 
conducted no more than one or two quarters prior to the forecast period. For the banks with 
ratings more than one or two quarters old, the off-site probit model provided a more accurate 
indication of survivability. These findings indicate an important role of off-site early warning 
models in assisting the on-site rating system. 
There is a limited number of studies which use a multivariate logit approach. DeYoung 
(2003), for instance, estimates the probability of four outcomes: survival, failure, being 
acquired and conversion. His sample is for 1664 commercial banks chartered in the US 
between 1980 and 1985. DeYoung finds that aggressive lending activity, large deposit 
funding, assets size and, to a lesser extent, poor cost control are significant long-run 
predictors of failure of both de novo banks and established banks. De novo banks were more 
likely to exit via being acquired (and to some extent by conversion) compared with 
established banks. The determinants of exit by acquisition, however, were less related to 
bank-specific variables. That is, banks were less likely to be acquired if they had a higher 
level of capital and assets growth. Further, the risk of acquisition was associated more closely 
with local competitive, economic, and regulatory factors. Finally, large deposit financing and 
intense lending activities were significantly related to conversion of both de novo banks and 
established banks; and banks affiliated with multibank holding companies were more 
likely 
to be converted into a branch of a parent bank. 
Literature using Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis models involve analysing time-to-failure events. 
The most popular model is 
Cox's (1972) proportional hazard model (CPH). Lane, Looney and 
Wansley (1986) is the 
first study to apply this model in banking. Using a small sample of 
failed and non-failed US 
banks in the period 1979-1983 they estimate two CPH models on 
21 financial variables. 
Several variables representing loans, municipal securities capital, operating expenses 
and 
incomes were found to be significant in predicting the probability 
that a bank will survive 
longer than one or two years. Interestingly, none of the 
loan quality variables, loan loss 
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provisions or net charge-offs, was found to be significant. Finally, the classification results 
from CPH compare favourably with those from MDA models, but with slightly fewer type I 
errors. In another similar study, these authors focus on misclassifications of CPH and DA 
models (Looney, Wansley and Lane, 1989). They use two models which are based on one 
year's data (including 303 failed and 388 non-failed banks) and two year data (including 286 
failed banks and 377 non-failed banks). The authors find that the results for the two-year 
model are similar. For the one-year model., compared with their previous study, the type I 
error rates were much higher, with a greater degree of deterioration for the DA than for the 
CPH model. In general, the results suggest . that the passage of time alone had little to do with 
the misclassifications produced by the DA and Cox models in this exercise. 
Henebry (1996) extends the literature by incorporating cash flow information in the CPH 
model. Using failed banks from the 1986-1990, several models ranging from one to six years 
were estimated. Henebry finds the three most common significant cash flow variables in four 
of the six models are: net-investment-cash-flow-to-total-flow; net-change-in-sources-of- 
funds-to-total-flow; and net-other-assets-and-liabilities-to-totaI flow. It appears that operating 
and investment cash flows were more important in the long run while changes in income 
earned were more important in the short run. Moreover, the results also suggest that only the 
short-time one year model performs well whereas most of the significant variables violate the 
CPH assumption in other longer year models. These results cast doubt on the appropriateness 
of CPH for both regular accounting and cash flow variables over time horizons exceeding 
one year. It appears this technique may be highly sensitive to the data and time frames used. 
Carree (2003) extends the literature to a non-US setting. The aim is to investigate the 
determinants of the hazard rates of 74 Russian banks of which 44 failed between 1994 and 
1997. Using the CPH method, Carree finds that the lifespan of new and small banks was 
limited and that banks which offered relatively high interest rates on the savings market were 
likely to be among the first to be failed. In addition, banks with higher market share were 
more likely to survive. 
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In the mid 1990s, another survival analysis model called the split-population survival-time 
model was introduced in the bank failure literature. Cole and Gunther (1995) apply this 
method to separate the determinants of bank failure from the factors that influence the 
survival time of failing banks. They use data in 1985 of 10,843 US banks of which 811 failed 
from 1986-1992. The estimated results indicate that, while 15 of the 19 variables selected 
were useful in explaining bank survival, only eight of these were useful in explaining 
survival time. More specifically, except the liquidity indicator, the basic indicators of a 
bank's condition, such as capital, troubled assets, and net income, are significantly related to 
the timing of bank failure. The results also suggest that the survival time of failing banks was 
not related to bank asset size. Finally, the performance of the split-population is also 
compared with Logit and CPH models. The authors find that the standard logit model results 
were similar to those obtained from the survival equation of the split-population model. 
However, in the CPH model, 14 out of the 19 variables were statistically significant 
explaining bank survival time while only 8 variables were associated with survival time in 
the split-population model. They suggest that the Cox proportional hazards model may 
provide a distorted view of the determinants of bank survival time because it does not allow 
for a distinction between failing and surviving banks. 
Literature using Neural Networks models 
Various Neural Networks models have been applied in bank failure literature since the early 
1990s. Tam (199 1) and later Tam and Kiang (1992) are among the first to introduce Neural 
Network (NN) for classifying bank failures. The authors compare the performance of several 
popular methods with two Neural Network models with 19 input neurons which are 19 
financial ratios covering different aspects of CAMEL ratings. Using a sample of 59 pairs of 
failed and non-failed US banks in the late 1980s they find that, on average, NN offered better 
predictive accuracy than DA, factor-logistic analysis and decision tree classification 
algorithm. NN was found to perform best for the one-year-ahead case while 
for the case of 
two-year-ahead, factor-logistic analysis was the best. Moreover, NN was found to be more 
robust due to their non-parametric nature, and showed better adaptability 
in model 
adjustment. Similarly, multilayer perceptron (MLP), one of the well 
known models of 
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artificial neural networks was found to perform better than the traditional parametric models 
(DA and logit regression) in a study of Spanish banks (Cinca, 1997). Cinca asserts that MLP 
is preferable model because other methods may suffer from the problem of non-normality, 
non-linearity and the presence of outliers in financial ratios. 
Neural networks have been compared with the CPH model. Tung et al. (2004) propose the 
use of a novel neural fuzzy system (NNFS), an integration of neural network and fuzzy 
system, as an alternative to predict banking failure. NNFS is used to identify the inherent 
traits of financial distress based on nine financial variables derived from publicly available 
financial statements of 548 failed and 2,555 non-failed banks in the US from 1980 to 2000. 
They find that NNFS network based classification performed much better over that PH model 
in minimizing Type I error. However, the NNFS network has a much higher Type 11 error 
rate than the CPH model albeit being more consistent and robust in the classification of 
survived banks. 
Unlike other studies focusing on bank failures, Swicegood (2001) compares the use of NN, 
"professional human judgment" (regulators' classifications), and DA approach to predict 
commercial bank underperformance. The underperforming banks were defined as banks with 
ROA in the lowest profit quintile (bottom 20%) while the adequately performing banks are in 
the upper four quintiles (top 80%). Twenty-three variables were used as independent 
variables that proxy for various aspects of bank operation such as financial leverage, asset 
and liability composition, key earnings and expense categories, liquidity measures, risk 
attributes, and other non-financial bank characteristics. A sample of 741 large banks and 
1,000 small banks in the US were selected using year-end data for 1993. The author finds 
that regulators' classifications were slightly less accurate than the neural network model but 
much more accurate than the DA model. 
Literature using Trait Recognition models 
Trait recognition, another non-parametric model, was adapted for use 
in the bank failure 
literature in the mid 1990s. Kolari et al. (1996) introduce this method to identify failed US 
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commercial banks. The main aspects of this model is the quantification of all possible 
interaction variables known as traits and then extraction of traits that are frequently found in 
either failed or non-failed banks. The authors use 28 financial ratios to proxy for various 
aspects of bank condition to estimate the trait recognition model and a logit model in three 
stages. The data comprise of 123 failed banks and 900 non-failed banks for the two years 
1984 and 1985. The results show that trait recognition outperformed the logit model with 
classification accuracy average 99% for the holdout sample (sample set aside to test the 
estimated models). The findings also suggest the staged approach enhanced the classification 
accuracy of the logit model. Similar results are reported in another similar study of Kolari et 
al. (2002) for a sample of 55 large failed banks and 1,000 non-failed large US banks during 
1989-1992. Particularly, they find that both logit and trait recognition perform well in terms 
of classification results, with within sample and out sample classification accuracy of 95% 
and 85%, respectively. In addition, the results from the holdout sample show that the logit 
model perfon-ned better than the trait recognition model in one year lead time. However, the 
logit model's predictive accuracy gradually declined in the 1991 and 1992 holdout samples. 
By contrast, the trait recognition models appeared to be quite stable over the sample period. 
Overall, the prediction accuracy of trait recognition models was better than logit models. 
Literature using other approaches 
Besides the above mentioned approaches, some other methods have been introduced in the 
literature. Santomero and Vinso (1977) introduce the maximum risk exposure (MRE) method 
to estimate the probability of capital inadequacy or bank failure of 200 US banks. The 
probability of bank failure is estimated by considering weekly changes in the capital account 
as a random variable whose distribution remains stationary over time. Their results show that 
a very small probability of failure existed in the US banking sector and this probability has 
been stable over the period 1965-1974. However, this probability of failure was fairly 
insensitive to any reasonable changes in capital account levels. In addition, they find that 
some banks within the sample did exhibit higher probability of failure. This was mainly 
because the relatively low capital ratios and/or high variability of these banks over the 
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sample period. Martin (1977), however, questions the stability of the underlying probability 
distributions used in this approach. He maintains that the underlying probability distributions 
may not change slowly enough so that estimates based on a previous ten-year period can be 
used for forecasting, given the following period experienced a massive increase in problem 
loans, earnings reduction, and the failures of Franklin National Bank and Security National 
Bank. 
Alam et al. (2000) use fuzzy clustering and two self-organizing neural networks to classify 8 
failed banks from 240 non-failed US banks in 1993. Fuzzy clustering' allows a researcher to 
distinguish ambiguity in data that may lie between clusters. This method uses probability 
information in assessing banks on a continuous scale rather than a dichotomous scale. Using 
a trial and error approach, they employ 9 clusters for each of the three methods. In addition, 
five financial variables are used in the models which proxy for income, and loan quality. The 
results show that performances of the three methods were very similar and all methods 
provide useful tools in identifying bankruptcy possibility. 
Several studies use integrated approaches to identify problem banks. West (1985) utilises 
factor analysis and logit estimation to identify problem banks for a sample of 1,900 US banks 
in period 1980-1982. An advantage of factor analysis is that it can reduce a large number of 
variables to a smaller number of factors (Korobow and Stuhr, 1985). The study finds 8 
meaningful factors of which 4 factors bear very close resemblance to CAMEL components: 
capital adequacy, asset quality, earnings, and liquidity. Next, the scores assigned on each 
individual bank (based on the eight factors) are used as input variables in a maximum- 
likelihood logit estimation to test their ability to distinguish problem from sound banks. The 
results indicated that banks with good capital, earnings, and liquidity positions tend to receive 
lower probabilities of being problem banks. On the other hand, banks with higher 
levels of 
classified assets and substantial real estate portfolios received higher probabilities of 
being 
problems. Overall, the study finds that the integrated factor analysis/logit approach was 
useful in identifying problem banks. 
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Similarly, Canbas et al. (2005) construct an integrated early warning system by combining 
three parametric models (DA, logit and probit) with a non-parametric approach, principal 
component analysis (PCA). Similar to West (1985), they use PCA to determine the important 
factors (characters) which can explain the changes in financial conditions of the banks. Then, 
discriminant, logit and probit models are estimated based on these factors to construct an 
JEWS model. Using a sample of 40 privately owned Turkish commercial banks, of which 21 
banks were failed during the period 1997-2003; they find that three factors representing 
capital adequacy, income-expenditure structure and liquidity were the main predictors of 
bank failures in Turkey. With regard to predicting accuracy, DA performed slightly better 
than logit and probit models; however, they assert that the combination of these three models 
can be a good early warning system. 
Literature of bank failures in South East Asia 
There are two studies of bank failures in SE Asia. Bongini, Claessens and Ferri (2001) study 
the determinants of distress and closure of financial institutions in the East Asian crisis of 
1997-1999. Logit models are used to analyse a sample of 283 financial institutions from 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Of the 238 financial institutions, 
120 were identified as distressed and 38 were closed. Their results from four separate binary 
logit models show that banks with a higher share of loan loss reserves in overall 
capitalisation were more likely to be distressed but less likely to be closed. The authors argue 
that for distressed institutions, relatively higher provisioning indicated better management 
and gave authorities more reason not to close the institution. They also find that banks with 
higher loan growth, less return on assets and lower net interest income-to-total income were 
more likely to be distressed and closed. Regarding ownership and connection, they find that 
private-owned and connected financial institutions were more likely to be distressed. 
On the 
other hand, foreign ownership decreased the probability of distress. In addition, the 
probability of final closure is found to increase with connections, suggesting that the closure 
process was free from political pressures. Finally, the authors find the evidence of too-big-to- 
fail policy. 
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Bongini, Laeven and Majnoni (2002) use the logit approach to examine the performance of 
three indicators of bank fragility: CAMEL like accounting variables, stock market prices, and 
credit ratings. They use a sample of 246 financial institutions, of which 43 are listed ones, in 
the four East Asian crisis countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand. Four variables 
including LLR-to-capital, loan growth, net interest income to total income, and return on 
assets were integrated in to one CAMEL indicator that takes a value of 0,1,2,3, or 4. The 
higher value of the indicator indicates higher risk. To account for market indicators of risk 
they use Moody's credit ratings and implicit deposit insurance premiums derived from an 
option pricing model. The first test of market discipline shows that neither rated nor listed 
banks was subject to a significant degree of market discipline, and they were not safer than 
non-rated or non-listed banks. The CAMEL type indicator alone could predict 77% correctly, 
and when included, the rating or listing variables did not provide additional predictive power. 
In the second test, using a subset sample of 43 listed financial institutions, they find that the 
market based indicator (implicit deposit insurance premiums) performed relatively well, 
followed by the balance sheet indicator. The rating indicator although it could distinguish the 
good from bad countries, had limited power in distinguishing the good from bad banks. 
Finally, using quarterly data they find that stock market based information responded more 
quickly to changing financial conditions than ratings of credit risk agencies. 
In summary, the literature of bank failures has been dominated by studies in the US. Since 
1970, various methods have been employed to classify problem banks. In general, the later 
introduced methods tend to provide better classification results. Accounting variables used to 
predict bank failures are often the CAMEL type financial ratios. Particularly, the capital 
adequacy and earning ratios have been the most important indicators discriminating problem 
and non-problem banks. They are found to be significant in 70% of the studies under 
reviewing, followed by asset quality and liquidity indicators (50%), and management 
indicators (27%). Beside these traditional ratios, several other indicators have been 
introduced and found to be significant, including loan growth, diversification and 
concentration indicators, asset size, and cash flow variables. 
As far as the state of financial 
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distress is concerned, most studies only deal with two states (failed (or closed) and non- 
failed). There are only three studies that work with more than two states of financial distress: 
Altman (1977) and DeYoung (2003) for US banks and Bongini et al. (2001) for SE Asian 
banks. AtIman (1977) uses discriminant analysis; DeYoung (2003) employs a multivariate 
logit approach, whereas Bongini et al. (200 1) estimate four separate binary logit models. 
I Methodology 
This section describes the methodologies to be employed in this paper. We begin with the 
introduction of the panel data methodology and variables that will be used to examine the 
relationship between accounting-based and market-based measures of bank risk. We then 
provide a brief overview of alternative approaches that can be used to predict bank failures 
before paying more attention to the model that will be employed in this study. 
3.1.1. Panel data methodology 
This paper uses panel data techniques to examine the relationship between accounting-based 
and market based measures of bank risk. Several advantages are gained in using panel data 
methods to model differences in behaviour across firms (see Greene, 2003), for instance, 
accounting for unobserved individual effects, like differences in bank managerial quality, and 
the reduction of multicollinearity II and estimation bias problems (see Hsiao 1986; 
Wooldridge, 2002). The basic model which accounts for the combination of cross-sectional 
and time series effects takes the following general form as shown in equation (1): 
y, l = x,,, 
8 + zia + cit ýi= 
1ý N; t=1, T (1) 
" The problem of multicol linearity in the OLS models which were employed 
in the earlier literature is noted by 
Pettway (1976) and Jahankhani and Lynge (1980). 
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where5 yit is the market measure of risk for bank i at time t, xit represents K accounting risk 
measures, P is KxI coefficient vector5 zicc is individual effect which contains a constant 
term and a set of individual or group specific variables that may be observed or unobserved, 
and cit is error term. 
If zicc contains only a constant term then the model becomes a pooled regression model that 
can be estimated using OLS techniques. The panel data models can be grouped into the fixed 
effects (FE) model and random effects (RE) models. In fixed effect models, zi a becomes ai5 
which is an intercept (dummy variable) for each firm, captures firm-specific effects. The FE 
approach allows the unobserved effects ai to be correlated with observed independent 
variables xit . The fixed effects model is estimated using the least square dummy variable 
(LSDV) approach. The RE approach, on the other hand, does not allow unobserved effects to 
be correlated with xit . In this model, zi a includes a constant term a and a group specific 
random variable which captures the variation across firms. The RE model is estimated using 
generalised least square procedures (GLS). 
The selection of the most appropriate model is made on the basis of two statistical tests. The 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests are used to choose between the 
pooled OLS model and the random effects model (Greene, 2003): 
The null hypothesis is that cross-sectional variance components are zero: 
:a2=0 or (Corr[77,,, 77is] = 0), HO u 
H: C 
2#0 
1u 
nT T2e, j The test statistic is: LM = 2(T - 1) 1 e'e 
1 
x2(l) 
where e- is the nxI vector of the group specific means of pooled regression residuals, and 
e9e square is the total sum square of errors (SSE) for the pooled 
OLS regression. Under the 
null hypothesis, LM is distributed as chi-squared with one 
degree of freedom. A large LM 
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test statistic supports the specification of the random effects model over the pooled OLS 
model. 
The Hausman (1978) specification test is used to select between the random effects model 
and fixed effects model. This test compares the fixed versus random effects under the null 
hypothesis that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model 
(Hausman 1978). The test is based on the idea that under the hypothesis of no correlation, 
both OLS in the LSDV model (fixed effects model) and GLS (random effects model) are 
consistent, but OLS is inefficient, whereas under the alternative, OLS is consistent, but GLS 
is not. Therefore, under the null hypothesis, the two estimates should not differ 
systematically, and a test can be based on the difference between the estimated covariance 
matrix of the parameter estimates in the fixed effects model (b ) and that of the random 
effects model (fl)(Greene, 2003): 
Var[b -, 6] = Var[b] - Var[, 6] 
The chi-squared test is based on the Wald criterion: 
W= ; r'[K - 1] = [b - -'[b - 
where is the estimated covariance matrices of the slope estimator in the LSDV model and 
the estimated covariance matrix in the random effects model, excluding the constant term. 
Under the null hypothesis, W has a limiting chi-squared distribution with K-I degrees of 
freedom. A large Hausman test statistic implies the fixed effects model is the better choice. 
3.1.1. Dependent variables (market-based measures of risk) 
We estimate the three capital-market measures of risk which were traditionally used 
in 
literature: namely, total risk, systematic risk and unsystematic risk 
(following Markowitz's, 
1952, framework to define these measures). The total risk of each bank (TOTALRISK) is the 
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annualised standard deviation of the weekly stock price returns, and it is comprised of two 
components: systematic risk (undiversifiable risk) and idiosyncratic risk or specific risk 
(SPECRISK). Two methods are used to estimate systematic risk. In the first method, 
systematic risk is estimated using the traditional static Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), which can be expressed as follows in equation (2): 
E(Rs) = rf + P,, [E(Rm) - rf ] 
where E(R s) is the 'expected return to investing in an risky asset S; E(R m) is the expected 
return of the market portfolio; rf is risk-free rate of return; P. = cov(R m, Rs)/ var(R m) is the 
systematic risk where cov(Rm, Rs)and var(Rm)are the covariance between the stock and 
market portfolio returns and variance of market returns, respectively. The estimated 
systematic risk, 6s (REGBETA) can be obtained using the OLS regression in equation (3): 
Rs, t = 
bo+ PsRm', +Ft (3) 
Systematic risk (REGBETA) is the value of beta for each bank relative to the market return 
and it is reported as an annualised value. The unsystematic or specific risk (SPECRISK) is 
calculated as the annualised standard deviation of errors from the market model. 
The static CAPM model in equation (3) has the limiting assumption of a constant variance 
(see Fama and French, 1992). This assumption is likely to be violated due to volatility 
clustering of asset returns. The introduction of the autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic 
model (ARCH) and generalised autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic model (GARCH) 
by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), respectively, have opened up new methodologies to 
estimate a dynamic time varying beta that overcomes the shortcoming of the static 
CAPM 
model (see Bollerslev et al., 1988; Harvey, 1989; and Shanken, 1990). 
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A second method of estimating systematic risk is to use the bivariate asymmetric 
VARMA(m, n)-GARCH(p, q)-M model. 12 This is a more sophisticated measure of risk since it 
accounts for the asymmetric effects that good and bad news has on the variance/covariance 
of returns. To capture the dynamic interaction between stock and market portfolio returns 
(causality in volatility), we specify the conditional mean equations of the model as a Vector 
Autoregressive Moving Average (VARMA) 13 process with conditional variance and 
covariance terms, which is written as follows in equation (4): 
y= 
Rm', 
_Rs, l 
] 
TI'S TI'SM 
LT2, 
S 
T2, 
&W 
Y=a+2: 6-jiYt-i+2: (D et -. d i -j+YVECH(Ht)+Et j=I 
-, M -M (Dm (Dm am j, M j's a 
's 
; (Dj= 
[a 
0-4 ; 7s (Ds s- _6-Ji, M -I i's -- JIM i's - 
Ti'm I 
61= 
[ Em't 
as, 
] 
where Y, is a2xI return vector at time t; "M" and "S" refers to "Market portfolio" and 
"individual bank stock". respectively; a is a2xI parameter vector of constant term; is a 
2x2 parameter vector of conditional return with i =1 .. n lags; (D, 
is a2x2 parameter vector 
of conditional innovation c with j= Lm lags; T is a2x3 parameter vector of conditional 
variance/covariance H; "VECH" is the column staking operator of lower triangular matrix; 
H, is 2x2 conditional variance, covariance matrix; 6, is 2xI innovation vector. 
Under the assumption E, 1 C2,1 - N(O, H, ), where Q, -, represents 
the innovation set at time 
t- I and 
H. = --I I-TT 
Hm, t 
Hms, t 
_ams, t 
Hs, t 
] 
CI t1 W-140 , JL ýc . 
12 The VARMA-GARCH model has been used in several studies, for instance, Comte and 
Lieberman (2000), 
Brooks and Henry (2002), and Ling and McAleer (2003). 
13 We use the Akaike (1974) and Schwarz (1978) information criteria 
to determine the optimal lag order of the 
VARMA(m, n) model (4) for each bank. 
ivia't O'L 
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Equation (4) can be estimated using maximum likelihood methods with the guarantee that 
Ht will be positive definite for all values oft, For estimation, we employ the asymmetric 
specification of the BEKK approach of Engle and Kroner (1995), see equation (5): 
where C., GII, AýI, 
Co, Co + Gl', H, 
-, 
G, I+A, 
', 
-, 
All +Dll)l, 
-17; -, 
Dll 
Co = 
C11 C12 
0 C22 C22 
12 11 a, 2 Gil =[g2" -g 
]; 
All = 
[a2l 
91 922 a a221 
DI, = 
dl, d 12 
; yt-, = 
ym, t-, 
]= [minfsm, 
ý-1,01 
[d2, 
d221 
[Ys, 
t-i min{ss, t-1301 
] 
(5) 
D, , are 2x2 parameter matrices of constant term, GARCH term, 
ARCH term, and asymmetric term, respectively. 
From equation (5), the time-varying systematic risk Ps', (BETA_VAR) for each bank at time 
t can easily be estimated as shown in equation (6): 
ps't = 
Hms, 
t 
Hm, 
t 
(6) 
where H ms't is the conditional covariance 
between the return to market portfolio, R m', , and 
the return to individual bank stocký Rs't ;Hm, t 
is the conditional variance of the return to the 
market portfolio. 
3.1.2. Independent variables (Accounting-based measures of risk) 
Our first independent variable is the Z-score. To the best of our knowledge, its relationship 
with capital market-based measures has not been investigated before. 
14 Following Hannan 
and Hanweck (1988) the Z-score is a measure of risk and is defined in equation 
(7) as: 
" The Z score indicator has been applied in studies of banking risk by several authors 
including Liang and 
Savage (1990), Ei senbeis and Kwast (199 1), Sinkey and Nash (1993), and Nash and Sinkey 
(1997). 
212 
Z score = 
RROA) + ETA 
(TROA 
(7) 
Where E(ROA) =a three-year moving window of the ratio of pre-tax profits to assets, ETA = 
the ratio of equity-to-total assets, andGROA =a three-year moving of the standard deviation 
of ROA. Nash and Sinkey (1997, p. 96) note the 'resultant Z statistic is a measure, expressed 
in units of standard deviations of ROA, of how much a bank's accounting earnings can 
decline until it has a negative book value. Intuitively, Z gauges the thickness of the book- 
value "cushion" a bank has available to absorb- accounting losses. Therefore, a lower Z 
implies a riskier banks; a higher Z implies a safer bank". 
We select five other accounting-based measures of bank risk. The first is ETA as defined 
above. We expect this variable to be inversely related to the market-based risk measures 
since a higher level of financial leverage (less equity) is positively associated with risk. A 
moral hazard interpretation implies that the owners of better capitalised banks have more to 
loose in the event of default and are more likely to behave prudently as a result. The natural 
logarithm of the standard deviation of customer deposits and short-term funding (InStdCSTF) 
shows the variability in banks' funding. Greater variability in the amount of short-term funds 
could cause liquidity problems and may require a bank to resort to high cost sources of 
funding which may destabilise bank earnings. We expect a positive relationship between this 
variable and market-based risk. The third independent variable is the ratio of liquid assets-to- 
total assets (LIQTA) and it is an indicator of bank liquidity which is very important in case of 
unexpected deposit withdrawals. It is interpreted as follows: a higher ratio reduces the risk of 
illiquidity implying that we expect a negative relationship with market risk. The fourth 
variable is loan growth (LOANGR) and it can be a proxy for credit risk. A large expansion of 
loan portfolio would lead to increase in credit risk exposure and therefore, this indicator is 
expected to be positively associated with market risk. 
15 The final variable is the ratio of loan 
loss reserves-to-total loans (LLRLOAN) and it is an indicator of credit risk. A higher ratio 
implies poorer asset quality and a higher degree of expected loss on the loan portfolio. 
Thus, 
" Loan growth has been used in several studies in EMEs, for instance, 
Laeven (1999), Bongini et al. (2001), 
and Rojas-Suarez (2001). 
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we expect a positive relationship with market risk. It should be noted that since this ratio 
reflects bank management's estimate exposure to credit risk it may not fully capture the 
degree of credit exposure of a loan portfolio especially for banks which have low risk 
management skills in emerging markets. 
Methodologies for predicting bank failures 
Methods for predicting bank failure began with the technique of multivariate regression with 
a dichotomous (0-1) dependent variable in a study of Meyer and Pifer (1970). Since then, 
various methodologies have been developed for the purpose, ranging from multivariate 
analysis techniques to more advance computer based mathematical programming approaches. 
In general, these techniques differ on whether there is an underlying assumption or not. 
Based on this criterion, there are two broadly approaches used to classify or predict bank 
failures, namely parametric approaches and non-parametric approaches. Parametric 
approaches impose some assumptions on variables used in the model whilst non-parametric 
approaches do not. This section reviews some of the main methodologies used by researchers 
and bank regulators. 
3.2.1. Parametric Approaches 
Parametric approaches are based on the theoretical relationship between dependence and 
independence variables as well as distributional assumptions of these variables. There are 
three main parametric approaches: discriminant analysis, conditional probability models, and 
survival analysis models. 16 
Discriminant Analysis (DA) is a technique used to separate distinct sets of observations and 
to allocate new observations into defined groups. For example, DA can be used to separate 
banks into "failed" and "sound" groups based on a classification function formed by a set of 
16 Some other multivariate analysis techniques such as factor analysis, cluster analysis 
(ftizzy clustering) and 
principal components analysis have been used in the bank failure predicting 
literature. However, we do not 
review these techniques here since their use is very limited. Readers 
interested in these methods are 
recommended to read Mirdle and Simar (2003). 
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bank accounting variables (predictor variables); and this function can then be used to classify 
new banks whose group membership is unknown. A discriminant function finds a transform 
which maximises the between group variance whilst minimising the within group variance 
(Davis, 1986). There are two forms of discriminant function: linear and quadratic. For the 
linear discriminant function, the variance-covariance matrices are assumed equal for all 
groups. When the variance-covariance matrices are not equal, the quadratic form should be 
used instead. In all cases, DA assumes that (1) the predictor variables are multivariate 
normally distributed; and (2) the dataset is dichotomous: groups are discrete, non- 
overlapping and identifiable. In fact, these assumptions, especially the (1), are often violated 
in practice (Deakin, 1976; Eisenbeis, 1977). In addition to the restrictive assumptions, DA 
has some other disadvantages. For example, it does not give the relative importance of 
predictor variables; although this approach can classify between failed and non-failed banks, 
it can not provide the probability of bank failure. Until the 1980s, the DA approach 
dominated the literature on bank predicting failure models (Sinkey, 1975,1977,1978; Rose 
and Scott, 1978; Pettway and Sinkey, 1980; Looney et al., 1989). After the 1980s, its use has 
declined; however, DA is still used as a "benchmark" technique for comparative purposes. 
Probability Models estimate the probability of bank failure conditional on a set 
of bank characteristic variables. The simplest technique is linear probability model. Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) assumes that the dependent dummy variable measuring the 
probability of default can be described by a linear combination of independent variables. It is 
essentially a simple regression with a dichotomous (0-1) dependent variable. LPM models 
suffered from various deficiencies such as non-normality of residuals, heteroscedasticity of 
residuals, the possibility that the estimates lie outside the 0-1 range, and generally lower R2 
values (Gujarati, 2003). Because of the problems with the linear probability model, 
alternative models called Binary Logit and Probit were developed and used widely since the 
late 1970s. In these models, the probability of bank failure is assumed to be a non-linear 
function of predictor variables; and the parameters are estimated based on maximum 
likelihood estimation technique rather than OLS. These models address the outside 
0-1 range 
problem faced by the LPM model. The major difference between the 
logit and probit models 
is that the logit models based on the cumulative logistic probability function which 
has a 
slightly fatter tail than that of the cumulative normal probability 
function of the probit model. 
215 
Overall, the two models give qualitatively similar results, and therefore, in practice, most 
researchers choose the logit model because of its comparative mathematical simplicity 
(Gujarati, 2003). 
Logit and probit models are preferable to DA because of the superior statistical properties 
which can provide significance tests for coefficient estimates as well as overall classification, 
such as t-test, log likelihood ratio test and the Pseudo-R square for the goodness of fit. Both 
models allows for a direct assessment of hypotheses regarding how the default probability is 
affected by independent variables, which is not available in DA. In addition, these models 
avoid the restrictive assumption of DA approach regarding independent variables. However, 
these approaches are not free from drawbacks. For example, they are also sensitive to 
outliers, missing values and the multicollinearity problem. Another drawback is that these 
models only allow for 2 states of financial distress (failed or non-failed) whilst there are more 
states of financial distress in reality. This problem is then addressed by the Multinomial 
Logit Model developed in the late 1980. Multinomial logit model can capture more states, 
reflecting the continuum of the bank financial health such as "sound", "crisis" and "failed". 
As an extension of the binary logit model, MLM is also estimated using maximum likelihood 
techniques; and it has most advantages as well as disadvantages of the binary logit model. In 
bank failure literature, MLM model has only been used recently by DeYoung (2003) and Bae 
et al. (2003). 
Survival Analysis, also known as duration analysis, is referred to statistical methods for 
analysing survival time or time-to-failure events. The main advantage of this approach is the 
ability to estimate probable time to failure, in addition to failure probabilities. Survival 
analysis is widely used in biosciences, medicine and also in finance and other social sciences. 
Two models have been used in analysing bank failure are the Cox's Proportional Hazards 
Model and Split-Population Survival-Time Model. 
Cox's Proportional Hazards Model (CPH), developed by Cox (1972), specifies a survivor 
function that can be used to estimate an individual bank's likely time to failure. 
This model is 
a semi-parametric model since it does not base on any assumptions concerning 
the nature or 
shape of the underlying survival distribution; but it does assumes that there 
is a log-linear 
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relationship between the predictor variables and the underlying survivor function. This model 
also suffers from some potentially shortcomings. In particular, it assumes that the effects of 
the predictor variables are constant over time which is likely to be violated in practice. In 
addition, the estimation of the PHM requires data on the time to failure as dependent 
variable. However, bank failures often represent regulatory decision rather than due to 
economic insolvency (Whalen, 199 1). For example, a bank may have been effectively 
insolvent long before the closure decision; or this bank may later be rescued by the 
government rather than being closed as in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Incorrect 
identifying failure time can significantly affect the coefficients and classification accuracy of 
the CPH model. Another major shortcoming the CPH model being that this model implicitly 
assumes all banks eventually fail and, thus, it can not differentiate between the determinants 
of bank failure and the factors influencing the timing of failure (Cole and Gunther, 1995). 
Schmidt and Witte (1989) developed the Split-Population Survival-Time Model (SPST) to 
address the shortcoming of CPH. This model allows the determinants of failure to differ from 
the determinants of survival time by splitting the bank population into two groups: failures 
and survivors. Overall, SPST technique is quite similar with CPH approach; the parameters 
are also estimated based on the maximum likelihood techniques. However, like the binary 
logit and probit models, both CPH and SPST models do not allow researchers to analyse 
more than two states of financial distress. 
With regard to performance of these survival analysis models, CPH is found to be slightly 
more accurate than discriminant analysis (Lane et al., 1986), whereas SPST model provides 
similar results to those obtained from the binary logit model (Cole and Gunther, 1995). 
3.2.2. Non-parametric Approaches 
Recent developments in computer science and artificial intelligence have produced a new 
class of prediction modelling techniques. These approaches are computer-intensive processes 
which based on human thought process to classify banks 
into different groups. These 
techniques are non-parametric because they do not specify any relationship 
between 
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independent and dependent variables; and no assumption of probability distribution is made 
for these variables. Here, we will introduce the two main approaches: Neural Network (NN) 
and Trait Recognition (TR). 
Neural Networks (or Artificial Neural Networks) found its ways to bankruptcy prediction in 
the early 1990s (Tam, 1991; Tam and Kiang, 1992). Since then, the research on and using 
Neural Networks have been increasing continuously. Neural Networks are machine learning 
techniques constructed to process information similar to the human thought process (learn by 
experience) 17 . The user first trains NN to "learn" the complex relationships between input 
variables and predicted outputs; and then this "experience" will be applied for new data that 
it had not seen before. NN have several advantages over the parametric models (Swicegood 
and Clark, 200 1). First, they are well suited for solving nonlinear problems; no distributional 
assumptions of the data need to be made. Second, this approach can handle both noisy and 
incomplete data. Finally, NN have the ability to adjust easily to a rapidly changing 
environment (Tam, 199 1; Tam and Kiang, 1992). However, NN also have some serious 
drawbacks. NN are often called "black boxes" since they do not reveal the interactions of 
variables as well as the individual role of each independent variable in determining 
probability of bank failure. Coefficient estimates from NN do not have theoretical 
interpretation. Furthermore, some choices regarding technical information of the model need 
to be decided by the users, which is ad hoc in nature. Different choices can lead to different 
classification results. 
Trait Recognition JR) was originally developed to use in the hard sciences such as 
predicting earthquakes and the location of oil and uranium fields. In recent years this method 
has been applied in predicting bank failures and found to perform better than the binary logit 
model (Kolari et al., 1996; Kolari et al., 2002). TR is closely associated with Neural 
Networks. Like NN, TR also seeks to exploit information contained in complex interactions 
of the independent variables (known as traits) that are useful in classifying 
failed and non- 
failed banks. However, this model has an important advantage over the Neural Networks. In 
NN, variable interactions are contained in a "black box" that cannot 
be observed, whereas TR 
17 See Haykin (1999) for details of various types of neural networks developed in the literature. 
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documents all these variable interactions. Apart from this advantage, TR also suffers from 
some other shortfalls faced by NN. For example, this method also requires considerable 
hands-on manipulation by the users. It demands researchers to perform a number of 
intermediate steps and making different ad hoc choices. In addition, there is no measure to 
test the importance of independence variables in the model. 
All in all, parametric and non-parametric approaches both have advantages and 
disadvantages when they are to apply in modelling bank failures. The advantages of non- 
parametric approaches are often the disadvantages of non-parametric approaches and vice 
versa. Non-parametric approaches avoid the dependence on distributional assumptions of 
data. However, these approaches provide no theoretical information on the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. In addition, non-parametric approaches 
demand considerable hands-on manipulation by the researchers, which is ad hoc in nature. 
Therefore, if the main purpose is to purely classify or predicting bank failures then non- 
parametric approaches are preferable since they are often found to be more than or at least as 
accurate as parametric approaches. However, if the focus of the analyses is on which or how 
different factors affect the probability of bank failures, the parametric approaches are more 
appropriate due to the underlying theoretical relationship with independent variables and 
their statistical measures of variables' significance. Because our study focuses on the latter, 
parametric approaches will be applied in our study. Furthermore, because we deal with more 
than two states of financial distress, the multinomial logit model is our preferred model 
because it addresses many shortcomings of the DA model. The multinomial logit model will 
be further described in the next section. 
3.2.3. Multinomial Logit model 
The restructuring process in the aftermath of the Asian crisis 1997 
has led to three possible 
outcomes (or states) for a bank: healthy, restructured or exiting. 
Banks in different states may 
have different characteristics and behaviours which lead them to that particular outcome. 
To 
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capture these three different economic outcomes we utilise multinomial logit model. The 
multinomial logit model is an extension of binary logit model, it can be thought of as 
simultaneously estimating binary logits for all comparisons among the dependent categories. 
This model assumes that the three outcomes are nominal or unordered. 
The general form of the multinomial logit model is: 
In(D 
lib(x) = 
In Pr(y =m1 x) = xßmlb for m=0 to J Pr(y =b1 x) 
Where b is the base category, which is also referred to as the comparison group; m=0,1,2, 
corresponds to three outcomes: healthy, restructured or exiting, respectively; and x is a vector 
of exogenous variables (characteristics) that influence bank outcomes. Since 
In(Dbjb(x) = In I=0, it must hold that Alb =0 (the log odds of an outcome compare to itself 
is always 0). This model is estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. Equation (8) can 
be solved to compute the predicted probabilities: 
Pr(y =m1 x) = 
exp(Xß .. lb) 
li exp(Xßjlb) 
j=I 
(9) 
It should be noted that the predicted probability for each outcome will be the same regardless 
of the base category. 
Specification tests 
In order to employ multinomial logit model, two main specification tests will be carried out 
including independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) test and tests for combining dependent 
categories. 
First, multinomial logit model make the assumption known as the 
independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) which means that the odds in equation (8) 
do not depend on other outcomes 
that are available. That is to say, adding or deleting outcomes 
does not affect the odds among 
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the remaining outcomes. We use Hausman type test of the IIA assumption, proposed by 
Hausman and McFadden (1984). 18 If the IIA assumption is rejected - that is, the test statistic 
is significant - the multinomial logit model is inappropriate. The Hausman test of IIA 
involves the following steps (Long, 1997): 
1. Estimate the full model with all J outcomes included, with estimates 'nBF 
2. Estimate a restricted model by eliminating one or more outcome categories, with 
estimates in 18R. 
3. Let 6F be a subset of 8, after eliminating coefficients not estimated in the restricted 
model. 
The test statistic is: H= 
OR 
-, 8*F)'[Var(, 8R) - 
Var(ft*F)]-I( 
F) J8R 
where H is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the 
rows in 8R if IIA is true. Significant values of H indicate that the IIA assumption has 
been violated. 
The second specification test is test for combining outcome (dependent) categories. We use 
likelihood-ratio (LR) test to test if two outcomes are indistinguishable with respect to the 
variables in the model, the null hypothesis is: 19 
r-T- 
... : )6k, m\n '4U: A, M\n 
ý-.. 
An LR test of combining outcome m and outcome n can be computed by first estimating the 
full model with no constraints, "rith the resulting LR statistic LR' . Then estimate a restricted F 
model in which category m is used as the base category and all the coefficients except the 
constant in the equation for category n are constrained to 0, with the resulting test 
statistic LR'. The test statistic is the difference LR' LR' - LR', which is distributed as R Rv. YF FR 
chi-squared with K degrees of freedom (Long, 1997). 
" Details of testing procedures for Hausman type test of the IIA can be found in Hausman and 
McFadden 
(1984); and Long (1997). 
19 Test for combining outcome categories can also be carried out using Wald test. 
However, LR test is generally 
considered superior; therefore we will report LR test results only. 
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4. Data 
We select a sample of 55 listed commercial banks from SE Asia (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand) and analyse the period from 1991 to 2004. The bank financial 
statements data are sourced from Williams and Nguyen (2005) with some updates to 2004. 
These data were originally sourced from the BankScope and IBCA databases whilst the 
capital market data, including banks' weekly stock price and the stock market indices of the 
five countries, were obtained from DataStream. We chose weekly data to overcome the 
problem of calendar effects and thin trading in emerging stock markets. The sample is split 
into two time periods; 1991-1997, and 1998-2004. Our intention is to see if the relationship 
between accounting-based and market-based measures of banking risk is time-varying. The 
sample of banks is balanced over 1991-1997 but unbalanced over 1998-2004 because some 
banks were delisted due to nationalisation and/or acquisition by foreign banks who delisted 
the shares. 
The banks are classified as healthy, restructured, or exiting. Healthy banks are institutions 
that either did not require financial assistance from government or they carried out private 
recapitalisation strategies via the capital market. Restructured banks required significant 
assistance from goverriment, for instance, a capital injection (via a policy of bank 
nationalisation, cleansing, and eventual privatisation), or the transfer of bad assets to 
healthier banks or state-owned asset management companies. Exiting banks are unviable 
banks which were closed down either during or soon after the crisis. The exit category also 
includes banks absorbed by healthier banks. Of the 55 listed banks, 19 banks are identified as 
healthy, 21 restructured, and 15 exiting. 
Table I shows the descriptive statistics for the 55 banks in each sub-period and across the 
complete interval. The data are broken down into sub-samples; healthy banks 
(0), 
restructured banks (1) and exiting banks (2). Data for the exiting banks are only available 
before the crisis. During 1991-1997, on average, healthy banks are less risky than 
restructured banks and, particularly, exiting banks: healthy banks achieve 
lower levels of 
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total risk, specific risk and systematic risk. On the contrary and according to expectation, 
exiting banks have the highest levels of total risk and specific risk although restructured 
banks have the highest level of systematic risk. Generally, the average level of risk is greater 
in 1998-2004 compared with 1991-1997, and for healthy banks and restructured banks. 
However, we note that whereas systematic risk estimated by the VARMA-GARCH model 
(BETA_VAR) increases over time, the estimate from the static CAPM model decreases 
(REGBETA). 
Over 1991-1997 and with regard to accounting-based measures, healthy banks appear to be 
much safer (higher Z score), better capitalised (higher ETA), more stable in sources of 
funding (lower LnStdCSTF), exhibit lower liquidity risk (higher LIQTA), and have higher 
growth of loans (LOANGR) compared with restructured banks and exiting banks. Whilst 
exiting banks have the highest credit risk levels (LLRLOAN) and lowest levels of safety (Z 
score), restructured banks appear poorest in capitalisation, liquidity risk, and stability of 
sources of funding. In 1998-2004, healthy banks and restructured banks appear less safe, 
report considerably lower loan growth, and have considerably higher levels of credit risk. 
Whereas healthy banks are slightly better capitalised after 1998, the standard deviation of 
bank capitalisation is much greater following the crisis in the restructured bank cohort. For 
the latter, there is a noticeable increase in average liquidity which is unsurprising given the 
bank restructuring initiatives in place in the region. 
Table 2 shows the correlation across and between the accounting-based measures and the 
market-based measures from 1991 to 2004. Across the market-based measures of risk, total 
risk (TOTALRISK) is significantly correlated with specific risk (SPECRISK) and systematic 
risk (REGBETA and BETA_VAR). The correlation of specific risk and systematic risk is 
sensitive to the method of estimating the latter. Only BETA_VAR is significantly (and 
positively) correlated with specific risk. 
The correlations between the accounting-based and market-based measures of risk generally 
show the expected signs, particularly the ZSCORE and ETA which are strongly and 
significantly correlated with the market-based measures of risk 
(with the exception of the 
correlation between ZSCORE and REGBETA). Among other accounting variables, 
liquidity 
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risk (LIQTA) and loan growth (LOANGR) are significantly correlated with total risk 
(TOTALRISK) and with the expected sign. The stability of funding (LnStdCSTF) is 
significantly correlated with specific risk (but with an unexpected sign) and systematic risk 
(both REGBETA and BETA 
- 
VAR with the expected sign). Interestingly, asset quality 
(LLRLOAN) is not significantly correlated with each of the market-based measures of risk. 
Finally, the correlations among accounting variables generally are weak and not significant - 
except the case between LIQTA and LOANGR - which reduces potential multicollinearity 
problems. 20 
20 In fact, at the beginning we include some other accounting measures of risk such as 
total loans-to-total 
deposits and public securities-to-total assets. However, because they are significantly correlated 
with other 
accounting variables we exclude them from this study to avoid the multicol 
linearity problem. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, 1991-1997; 1998-2004' 
Variable StatuSb N' 
TOTALRISK (%) 
SPECRISK (0/o) 
REGBETA(%) 
BETA_VAle (%) 
Z score 
ETA (%) 
LnStdCSTF 
LIQTA (%) 
LOANGR(%) 
LLRLOAN (/o) 
Mean 
0 266 2.43 (4.12) 
1 273 2.65 (5.73) 
2 105 2.84 
0 266 2.00 (3.21) 
1 273 2.04 (4.91) 
2 105 2.43 
0 266 0.66 (0.76) 
1 273 0.96 (0.89) 
2 105 0.81 
0 266 0.69 (0.81) 
1 273 0.92 (0.96) 
2 105 0.88 
0 266 43.15 (25.85) 
1 273 23.49 (3.82) 
2 105 19.52 
0 266 9.56 (9.70) 
1 273 7.49 (-4.47) 
2 105 8.81 
0 266 6.07 (6.27) 
1 273 6.52 (7.03) 
2 105 6.31 
0 266 23.07 (22.99) 
1 273 18.22 (24.33) 
2 105 20.65 
0 266 18.12 (8.63) 
1 273 15.68 (-6.50) 
2 105 15.34 
0 266 2.67 (6.24) 
1 273 2.25 (14.96) 
2 105 2.82 
StDev 
1.45 (2.06) 
0.99 (2.26) 
1.54 
1.44 (1.92) 
0.85 (2.33) 
1.59 
0.51 (0.57) 
0.48 (0.43)_ 
0.43 
0.41 (0.42) 
0.35 (0.40) 
0.42 
29.08 (27.46) 
14.36 (17.50) 
11.65 
3.20 (5.44) 
2.96 (28.12) 
3.29 
1.52 (1.39) 
1.37 (1.35) 
1.41 
10.92 (10.23) 
9.46 (11.25) 
11.66 
37.97 (26.30) 
34.72 (38.63) 
18.10 
1.49 (3.67) 
1.93 (14.96) 
4.05 
Minimum Maximum 
0.07 (1.32) 8.56 (10.65) 
0.22 (0.03) 5.45 (11.14) 
0.69 12.91 
0.07 (1.09) 8.27 (10.61) 
0.23 (0.03) 4.71 (11-00) 
0.69 12.72 
-0.57 (-0.75) 2.09 (1.68) 
-0.91 (0.00) 2.63 (1.75) 
-0.11 1.99 
-0.03 (-0.07) 1.34 (1.51) 
0.04 (0.00) 1.77 (1.59) 
0.05 2.40 
11.53 (1.64) 180.28 (129.8) 
-5.04 (-69.2) 87.60 (74.47) 
-0.90 89.07 
3.93 (2.65) 17.74 (25.35) 
-4.24 (-126) 19.80 (11.17) 
-2.54 17.22 
2.38 (2.25) 9.04 (8.72) 
3.38 (3.78) 9.55 (9.40) 
2.65 9.06 
4.93 (7.38) 59.89 (57.86) 
4.39 (10.60) 46.42 (59.10) 
3.94 80.03 
-63.24 (-33.5) 177.92 (97.38) 
-74.95 (-82.4) 241.01 (113.4) 
-60.61 61.85 
0.72 (2.11) 10.95 (19.96) 
0.63 (2.10) 17.45 (60.25) 
0.29 34.21 
Notes: a, Data for the period 1998-2004 are in the parentheses and 
there are no data for 
exiting banks in this period. b, Healthy=O, Restructured=l, 
Exiting =2. c, Observations for 
the whole period 1991-2004. d, BETA - 
VAR of 34 banks out of 55 banks were estimated 
from VARMA(2, I)-GARCH(l, 1) model. For other banks, the optimal lags in VARMA vary 
and were determined using the Akaike information criterion. 
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5. Empirical Results 
This section provides the empirical results. We first discuss the relationship between 
accounting-based and market-based measures of risk. To see how this relationship has 
changed over time, we consider it in the context of before the 1997 crisis, after the 1997 
crisis and for the whole period 1991-2004. We then examine the capability of the accounting- 
based measures of risk in predicting bank failures and distresses caused by the 1997 financial 
crisis. 
5.1. The relationship between accounting-based and market- 
based measures of risk 
Equation [1] is estimated using pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects methods. It is 
estimated for the full time period (1991-2004) and the two sub-periods (1991-1997; 1998- 
2004), and for each classification of bank (healthy; restructured; exiting). The Breusch-Pagan 
LM tests select the random effects models over OLS whilst the Hausman tests select the 
random effects models over the fixed effects. 
5.1.1. General relationship for the full period, 1991-2004 
The estimates of equation [ I] for the 55 banks are shown in Table 3. Three of the accounting- 
based measures enter the models for market-based risk significantly. Safer banks (those 
banks with a larger Z score) have significantly lower total risk (TOTALRISK) and systematic 
risk - but only when systematic risk is estimated using the 
VARMA-GARCH model. This 
suggests that regulators should consider more flexible and sophisticated measurement 
techniques which can distinguish the effects of good and bad news. As expected, better 
capitalised banks (higher ETA) have significantly lower market-based risks, particularly total 
risk and systematic risk (BETA_VAR). Similarly, the variability of customer 
deposits 
(InStdCSTF) is positively related to all market-based risk measures though the relationships 
are stronger with total risk and systematic risk (BETA 
- 
VAR). Finally, banks with lower 
liquidity risk (higher LIQTA) are associated with lower levels of total risk. Surprisingly, 
there is no significant relationship between market-based measures of risk and both the 
growth of loans (LOANGR) and credit risk (LLRLOAN). 
Table 3: Market-based Risk and Accounting-based Measures, 1991-2004 
ETA 
LnStdCSTF 
LIQTA 
LOANGR 
LLRLOAN 
Constant 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test 
Hausman Test, 
Observations 
-0-017* 
(0.007) 
-0.053** 
(0.011) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.045* 
(0.021) 
0.015 
(0.046) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.023* 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.04* 
(0.020) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.026) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.013* 
(0.018) 
26.65** 22.65** 
4.55 3.76 
644 644 
REGBETA 
-0.0167 
(0.013) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.0093 
(0.011) 
0.0109 
(0.018) 
-0.0345 
(0.029) 
0.0257** 
(0.007) 
22.65** 
5.42 
644 
BETA_VAR 
-0.0315* 
(0.012) 
-0.012** 
(0.003) 
0.0056** 
(0.002) 
0.0075 
(0.021) 
0.0114 
(0.010) 
-0.0244 
(0.019) 
0.0316** 
(0.009) 
20.65** 
5.65 
644 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are reported for random effects models. 
**9* statistically significant at the I% and 5% levels, respectively. 
Before financial crisis relationship, 1991-1997 
In this section we are able to discuss exiting banks in addition to healthy and restructured 
banks (see Table 4a and Table 4b). The results show there are more significant relationships 
between total risk, specific risk and the accounting-based measures for exiting banks 
compared to restructured banks and healthy banks. For both exiting and restructured 
banks, 
the Z score has the expected negative and significant relationships with total risk and specific 
risk. Similarly, equity capital (ETA) is a good predictor of total risk and specific risk 
for 
exiting and restructured banks but not for healthy banks. While 
both variation in short-term 
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funding (LnStdCSTF) and liquidity risk (LIQTA) can explain total risk for exiting and 
restructured banks, only LIQTA can also explain specific risk of exiting banks. Finally, for 
exiting banks, lower loan loss reserve (LLRLOAN) is associated with higher levels of all 
market-based risk measures (total risk, specific risk and systematic risk). This result is in line 
with the finding of Elyasiani and Mansur (2005) for Japanese banks. Elyasiani and Mansur 
report an inverse relationship between that market beta of Japanese banks and provision for 
loan losses in the period from 1986 to 1996. These results seem to contrast with the normal 
wisdom of loan loss reserve, however, they are unsurprising for Asian banks because before 
the financial crisis 1997 loan classification and provisioning regulations in these countries, 
including Japan, were far from international best practice. 21 As a result, SE Asian banks, 
particularly for lacking risk management skills, often underestimated the true level of 
problem loans. Healthier banks with better internal credit rating systems set aside more 
provision for loan losses. 
Table 4a: Total Risk, Specific Risk and Accounting-based Measures, 1991-1997 
Total Risk Specific Risk 
Healthy Res Exiting 
_ 
Healthy Res Exiting 
ZSCORE -0.037* -0.022** -0.038** -0.005 
_ -0.017** -0.044** 
(0.017) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) 
ETA 0.018 -0.104* -0.294** 0.081 -0.107** -0.264** 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.062) (0.052) (0.035) (0.063) 
LnStdCSTF 0.060 0.034** 0.04* -0.050 0.015 -0.358 
(0.107) (0.010) (0.018) (0.112) (0.067) (0.184) 
LIQTA -0.007 -0.019* -0.025* -0.004 0.004 -0.032* 
(0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) 
LOANGR 0.013 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.005 
(0.347) (0.024) (0.007) (0.003) (0.019) (0.007) 
LLRLOAN 0.034 -0.053 -0.129** -0.047 -0.037 -0.152** 
(0.094) (0.051) (0.041) (0.089) (0.043) (0.040) 
Constant 2.011** 3.758** 4.366** 3.928** 2.75** 6.273 
(0.610) (0.673) (1.053) (1.117) (0.574) (1.276) 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test 6.39* 6.15* 12.90** 7.08* 12.23** 13.40** 
Hausman Test, ;r2 (5) 8.07 7.62 7.96 7.10 6.76 7.10 
Observations 133 147 105 133 147 105 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are reported for random effects models. 
**5 * statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
21 Only in the aftermath of the financial crisis 1997, did SE Asian countries, 
including Japan, started to adopt 
loan classification and provisioning rules similar to the international standards 
(see Appendix I and Fukao, 
2002). 
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The analysis is repeated for systematic risk and the results are reported in Table 4b. A 
different pattern of relationships is observed for systematic risk. The accounting variables are 
more significant related to the BETA 
- 
VAR estimate of systematic risk compared with the 
static REGBETA estimate. For instance, the safety indicator (Z score) is significantly 
associated with the BETA 
- 
VAR estimate of systematic risk (for restructured and exiting 
banks). While the variation in short-term funding (InStdCSTF) is significantly associated 
with BETA_VAR for both healthy and restructured banks, the static estimate, REGBETA, is 
significant for healthy banks only. Similarly, liquidity risk is a good predictor for the 
BETA_VAR estimate of systematic risk for exiting banks whereas it is'not significantly 
related with REGBETA. Finally, when REGBETA is dependent variable, loan growth 
(LOANGR) enters the healthy equation and exiting equation significantly but with the 
unexpected signs. Thus far, the results confirm that the BETA 
- 
VAR estimate of systematic 
risk yields relationships with accounting-based measures that are more consistent with 
theoretical predictions than those of the static model. 
Table 4b: Systematic Risk and Accounting-based Measures, 1991-1997 
RIEGBETA BETA VAR 
Healthy Res Exiting Healthy Res Exiting 
ZSCORE 0.007 -0.002 -0.009 0.003 -0.004* -0.011 
(0.011) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) 
ETA -0.028* -0.034* -0.024 -0.036** -0.032** -0.035* 
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) 
LnStdCSTF 0.073* 0.062 0.010 0.037* 0.041 * 0.011 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.051) (0.018) (0.018) (0.047) 
LIQTA 0.004 -0.002 -0.017 -0.004 -0.002 -0.013* 
(0.005) (0.055) (0.019) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
LOANGR -0.002* -0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
LLRLOAN -0.0025 -0.012 -0.035* -0.002 -0.0188* -0.043** 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.011) (0.015) (0.009) (0.01) 
Constant -0.196 0.782 0.834* 0.401 
* 0.692 0.911** 
(0.293) (0.291) (0.353) (0.199) (0.186) (0.303) 
Breusch-Pagan LM Test 19.36** 23.29** 8.45* 28.71 17.14** 13.52** 
Hausman Test, 2 (5) 11.50 5.20 7.15 10.23 4.03 2.83 
Observations 133 147 105 133 147 105 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are reported for random effects models. 
**ý * statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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After financial crisis relationship, 1998-2004 
Table 5 presents the results for healthy and restructured banks over the period from 1998 to 
2004. Over time we observe that there are similar relationships between the measures. 
Therefore, we concentrate our discussion on important differences. ETA becomes a more 
significant covariate of market-based risk in 1998-2004. It is significantly related to each 
type of market-based risk and for healthy and restructured banks (with the exception of 
BETAREG for healthy banks). In terms of total risk, LIQTA loses significance for 
restructured banks, whilst the ZSCORE becomes a significant predictor of specific risk for 
healthy banks. Focusing on the BETA_VAR estimate of systematic risk, the ZSCORE and 
LIQTA become significant for healthy banks whilst the significance of the variation in 
customer deposits (LnStdCSTF) increases. Each accounting variable enters the model with 
the expected sign. 
Finally, and most importantly, this period experienced a significant change in the relationship 
between loan loss reserve ratio (LLRLOAN) and capital market-based measures of risk. The 
covariates of LLRLOAN shift from negative to positive in most of the models. For 
restructured banks, the higher loan loss reserve ratio is associated with higher levels of total 
risk and systematic risk (but only when systematic risk is estimated using the VARMA- 
GARCH model). This result is more consistent with the previous findings in the US 
(Jahankhani and Lynge, 1980; Hassan, 1993), where a high level of loan loss reserve truly 
represents high level of risk. The change in the relationship between loan loss reserve ratio 
and capital market-based measures of risk reflects the sizable efforts of the government 
authorities in strengthening loan classification regulations, providing a more transparent view 
of classified and nonperforming assets in post-crisis period. 
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Table 5: Market-based Risk and Accounting-based Measures, 1998-2004 
TOTALRISK 
Healthy Res 
SPECRISK 
Healthy Res 
REGBETA 
Healthy Res 
BETA 
Heathy _VAR Res 
ZSCORE -0.007* -0.025** -0.005* -0.023** -0.002 0.001 -0.009* -0.001 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) 
ETA -0.145** -0.032* -0.079* -0.024* -0.015 -0.006* -0.017** -0.004** 
(0.036) (0.013) (0.040) (0.012) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) 
LnStdCSTF 0.136 0.118 -0.122 0.063 0.101* -0.013 0.079** 
0-010* 
(0.201) (0.160) (0.145) (0.156) (0.040) (0.034) (0.027) (0.005) 
LIQTA -0.003 0.004 0.013 0.015 -0.013* -0.003 -0.009** 
0.001 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
LOANGR -0.004 -0.010 0.001 -0.011 -0.005* 
0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0-001) 
LLRLOAN 0.031 0.023* 0.029 0.009 -0.010 -0.011 0.006 
0.004* 
(0.048) (0.012) (0.041) (0.027) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.002) 
Constant 4.35** 4.54** 3.733** 3.808** 0.798** 1.277** 0.740** 
0.983** 
(1.291) (1.312) (1.128) (1.273) (0.307) (0.283) (0.211) (0.190) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 9.18* 10.34** 12.32** 9.34* 25.83** 25.72** 16.98** 17.92* 
Hausman Test, X2 (5) 7.84 7.15 8.65 8.64 6.55 3.14 7.67 
4.41 
Observations 1133 126 - - 
126_ 133 126 133 126 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are reported 
for random effects models. 
* *) * statistically significant at the I% and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
5.2. Multinomial Logit model of Bank Status, 1991-1997 
This section reports results from estimating 
the multinomial logit model. We first report 
two 
specification tests results and then analyse 
the determinants of bank failure and distress. 
Finally the results from predicting bank 
failure and distress are presented. The purpose of 
this 
exercise is to understand how changes in accounting 
measures of risk affect the probability of 
a bank belonging to either the 
healthy, restructured, or exiting groups 
for the pre-crisis period 
1991 to 1997. 
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Table 6 reports the Hausman tests of independence of irrelevant alternatives (11A) 
assumption. The results show that none of the tests reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds. 
Table 6: Hausman Tests of IIA Assumption* 
Omitted 
Restructured 
Exiting 
Healthy 
Degree 
P-value Evidence freedom 
2.233 
3.321 
-9.191 
7 
7 
0.946 
0.854 
1 
for Ho 
for Ho 
for Ho 
Notes: 
* Test Ho: Odds (Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
The negative result for healthy group is also the evidence that IIA has not been 
violated (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). 
Table 7 shows the Likelihood-ratio test results for combining outcome categories. With six 
degree of freedoms, all the tests reject the null hypotheses that alternative outcome categories 
can be combined. It should be noted, however, that ;r2 of test for combining restructured and 
exiting banks is 42.2 which is only a half of the two other tests between healthy bank group 
and other bank groups (88.3). These results suggest that the healthy bank group was distinct 
from restructured and exiting bank groups. On the other hand, restructuring and exiting banks 
group were closer to each other, they have similar features. 
Table 7: Likelihood-ratio Test for Combining Outcome Categories* 
Alternatives tested x 
Degree P-value Evidence 
freedom 
Restructured - Exiting 42.225 60 against 
Ho 
Restructured - Healthy 87.189 60 against 
Ho 
Exiting - Healthy 88.324 
60 against Ho 
Notes: *Test Ho: Alternative outcome categories can be combined. 
Table 8 reports the parameter estimates from the multinomial logit model 
for the sample of 
banks from 1991 to 1997. The healthy banks are the comparison group and observations 
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therefore take the value of zero whilst observations of restructured and exiting banks take the 
values of unity and two, respectively. 
Table 8: Multinomial Logit Parameter Estimates, 1991-1997 22 
Restructured Banks 
ZSCORE 
ETA 
LNSTDCSTF 
LIQTA 
LOANGR 
LLRLOAN 
CONSTANT 
Exiting Banks 
Coefficient (c) Standard Error %X %Std X 
-0.045** 
-0.159* 
0.101* 
-0.034* 
-0.002 
-0.186** 
3.289* * 
0.009 
0.053 
0.041 
0.014 
0.004 
0.070 
1.004 
-4.5 
-14.8 
10.6 
-3.2 
-0.2 
-17.0 
-64.4 
-40.6 
15.7 
-31.4 
-5.5 
-38.2 
ZSCORE -0.081** 0.013 -7.8 -84.0 
ETA -0.083* 0.040 -7.9 -23.2 
LNSTDCSTF 0.073* 0.036 7.5 10.0 
LIQTA -0.042** 0.014 -4.6 -52.9 
LOANGR 0.000 0.005 0.0 0.5 
LLRLOAN -0.097* 0.047 -9.3 -22.2 
CONSTANT 4.617** 1.079 
Log Likelihood -342.22 
Pseudo R-square 0.62 
Observations 385 
Notes: 
Healthy bank group is the base outcome. 
I/oX = exp(c) = percent change in odds for unit increase in independent variable X. 
%Std X= exp(c*SD of X) = percent change in odds for Std. Dev increase in 
independent variable X. 
Odds express the likelihood of occurrence relative to the likelihood of non-occurrence 
(i. e. the ratio of the proportions of the two possible outcomes: odds = event's 
probability/(I - event's probability). 
**ý * statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
22 Estimated using Stata 8.0 and SPost (Post-estimation with Stata of J. Scott Long, available 
at http: //www. indiana. edu/-jslsoc/spost-install. htm). 
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In general, the results from estimating MLM support our previous findings on the 
relationship between accounting measures of risk and capital market-based measures for the 
period 1991-1997. More specifically, all the accounting measures of risk, except loan growth 
(LOANGR), are significant in explaining exiting and restructured banks. As expected, 
increases in the safety index (Z score), equity capital (ETA), liquidity (LIQTA) and decrease 
in instability of funding (LNSTDCSTF) make a bank more likely to become a healthy bank 
rather than restructured or exiting bank. The safety index (Z score) and equity capital (ETA) 
are among the most important determinants classifying a bank as healthy, restructured or 
exiting. For instance, with every one standard deviation decline in the safety index, the odds 
of being a restructured bank or exiting bank rather than healthy bank increase by 64% and 
84%, respectively, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, for every decrease in 
equity capital, the odds of being in either the restructured or exiting bank groups increase 
14.8% and 7.9%. respectively, holding all other variables constant. These results suggest that 
the exiting banks and particularly restructured banks had capital inadequacy problems. In 
addition, the liquidity risk indicator (LIQTA) is also a good indicator for bank distress 
classification. For every one standard deviation decrease in the liquidity indicator (LIQTA), 
the odds of being in restructured or exiting bank groups increase by 31.4% and 52.9%, 
respectively, holding all other variables constant. These results indicate that exiting banks 
during period of 1991-1997 had serious liquidity problems. 
Loan loss reserve to total loans (LLRLOAN) is another factor which appears to determine 
bank status. Increases in loan loss reserves make a bank more likely to become a healthy 
bank rather than a restructured bank or exiting bank. These results largely support our 
previous finding regarding the inverse relationship between LLRLOAN and capital market- 
based measures of risk in the pre-crisis period. The reason is similar. Healthy banks might be 
better at evaluating their loan portfolios compared with restructured and exiting banks. As a 
result, they put aside more reserves than restructured and exiting banks did, and this 
has 
helped them to remain healthy. Due to the lack of credit risk management skills, the exiting 
and restructured banks ran into difficulties as the crisis erupted 
in 1997. In fact, problem 
loans of both exiting banks and restructured banks increased sharply 
during the crisis and, as 
a result, their loan loss reserve ratio increased from 2.25% 
before the crisis to 14.96% after 
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the crisis. Thus, with the combination of liquidity shortage problems, exiting banks have 
been forced to close or merge with healthier banks, while the restructured banks, with lesser 
liquidity problems, have been selected for injections of fresh capital and for restructuring of 
bad debts. 
Finally, loan growth (LOANGR) seems to play no role in determining bank status. This 
result is different with the previous studies of Laeven (1999) and Bongini et al. (200 1), who 
find that problem banks tend to have higher loan growth rate than non-problem banks. This 
difference of result may be caused by the difference of data used. Our bank sample only 
covers listed banks while previous studies use non-listed banks. 
5.3. In sample predicting of bank status 
The objective of in sample predicting of bank status is to test the accuracy of the multinomial 
logit model in predicting bank status using the data employed. In addition, it shows how 
changes in different accounting measures of risk affect the bank probabilities of falling into 
different outcome categories. 
Given the estimated parameters of the model, equation (9) is used to compute the predicted 
probabilities of a bank that will fall in each outcome: healthy, restructured and exiting. For 
each bank, three probabilities according to the three outcomes are calculated and the highest 
probability is the predicted bank status. For example, if the calculated probabilities of bank A 
are 5,105 85 for healthy, restructured and exiting, respectively, this bank is predicted or 
classified as exiting banks. This predicted outcome of bank A then be compared with the 
actual status of this bank (according to our classifications) to determine whether the model 
has predicted the status of bank A correctly. 
Table 9 shows in sample predicting of bank status. Overall, the model performs 
best in 
predicting restructured banks (with over 70% corrected predicted), 
following by healthy 
banks (56.8 8%) and exiting banks (54.10%). With regard to predicting error, the percentages 
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of problem banks but predicted as healthy banks are low (8.9% for restructured banks and 
7% for exiting banks). Between the two types of problem banks, 39% of exiting banks were 
predicted as restructured while only 21% of restructured banks were classified as exiting 
banks. Finally, 30.83% of healthy banks were predicted as restructured and only 12.29% as 
exiting. It should be noted that misclassification of healthy banks is not as dangerous as 
misclassification of problem banks. Our model is proved to be useful because the 
misclassification of problem banks (including both restructured and exiting) are much lower 
than misclassification of healthy banks. 
Table 9: Predicted Status of Alternative Outcomes (%) 
Outcome Pr(Healthyl* Pr(Restructured) Pr(Exiting) 
Healthy 56.88** 30.83 12.29 
Restructured 8.93 70.07* 21.01 
Exit 7.00 38.90 54.10** 
Notes: * Predicted as outcome X. 
** Percent correctly predicted. 
Plotting the summed probabilities is a useful way to show predicted probabilities for all 
outcome categories. Figure I shows how changes in different accounting measures of risk 
affect the bank probabilities of falling into different outcome categories (healthy, restructured 
or exiting). The predicted probability of each outcome is the space between its upper and 
lower probability lines. The summed probabilities of the three outcomes always equals to 
100%, i. e., as the probability of being a healthy bank increases the probability of being an 
exit bank and restructured bank decreases. 
It is very clear that, although there are different patterns in each graph, increases in safety 
index (Z score), equity capital (ETA), liquidity (LIQTA) and loan loss reserve (LLRLOAN) 
tends to increase the probability of a bank falling into healthy group, and decrease the 
probability of being a restructured or exiting bank. The exiting outcome 
becomes very clear 
as safety index (Z score) and liquidity (LIQTA) decline to 0. Similarly, the restructured 
outcome becomes much larger when equity capital (ETA) and loan loss reserve 
(LLRLOAN) 
reduce to 0. 
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It is also clear that the increase in instability of customer and short-ten-n funding 
(LNSTDCSTF) would lead to the increase in probabilities of exiting and particularly 
restructured outcomes. Similar to previous results, changes in loan growth (LOANGR) have 
no impact on outcome categories. 
Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities of Outcome as Changes in Independent Variables 
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6. Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether accounting-based measures of bank risk 
can be used to signal problem banks. It aims to build up an early warning system for SE 
Asian banks in post crisis. In order to do so, the paper first investigates the relationship 
between accounting-based and market-based measure of risk. Then, the information from this 
exercise and from the N1NL model is used to build up early warning models for SE Asian 
countries in both pre- and post- crisis periods. 
Panel data methods are used to analyse the accounting-market-based relationship for a 
sample of 55 SE Asian commercial banks before and after the financial crisis of 1997. It is 
important for bank regulators to ascertain which accounting variables are significant 
indicators of market-based risks given the limited number of listed banks in the region and in 
EMEs in general. Our methodological approach involves estimating a more sophisticated 
measure of systematic risk using a VARMA-GARCH model, the specification of which 
allows good and bad news to affect the variance and covariance of stock price returns 
asymmetrically. Our analysis of descriptive data finds that the more sophisticated estimate of 
systematic risk increases over time, which is consistent with total risk but is inconsistent with 
the estimate of systematic risk derived from the static CAPM. Furthermore, we observe a 
number of inconsistencies between the two estimates in the relationships with accounting 
variables. In our opinion, the VARMA-GARCH estimate of systematic risk is the more 
accurate measure and we would encourage bank regulators to consider employing such 
models which offer greater flexibility than traditionally employed measures. 
We find some accounting variables have become a better proxy of market-based risks over 
time. For instance, ETA (the ratio of equity-to-assets) is significantly correlated with each 
market-based risk measure in 1998-2004 whereas it was insignificant for healthy banks over 
1991-1997. Similarly, the Z score measure of bank stability becomes a more significant 
covariate with total risk and specific risk for healthy and restructured banks. Systematic risk 
appears to be best proxied by ETA and the variation in customer deposits 
for healthy and 
restructured banks but these relationships are time-invariant. The exception 
is liquidity 
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(LIQTA) which becomes a significant covariate of systematic risk only for healthy banks in 
1998-2004. Generally speaking, the relationships are of the expected signs and accord with 
those found in the established literature. Yet, whilst the signs of most relationships remain 
unchanged over time we do find a change in relationship between loan loss reserve ratio 
(LLRLOAN) and capital market-based measures of risk. The sign of this relationship has 
shifted from negative in pre-crisis period (like found in Japan) to positive in post-crisis 
period (like found in the US), with the latter is consistent with the general wisdom of loan 
loss reserves. The change in relationship for loan loss reserves reflects an improvement of 
prudential regulation related to loan classification and provisioning in SE Asian countries in 
post-crisis 1997. 
We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the failure prediction model for SE Asian 
banks in the period leading to the financial crisis (1991-1997). This model handles three 
states of bank financial status, namely exiting, restructured, and healthy. Overall, the results 
support our previous findings on the relationship between accounting-based and capital 
market-based measures of risk for the period 1991-1997. With the exception of loan growth 
(LOANGR), all other accounting measures of risk significantly determine bank financial 
status. As expected, increases in the safety index (Z-score), equity capital (ETA), liquidity 
(LIQTA), loan loss reserves (LLRLOAN) and decrease in instability of funding 
(LNSTDCSTF) make it more likely for a bank to be healthy rather than restructured or 
exiting. Of the accounting-based risk indicators, the safety index (Z-score) and followed by 
equity capital (ETA) and loan loss reserves (LLRLOAN) are among the most important 
determinants classifying banks as healthy, restructured or exiting, whereas liquidity is the 
most important indicator separating exiting banks from restructured ones. 
For the post-crisis failure prediction model, a change need to be made compared with the pre- 
crisis model. Due to the change in relationship between loan loss reserve ratio and the 
market-based measures of risk we suggest that there is also a change 
in behaviour of this 
variable in the post-crisis model. Our recommendation is 
for bank regulators to monitor 
closely levels of bank capitalisation, safety indicator (Z-score), 
loan loss reserves, liquidity, 
and the variation in customer deposits when the number of 
listed banks is at a minimum. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Contributions to the Literature 
and Limitations of the Study 
1. Summary and Conclusions 
With the aim to improve financial system efficiency and to promote economic growth, the 
authorities in SE Asian countries implemented large scale financial liberalisation 
programmes during the late 1980s and early 1990s. These programmes were ended 
abruptly by the Asian financial crisis of 1997 which plunged SE Asian economies and 
their financial systems into severe depression. The resolution of the crisis involved the 
participation of international financial organisations. Nine years since the crisis, there 
have been signs of recovery in these banking sectors though the pace of recovery is 
uneven across countries. 
This thesis carries out an extensive analysis of Asian banking industry over 20 years of 
developments, from 1985 to 2004. Particularly, it investigates three important interrelated 
aspects of Asian banks: efficiency, risk and management behaviour; focusing on five 
crisis-affected countries in SE Asia: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines. In order to do this, the thesis is organized into three research papers. 
The first research paper empirically investigated the effects of financial deregulation, 
financial crisis and restructuring on efficiency of SE Asian banks from 1985 to 2004. The 
developments in the SE Asian banking industry, particularly bank restructuring, have led 
to substantial changes in bank governance. In addition, given that corporate governance is 
considered to be a serious problem contributing to weaknesses in domestic banking 
sectors in SE Asia, this paper also examines whether bank efficiency is related to 
ownership structure, and how changes in bank governance affect bank performance 
in 
terms of cost and profit efficiencies. The findings from this study are important 
because 
they provide information for policy makers on how their policies such as privatisation, 
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easing foreign bank entry, consolidations, affected the performance of national banking 
sectors. Employing both the alternative profit efficiency and cost efficiency concepts 
which are estimated using the Fourier flexible functional form and stochastic frontier 
model of Battese and Coelli (1995) we find several main results. 
First, regarding the effects of financial deregulation, financial crisis and restructuring on 
bank performance, our results suggest that financial deregulation appears to have a strong 
positive effect on the banking sector in Indonesia (in terms of both cost and profit 
efficiency), whereas it is also found to improve banking sectors efficiency in Korea, 
Malaysia and Thailand, but only on the profit efficiency side. On the other hand, no 
efficiency improvement is found for Philippine banks. The 1997 Asian financial crisis is 
found to increase the amount of potential efficiencies being lost to inefficiencies. Yet, the 
efficiency estimates show that banking systems in the Philippines, Korea and Malaysia 
were better in weathering the crisis than the Indonesian and particularly Thai banking 
systems. The results suggest that Indonesia and Korea have had the most successful 
restructuring programmes that helped Indonesia to become the second most efficient 
banking sector since 2001; and it helped Korean banks to maintain their best performer 
position. On the contrary, although the Philippine banks were less affected by the crisis in 
terms of liquidity and bank runs, their performance has been worsening due to the 
unfavourable economic condition in this country since the 1997 crisis (IMF, 2004). 
Regarding the relationship between bank governance and performance, our results tend to 
support diffused ownership (widely-held) rather than concentrated ownership types (state- 
owned, company-owned and family-owned). Indeed, our results support previous findings 
regarding the problems with family and company ownership. In all countries, the poorest 
efficiency performing groups were company-owned, family-owned, absorbed and closed 
banks (in descending order). Thus, the decision to close down a number of banks (mostly 
family-owned or company-owned) can be supported on economic grounds of low 
efficiency. With regards to the effect of bank governance changes, our results 
imply 
economic justification for polices such as bank privatisation, encouraging 
foreign bank 
entry, and restructuring (consolidating) national banking systems. 
The results suggest that 
relatively less profit efficient banks tended to be selected 
for privatisation and bank 
privatisation has raised bank performance to levels 
in excess of pre-privatisation 
performance. Similarly but except for the Philippines, 
banks taken over by foreign 
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institutions underperformed prior to the governance change. However, these banks have 
become one of the strongest profit efficiency performers in the long-term. Concerning 
banks selected for restructuring, the results suggest that the relatively efficient banks were 
more likely to be rescued and the results have been very encouraging. Furthermore, our 
evidence suggests that while only domestic M&A yielded significant short-term 
efficiency gains, the benefits of other policies such as easing restrictions on foreign banks, 
bank privatisation and restructuring may take a longer time to realise. 
The second research paper examines management behaviour at Asian banks between 
1985 and 2004. This paper contributes to the existing literature as a robustness test of the 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Williams (2004) results for US and European banks, 
respectively. We employ the Granger-causality approach to infer different types of 
management behaviour at commercial banks from seven Asian countries: China, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Thailand. The inference is 
based on specific interternporal relationships between loan loss provisions, efficiency, and 
capitalisation. 
For Asian banks, we find very strong statistical evidence to support the bad management 
hypothesis (that poorly managed banks tend to make more poor quality loans) and the bad 
luck hypothesis (that banks with high loan loss provision suffer a reduction in operating 
efficiency). There is also significant evidence of moral hazard behaviour (that poorly 
capitalised banks suffering reductions in capital will take greater risks and hence, on 
average, end up with higher loan loss provision). In addition, there is very weak evidence 
to suggest skimping behaviour at Asian banks. At the country level, we find significant 
evidence of bad management and bad luck affecting national banking sectors in Asia 
(except for Malaysia and the Philippines). The twin problems appear to be particularly 
severe in China and Indonesia. Our estimated results of economic effects of 
different 
types of management behaviour show that, on average, the economic effect of moral 
hazard outweighs the effects of bad management and bad 
luck. Our Asian results are 
largely consistent with the findings of Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) for US commercial 
banks which were found to be affected by bad management and 
bad luck and moral 
hazard. The difference is the lack of evidence to suggest skimping behaviour at Asian 
banks. This makes the Asian results different from those obtained 
for European banks 
with the exception that bad management is common to 
both sets of banks. 
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The third research paper examines whether accounting measures of bank risk can be 
used to signal bank failure and distress in SE Asia. Indeed, the 1997 financial crisis 
revealed the shortage of an effective early warning system which can monitor bank risk 
and provide early signal of problem banks. This paper aims to build up a set of bank risk 
accounting indicators which can be used to monitor the risk of distress or failure of banks 
in future. Because capital market-based measures of bank risk may be better than the 
accounting measures in signalling problem banks and the number of listed banks in SE 
Asia tends to be limited, this paper aims to ascertain which accounting variables are 
significant indicators of market-based risks. In doing so, it examines how the relationship 
between market-based and accounting-based measures of bank risk changes over time. 
This information is an important input for building up the post-crisis early warning 
system. 
We use panel data method to examine the accounting-market-based relationship for a 
sample of 55 SE Asian listed commercial banks in two periods before and after the 
financial crisis of 1997. We estimate a more sophisticated measure of systematic risk 
using a VARMA-GARCH model which allows good and bad news to affect the variance 
and covariance of stock price returns asymmetrically. Our results suggest the VARMA- 
GARCH estimate of systematic risk is the more accurate than the estimate of systematic 
risk derived from the static CAPM. Regarding the accounting-market-based relationship, 
we find some accounting variables have become a better proxy of market-based risks over 
time such as the ratio of equity-to-assets (ETA) and the measure of bank safety index (Z 
score). Systematic risk appears to be best proxied by ETA and the variation in customer 
deposits for healthy and restructured banks but these relationships are time-invariant. 
Generally speaking, the relationships are of the expected signs and accord with those 
found in the established literature. Whilst the signs of most relationships remain 
unchanged over time we do find a change in relationship between loan loss reserve ratio 
(LLRLOAN) and market-based measures of risk. The covariate of this relationship 
changed from negative in pre-crisis (like found in Japan) to positive 
in post-crisis (like 
found in the US), with the latter is more consistent with the general wisdom of loan 
loss 
reserves. This change suggests improvements in prudential regulation related 
to loan 
classification and provisioning in SE Asian countries in the post-crisis period. 
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A multinomial logit model is used to estimate the early warning model for SE Asian 
banks in the period leading to the financial crisis (1991-1997). This model accounts for 
three states of financial distress: exiting, restructured, and healthy. Overall, the results are 
in line with our previous findings on the accounting-market-based relationship for the 
period 1991-1997. All the accounting measures of bank risk, except loan growth 
(LOANGR), significantly determine bank financial status. As expected, an increase in the 
safety indicator (Z-score), equity capital (ETA), liquidity (LIQTA), loan loss reserves 
(LLRLOAN) and a decrease in instability of funding (LNSTDCSTF) make banks more 
likely to be healthy ones rather than restructured or exiting. Of the accounting-based 
measures of bank risk, the safety index (Z-score), following by equity capital (ETA) and 
loan loss reserves (LLRLOAN) are among the most important determinants classifying 
banks as healthy, restructured or exiting, while liquidity is the most important indicator 
separating exiting banks from restructured ones. 
From the results of the two exercises, we suggest an early warning system for post-crisis 
period should be the same as the pre-crisis model but with a change in sign of the loan 
loss reserve ratio. More specifically, because there is a change in sign of the covariate of 
the relationship between loan loss reserve ratio and the market-based measures of risk, we 
suggest there is also a change in sign of this measure in the post-crisis early warning 
model. Our recommendation is for bank regulators to monitor closely 
levels of bank 
capitalisation, safety indicator (Z-score), loan loss reserves, liquidity, and the variation 
in 
customer deposits when the number of listed banks is at a minimum. 
Contributions to the Literature 
This thesis makes several policy implications and contributions to 
the existing literature 
on efficiency, risk and management behaviour 
in banking. 
Previous studies of bank efficiency in SE Asia mostly covered 
the pre-1997 
financial crisis period. Our study enhances the 
literature by examining the 
development of SE Asian banks over a long time period, 
from 1985 to 2004, 
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covering periods of financial deregulation, financial crisis, and financial 
restructuring. 
The empirical evidence provided in this paper is among the earliest indications of 
the effects that policies such as bank privatisation, widening access to foreign 
institutions, and restructuring (consolidating) national banking systems have had 
on commercial bank performance in SE Asia. Our findings are important given the 
progress of restructuring and privatisation (mainly) remains incomplete. We 
recommend that the government authorities should continue to support these 
policies, although we note the benefits of policies such as easing restrictions on 
foreign banks, bank privatisation and restructuring may take a longer time to 
realise. In addition, we recommend ownership of domestic banks should be 
encouraged to be dispersed widely rather than concentrating in the hands of family 
or companies. 
There is a paucity of studies estimating profit efficiency dynamics in emerging 
markets. This study provides a comparison on the effects of financial deregulation, 
financial crisis and restructuring on both cost efficiency and profit efficiency. We 
find that cost efficiency and profit efficiency are not always consistent. In several 
cases, there is a trade-off between these two types of efficiency measures. In 
addition, we find that the profit efficiency of SE Asian banks tends to be more 
affected by changes in environment than the cost efficiency. We suggest 
future 
studies should use both cost and profit efficiency measures to evaluate the effects 
of dynamic environment changes on bank performance. 
The finding of bad management, bad luck and moral hazard behaviour at 
Asian 
commercial banks has policy implications for bank regulators and supervisors, and 
bank owners and managers. Our finding confirms the 
bad management and moral 
hazard problems which have been cited as the main reasons contributing 
to the 
Asian financial crisis 1997. Due to the severe moral hazard problem at 
Asian 
banks (the economic effect of moral hazard outweighs the effects of 
bad 
management and bad luck at Asian 
banks), we recommended that, to prevent 
future bank runs and crises, bank capital regulations should 
be tighter and banks 
need to be better capitalised. For 
bank owners and managers, bad management 
might be an outcome of the diverse range of ownership models 
in Asian banking. 
Notably, Asian bank managers have faced significant pressures and managerial 
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challenges during the 1990s such as financial liberalisation and issues pertaining 
to capital adequacy. 
We extend the literature on the relationship between market-based and 
accounting-based measures of banking risk to emerging markets. This is important 
given that the number of listed banks in emerging markets tends to be limited and 
the experience in the US can not be transferred automatically to other emerging 
countries where banks operate in very different environments. 
In addition to extending the literature to emerging economies context, our 
methodological approach constitutes several developments. 
Firstly, we improve the methodology by using panel data techniques which 
could limit the multi collinearity and estimation bias problems. 
Secondly, we extend the methodology by estimating a time-varying 
conditional beta using an asymmetric VARMA-GARCH model which 
allows the variance/covariance of stock returns to respond differently to 
the arrival in the market of good and bad news. Our results allude to the 
superiority of this measure. Thus, we would encourage bank regulators to 
consider employing such models which offer greater flexibility than 
traditional static CAPM model. 
v' Thirdly, we further include a safety indicator (Z-score) (Hannan and 
Hanweck, 1988) in our models to capture banks' financial health. 
Finally, unlike most other studies working with only two state of financial 
distress ("failed" or "non-failed"), we analyse simultaneously three states 
of financial distress which reflect the continuum of the bank financial 
health in reality. 
Our study is amongst the earliest studies to build up an early warning system 
for 
SE Asia in post-crisis. Our recommendation is for bank regulators to monitor 
closely the levels of bank capitalisation, safety 
indicator (Z-score), loan loss 
reserves, liquidity, and the variation in customer 
deposits when the number of 
listed banks is at a minimum. 
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I Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
This thesis is subjected to several limitations. This section discusses these limitations and 
provides suggestions for future research. 
This study employed the parametric stochastic frontier analysis with Fourier Flexible 
terms to explore the alternative profit efficiency and cost efficiency of Asian banks. 
However, the established literature reports quite different estimates of bank efficiency 
when different techniques are employed, especially between parametric and non- 
parametric approaches (Bauer et al., 1998). The results herein would be more robust if we 
employed both parametric approaches and non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) approach for the same bank database. Employing non-parametric approach could 
help overcome the typical drawbacks of the parametric models, such as the imposing of a 
particular functional form that presupposes the shape of the frontier. 
Our study uses non-standard (i. e. the alternative) *profit function to estimate altemative 
profit efficiency. However, a recent study of Khumbhakar (2006) suggests that, instead of 
estimating profit efficiency directly from the non-standard profit function, one can 
estimate profit efficiency using the cost function. Thus, it is interesting for future research 
to compare these two different approaches in estimating profit efficiency in dynamic 
environment. Furthermore, this thesis can be improved further by employing other 
measures of bank performance such as scale, scope efficiency, technical change and 
productivity (Baumol et al., 1988; Evanoff and Israilevich, 1995; Williams and Nguyen, 
2005; Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005). 
In modelling bank efficiency we use the traditional intermediation approach as the bank 
production process. This approach considers total loans and securities are outputs whereas 
deposits, capital and labour are inputs to the production process. Berger et al. (1997) 
assert that the intermediation approach, under most circumstances, is preferred 
for 
analyses in banking because it is more inclusive and it captures the essence of 
banks as 
financial intermediaries. Nevertheless, this approach is imperfect (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997) and other production process approaches such as the value-added approach could 
have been used for comparison purposes. 
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In this study we use the parametric multinomial logit model to estimate bank failure 
prediction model. This method has several advantages over the non-parametric approach 
such as it provides information on the relationship between bank failure probability and 
factors that may affect this probability. However, future studies can use an integrated 
approach (including both multinomial logit model and non-parametric model such as trait 
recognition and neural networks) to improve forecasting accuracy. 
Our final point related to the data used in this study. Although our data has a good 
coverage for Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, it has a poor coverage for Indonesia 
and Korea (less than 40 percent of total numbers of bank). The poor coverage may affect 
our results for these two countries. However, because larger banks are more likely to be 
included in the BankScope database, and these banks account for more than 90% of 
banking system assets in Asian countries (Nguyen and Williams, 2007), the effects of this 
low coverage in terms of numbers of bank should be limited. 
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Appendix I. Major financial liberalisation and reforms in SE Asia 
Major financial liberalisation and reforms: Indonesia 
1983 In June, major financial reform was announced: 
- Removal of the credit ceiling system. 
- Liberalisation of interest rates at the state-owned banks, both on deposit and lending, with the exception of the rate on programmed (priority) lending. Prior 
to June 1983, interest rates at the state-owned banks were set by the Central Bank, while interest rates at private banks were not regulated. Overhaul of the policy on priority credits and the accompanying liquidity (refinancing) credits from the Central Bank. This was particularly intended to 
reduce the dependence of banks on the Central Bank's funds. 
1984 Central Bank certificates issued through auctions to stimulate money markets 1985 Money market instruments were introduced 
1988 In October, the second major financial reform (liberalisation): 
- The reopening of the financial market for new banks to enter (the entrance into 
the market was closed in 1971). The new entrant can be a national bank or a 
joint venture between foreign and national banks. 
- Monopoly of state banks over deposits of state enterprises removed. 
- Activities of financial institutions broadened, all banks can issue Cds and are 
allowed to offer new services. 
- Reserve requirements are reduced from 15% to 2%. 
The simplification of procedures of application for branch expansion as well 
as for foreign exchange operation permits. 
The reduction and unification of required reserve ratio for all banks and 
NBFFs short-term liabilities from as high as 15% to 2%, and the improvement 
of money market trading. 
The equalisation of tax treatment between interest income on deposits and 
income on securities. This was meant to accelerate the development of the 
capital market. 
The realignment of Bank Indonesia's swap facility. This facility was 
introduced in the late 1960s to provide exchange risk coverage for money 
L 
borrowed by investors from overseas. The rate had been set by Bank 
Indonesia; since October 1988, it has been determined by market forces-that 
is, equal to the difference between the domestic interest rate and interest rate 
overseas (US$ London Inter-Bank Offered Rate). 
- Introduce some prudential frameworks: 
Legal Lending Limit [LLL] to a 
debtor is 20% of the capital of the lending bank or financial institution, and to 
a debtors' group 50% of capital. Furthermore5 there was a lending limit of 
1 o% of capital to the stakeholders of a bank or non-bank institution, 25% to 
and stakeholder's corporate group5 5% to auditors-not-stake-holders and to 
corporation owned by auditors. In addition, there were limitations on 
lending 
to board members, auditors and families of stakeholders. 
- Established over-the-counter market to encourage 
firms to go public. 
_ 
1989 Prudential measures as capital adequacy ratio are introduced. 
Removed the ceiling on banks' offshore borrowings, and at the same time 
installed a limit on foreign exchange net open positions equal to 
25% of each 
bank's net worth. 
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The monopoly of state-owned banks over the deposits of state-owned enterprises was removed. 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1994 
1996 
1997 
1998 
New reform package announced in 1990 which took on the directed credit program; Most of the liquidity credit arrangements for priority loans are eliminated. 
A requirement for each bank to supply at least 20% of its total credit to small businesses. Compared to the prior liquidity-credit program, the new measure is 
more market oriented. 
Organised a policy package for sound banking: 
0 Raised banks' minimum capital from 10 billions rupiah to 50 billions 
rupiah for commercial banks, and from 50 billion rupiah to 100 billion 
rupiah for foreign joint banks; 
0 To strengthen sound banking management, the government reinforced 
observation of the Legal Lending Limit and the provision concerning 
non-performing loans; 
0 Including the capital adequacy ratio based on the Basle Accord were 
introduced in February 199 1. 
Bank Indonesia limited banks' short term foreign exchange liabilities to 3 0% 
of capital and required that at least 80% of all foreign exchange loans be 
allocated to businesses earning foreign exchange. 
The introduction of the Insider Trading Laws. 
Implementation of Bank Act of 1992 allowed foreign investors to own 49% of 
private national banks. 
The central bank required all banks to issue quarterly financial statements, 
revamped the loan loss reserve fund system, introduced an early warning 
system, and established the first domestic credit rating organisation, while the 
Ministry of Finance raised the minimum capital required for the establishment 
of new banks. 
Deregulation of foreign investment: 
100% foreign capital participation was allowed without conditions; 
minimum investment limitations were abolished; 
the admission-to-extension business period was set at more than thirty years; 
The localisation regulation, which had been required for the purpose of 
increasing Indonesian local capital by more than half after a certain period, 
was suspended. 
Controls on branching by foreign banks were lifted. 
Foreign exchange banks were subject to central bank directives with respect to 
borrowing abroad. 
Financial crisis: 
In July, financial crisis start with the devaluation of the Thai Baht. Rupiah 
plunged nearly 7%, a record low against the dollar. 
The government officially enlisted the support of the IMF on October 31 in an 
effort to preempt a further deepening of the crisis. 
16 insolvent banks were closed. 
Improved bank supervisory legislation, including new loan classification and 
loan lo "S. 
The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) as a new oversight body. 
Introduction of blanket guarantee for bank deposits in January 1998, 
The country's two largest private banks merged; closed 
7 banks and seized 
control of seven more banks faced with loan default. 
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Indonesia pledged to open up the banking sector to foreign ownership. Controls on foreign investments in retail trade banks were lifted. Controls on foreign investments in wholesale trade banks were lifted. Controls on branching by foreign banks were lifted. Special exchange rate regime for capital transactions was introduced. The paid-in capital required to establish a new commercial bank, including a joint-venture bank, increased to Rp 3 trillion (US$280 million). Issued new regulations on loan classification and provisioning, related-party lending, capital adequacy, and foreign exchange rate risk. Developed a master plan to address the deficiencies identified in a Basel Core Principles for Bank Supervision (BCP) assessment. 
1999 In May 1999, the new Central Bank Act (Act No. 23 of 1999) was enacted, 
replacing the Central Bank Act of 1968. The new act explicitly states that the 
central bank is an independent national institution, which is free from 
intervention of the Government. This aims to improve the system of bank 
supervision by the central bank. 
Equity participation of foreign banks in a joint bank was raised from 85% to 
99%. 
March 13, the government announced that it would close 38 banks, take over 
seven and recapitalise another nine in a move to strengthen the country's debt- 
laden banking sector. 
Agreed with the IMF in 1999, to attempt to enhance the effectiveness of 
banking regulation and supervision to meet international standards, 
particularly the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision by 
adopting three strategies: (i) a clear responsibility for the supervision and 
regulatory functions within the Board of Governors; (ii) a uniform supervision 
standards for all public and private banks; and (iii) risk-based supervision. 
2000 - IMF and the Indonesia signed a new letter of intent with banking sector 
reform, corporate restructuring, governance, and law enforcement as key 
issues. 
- Since July 2000, Bank Indonesia has carried out an intensive supervision by 
placing an on-site supervision. Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) was 
also established to supervise financial institutions and financial markets. 
2001 - During 200 1, the main emphasis shifted to sales to the private sector of 
bank 
2002 assets controlled by the IBRA. Full-scale sales of the IBRA owned shares and 
assets started in 2002. (Majority divestment of BCA and Niaga Bank; Merger 
of 4 banks with Bank Bali (creating Permata)). -. 2003 - Required banks to fori-nally apply risk 
based management; In accordance with 
improving risk-based management, several regulations were issued as 
guidelines with reference to the 25 Basle Core Principles. 
- Modified capital provision 
by incorporating market risk component in Capital 
Adequacy Ratio calculation in the middle of 2003 with a transitional period 
until the end of 2004; 
- Issued prudential principle on equity participation 
in other financial 
companies; 
inancial System Stability Bureau (BSSK) and initiated steps - Established the F 
to fon-n a Financial Safety Net; establishment of a 
Depository Guarantee 
Agency (LPS). 
- In June: An initial public offering 
(IPO) of Bank Mandiri, Indonesia's largest 
bank, marks further progress in the country's attempt to return 
the banking 
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sector into private hands. 
- Majority divestment of Danamon and B11. 2004 
2005 
Establishment of the Financial System Stability Forum (FSSK) for 
coordination and information sharing among the relevant agencies. This aims 
to enable the early detection of symptoms of threats to stability and quick 
action to seek remedial measures. 
Set out the Indonesian Capital Market Master Plan which tightened 
supervision on the capital market, improved legal certainty, expanded role and 
improved quality of capital market players, more alternatives for capital 
market investment and financing, and development of a sharia-based capital 
market. 
Majority divestment of Lippo Bank. 
Dissolution of the IBRA in February 2004. Unsold assets with clear legal title transferred to new government-owned asset-management company; unsold assets in litigation handled by high-level team. 
Passed Law concerning Establishment of the Deposit Guarantee Institution in 
September 2004. Based on that law, the deposit guarantee institution will start 
operations in 2005; thereafter, funds guaranteed by the government would be 
gradually narrowed in scope. The objectives are expected to promote market discipline. 
Issued several regulations including: (a) a regulation concerning bank 
supervision and status after dissolution of IBRA; (b) a regulation concerning a 
change in the methodology for assessing the condition of banks; and (c) a 
regulation anticipating the development of internet banking. 
Establishment of the Deposit Insurance Agency (LPS) on September 22,2005 
Sources: Central bank reports (various issues); Sabirin (199 1); Hamada (2003); Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002); Laeven (2003). 
Appendix I (cont. ) Major financial liberalisation and reforms: Korea 
1980 Switch to a basket-peg exchange rate system from a dollar-peg. 
1981 Privatisation of nationwide commercial banks. 
Introduction of corporate paper (CP). 
Foreign exchange forward transaction implemented. 
1982 Abolition of beneficial interest rate on policy loans. 
1983 - Entry barriers are lowered and 
banks are allowed to introduce new services. 
1984 - Alleviation of government 
intervention in the internal operation of banks. 
- Minimum and maximum 
bank interest rate ranges introduced. 
- Interest rate restrictions on 
inter bank lending abolished. 
- Banks were allowed to 
issue CDs at rate higher than for time deposits. 
- Introduction of negotiable certificate of 
deposit (CD). 
- introduction of a band 
for bank loan rates. 
- Indirect opening of the stock market 
through the Korea Fund. 
- interest rate swap allowed. 
- Switc, m 
in foreign direct investment policies. 
_Issuance 
of CB, WB, DR allowed. 
268 
1987 Relaxation of entry barriers to financial industry including banks, life insurance 
, lease and investment trust , . 
- Introduction of cash management account by short-term finance companies. 
- Introduction of bond management fund by securities companies. Financial futures allowed. 
1988 - Opening of the life insurance industry to foreign firms. 
- Announcement of phased deposit and loan rate deregulation, Dec 1988. 
- Most bank and non-bank financial institution lending rates and long-term deposit rates liberalised. Bank of Korea still controls short-term deposit rates, total volume of credit, and minimum credit guidelines to small and medium firms and conglomerates. 
- Transition to a IMF article country. 
1989 - Entry barriers for banks are lowered again. The establishment of new financial institutions is 
__approved. 1991 - Announcement of a four-step interest rate liberalisation plan. 
- Opening of the securities industry to foreign firms. 
- Conversion of short-term finance companies to securities companies or banks. 
- General Banking Act of 1991 introduces new prudential measures and imposes 
supervisory regulations. 
1992 - Allowing foreign investors to purchase individual equity stocks at the Korea 
Stock Exchange. 
- Measures were introduced to increase transparency of regulations and 
procedures on bank supervision: adopted the Bank International Settlement 
(BIS) risk-adjusted capital requirement in July 1992. 
1993 Announcement of the Third-stage blueprint for the liberalisation and opening of the 
financial sector. Including three Phases: 
Phase 1: 
- Liberalise all bank and non-bank lending rates (except for policy loans) and 
long-term deposits over two-year maturity. 
- Issue Monetary Stabilisation Bond and government bonds at close-to-market 
interest rates. 
- Operate M2 targets flexibly. 
- Liberalise call markets. 
- Widen the daily won-dollar trading margin 
from 0.8 % to 1- 0% 
- Switch to the notification system for 
foreign direct investment into Korea. 
1994- Phase 2: 
1995 or short-term marketable instruments. - Liberalise all lending rates and rates 
f 
- Establish indirect monetary controls. 
- Deregulate loans to large conglomerates. 
- Develop short-tenn financial markets. 
- Further widen the daily won-dollar 
trading margin. 
- Further ease requirements 
for underlying documentation prior to foreign 
exchange transactions. 
- Expand limits on 
foreign investments in the stock market. 
- Allow the foreign participation 
in primary markets for some bonds. 
- Ease requirements 
for opening branches of foreign securities companies. 
plan for opening the financial sector announced with the start of 
the WTO. 
1996 Phase 3: 
o Liberalise all deposit rates except 
for demand deposit (allow MMC, 
MMF). 
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0 Utilise open market opemt-i-ons asma-i-n-mo-neta-rypo-licy -tool. - 
0 Operate the Loans Management System as a prudential regulation. 0 Introduce free floating exchange rate system. 
0 Eliminate requirements for underlying documentation for the usual foreign exchange transactions. 
0 Allow foreign borrowing through commercial loans. 
0 Allow foreign financial institutions to hold stocks of domestic banks. Plan for opening the financial sector announced with the Korea's participation in the OECD. 
Lowered reserve requirements. 
Most policy-based lending phased out. 
Removed the restriction on the premium a bank could charge over its prime lending rate, and revised its rules for credit control. 
1997 
1998 
Financial crisis led to forming a Comprehensive Program for Market 
Stabilisation and Structural Reform Financial Industry: 
Increase in funding for the new Korea Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO) 
Liquidation and integration of financial institutions. 
Depositor protection (adoption of blanket deposit guarantee). 
Approval of support by IMF (Dec. 4, a $55 billion bailout package): The main 
content of the financial restructuring component of the IMF program was: 1) 
suspension of the licenses of merchant banking corporations (if unable to 
formulate an appropriate rebuilding plan within one month offer operational 
suspension), 2) achievement of BIS capital adequacy ratios within the year, and 
3) elimination of public deposit guarantees by the end of 2000. 
Passed Laws in December 1997 to strengthen the independence of the Bank of 
Korea, consolidate all financial sector supervision (for banks, nonbank financial 
institutions, insurance and securities markets) in a single Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC), separate from the government, and merged all deposit 
insurance protection agencies into the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(KDIC), a new agency. 
In December 1997, full foreign ownership of merchant banks has been allowed. 
On December 22,1997, the statutory ceiling on interest rates was raised from 
25 percent per annurn to_jQý percent........... 
as substandard. 
Introduced regulations to require the provisioning for securities 
losses, and to 
deduct from Tier 2 capital all provisions for nonperforming 
loans (effective 
January 
Foreign exchange exposure limits for banks were introduced. 
Established the FSC (Financial Supervisory Commission). 
Announcement of first Financial Reorganisation Plan: Injection of 64 trillion 
won of public funds (primarily for the purchase of non-performing loans from 
commercial banks and their recapitalisation). (Full amount injected by the end 
of August 2000). 
Strengthened prudential standards and supervision procedures-with special 
emphasis on strengthening the regulations on foreign exchange activities -to 
bring them in line with the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
recommended by the Basle Committee. 
On June 30, the authorities introduced new loan classification standards and 
provisioning rules whereby loans more than 
3 months overdue will be classified 
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Strengthened liquidity management for commercial and merchant banks. Ceiling on foreign ownership in domestic banks is eliminated and foreign nationals were allowed to become directors of Korean banks. Full liberalisation of bond investments. 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Asset assessment criteria strengthened (introduction of "forward-looking 
criteria"). 
Announcement of second Financial Reorganisation Plan: 
Additional injections of public capital (50 trillion won [investment trust 
companies, merchant banking corporations, credit banks, Korea First Bank, 
etc. ]). 
Introduction of financial holding companies. 
Promotion of bank mergers. 
The full protection system has been abolished and a limited protection scheme 
adopted, with a coverage limit of 50 million won per person for each financial institution; Settlement deposit continues to be guaranteed until 2003. 
Eased restrictions on foreign currency loans and abolished the regulation on 
foreign currency deposits and loans for domestic financial institutions. 
Facilitation of Corporate Restructuring through The Corporate Restructuring 
Promotion Act, together with its associated Enforcement Decree, which 
empowers creditor financial institutions to initiate prompt restructuring 
measures against companies displaying symptoms of insolvency and establish a 
system for the adjustment of outstanding credits among financial institutions. 
Strengthened the protection of investors including minority shareholders. 
Privatisation of nationalised banks: Sale of Woori Financial Holding Company 
shares to begin; Seoul Bank sold to and merged with Hana. Bank (December). 
Improvement of ownership and governance structures: 
o Raised the single shareholder ceiling on the ownership of stocks of a 
bank from 4 percent to 10 percent; 
o Strengthened restrictions on transactions between such institutions and 
major shareholders. 
Expanded the scope for the operation of financial institutions by allowed 
financial institutions to sell insurance products. 
Privatisation, sold off entire stake in both Chohung Bank and Kookmin Bank. 
The "Bank of Korea Act" was revised and came into force (on Jan. 1,2004) to 
promote the central bank's neutrality and independence, and strengthen its 
functions. 
Eased the requirements for the establishment of a domestic branch presence by 
a foreign bank. Allowing foreign based financial firms to enter the 
domestic 
financial industry by setting up a local subsidiary in addition to the existing 
method of establishing a branch. This also opened the way 
for banks from 
developing countries to set up a branch in Korea. 
Privatisation, sold off entire 22.2 percent stake in Hana Bank. 
Expansion of liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions: abolished ceilings 
on overseas direct investment in financial and 
insurance businesses by non- 
financial institutions and raised the ceiling on individuals' overseas direct 
investment from the previous I million dollars to 3 million dollars. 
Strengthen its supervising and monitoring of foreign exchange transactions. 
Expanding the scope of financial institutions, allow them to 
handle trust 
business and allowing the delegation of 
business by financial institutions in 
pr 
271 
Enhancement of the transparency of financial institutions, introducing an audit committee system and making it obligatory for trust companies to establish guidelines on internal controls. 
Privatisation, sold off the Korea First Bank (the government and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation: 51.4%, Newbridge Capital: 48.6%) to the U-K based Standard Chartered Bank. 
Sources: Central bank reports (various issues); Cho (2002); Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002); Laeven (2003), Akama et al. (2003) and Bekaert and Harvey website for Major Political and Economic Events (http: //www. duke. edu/-charvey/Country_risk/couindex. htrn) 
Appendix I (cont. ) Major financial liberalisation and refonns: Malaysia 
1971 Interest Rates on long term (4 or more years) deposits are liberalised. 
1972 - Rates on deposits with maturity greater than I year are freed. 
1973 - Rates on deposits placed with finance companies are freed. 
1978 - All interest rates and capital accounts were liberalised. 
1982 - Foreign exchange controls loosened. Banks allowed to lend foreign currency to 
residents and borrow funds from abroad. 
1984 - New controls are set on the lending rates. Specifically, the Base Lending Rate 
(BLR) is introduced. Lending rates offered by every bank and finance company 
are then anchored to their declared BLR, determined on the basis of the cost of 
funds taking into account the cost of statutory reserves, liquid assets 
requirements and overheads. 
1985 Banking crises (1985-88). Causes: economic recession, bursting of bubble, 
weak demand, shortcomings in regulatory and accounting framework for 
Deposit Taking Cooperative sector as well as inadequate supervision for DTC 
sector. Overall change in macro policies: tight fiscal policy and accommodative 
monetary policy. 
Controls on interest rates were re-imposed (Oct). 
1987 Controls on deposits rates are eliminated (Jan). 
Interest rates on priority lending are pegged to the BLR (Apr). 
The Central Bank (CB) imposes new, and more restrictive, guidelines for the 
determination of the BLR. 
New measures to provide foreign investors with greater access to credit. 
1989 The Banking and Financial Institutions Act extends and strengthens CB's 
supervisory powers. 
1991 Controls on interest rates were completely eliminated, including BLR. 
The number of the required loan amount was reduced. 
1994 A two-tier banking framework was introduced for commercial banks. Banks in 
tier I are allowed more autonomy than banks in tier 2 in offering 
financial 
products. 
reduced - Reserv 
1995 _ - Ceilings on the net external 
liability positions of banks, imposed since Jan. 24, 
1994, were removed. 
- Central bank raised the requirement on statutory 
reserves--funds that banks keep 
interest free with the central bank - from 11.5% to 12% of 
liabilities. 
- Kuala 
d Financial Futures Exchanged opened on 12/ 
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1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
Financial crisis: Ringgit drops to 38-month lows against the dollar. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, renewed calls for tighter restrictions or a ban on foreign exchange rate. 
Government announcements that it will accelerate its deregulation of the bank courage mergers gave an added boost to the sector. The exchange rate of the ringgit to the U. S. dollar was fixed at 3.8 RM/IJS$ and selective capital controls were instituted (Sept). 
Established Danamodal Nasional Berhad, Danaharta (Asset Management Company or AMC) and Corporate Debt and Restructuring Committee to 
recapitalised and restructuring bad dept for the bankin sector. Bank Negara, Malaysia's central bank, called to merge the nation's 21 banks into six groups. 
Allowed domestic bank to offer a full range of banking products and services 
over the internet (from I June 2000). 
Uplifted the wage moratorium for banking institutions; allowed banks to 
determine the remuneration, allowances and bonuses of their employees 
(excluding CEOs and Directors) based on their respective productivity and 
efficiency levels. 
The maximum total credit facilities that could be obtained by non-resident 
controlled companies (NRCCs) from foreign-owned banking institutions in 
Malaysia was increased from 40% to 50% in December 2000. 
Licensed Offshore Banks in the Labuan International Offshore Financial Centre 
(Labuan Offshore Banks) would be allowed to invest in ringgit 
assets/instruments in Malaysia for their own accounts, though not on behalf of 
their clients. 
The merger programme was successfully implemented, with 50 out of 54 
domestic banking institutions consolidated into 10 banking groups and 94% of 
the total assets of the domestic banking sector rationalised and consolidated (As 
at 31 December 2000). 
Finished consolidation programme, banks were merged into 10 groups. 
Launched Financial Sector Masterplan (FSMP), which outlines the broad 
strategies for the development of the Malaysian financial sector over the next 10 
years (March 2001). The three objectives are: 
0 To enhance domestic capacity by building the capabilities of domestic; 
banking institutions and increased deregulation in certain areas to 
increase competition; 
0 To promote financial stability through strong, risk adjusted prudential 
regulations and supervision; 
0 To meet the socio-economic objectives of Malaysia which 
include 
increasing the level of consumer activism. 
issued guidelines on best practices for the management of credit risk; and 
guidelines on directorship in banking institutions to 
improve the quality of 
corporate governance in the banking. 
Liberalised the restriction on sale of housing loans (29 May 2001). 
Liberalised the restriction on the provision of bridging 
finance for residential 
property development exceeding RM250,000 per unit. 
Allowing banks (including the foreign-owned banks) to extend up to three 
credit facilities in ringgit to non-residents to 
finance the purchase or 
construction of any property in 
Malaysia. 
ittee (CDRC) (31 July) 
Closed the Corporate Debt and Restructuring Comm 
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2003 
2004 
Foreign-owned commercial bankýs al-low-ed'-t-o--of7f7e-r-tran-sacti-onal-intem-et- 
banking services (from I January 2002). 
Liberalisation of policy on internet payment gateway, allowing banks to establish their own internet payment gateways or subscribe to payment gateways of their choice. 
Liberalisation of repo transactions5 allowing banks to undertake repo and reverse repo transactions of less than one month maturity, with non-licensed institutions. 
Introduction of deposit insurance. 
Required banks to public financial statements in newspapers. Closed the Danamodal Nasional Berhad on 31 December 2003. 
Issued guidelines on the appointment of external auditor by licensed institutions. 
Issued the prudential standards on asset-backed securitisation. 
Removed the 50% limit on the maximum total credit facilities that could be 
obtained by NRCCs from foreign-owned banking institutions in Malaysia (I 
April 2003). 
Incorporation of market risk into the Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio (Sept 2004). 
Announced the implementation approach and timeline of the new Basel Capital 
Accord (Basel 11) in two phases; the first phrase in Jan 2008 and the second 
phrase in 2010. 
Further liberalisation of interest rate: removed the ceiling on Base Lending Rate 
(BLR) and the maximum lending spread of 2.5 percentage points above the 
BLR or cost of funds. 
Sources: Central bank reports (various issues); Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002); Laeven 
(2003). Bekaert and Harvey website for Major Political and Economic Events 
(http: //www. duke. edu/-charvey/Country_risk/couindex. htm) 
Appendix I (cont. ) Major financial liberalisation and reforms: the Philippines. 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1985- 
1987 
1989 
Deregulated all lending and deposit rates, except short-term lending rates: In 
July, ceilings on all deposit rates were lifted and in October, the ceilings on 
medium and long-term lending rates were also lifted. 
Banking crises (1981-1987): In 1981, banks accounting for 1.6% of the banking 
system failed. Causes: increase in oil prices and international interest rate, 
lendina to related parties and politically motivated loans, shortcomings in 
regulatory and accounting framework and deficient 
bank management. 
In December, the ceiling on short-term lending rates was eliminated. 
- Directed credit partly abolished. --------- -- Introduced measures to strengthen prudential regulations. These 
include, among 
others, the improvement in commercial 
banks' reporting requirements and 
specific guidelines for asset valuation and 
loan loss provisions aimed at 
tightening, standardising and applying criteria uniformly to all 
banks, and 
several measures to cube insider abuse. 
Measures to petition among banks. Abolition of opening new 
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branches in preferentially treated agricultural area. Unification of legal reserve ratios 
1990 - Abolition of moratorium of new entry by domestic banks. 
- Raising the minimum paid-in capital of savings banks. 
- Approved off-site ATMs. 
1991 - Raised minimum paid-in capital of expanded commercial banks and ordinary commercial banks. 
- Measure to promote bank mergers and consolidation. 
- Liberalisation of regulation on opening bank branches. Approval of opening branches across the country was given to agricultural bank. The Central Bank's 
approval was no longer required for installing ATM in areas where bank branch does not exist. 
- Fore lisation. 
1992 - Measure to promote the opening of branches. 
- Raised the ceiling on the ratio of foreign exchange holding to receipts from 
exports to 40%. Abolition of foreign exchange regulation as a principle. 1993 - Creation of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas 
- Further relaxation of branching policies; Lifting of prior CB Approval in the 
establishment of ATMs. 
- Gradual reduction of reserve requirements. 
- Capital ratio, liquidity and profitability and sound management became criteria 
for approving the opening of bank branches. The New Central Bank Act was 
enacted. Legal reserves were introduced to common trust funds. 
1994 - Liberalisation of market entry by foreign banks. Reduction of required 
equivalent capital for opening branches for savings banks (Foreign Bank 
Liberalisation Act of 1994). 
- Foreign banks were allowed to purchase up to 60% of the equity of local banks. 
- Revision of minimum paid-in capital for savings banks. 
- Rationalisation of the rediscount rate. 
1995 - Liberalisation of entry-exit rules for rural banks; Passage of Thrift Bank Act of 
1995. 
- Increase in the minimum paid-in capital for banks. 
- Easier rules on investment in banks. 
1996 - Guidelines on the issuance of expanded commercial 
banking authority to local 
branches of foreign banks operating in the country. 
Further increase in the capital requirement of banks. 
1999 Further encouraged mergers and consolidation. Increased disclosure 
requirements of banks. 
2000 Passage of the General Banking Law of 2000; Electronic Commerce Act. 
Greater transparency in granting DOSRI loans. 
Issued rules and regulations to combat money laundering. 
Issued guidelines on operations of foreign exchange subsidiaries of 
banks. 
2001 Issued regulations to implement the General Banking Law of 
2000. 
Amendments to the New Central Bank Act. 
2002 - Maintenance of strength and stability. 
Improvement of banking services and 
corporate governance. 
- Promote microfinance. 
2003 - Approved the increase 
in the liquidity reserve requirement against peso 
demand, savings, time deposits and deposit substitute 
liabilities of Universal 
Banks (UBs) and Commercial Banks (KBs). 
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2004 
Issued guidelines in the establishment of a foreign subsidiary by a bank subsidiary. 
To increase the liquidity reserve requirement against peso demand, savings, time deposits and deposit substitute liabilities for UBs and KBs and NBQBs. 
Source: Sources: Central bank reports (various issues); Manlagnit and Lambert (2004), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), Laeven (2003). 
Appendix I (continued) Major financial liberalisation and reforms: Thailand 
1980 Ceilings on lending interest rates charged by commercial banks and finance 
companies are freed from the 15 percent limit imposed previously. 1983 Banking crises (1983-1987): 15% of bank assets were non-performing. Causes: 
oil shock in 1979/80, deficient bank management, shortcomings in regulatory 
and accounting framework as well as inadequate supervision. 
1984 Due to the increasing volatility of the U. S. dollar, the official exchange rate is 
no longer determined by pegging the baht solely to the US dollar, but to a 
basket of major currencies. The baht is also effectively devalued by 15 percent 
against the US dollar. 
1985 Controls on the opening of letters of credit are lifted (May). 
The Bank of Thailand encourages commercial banks to introduce BIBOR - 
Bangkok Inter-bank Offered Rate - as a reference for the pricing of floating rate 
loans to customers. 
1986 - The interest rate ceiling on credit to priority sectors is lifted 
1989 - The interest rate ceiling on time deposits with a maturity of more than one year 
is lifted, marking the first step toward full interest rate liberalisation. 
1990 - Start the first Three-Year Financial System Development Plan (1990-92). 
- Acceptance of obligations under Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of 
Agreement and relaxation of foreign exchange controls by liberalising all 
cur-rent account transactions and reducing restrictions on capital movements 
(May). 
The interest rate ceiling on time deposits with a maturity of one year or less is 
abolis 
1991 - Second-stage liberalisation of foreign exchange controls, 
including more liberal 
outward transfer of funds for investment, provision for foreign investors to 
repatriate inves nds and proceeds from sales of stocks. 
1992 - Ceilings on savings deposit rates and all 
lending rates are abolished. 
- Ceiling on commercial 
bank loans are lifted. 
- Expansion of the scope of activities of commercial 
banks, finance companies 
and securities companies. 
- Reduction of reserve requirements. 
- Relaxation on opening new 
bank branches: percentage of outstanding deposits 
required to hold in government bonds in order to open new 
branches reduce 
from 16% to 6.5% (Nov). 
- Enactment of the 
Securities and Exchange Act (B.. E. 2535). 
- Exchange controls are 
further liberalised. 
- Revision of the rural credit policy. 
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1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Start the second Three-Year Financial System Development Plan (1993-1995). Adoption of the BIS capital adequacy standards (capital to risk asset ratio) for commercial banks. Min 7% for domestic banks and 6% for foreign banks. The Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) is established (March). Foreign bank are allowed to establish under BIBF license. The scope of business activities of commercial banks is ftulher expanded. Abolishing requirement on opening new bank branches: percentage of outstanding deposits required to hold in government bonds in order to open new branches reduce from 6.5% to 0% (May). 
Commercial banks are required to announce the Minimum Lending Rate (MLR), the Minimum Retail Rate (MRR) and the maximum margin to be added to the MRR as a reference rate for customers other than those eligible for the MLRýOct). 
Increase minimum reserve for doubtful debt of commercial banks from 50% to 
75%. 
Third round of the liberalisation of foreign exchange controls. 
A tighter BIS CAR is imposed on commercial banks at 7.5 percent, with tier- I 
capital being not less than 5 percent. 
Commercial banks are permitted to open ATMs without seeking approval. 
Commercial banks are allowed to invest in any business, or in its shares, of not 
more than 10 percent of the total amount of shares sold. 
The Cabinet approves the Financial System Development Plan (1995-2000). 
Adjustment of the new calculation of the MRR based on total deposit cost. 
A tighter BIS CAR of 8 percent is adopted for commercial banks, with tier- I 
capital being not less than 5 percent. 
Adoption of the Basle guidelines for commercial banks on risk management in 
derivatives trading. Commercial banks have to submit details of their risk 
management to BoT. 
Increase minimum reserve for doubtful debt of commercial banks from 50% to 
75%. 
Commercial banks are required to hold no less than 7% of non-resident baht 
accounts in the form of demand and time deposits at the Bank of Thailand. 
The Tier I capital/risk asset ratio for commercial banks is raised from 5.5 to 
6%, and the overall capital/risk asset ratio to 8.5%. The BIS CAR for foreign 
bank branches is raised from 6.75 to 7.5 percent. 
Adoption of a 100% ratio for provision against doubtful debt for finance 
companies, finance and securities companies, and credit 
foncier companies. 
Short-term offshore borrowing by financial institutions is subject to a 7% 
liquidity requirement. 
New entry of new domestic and foreign banks 
is permitted. 
Relax regulation on foreign shareholding limit (June). 
Crisis outbreak with the devaluation of the Thai 
Baht (July). 
The interest rate ceilings imposed on financial 
institutions are raised (July): 
Six emergency decrees are announced 
for the financial restructuring package, in 
order to facilitate normal resolution of 
distressed financial institutions (Oct): 
0 The Financial Sector Restructuring 
Authority (FRA) is established to 
review the financial rehabilitation plans of 
the closed finance 
companies; 
0 The Asset Management 
Corporation (AMC) is established to ensure the 
orderly sale of assets of companies 
taken over by FRA 
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Reserve requirement reduce from 7-0Yo-t-o6-%-. ---' 
Further strengthening of loan loss provisioning requirements (Nov). FRA's decision on the 58 suspended financial institutions is announced: two rehabilitation plans are approved; 56 companies are to be permanently closed (Dec). 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
Establishment of Radanasin, a new commercial bank ("good bank") to 
participate in the bidding of assets of the 56 closed finance companies. New provisioning and asset classification regulations are issued with an aim to further strengthen financial supervision and bring supervisory regulations in line with international standards by end-2000. 
Imposing interest rate ceiling of deposits: the maximum demand deposit rate of 
commercial banks was set at 2 percent above the reference savings deposit rate 
announced by BOT (July 1998). 
Interest rate ceiling for negotiable certificates of deposits (NCD): NCD rates 
must be the same as for time deposits, i. e., not exceeding the reference rate plus 
a margin of 3 percent. 
Abolished the two-tier foreign exchange market. 
Allowed foreign bank branches to maintain a broader range of assets to include 
investment in juristic persons. 
Reduced Bank Rate through the loan window three times from 12.5 percent to 4 
percent. 
Relaxation of liquidity reserve requirement. 
Relaxation of car hire purchase rules. 
Revised criteria for financial institutions' asset classification and reserve 
provisioning for debtors who have undergone debt restructuring. 
Granting permission to financial institutions to operate the securities borrowing 
and lending business as agent or broker. 
Announced for the first time to use the 14-day repurchase rate as the key policy 
rate on 23 May 2000. 
Abolishment of the credit targets for various economic sectors. 
Expanding financial institutions' scope of business: 
0 Permission for commercial banks to engage in securities borrowing and 
lending, as well as securities short-selling; 
0 Expanding commercial banks' custodian service; 
0 Expanding cornmercial banks' stock underwriting business; 
0 Allowed the use of the Internet network to provide banking services. 
Relaxed the re g and closing of commercial banks branches. 
Abolition of the bank rate in order to increase the effectiveness of its policy 
interest rate (the 14-day repurchase rate). 
Abolition of the previous requirement on the calculation of the Minimum 
Retail 
Rate (MRR) that commercial banks quote to ordinary customers using the 
posted MLR plus a spread not exceeding 
4 percent per annum. 
Relaxation of the lending limit to hire-purchase companies 
for passenger cars 
than 7 ioassen-ers) 
s areas of financial institutions, permission 
for commercial 2002 Extension of busines 
banksto: 
- Undertake the credit 
linked notes business (effective from 12 June 2002); 
- Appoint other commercial 
banks or non-bank companies as agents to receive 
deposits, credit payments, and credit card payments 
(21 August 2002); 
- Operate the investment advisory 
business Q September 2002); 
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Operate businesses related to the securities business (11 September 2002); 
Undertake back office services (16 October 2002); 
Operate the business of contacting or giving advice to customers on securities 
company services (29 November 2002). 
2003 Expansion of the business scope of financial institutions, permission for 
commercial banks to: conduct deposit or borrowing transactions with returns 
payment indexed to variables; engage in credit default swap transactions; 
engage in financial services consistent with Shariah Banking Services; engage 
in business related to the management of escrow accounts; 
Extended the business scope for foreign exchange agencies to include activities 
such as providing settlement services for commercial banks or any individual 
via cash or cheque. 
Relaxed some exchange control regulations, allowing six types of financial 
institutions to invest in securities abroad. 
Modification of the NPL definition. 
2004 - Allowed any foreign bank with an IBF or branch in Thailand that met the 
required criteria to submit application for the establishment of a commercial 
bank as a subsidiary of a foreign bank. 
- Foreign banks operating IBFs in Thailand with the required qualifications as 
specified in the Notification of the Ministry of Finance were allowed to submit 
to the BOT an application for the establishment of a foreign bank branch. 
- Non-bank financial companies are allowed to submit application to establish a 
bank. 
Sources: Central bank reports (various issues), Kawai and Takayasu (1999); Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002); Laeven (2003). 
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